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The possible use of fissionable substances as a new and important source of energy gives rise to a number of economic questions. This paper deals in a very general way with two sets of questions—those related to the comparative costs of producing energy from atomic fuels and other sources, and those related to the economic consequences which might follow the introduction and use of atomic fuels. The discussion is built around examples which illustrate each of the questions considered. Energy is developed in the atomic pile in the form of heat. The heat produced might possibly be consumed directly in a variety of industrial and nonindustrial uses requiring either low- or high-temperature heat. In the light of what is known of current research on peacetime applications of atomic power, it is probable that the earliest important use of the heat produced in the pile will be in the generation of electricity. It is for this reason that such estimates as have been made of the cost of energy from atomic sources have been for the generation of electric power. This paper, similarly, is limited to a discussion of atomic energy as a source of electric power.

The article presents a comment on a previous article New England Power Economics, by Roy G. Poulsen that appeared in the August 1965 issue of the journal Land Economics. According to the author, this article describes prospective improvements in electricity supply and costs in New England and looks forward to the time, not too far in the future, when atomic energy for utility generating plants will be widely used in the Northeast, and New England at long last will have a power source no more costly to the region than to any other part of the nation and its competitive power cost disadvantage will come to an end. The Poulsen paper learns heavily, as of course it must, on statements by utilities and their executives about future plans for larger, more efficient conventional and nuclear regeneration. According to the author, the reason for the present high level of electric rates in New England lies not solely in fuel cost. The fixed costs of operation and maintenance, depreciation, taxes and rate of return as well as the magnitude of the unit investment per customer and per kilowatt must be examined in depth before one can be sure of the reasons for the present situation.

This article presents information on the role played by technological innovations in the electric utility industry which would help to meet up the requirements of power generation. Although the process of technological innovations is composed of research and development, invention and innovation, the study presented in this article examines only the innovations pioneered by electric utilities, such as new financial and accounting techniques. Innovations in hydroelectric power generation is also considered. Despite the apparent need for additional research and development expenditures, the electric utility industry historically has spent relatively little of its own funds on energy related research and development. The process of technological advance is dichotomized in the electric power industry. The electric utilities, with few exceptions, purchase technology from electrical equipment manufacturers and pay for this new technology in the purchase price of the equipment. The manufacturers innovate by pioneering the design, development, and production of power equipment, whereas the utilities innovate by being the first to install, operate, and apply the equipment to generate electric power.

The article presents a comment on a previous article by Edwin Fleischmann in response to author's article New England Power Economics that appeared in the August 1965 issue of the journal Land Economics. According to the author, Fleischmann expresses concern about the use of Federal Power Commission (FPC) data to substantiate the argument that New England power costs are higher than in other parts of the country. He quotes the FPC qualification that this presentation of typical electric bills does not include a critical evaluation of many factors, which operate to produce differences in the level of bills. According to the author, it was atomic electric plants as expressed in the Land Economics article that New England electric rates would most significantly bring down his belief. The six new atomic plants under construction or planned for New England by 1972 show utility acceptance of the atomic promise. Furthermore, the growth of the nuclear capacity will have important indirect effects.

The article examines the introduction of electric power in the U.S. manufacturing industry. Probably, the most sweeping and complex technological change in American manufacturing over the past century has been electrification. It dates from 1885-90, a period that saw two critical revisions made in the original Edison electrical systems: alternating current equipment, namely, the transformers and alternators produced and sold commercially by Westinghouse and, after 1892, General Electric; and Nicola Tesla's polyphase electric motor. Both were indispensable in applying electricity to industrial operations. The first statistical report of electric motors in manufacturing plants is the "Census Office Report on Manufacturing Industries in the United States at the Eleventh Census: 1890," which lags not far behind prior discussions, in business and engineering literature, of actual installations in plants. Of 360 industries canvassed at that time, 208 had stationary electric motors of one sort or another, although in almost every industry reporting such motors, a mere handful of establishments was responsible for them.

This article presents the results of a calculation of an index of industrial output Soviet Union in 1960. In Section I, the index of industrial output is presented and briefly discuss its nature and limitations. The index is intended to measure the net product of industry, i.e., gross output less materials consumed in mining, manufacturing, and electric power production. At various stages in the aggregation, however, important compromises and approximations were necessary: the index is computed by aggregating physical output series at various stages of fabrication, using 1950 price weights within certain groups of commodities and 1950 wage-bill weights among these commodity groups. There are major trends in the annual rates of increase of industrial output from 1927 to 1928 and until 1958, such as in the prewar years, the rates of increase for all industrial products decline slightly from 1927/28-1932 to 1932-1937, reflecting very substantial declines in the rate of increase for machinery and other producers' goods and a very substantial increase in the rate of increase of consumers' goods; The war years, of course, saw a very large decline in civilian output--a decline of about 50 per cent from 1940 to 1945 in all industrial products, 60 per cent in machinery and consumers' goods, and 40 per cent in other producers' goods. In the 1950-1958 period, the rates of increase for all major categories of output decline sharply as against the immediately postwar rates.

This article focuses on the U.S. government action on private enterprise in river valley development. For the purposes of this discussion, the author confines himself to river valley development to his own experience as administrator of the Bonneville Power Administration, which has the responsibility for marketing the power generated at Bonneville and Grand Coulee dams as well as from all future federal projects in the Pacific Northwest. Economically speaking, the Bonneville Power Administration, which constructs and operates transmission lines, substations, and other facilities to bring the power to the load centers, is unique in that it is the major supplier of the only indigenous energy base of the Pacific Northwest capable of being expanded to meet the needs of the region. Utilities, both privately and publicly owned, as well as industry, are looking to the federal government to develop low cost Columbia River hydro power to satisfy their increasing electric energy requirements.

The advantage of evaluating single research projects, or choosing a programme of projects, by estimating and comparing their costs, benefits, and resource requirements, depends on the accuracy with which the latter are known. In this study, comparisons are made between the estimated and actual costs and durations of 84 research projects in a laboratory concerned with improvements in electricity generation. The estimates show considerable errors, and a bias towards under-estimation. There is no evidence of an improvement in accuracy as projects approach completion, or as experience of making such estimates accumulates. There is no consistent pattern of expenditure over the lives of projects, such as might enable estimates to be corrected by reference to the early outcomes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The origins and early development of electricity production in Malaya are closely connected with the tin mining industry and with European participation in it. The present constitutes a turning point for the electricity supply industry since mining now consumes less than half the Federation's total electricity output; moreover, this share is expected to decline further in the future as a result of the fast-growing demand from industrial, commercial, and domestic consumers. Official projections for the next three decades envisage a tenfold increase in demand and the establishment of an integrated West Coast transmission system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]