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The central theme of this paper concerns the way Eastern and Western (sometimes termed Oriental and Occidental) thought view the formation of the world; the means of arriving at these conclusions and the concepts or pre-conceived ideas upon which they are based. Western thought has been limited to views that have developed out of modern science, post-1500; they are mechanistic science, evolution, Whitehead's philosophy pertaining to God and modern physics. For the purpose of this paper, the emphasis in Eastern thought is placed on Mahayana Buddhism, especially the Madhyamika school of philosophy. In India it developed in contact with many other philosophical schools, and it if it is to be understood, some of these systems of though must also be studied. Therefore, the Vedanta school of Indian philosophy, Early Buddhism, and one of the creation stories of the Upanishads are used when they help to explain the Buddhist view. Mahayana Buddhism also spread to China and Japan where in developed in contact with Confucianism and Taoism, and so these are considered when they help to explain Chinese Buddhism. While this paper is focused on the views pertaining to the formation of the world, an important aspect of the study is to show what Eastern though understands by the terms "higher" and "lower" knowledge. As a further clarification, a chapter has been devoted to illustration how the respective interpretations of the world, in Eastern and Western cultures, are carried out in the everyday lives of the people. And finally, an effort is made to employ Eastern concepts in establishing a new basis for the organization and clarification of the concepts of present day science.

A philosophical analysis of the thesis of the metaphysic of the non-dual that "the world we are confronted with is nothing but words, words, words" is a difficult one upon which to embark. The difficulty does not lie in assuming this argument, but in examining it from the opponent's position. It is equivalent to an evaluation of the New York Giants in Brooklyn. If we assume the thesis of the metaphysic of the non-dual, finding the proper arguments and quotations to substantiate its claims, all that we would be doing is claiming a victory for "our side” when, indeed, no battle had been fought. The issue is not that what has been said can be said, but that there is a validity in the arguments and a truth in the assertions. As pleasant as it might be to find quotations to support this thesis, it would have little value if our sources were all one-sided. To return to an earlier analogy, if the issue were whether the Giants have the better team, we certainly should not confine our inquiries to only Giant fans. The issue is quite simple and clear. One must find in even the Brooklyn fans a tacit agreement that the Giants are a superior team. Or, putting our playful analogy aside, one must find in even the strongest antagonist's thesis a large place for the final pronouncement upon the nature of the phenomenal world of the metaphysic of the non-dual. The advantages are of course obvious even though it might be a more difficult task. But this is always the role of the mythical hero. If we momentarily forget that the weapons are only paper and typewriter and the armor, rhetoric, we can then, perhaps, see the correspondence. The present fashion in philosophy or at least the most vocal and vociferous, is the forthright denial of metaphysics as a valid intellectual pursuit - even in principle. It is with this school that we encounter our first difficulties. Thus, if we can discern in their writings - the critics of the metaphysic of the non-dual and mysticism - a metaphysical bias as well as either an implicit or explicit use of what, for the moment, we may call typifying reality as a word structure, then we can claim not only a victory, but an ally even if they may prefer a disguise. Again, if we are fortunate enough to see this pattern with the concomitant parts we have mentioned, then it would be interesting, if one is not interpolating too far, to utilize this as a tool for analytical purposes in other kindred fields to see if a general thesis could be maintained to substantiate the non-dualist's claim where the critics might not have lingered. Thus, if the same form can be discovered, an underlying thought process may be discerned that well may prove interesting as well as provide a way of handling thought while escaping the dangers of dogmaticism. If so, this may be the analogue to the non-dualist's thesis presented in a rational context. A word of caution, however. One must recall the Platonic dictum to joke seriously and sport in ernest.

Philosophy is the quest for wisdom and hence it may share a common end with religion. Not all philosophies are, however, concerned with this end, nor, again are all religions involved with a quest for wisdom. There may be different techniques and tools employed in the accomplishment of wisdom, but this dissertation is concerned only with the study of the nature and use of reason. In the philosophy of Plato reason is employed in diverse fields including mathematics, myths, and elaborate analogies, but when he turns to reason itself, then it becomes important to this analysis. Reason may be utilized in other systems of thought, say in Aristotelian, but when it is functioning as the sole or paramount vehicle to the Good--then it is the subject for this paper and its contents will be examined. In the works of Plato, the use of reason in this sense is termed dialectic. The terms "philosophy" and "dialectic" are, of course, derived from the Greek. It is equally clear that a radical change has occurred in the meanings of these terms from the original formulation in the Hellenic Age to the present day. The primary and original meanings of these terms have been nearly eclipsed by modern usages and there is a confusion as to the basic meanings and content of these terms. This problem is further complicated by the tacit agreement that whatever is modern, or of late origin, must be better than what preceded it. Hence there is today a general reluctance to examine basic origins and classic sources. Contrary to this belief is the concept that every real advance is a result of returning to the basic origins and sources and redefining problems from this perspective. This work will base itself on the latter concept. The final object will be to re-examine the grounds and the extent to which philosophy can be termed dialectical. It is a request to reconsider philosophy in the terms of dialectic. A return to origins, in this case, is a return to the Greeks and the terms philosophy and dialectic will be defined with reference to the classic philosopher and dialectician - Plato. The Platonic concept of dialectic is to be utilized as a standard and basis of judging other systems that have been termed dialectical. Further, the work intends to reply to the criticism that philosophy, including philosophy as dialectic, has been superseded by religion since religion rather than philosophy can better insure the object of philosophy-- wisdom. Such a rejection of philosophy and dialectic must of course presuppose a familiarity with the process of the Platonic dialectic as well as its scope. Thus, a rejection, to be considered, must demonstrate a knowledge of Plato and an understanding of the dialectic. A decline of philosophy and dialectic based upon a valid criticism would be justified. On the other hand, it is important to discern the mechanism implicit in a denial of philosophy, as well as dialectic, in order to discern the consequences that follow from such a denial. Different systems of thought have been termed dialectic and those chosen for analysis will be examined to determine whether they advance the concept of dialectic as defined in the thesis, and if they do not, to see if it is possible to assign a cause. The deficiencies and inadequacies of the Platonic concept of philosophy as dialectic will also be shown and an attempt to correct this will be made by recourse to other traditions of thought. In the succeeding chapters, the analysis will include Augustine, Vico, Kant, Hegel, and Jung, as well as Gaudapada, Sankara, Nagarjuna, Confucius, and Lao Tzu. These authors have been chosen because of their use of dialectic and/or because they can contribute to the concept of dialectic as a philosophy as noted in this thesis. There is no intention to review or appraise any part of their work, except as regards their use of dialectic in selected instances. The philosophers are chosen to support and to illustrate the thesis of this dissertation. Therefore the task will be to define dialectic within the philosophy of Plato, to account for its decline or rejection, analyze some private definitions of dialectic, and to correct any shortcomings or inadequacies of dialectic.