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This paper explores industry-level, collective stakeholder action. It argues that industry stakeholders will act collectively at the industry level when they perceive change to be radically in conflict with their shared beliefs. Although collective action may not be in their immediate economic self-interests, this type of industry level collaboration is undertaken with the long-term interest of the collective industry in mind. The example of the Scotch whisky industry is used here to illustrate such collaborative industry-level collective stakeholder action. Introduction Mancur Olson's (1965) treatise 'The Logic of Collective Action,' has long influenced the way economists have treated the subject of collective action. Theorists such as Olson have reasoned that the basis for collective action is a pure rational one of looking out for one's own immediate self interest rather than the collective benefits that could result out of collaboration. If one was to use this rationalist perspective to study collective stakeholder action at the industry level, then one should observe collaborative action only when each 'rational' actor perceives his/her individual economic interest or stake to be in danger rather than that of the collective group. The self interest motive is the case in many instances of observed collective action. However, this perspective does not explain the collective action of actors who appear to be acting against their own immediate economic interests. By subsuming their own interests to those of the collective, these actors appear to be giving up their own economic gain in the short run. This paper's main purpose is to examine what drives collective stakeholder action at the industry level. It uses the sociocognitive perspective (Fiske and Taylor, 1991) as its theoretical lens to study this question in order to provide an alternative viewpoint to the rationalist economics based perspective of collective action. The paper next briefly reviews the relevant literature on how social cognition is involved in the evolution of industry structure. It also provides a short overview of the extant research on the stakeholder's perspective. This paper uses the extant stakeholder literature (Freeman, 1984; Frooman, 1999; Mitchell, Agle, and Wood, 1997; Rowley and Moldoveanu, 2003) and the literature on the social and cognitive aspects of industries (Abrahamson and Fombrun, 1994; Christensen and Gordon, 1999; Daniels, Johnson, and Chernatony, 2002; Porac and Thomas, 1995; Porac, Thomas, and Baden-Fuller, 1989; Spender, 1989) as its theoretical underpinning in order to further investigate this research phenomenon. It then follows with a brief description of the events associated with the introduction of the Cardhu Pure Malt whisky in the Scotch whisky industry. The paper then discusses the factors contributing to industry-level stakeholder group action in traditional industries and concludes with implications of this study for scholars and for practitioners who are interested in learning more about the stakeholder concept. Literature Review Prior research on firm-stakeholder relationships has focused mainly on managerial cognition, i.e., how managers perceive and manage their stakeholders (Freeman, 1984; Mitchell, Agle, and Wood, 1997; Agle, Mitchell, and Sonnenfeld, 2000). However, relationships are embedded within their social context (Rowley, 2000). Studying a single firm's relationship with a single stakeholder doesn't capture the lull complexity of the effects of the social context on such relationships. A better understanding can only be gained when these interactions can be studied within the broaden context in which they are embedded. This paper addresses the issue of collective stakeholder action in one such context, namely the industry context, as not much is known about collective stakeholder action at this level of analysis within the extant stakeholder research. …

In this paper, I have described the beginnings of a theory of collective decisions, using as a basis the controversy which has occurred in the theory of public finance, between the individualists and the organicists. In developing such a theory, my aim is to face the most difficult of all intellectual problems in the functioning of a society: how individuals, each acting in his own self interest, can nevertheless make collective decisions, function as an ongoing society, and survive together without a “war of all against all.” In a previous paper I have indicated conditions under which this is possible without the psychic investment in the nation, which constitutes the central mechanism of this paper; but there are obviously problems in collective decisions, best illustrated in public finance, which cannot be accounted for without such a mechanism.

Research on determinants of collective action in the commons generally focuses on interest-group heterogeneity, implicitly assuming that groups perceive the same problems but have different priorities. This paper changes the focus to the role played by perceptions themselves. Within localities, collective action may be easier if elite and non-elite households have similar assessments of environmental risks. Regionally, collective action may be aided by common assessments among local elites who communicate across village lines. This paper uses regression analysis to explore variations in environmental risk assessments across socioeconomic classes and localities, using new survey data from the Indian Sundarbans. We find that assessments vary significantly across localities. At the same time, assessments among elite households vary significantly more than assessments among non-elite households. Our results, therefore, favour locally-oriented collective action in the region, along with local governance that promotes non-elite participation.

mental resources has many objectives and wide impact. Taken as a whole, this policy can be neither simply characterized nor appraised. Yet there is fundamental rationale for policy in this area and, in turn, some generalizations can be made regarding the effectiveness of collective action. This discussion represents an effort to discern the order within the full sweep of policy measures in the natural resources and environmental areas and to characterize, from an economic point of view, the impact of these policies. In the first section of the paper, it will be argued that the economic characteristics of natural resource stocks provide the basic rationale for collective action to forestall exploitation of them or to secure economic gains which would otherwise be unrealized. The nature of marketfailure in the use of natural resources will be

Previous efficiency arguments for redistribution have derived from an externality of some form. This paper investigates an ‘internality’ process–endogenous change of tastes by recipients of transfers–adapted from C. C. von Weizsäcker. Benevolent or paternalist preferences of donors do not enter the argument, unlike most previous theories. Taste change operates to alter the recipient's working behavior. His increased earnings make him no longer eligible for transfers. An income tax device or contingent loan repayment can be implemented to repay the original donors. Thus, Pareto superiority of the transfer may be established. Further consideration of information and enforcement costs suggests a case for collective action.

In The Logic of Collective Action, Mancur Olson shows how the activities of various political organizations can be fruitfully analyzed using the theory of collective goods. Several of Olson's major conclusions concern the relationship between the size of a group and its ability to provide its members with collective benefits. He concludes that as group size increases, the amount of collective benefits provided will become increasingly suboptimal, and that the absolute amount of collective benefits provided will decrease. This paper shows that Olson's conclusion concerning the relationship between group size and the absolute amount of collective benefits provided is not generally true. Within the framework of analysis used by Olson, it is demonstrated that the relationship is determined by the interaction between two effects, an “income” effect which may cause the level of benefits provided to increase as group size increases, and a “congestion” effect which may cause the level of benefits to decrease as group size increases. The final result is that for “inclusive” collective goods the relationship is an increasing one, while for “exclusive” goods it is a decreasing one. Some implications of this result for the use of the theory of collective goods in studying political processes are discussed.

In this paper we presented a framework for viewing the development of new educational settings. We also postulated the necessity of two conditions for the creation of a coherent self-renewing educational program: the development of a community, especially in a linguistic sense, and on-going practical dialog that defines and redefines the setting over time in light of collective action and experience. In doing so, we took the position that “educational program” and “program development” mean something more than what is implied in most theories of organizational and program development. We argued that a collection of educational activities constitutes a program only when the activities are grounded in a commonly perceived core of beliefs and values about what is and what ought to be.

Two important areas for the application of biological processes are the reclamation of water and organic nutrients from waste waters and the complete control of enclosed environments. The former may be accomplished through the agency of biotic communities consisting of algae and bacteria grown in especially designed lagoons known as "high-rate oxidation ponds." These ponds have been described by Oswald and his colleagues (1954, 1957, and 1958). The biological control of enclosed environments, such as in atomic submarines or in space vehicles, may also be brought about through the collective activity of algae and bacteria and has been described by Golueke and Oswald ( 1958). The successful application of a biological process to such widely divergent and, paradoxically? closely related functions as the control of the environment in a space vehicle and the treatment of wastes in a high-rate oxidation pond requires an extensive knowledge of the ecology of the organisms involved in the process. This is true because effective biological control requires an optimum relationship between the environment and the biotic community concerned, and this can be accomplished only by providing proper environmental conditions. To establish such a relationship, it is necessary to know the nature and extent of the influence of the principal environmental factors involved. Among the key factors to which an algal-bacterial community is subject, whether in an oxidation pond or in a space ship, are carbon dioxide concentration, light intensity and length of duration of light per day, length of growth period, and temperature. In a space ship these factors can be regulated mechanically, and in an oxidation pond, by engineering and geographical location. Although much has been written on the effect of the key environmental factors on individual algal species, there is a paucity of information in thle literature on the effect of these environmental factors, either individually or collectively, on such organisms when living as members of a biotic community. Inasmuch as the influence of these factors are modified by the collective action of different types of organisms living together in the same community, and by the nature of the action of one group upon the other, information gained from studies of an organism grown as a pure culture cannot be applied unequivocally to the same organisms when living as a member of a biotic community. This paper treats that part of an investigation on the biological control of enclosed environments which deals with the influence of certain environmental factors in determining the nature and over-all activity of climax associations of algae and bacteria resulting from the application of a given set of factors. In the description to follow, the term "culture" will he used synonymously with "biotic community," inasmuch as the microorganisms were grown in a prepared nutrient medium under controlled conditions. The author wishes to express his appreciation for counsel given him by Dr. WV. J. Oswald, Dept. of Civil Engineering and School of Public Health, University of California, Berkeley.

This paper presents in the first person singular a description of some needs of human factors scientists and practitioners which have programmatic implications for individual and collective action by the membership of the Human Factors Society.

This paper has argued that changing technology has increased opportunities for voter participation in the legislative process and has presented a proposal which takes some advantage of such possibilities. The objective has not been so much to criticize our present legislative voting arrangement, but to suggest for the future an alternative that might prove superior. The New Left balks at the “establishment”, and conservatives look with dismay upon the “liberal clique”. Direct participation largely would solve these problems, by-passing intermediaries and allowing direct voter or voter-proxy approval of all legislation. If we accept the principal that, with constitutional guarantees, qualified individuals should determine as democratically and as directly as possible the decisions that affect their personal and corporate welfare, then the future holds opportunities for greater efficiency in collective action.

Fast decision making, a propensity for action, and getting things done appear to be highly valued by both practitioners and academics in the United States. Under such monikers as exhibiting initiative, being proactive, walking the talk, and taking charge, getting things done is widely lauded and promoted. As a result, most managers are content to deal with day-to-day operational activities that require immediate attention, daily routines, and superficial behaviors rather than addressing important issues requiring reflection, systematic planning, creative thinking--and above all-- time. To address this often unproductive busyness the authors propose active waiting which involves the recognition that not all problems are open to a quick fix and that sometimes waiting can be a valuable option. However, waiting does not have to be passive. The authors recommend that managers act like the skilled, veteran lions of the Serengeti plains and adopt active waiting in order to be able to seize the opportune moment in pursuit of effective business strategy. This paper offers a six-step process to help leaders integrate active waiting into their supervision style and concludes with recommendations for managers. Keywords: Business strategy, active waiting, second-mover advantage INTRODUCTION "Every morning in Africa, a gazelle wakes up. It knows it must run faster than the fastest lion or it will be killed. Every morning a lion wakes up. It knows it must outrun the slowest gazelle or it will starve to death. It doesn't matter whether you are a lion or a gazelle. When the sun comes up, you better start running" (Friedman, 2005, p. 114). The above quote by Thomas Friedman reminds us that organizations are competing for their very survival and that the quickest, swiftest, and fastest continue to live another day while those left behind become food for the lion. Fast action enables both people and organizations to survive and flourish. However, while running is important for lions, lions also need to be cautious in doing so. Younger lions lacking in experience, will instinctively chase targets often resulting in failure. Successful hunters surprise their victims after carefully scanning the horizon and patiently waiting with focused attention for just the right circumstances before taking action (Stander & Albon, 1993). The key to the lion's survival is not only size and strength, but also cleverness in knowing when and how to attack their prey. Even when hungry, lions will forego a meal rather than hazard a hasty and uncontrolled attack (Haas, 2013). The Serengeti plains of Africa provide us with an important lesson regarding business strategy. That lesson features an overemphasis on quick decision making and speed of action that in many instances at the expense of reflective thinking, thoughtfulness, and resourcefulness demonstrated by the lions' successful hunting strategy. Both the academic and practitioner literature in the United States emphasize the importance of quick decision making and fast action. Taking Action--The Practitioner's Perspective The emphasis on swift action has become so entrenched in management thinking that FastCompany, and their magazine is now a popular read for many business managers. The bias for action has also been underscored by many practitioner-oriented books. For example, Eccles and Nohria (1992), in their book Beyond the Hype wrote that "Management was, is, and always will be the same thing: the art of getting things done.... And to get things done, managers must act themselves and mobilise collective action on the part of others" (p. 32). Further, Kelley (1998) emphasized initiative along with other proactive behaviors as the explanation that distinguishes top perfonning employees from average employees in his book How to Be a Star at Work. In addition, Bruch and Ghoshal (2004) stated in their book A Bias for Action, that management is essentially the art of doing and getting things done. …

"Collective behavior" theory has its roots in antidemocratic theorists of nineteenth century Europe, espe cially LeBon. American sociologists have modified but not eliminated these biases, particularly the imputation of "irra tionality" to collective action. Yet evidence suggests that rioters, for instance, are more "rational" than is often sup posed, and that authorities are also capable of "irrationality." In this paper, we critically examine Smelser's significant efforts to organize the field systematically. We argue that Smelser's efforts result in a "systematization" that often confounds rather than clarifies; that his conceptual organization is founded on undemonstrated assertions about the "exaggerated" character of "uninstitutionalized" beliefs and behavior; that his values are unstated or unclear; and that, whatever his values, he tends to drift into a managerial or administrative vision of collective action.

In the Civil Engineering industry the attitudes of the navvies have been found to conform to a broad pattern imposed by their like interest in, and value of, individual independence. This interest and value appear to have originated in the circumstances of the industry which enforce on the workers a reaction of individual independence of, and an evasion of relationships with, the employers. The resulting like interest and value become dominant among the interests and values held by the navvies in their industrial situation inhibiting the growth of common interests and of collective action. This paper describes a participant-observer study carried out in 1953 on a hydro- electric construction site in the north of Scotland. The purpose was to study patterns of group behaviour among the navvies in order to compare them with those found in printing and other industries previously studied (Sykes: i960 and 1967). It was found that the patterns of group behaviour among the navvies were unusually weak and ill-defined. In the other industries studied the workers showed attitudes of hostility to their employers whom they opposed by means of collective action. Cohesive work groups were formed and group rather than individual responses to the work situation were cultivated. The navvies showed similar attitudes of hostility but they sought to evade rather than to oppose the employer. A high value was set on individual independence and on the evasion of obligations to others. This led to very weak work groups and to an emphasis upon an individual rather than a group response to aspects of the work situation. The author lived for five weeks in a camp in Northern Scotland at a site for the construction of a hydro-electric generating station. The period of observation was brought to an end by an accident which led to a week's hospitalization in Inverness - also amongst navvies. As navvies are intensely suspicious of outsiders, partici- pant observation seemed the only way by which an effective study could be made. To check on the representativeness of the author's observations in the one camp, he made frequent visits during the study to the bars in two adjacent camps belong- ing to other firms. Later a series of interviews, both formal and informal, were held with navvies, trade union officials and engineers with experience in the civil engineering industry: these were held in Glasgow and Edinburgh, the navvies being mostly men in transit through Glasgow. Finally, the results of study were checked against published accounts of the industry. These other sources of infor- mation suggest that the attitudes and ethos found in the camp studied were widely held throughout the industry. The camp had a labour force of 208 men, excluding foremen and office staff, at

This paper describes and analyses a kind of school separated from the public power and the pri vate system, located in arcas of extreme poverty, built and administrated by the inhabitants of these arcas. It's a community school, whose history offers the possibility to reflect on how the poor population deals with and resolves the problems concerning the lack of formal instruction for its children. Throughout the papar, the changes which are produced in the culture of a social group, while testing the strength present in the interaction with the city from which it is separated, are also described and analyzed. The existence of this type of school constitutes an accusation of the State's omission regarding the public school system. It also makes collective action emerge, including the demand for schools and other services, and through which the population tries to interact with the city.

The paper describes the action of a group of low-income tenants, inexperienced in dealing with bureaucracies or in understanding the complexities of landlord tenant law, who attempted to improve their living conditions by using the Government's Rent Tribunal. While the legal remedies provided under the Rent Acts were effective, the tenants were reluctant to use them until they had organized as a group. This was because of the particular relationship they had with the landlady who made it difficult for them to discuss with her their rights as tenants. Their only way of changing this was through collective action. We discuss the use of conflict strategies in a short-term issue; that is, in fighting a landlady for better living conditions (both lower rents and adequate repairs). It illustrates the difficulty of mobilizing a group of people whose ususal everyday experiences are that it is difficult, if not futile, to take action to improve their situation. This is so in spite of machinery set up by the Government to arbitrate over rents for private property. The difficulty lies in the precarious financial position in which deprived groups often find themselves, making it easy for them to fall into rent arrears and therefore be liable to eviction from their accom modation. It is difficult also because property owners are more likely to have easy access to the legal machinery. These tenants are usually in no position to hold a landlord to his side of the contract because they lack the resources to pay the legal fees entailed.

T HE Ideological Element in Social Problems. The notion that ideologies play an important part in contemporary social life seems to have penetrated into the sphere of popular discourse. Today even the newspapers occasionally refer to ideologies when they wish to allude to a complex of ideas, a body of doctrines, the programs of movements, the platforms of parties-in fact, to any creed or theory that takes on an intellectualized and rationalized form. It would be difficult to imagine a single social problem in the analysis and proposed solution of which we do not have to take account of ideological factors. They are an elusive but significant part of our contemporary social landscape. They serve as landmarks which help us to find our way in what otherwise would be a chaotic social world, by providing us with guidance in defining and evaluating situations. Ideologies enable us to identify ourselves with social movements and groups which offer interpretations and solutions of problems which could only rarely be undertaken by each individual independently. They aid us in reducing excessive individuation and indifference in respect to social problems by furnishing us with goals by which more or less articulate groups become integrated. While they help us to get our bearings and to sustain our capacity for collective action, it must be recognized, however, that much of our confusion and indecision is in part attributable to the wide variety of ideologies to which we are exposed and to the intermixture of conflicting ideological elements that direct the attention and court the loyalties of the several members of the society. A further confusion is introduced by the fact that the beliefs and creeds which men profess do not always correspond to the principles-if any-which find expression in their actual conduct. Consequently, in the world of action as well as in social science, ideologies are often referred to as mere ideologies, as if they were irrelevant epiphenomena having no substantial roots in and relations to the realities of existence. It is the object of this paper to elaborate the proposition that our contemporary social problems cannot be adequately treated and that the situations to which they refer cannot be understood without taking due account of the role of their ideological involvements. There is a widespread belief that the problems of maladjustment of men to one another and to the world in which they live arise out of the nature of men or of things. Despite the work of a long line of social scientists who have indicated that the situations we call social problems are problematical only because they represent deviations from socially accepted norms and

Commentators have seen the disabling provisions found in the American and Canadian constitutions as undemocratic because they restrict majority powers. Building upon the work of John Hart Ely, this paper puts forward a conception of democracy which nourishes both collective responsibility and individual judgment. The distinguishes between "statistical" and "communal'' conceptions of democracy. Traditional theories, such as Ely's, have relied on the statistical notion which of individuals in a democracy acting each on their own. In the communal conception, decisions are made by the ' 'people'' acting as a distinct and collective unit of responsibility. The author then elaborates on the communal conception by identifying two variations of it, ' 'integrated'' and ' 'monolithic' 'forms of collective action. In the latter, both the unit of responsibility and the unit of judgment are collective, while in the former the unit of judgment resides in the individual. If democracy is understood in the integrated communal sense, then many of the disabling provisions in the American and Canadian constitutions can be seen to democracy rather than contradict it.

E ACH country has its own individualized approach to the treatment of monopoly and restrictive economic practices. Likewise, the attitude toward and enthusiasm for competition vary among countries. Federal antitrust legislation was initiated in the United States as far back as 1890 in an effort to restrain monopoly more effectively and to eliminate restrictive trade practices. Great Britain, on the other hand, depended solely on common law protection against unreasonable restraints of trade until after World War II. In fact, the protection of the public interest in that country had, through the process of court interpretation, gradually become less important, and the safeguarding of the freedom of contract for business interests had gained paramount significance. Restrictive agreements, in themselves, had not been illegal and they came to be accepted as a part of customary business practice. Under the unstable economic conditions prevailing between the two world wars, restraints on competition were crystallized, and procedures for collective action and control were extended further. Subsequently, many of the trade organizations developed during these years for this purpose were utilized by the British government to carry out the World War II rationalization of production and distribution. In this setting a strong reaction began to develop in Britain against the whole institutional organization of restraints. Affirmative action was cautious, however, and emphasized a conservative approach of inquiry. To accomplish this goal, a Monopolies and Restrictive Practices Commission was established in 1948. Largely as an outgrowth of the findings of this commission, Parliament enacted a more vigorous statute in 1956, the Restrictive Trade Practices Act. It is the major purpose of this paper to show the character of this postwar legislation and to discuss the efforts made within its framework to eliminate those restraints that are viewed as being "opposed to the public interest." As an introduction to the analysis of this new legal position of restrictive practices, the evolutionary development of the common law doctrine and the reaction against it are traced briefly.