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Commentary is presented for the article "Three Modes of Conflict," by Anatol Rapoport, published in the April 1, 1961 issue of the periodical "Management Science." The author notes that he is in agreement with many of Rapoport's principles concerning conflict resolution, but is unconvinced of the applicability of these principles. According to the author, at the time of publication Rapoport's assumptions surrounding conflict resolution are invalid when an attempt is made to apply them to the conflict between the United States and Soviet Union.

The article comments on several research articles contributed to the "Decision Sciences" periodical in 1974 by behavioral scientists who are producing scholarship contributory to effective decision making and implementation. The research articles offer a range of theory, new empirical data and critical review from multiple behavioral disciplines. The article discusses each research paper and examines its key contributions to studies on decision making and decision theory.

The article analyzes economist James Ohlson's paper "Analysis of the Usefulness of Accounting Data for the Portfolio Decision: A Decision-Theory Approach," in order to determine if he's making a model comparison or a model choice. Ohlson's thesis is that he used methods of comparing models, but the author demonstrates the inaccuracies in that thesis. The author tests Ohlson's findings and also considers the portfolio-choice problem and whether the findings are conditional upon the comparison of the forecasting models used.

This paper reports some research, ideas, and theory about managerial decision making. The first research projects dealt with are aggregate production and employment scheduling. From this is developed the idea that management's own (past) decisions can be incorporated into a system of improving their present decisions. Decision rules are developed, with the coefficients in the rules derived from management's past decisions (rather than from a cost or value model). Half a dozen test cases are used to illustrate and test these ideas (theory). Some rationale about decision making in organizations and criteria surfaces is supplied to help interpret the major ideas presented. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Commentary is presented for an article published in the July 1960 issue of "Management Science," written by L. V. Kantorovich with an introductory note by T. C. Koopmans. According to the author, in his introduction Koopmans addresses in particular a linear programming problem and a matrix game presented by Kantorovich. Also presented is an interpretation of the article's treatment of decision variables and mathematical optimization. The author notes that the article presents algorithms that have been improved from their contemporary presentations.

This article presents a list of booms related to operation research. Some of the books enlisted are--"Management Standards for Data Process," by Dick H. Brandon; Quantitative Decision Procedures in Management and Economics: Deterministic Theory and Applications," by Charles R. Carr and Charles W. Howe; "Natural Language and the Computer," by Paul E. Garvin; "Schedule, Cost, and Profit Control with PERT: A Comprehensive Guide for Program Management," by Robert W. Miller; "Human Resources in the Urban Economy," by Mark Perlman; "Planning in Pakistan: Organization and Implementation," by Albert Waterston.

This paper examines two different ways of measuring the distribution of power in sixteen health and welfare organizations. Participation in decision making about the allocation of organizational resources and the determination of organizational policy was strongly related to the degree of complexity as measured by (1) the number of occupational specialities, (2) the amount of professional training, and (3) the amount of professional activity and was weakly related to the degree of formalization as measured by the degree of job codification and the amount of rule observation. Except for rule observation, hierarchy of authority or the reliance on the chain of command for work decisions was not as strongly related to each of these measures of organizational structure. A partial correlational analysis between each measure of the distribution of power and the five structural properties indicates that participation in decision making retains an association with the first two indicators of complexity and the first indicator of formalization even when the other five variables are controlled simultaneously. The hierarchy of authority retains an association with the amount of professional activity and the amount of rule observation. At the same time, it is important to recognize that these two measures of the distribution of power are themselves strongly interrelated. When decisions about the allocation of organizational resources are centralized, then there is a centralization of work decisions as well. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The topic of behavioral objectives has recently received considerable attention in the academic community. This paper contains a comprehensive overview of issues and explores the relevance of using the behavioral objective framework for teaching quantitative methods (QM) to undergraduate business administration students. Included in the paper are (1) a discussion of the nature and meaning of behavioral objectives, (2) arguments for and against their use, (3) a rationale for their use in a QM course, and (4) a series of examples demonstrating the use of behavioral objectives in a quantitative course. The evidence—consisting of expert opinion from professionals who have successfully used behavioral objectives for teaching quantitative material, the logic of the arguments for behavioral objectives, consideration of arguments against objectives along with rebuttal to these arguments, and the available empirical studies—indicates that behavioral objectives do appear to offer considerable potential for improving QM teaching. The use of behavioral objectives is worthy of thoughtful consideration by QM teachers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is the first in a series of articles introducing a new conceptual and methodological framework for the use of experts in decision situations. Presented is the first theory of expert resolution wholly consistent with the Bayesian or subjectivist view of probability. The approach taken rests philosophically on the foundations of decision analysis. The results form practical tools for solving expert resolution problems. The present paper develops a structure in which the expert resolution problem may be logically formulated and conceptually solved. A framework is developed which enables a decision maker to encode his state of reformation concerning an expert. Application of the tools of Bayesian inference provides a mechanism by which a decision maker can incorporate an expert's opinion into his own. The more complicated case in which a decision maker is confronted with the diverse judgments of more than one expert is also addressed in detail. Additionally, the problem of determining the economic worth of one or a panel of experts is presented. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents several letters to the editor referencing various articles and topics discussed in previous issues of the journal "Management Science," including comments on Ralph D. Snyder's paper "A Note on the Location of Depots," comments on the storage reduction scheme proposed in an article by Eugene L. Lawler, and a discussion of the article "Redundant Constraints and Extraneous Variables in Integer Programs," by David Rubin.

Gaming and simulation mean different things to different people. Currently there exist separate schools of individuals working on interrelated but basically different areas. Each has its own special goals and terminology. Yet there is a sufficient overlap among them that it is important to clarify the common and different interests and terminology. The general topic of gaming is ripe for an examination to see to what extent there exists a basic methodology and theory of gaming. This paper addresses itself, in part, to this problem. Different types of games and different purposes are discussed. It is stressed that there is not one validation problem but many validation and specification problems which must be addressed if professional standards are to be attained. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In an earlier paper ("Some Models of Inventory and an Application", Management Science, Vol. 2, No. 4, July, 1956) the author analyzed four inventory systems which were referred to as Models I, II, III, IV. In the present paper the notion of equivalence of inventory systems is introduced and it is shown that Models I and II are equivalent and so are models III and IV. The results are also extended to systems with non-zero leadtime. In all cases considered it is shown that the total expected costs of the systems (with or without leadtime) can be expressed in the form c1 ∫0S (S - r)f(r) dr + c2 ∫ S ∞ (r - S)f(r) dr. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article provides information about the "American National Meeting," which has been reported by the Institute of Management Sciences. The meeting was held from June 4-6, 1959 in Chicago, Illinois. Details regarding the convention committee, program committee, arrangement committee, key note speakers, opening general session speakers and topics are included in the article. Social groups are viewed as associations of individuals interacting with respect to a common goal. The group structure is described by a goal vector with components representing individual involvements with the common goal. The College of Business Computer and Data Systems of the Institute of Management Sciences will undoubtedly concern itself with the use of data processing systems and devices as tools of scientific management. The paper by B. Bryton on "Home Laundry Division," introduces a most suitable problem. The introduction formalizes a problem which is being accepted as an art. John Allderidge in his paper gives rather concrete examples and demonstrates an intuitive approach to matching the detail of description with the detail of specific need.

A new conceptual and analytical vehicle for problems of temporal planning under uncertainty, involving determination of optimal (sequential) stochastic decision rules is defined and illustrated by means of a typical industrial example. The paper presents a method of attack which splits the problem into two non-linear (or linear) programming parts, (i) determining optimal probability distributions, (ii) approximating the optimal distributions as closely as possible by decision rules of prescribed form. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Information on several papers discussed at the Fifth Annual International Meeting of the Institute of Management Sciences held on October 16-18, 1958 in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania is presented. The papers presented included on by Jacob Marschak on stochastic decision theory and another by Frank Harary about graph theory.

The article presents information on several papers related to management science that were presented in the first national meeting of the Institute of Management Sciences (MIT) that was held on October 21 and 22, 1954. The paper "Semantic Noise in an Information Processing Group," describes a series of experiments carried out at MIT to extend the basic concepts of Information Theory, and to gain further understanding of group communication processes. In these, a group performed a simple task which required the description in writing of objects which were difficult to describe precisely. The confusion and errors resulting were analyzed in terms of information theory, extended to the semantic level, and this extension shown proved to be applicable. Differences in performance between groups with different communication networks were investigated, and some of the relevant factors evaluated. Another paper "Elements for a Theory of Teams," focuses on decision making in a team.

This article reports that "Policy Analysis, Systems Approaches, and Decision Making," a new quarterly journal, will appear in 1970 under the editorship of E.S. Quade. According to its prospectus, it will provide a forum for the developing interest in the application of structured rationality, systematic analysis, and interdisciplinary knowledge to problems of public policy. It will include applied studies analyzing specific problem areas, theoretic studies on the methods, content, and problems of the policy sciences, and papers dealing with the policy sciences as a subject for research and teaching and as a new profession. It will pay close attention to the application of policy science to real decisions, aiming to improve the outcome as well as the state-of-the-art and to attract the participation and respect of practitioners. Case histories and experiences will be among the subjects of the journal's scrutiny. Another important service the proposed journal will provide through its book review department is an annotated bibliography and comprehensive review of new literature in the policy sciences.

The article focuses on corporate dividend policy formation and the invalidity of the target payout ratio hypothesis of decision making. The unrelatedness of aggregate values to individual firm behaviors is emphasized and it is therefore suggested that such bases for analysis are erroneous. It is suggested that a new theory of individual firm behavior must be created.

The article presents a list recent works in non market decision making. The bibliography covers works in non-market decision making and related fields. Coverage of the period 1963 to mid-1966 is complete, or at least as complete as possible in such a rapidly growing field. Some of the books included in the list are: "Welfare Economics and the Theory of the State," by W. J. Baumol; "The Public Economy of Urban Communities" edited by J. Margolis. Some of the journals included here are: "American Political Science Review"; "American Economic Review."

This paper discusses two different forms of identifying restrictions and compares them in a Monte Carlo framework. A similar analysis is performed to illuminate how the identification procedures affect problems of mis-specification. It is found that, using ordinary least squares as the estimating technique, the two types of identification perform much differently and thus they should not be confused. Similar results hold in the mis-specification case. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper combines learning curves with a PERT network to produce a dynamic PERT model. The dynamic model takes cognizance of the fact that many projects are of a repetitive nature and that the network may vary between runs of the project through the addition or deletion of activities attendant to producing variations of a basic model. Thus, on any given run, the activities comprising a network will exhibit varying degrees of repetitiveness. The proposed model treats the estimated completion times of activities comprising the network as a function of (1) the number of times the various activities have been repeated on prior runs of the project, and (2) the learning rate attendant to each activity. Thus, the estimated completion time for a run through the project changes as additional units are produced. A sixteen event PERT network is simulated (using the proposed dynamic model) through twenty runs of a project. The simulation is conducted under three situations; namely, with learning taking place on (1) only noncritical activities, (2) only critical activities, and (3) all activities. In all three cases the results are compared to the static PERT model. The implications of the proposed model for improved decision making are presented in the concluding remarks of the paper. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The incentive-type fee function (which has supplanted the Cost-PlusFixed-Fee arrangements of a decade ago) provides an excellent medium for achieving "fee flexibility" or, more exactly, for increasing the fee outcome on government contracts. The originators of incentive contracting stumbled unwittingly on a method for negotiating acceptable fee arrangements under conditions of uncertainty, and the primary purpose of this paper is to establish apodictically that incentive contracts (whether single or multiple) can and do provide the contractor with a method for securing a fee arrangement preferable to that obtainable through a CPFF or a FP (Fixed-Price) contract. Furthermore, this characteristic of incentive contracts can be demonstrated through the use of elementary decision theory. The incentive fee structure provides the contractor with a long-needed procedure for optimizing the expected utility of the fee outcome, and an appreciation of this property should be of value to both contractors and procurement officials with the authority for designing new contract fee arrangements. The paper does not investigate procedures for the optimal negotiation of contracts; rather, it identifies a feature of the incentive contract which appears to be the primary basis for its use and popularity. Our thesis is applicable to both single and multiple incentive contracts. For reasons of simplicity, however, the analysis has been largely confined to the former type of fee arrangement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The main object of the paper is to demonstrate a method by which a number of problems arising in the study of impatient customers in queues can be solved. The main difficulty in analyzing such queuing systems is the presence of variable coefficients in the difference-differential equations describing the processes; the usual generating function method fails in such cases. When there is a finite number of states, it has been shown that at least formal solutions can be obtained through matrix algebra, which yields what are called 'discrete transforms.' The results are explicitly given when the balking and reneging coefficients are linear in n. An alternative method in which the spectral resolution of matrices is used is also given for solution of the set of equations. In the special case of a M/G/1 queue with finite waiting room, both the methods fail (as the underlying matrix is in the Jordan form), and the solution is obtained by a simple manipulation of the underlying matrix. The methods presented here lend themselves readily to computer solutions. This paper demonstrates the generality of the basic M/G/1 model by relating it to problems arising in other branches of operations research, such as reliability theory, inventory control, etc. Finally, the methods used for the M/G/1 case are shown to hold for a similar class of problems in the GI/M/1 case. As very little work has been reported on impatient customer phenomena in GI/M/1, systems, possibly because of the difficulty in solving equations with variable coefficients, this method may prove to be useful. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The bond portfolio problem is viewed as a multistage decision problem in which buy, sell, and hold decisions are made at successive (discrete) points in time. Normative models of this decision problem tend to become very large, particularly when its dynamic structure and the uncertainty of future interest rates and cash flows are incorporated in the model. In this paper we present a multiple period bond portfolio model and suggest a new approach for efficiently solving problems which are large enough to make use of as much information as portfolio managers can reasonably provide. The procedure utilizes the decomposition algorithm of mathematical programming and an efficient technique developed for solving subproblems of the overall portfolio model. The key to the procedure is the definition of subproblems which are easily solved via a simple recursive relationship. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A cursory survey of the theory of games is presented. The basic models for games in extensive form, normal form, and characteristic function form are discussed, and some generalizations and extensions of these models are mentioned briefly. Some general remarks about the applicability of the theory are made in §2, and a few specific applications are referred to in sections subsequent to the description of the particular models. Mention is made throughout this paper to the other game theoretic articles in this issue in an attempt to place them somewhat within this outline of the subject. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is concerned with characterizing decision rules for the sequential E-model of chance-constrained programming. A key feature of our characterization will be a detailed discussion of various interpretations of the probability operator in the chance constraints. Specifically we define two new classes of decision rules by exhibiting those sets of constraints which locally support the corresponding probability requirements. The question of how the probabilistic constraints for future periods are affected by previous decisions and realizations of the random variables is considered in detail. Since we are primarily concerned with the feasibility of decision rules, we deal mainly with the constraints of the model. The procedure for selecting the optimum rule from among a particular class of feasible rules depends on the objective function and is briefly discussed in the final section along with some implications concerning the form of the optimum rule. The application of our proposed rules to a two-period example previously appearing in the literature concludes the paper. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates the potential reduction in decision-making effort in capital budgeting problems obtainable through the use of measures of risk in addition to variance. Specific measures of risk treated are Baumol's lower confidence limit and the maximum probability of loss. The primary purpose of the paper is to present a methodology which imposes certain "constraining relations" on acceptable investment programs rather than one which appeals to a specific utility function as the basis for ordering choices. In this connection a discussion of several different utility functions is presented, along with an analysis of their usefulness when the probability distributions of net present values for various investment portfolios cannot be taken as known. In addition, some of the logical problems involved in constructing a utility function are examined. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The general problem of control of a set of individuals to achieve the objective of a controller is common to many areas such as business and government. This paper attempts a mathematical formulation and analysis of such problems. It is assumed that each individual is a rational being acting in his own self-interest. The interests of different individuals are, in general, conflicting, thus leading to a competitive situation which can be analyzed using Game Theory notions. An important aim of mathematical analysis of such a situation will be to study the effectiveness of various kinds of power that a controller might have over the individuals. Most of the results in this paper are concerning a class of 'coordination problems' where the controller's objective is to maximize the total utility to the whole group of individuals and where competition arises due to constraints on strategies. The analysis indicates that in such cases the simple power to accept or reject strategies which violate the constraints may be sufficient to realize the controller's goals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper develops a linear periodic review inventory model in which the reorder rule is an extension of the "order up to S" or (S, T) policy where S varies as a general linear function of demand and net inventory. Stationary and non-stationary demand processes are considered. Lead time is assumed to be an integral multiple of the review period and, at most, an independent and identically distributed random variable. Analysis of the model includes stability, transient response, steady-state response, and the effects of common nonlinearities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The recent literature contains several papers which explore mathematical programming formulations of particular Markov sequential decision problems. Each of these papers deals with finite state and action spaces; thus, the corresponding programming formulations yield dual finite linear programs. In this paper these investigations are extended to include countable action and/or state spaces for finite horizon problems. Of particular interest are the duality aspects of the mathematical programming formulations. In addition, employing conditions analogous to fundamental concepts of Haar semi-infinite dual programming, we provide sufficient conditions for the existence of optimal rules for countable action spaces. Guided by the semi-infinite duality theory we explore mathematical programming formulations for two cases: 1) Countable action space and finite state space--the result is a pair of dual semi-infinite programs; and 2) Finite action space and countable state space--we obtain a pair of infinite programs. In the latter case we show that no duality gap occurs and obtain duality results comparable to those of finite linear programming. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Problems of multi-stage decision under uncertainty are usually classified into "stochastic" and "adaptive" ones, depending on whether the decision maker does or does not know the relevant probability distribution. If the Bayesian approach is taken, then, in the adaptive case, the decision maker is assumed to know the prior distribution of certain parameters. It is shown in the paper that the adaptive case is then reducible to the stochastic one. The problems can also be clarified according to the kind of information (memory) available to the decision maker. In the paper, optimal policies and the expected gains they yield, are determined for some important classes of "information structures." In cases in which added information does not increase the expected gain, a sufficient information structure is specified. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper we consider the dynamic inventory problem in which the demand distribution possesses a density belonging to either the exponential or range family of densities and having an unknown parameter. An a priori density is chosen for the unknown parameter. Using a Bayesian estimation scheme, in- equalities are obtained for the optimal purchase policies as the amount of demand information varies. In addition, asymptotic expansions for the optimal policies are found as the number of observations of the demand becomes large. This paper extends the results of Scarf, [8]. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper evaluates and compares classes of multi-item inventory problems where joint order of several items may save a part of the setup cost. A cost ratio and simple decision rule are determined for joint versus individual orders in specified cases. The comparisons call for the necessity of a new policy for reorder point-triggered random output multi-item systems. This policy, "the random joint order policy," operates through the determination of a reorder range within which several items can be ordered. The existence of an optimum reorder range is proved, and a computational technique is demonstrated with the help of a machine-interference type queueing model. Under favorable conditions the results exhibited on the diagram of optimum reorder ranges are generally applicable. The random joint order policy model is especially suitable for computer controlled inventory systems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Intelligent problem-solving, whether by man or by machine, implies selective rather than just rapid behavior. Humans achieve this selectivity through heuristics--principles that, on the average, contribute to reduction of search in problem-solving. Heuristic programming is the construction of computer problem-solving programs whose behavior is similarly organized. This paper surveys the present and potential use of heuristic programming in management science. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In a team decision problem there are two or more decision variables, and these different decisions can be made to depend upon different aspects of the environment, or information variables, the resulting payoff being a random variable. The choice of optimal rules for selecting information variables and for making decisions is the central problem of the economic theory of teams. This paper shows, by means of an example, how linear programming can be applied to obtain optimal team decision functions in the case in which the payoff to the team is a convex polyhedral function of the decision variables. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper reports the results of six experiments and analyses performed to explore the applicability of the non-constant-sum case of the theories of von Neumann-Morgenstern, and others, to the actual behavior of people playing games or involved in bargaining situations. The paper suggests directions in which the theory of games might be modified and extended to improve its applicability and usefulness. A "split-the-difference principle" is suggested to augment the usual theory, so as to specify the exact amount of payments to be made in an ordinary two-person bargaining situation such as the sale of a used car. The application of this principle seems satisfactory in the experiments. One experiment suggests that, in a sequence of trials in the same game situation, people tend to start near an equilibrium point and then try to find a better equilibrium, if there is one. The experiments show examples of non-optimal behavior of the bargainers when the judgment necessary to estimate the relevant payoff is obscure. A fair division of five parcels of objects among five players when each player attaches different values to the parcels is outlined and computed, and the effect of coalitions is discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper is concerned with the problem of selecting securities for managing an investment portfolio. The field of investment has a long history of detailed analysis by economists and investment analysts. This has resulted in theories of economic behavior (in terms of the securities markets as integral components in economy-wide analyses) and the evolution of a variety of rules of thumb (guided by more or less well founded prognostications) which are designed to steer the investor through complex considerations of yield and risk. Relatively little has been done, however, in devising adequate techniques, of a general kind, which can be used to determine optimum selections for a portfolio after the data have been analyzed, and after the predictions as well as the risk and yield criteria of the investor have been specified. The purpose of this paper is to analyze and explain, by reference to empirical data, some of the recent work done in this area by Dr. Harry Markowitz under the sponsorship of the Cowles Commission. 2 This article is divided into four parts. Part I contains a heuristic introduction to the basic problem together with a mathematical statement of Markowitz's theory of portfolio selection and its basic assumptions. Part II contains a discussion of some of the problems involved in formulating probability beliefs for available investment opportunities. En Part III, the selection technique is demonstrated by application to a very simplified case, and many of the problems involved in more complex cases are brought out. The final section contains a summarization and critique of the theory, its limitations, and its possibilities as a guide to practical decision-making. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the article, the author presents an analysis of the paper by John P. Fertakis, which attempts to draw conclusions with respect to accounting on the basis of unrelated or only indirectly related studies in the behavioral sciences. According to the author, his paper merely contains several examples of what may become even more prevalent in accounting. Accounting research frequently has its tentacles extended into the research efforts of scientists in the fields of psychology, sociology, economics, statistics, operations research, management science, etc. In so doing, accountants are looking to others for answers in order to avoid the dirty and painstakingly slow, expensive, and methodical means by which empirical evidence can be conceived and nurtured in their own studies. But this outside empirical evidence often flounders like a fish out of water when plucked from the environment in which it was generated. In addition, accountants must heed the cautions of scientists who generated and/or analyzed the cited empirical evidence. In supplying more information in annual reports, accounts are thereby making it possible for users to make finer distinctions between more companies. Professor Fertakis should note that his suggested "seven items" for a standard report are not one-dimensional at all.

Data reported in this paper indicate that staff-line conflicts may be less severe and essentially different in nature than had been previously assumed. Analysis indicates general agreement between line and staff officials concerning both the staff members' current role and participation in organizational decision making. Moderate disagreement was reported only over the amount of increased future decisional participation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]