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This paper provides a discussion of Latin American university reform within the context of Latin American colonial and national history and within the larger framework of international affairs. Particular individuals who played significant roles in educational as well as political reform are considered. The discussion uses Raul Haya de la Torre as its point of departure and cites Fidel Castro as the farthest point so far in the nationalization of modernism. (VM)

I The main sources used in this study are as follows: (1) the reports of American diplomats in Europe in: U.S., Department of state, Foreign relations of the United States: diplomatic papers, 1934 and 1935 (Washington, in progress) (here cited as U.S. F.R.); (2) the documents cited in evidence at the Nuremberg trial, printed in the two series, Nazi conspiracy and aggression (Washington, 1946) (cited as NCA), and Trial of the major war criminals (Nuremberg, 1949) (documents cited ND and Nuremberg numbering, testimony cited IMT and date, as pagination differs in the German and English transcripts); (3) the annual publications of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, Survey of international affairs and Documents on international affairs (London, in progress) (cited as Survey and Documents); (4) various volumes of memoirs-on the German side, Erich KORDT, Nicht aus den Akten (Stuttgart, 1950), and Paul SCHMIDT, Statist auf diplomatische Bilhne (Bonn, 1949) (both authors took part in the negotiations of June 4-18, 1935, in London, the one as liaison officer between the German foreign ministry and Ribbentrop's office, created in his capacity of foreign affairs expert on the staff of the deputy to the Fuehrer, Hess, the other as the official interpreter); for criticism of these memoirs see E. M. CARROLL in American political science review, Vol. XLVI, No. 2 (June 1952), and Sir Lewis NAMIER, In the Nazi era (London, 1953) (Kordt's friendship with Schmidt makes it dubious whether his book, published a year later than Schmidt's, can be regarded as altogether independent testimony); also, Baron VON GEYR VON SCHWEPPENBURG, The critical years (London, 1952) (German military attache in London 1933-37, acting air attach6, 1933-35, a Catholic); on the British side, the fullest account is contained in Viscount TEMPLEWOOD, Nine troubled many. But the events of March and April seemed to have dismissed all possibilities of Germany being offered a second chance. The white paper published in Britain at the beginning of March3 had discussed German rearmament in very strong terms and had used it as the justtification, the raison d'etre, for the proposed scheme of British rearmament. It had so incensed Hitler that he had postponed the visit of British cabinet ministers planned, on German invitation, for the end of the first week in March, on the grounds of his having a cold, an indisposition universally recognized as of purely diplomatic origin.4 His answer to this

This paper has attempted a new look at the course of the Tripoli-American War of 1801–5. The approach is, first, to avoid the beaten track and concentrate on the more obscure part of the story, namely, Tripoli's conduct of the war; and secondly, to attempt an explanation of Tripoli's success (or conversely America's failure) in a way that is different from the general American pattern. In this respect, emphasis has therefore been, not on the ineffectiveness of the American navy, but on three other important factors. These are: the moral and material support of the neighbouring Maghribi states for Tripoli's cause; the favourable international situation which helped Tripoli economically through the livestock trade with Malta; and thirdly, the contribution of Tripoli's navy, both as an instrument of warfare and as an economic asset. The paper concludes with an assessment of the international, dynastic, and political significance of the outcome of the war for Tripoli.

I N considering the development of civil defense in relation to American regions this paper begins with three assumptions: First, it assumes that civil defense comprises a needed protection for communities during the nuclear age. This may be compared with simpler forms of protection (as forts) which were needed in earlier centuries in view of the type of warfare then prevailing or with "blackouts" and other measures established in Europe during World War II as protection against air attack when ordinary (nonnuclear) bombs were used. Given the present state of (1) inharmonious and somewhat threatening international relations, (2) warfare not brought under international control, (3) suddenly erupting conflicts (exemplified by the Pearl Harbor attack), and (4) highly destructive war weapons, civil defense protection is regarded as a needed element in present-day city and metropolitan life. This paper assumes that it is needed just as the police and fire departments are necessary institutions regardless of whether a crime wave is at hand or whether major fires have recently occurred. The methods of defense may vary from time to time, depending on circumstances and on possible actions. But the need itself is thought to be present unless and until modern destructive war is surely controlled, armaments have surely been reduced by agreement of world powers to the extent that a significant threat to communities no longer exists, or some other defense system is devised (such as the use of defensive guided missiles) that will surely provide for the defense of a nation. While some progress has been made regarding the latter two items (probably little with respect to the first), it seems clear that none of these developments have been achieved as yet. One should also keep in mind that while international relations ebb and flow with respect to their state of amicability, potential enemies do have nuclear bombs piled up which may be used at any time. A second assumption of this paper is that the regional approach to the study of civil defense is a valid, appropriate, and promising one to be used along with other approaches. It is apparent that the characteristics which make one area attractive as a target for military attack and another area unattractive vary over a nation, hence the nuclear threat simply is not the same in all parts of the United States. While, it is true, the attack would be directed against individual communities or metropolitan centers, nevertheless certain regions have large clusters of these urban-industrial concentrations, as will be shown, and other regions have a smaller number. It may be inferred that an enemy would subject the former type of region to heavier attack-granting that individual cities in any region might be attacked. Other regions, as agricultural ones, might be ignored in a nuclear strike but attacked with germs. Some regions, less attractive as targets, would probably be used from the defensive standpoint as relief and rehabilitation areas. In any event, it is assumed that civil defense may be appropriately studied using the approach of regional sociology just as housing, occupations, water resources, public health, and other subjects may be so studied-and for much the same reasons: Differences in geographical and cultural conditions and in characteristics of the population are often shown to have a significant effect on the nature and extent of social phenomena and problems. Thirdly, this paper makes a pair of specific assumptions for practical working purposes, one applying to civil defense, the other to regions. In citing the development of civil defense activities it relies exclusively on the official data of the Federal Civil Defense Administration as published in its annual reports. In relating these data to regions, it defines a sociological region as an area having major size, possessing relative homogeneity in geographical and cultural characteristics, functioning as a cultural gestalt, though viewed as part of a larger grouping-namely, the nation. Admitting that various regional schemes have validity and could be used for present purposes, * Based on a paper read before the twentieth annual meeting of the Southern Sociological Society, Atlanta, Georgia, April 12, 1957.

tT HE following considerations on the writing of contemporary history have gradually taken shape in my mind as a result of writing and editing our Chatham House Survey of International Affairs since I924, but the occasion that has led me to put these ideas on paper now is some criticism of a recently published volume (reviewed in this issue of International Affairs on pages 204-5), The Middle East in the War, by my colleague Mr George Kirk, in the Survey of International Affairs series. Anyone whose acts are recorded in history has a right to receive the fair and considerate treatment that is claimed by Othello

The question of the direction of the speech which Lloyd George made at the height of the Agadir crisis of 1911 has recently been raised again by Dr Cosgrove. His article, however, is in some respects not entirely satisfactory. Most of the material that he uses to revive the traditional version of the Mansion House speech – namely that it was directed against the Germans – is derived from letters which deal with reactions to it, most of them Foreign Office reactions, and some of them at a considerable remove from the event itself. Admittedly one can build a prima facie case on ‘the entirely different impressions’ which the speech was observed to produce in Paris and in Berlin. There was the placing of it by Paul Cambon, the French Ambassador to London, at the end of a line of mounting irritation in England against the attitude of Germany, as the sort of thing theSpectatormight have quoted in support of its thesis of the necessity of the union ‘intime évidente, affirmée’ of England and France; and his suggestion that French papers be encouraged ‘à publier quelques appréciations flatteuses de ce discours et de son auteur’.

The negotiations between England and Germany over the future of the Portuguese Empire which were in progress between 1911 and 1914 have been given little attention by historians. Such as there is has usually taken the form of en passant remarks to the effect that the successful conclusion of an agreement was part of the evidence for something like an Anglo-German détente just before war broke out. Although the view that the episode does not rate full treatment is certainly correct, considerable importance was attached to the negotiations at the time, and their course does reveal some interesting features. There is useful evidence for discussing such problems as the views and influence of the permanent officials at the Foreign Office, the importance of imperial considerations in international politics at the time, and the attitudes of Sir Edward Grey and Mr ‘Lulu’ Harcourt (Secretary of State for the Colonies, 1910–15). The resolution of the divisions on the British side and the way in which the negotiations were handled has not before been put together from the available papers, and to do so gives an opportunity to reconsider what was the true significance of the episode in Anglo-German relations.

HE problems facing the contemporary world are very grave. To some they appear insoluble because their solution is predicated on the ability of nations to learn to base international relations on considerations of fairness and justice-a consummation devoutly to be wished for but seemingly unrealizable. There are Americans who are realistic enough to appreciate that the diplomatic policy of our government, as of all governments, is conditioned by self-interest but who would fain believe that American sportsmanship, love of fair play, and humaneness have led to a consistent concern for the suffering and oppressed. They would like to think that our department of state has intervened in behalf of persecuted people, regardless of where the affliction may have taken place and of who the oppressors may have been and of our specific interest in the matter involved. But is this hope justified by the day-to-day official acts of our government? Only by carefully analyzing the past policies of this country in matters involving the status of a persecuted group in all countries can a satisfactory answer be given to this question. Withfirmness in the right,' by Cyrus Adler and Aaron M. Margalith, provides much of the raw material for such an analysis. The authors have culled from the official publications of the United States government all instances of American intervention on behalf of Jews and have collected them-sometimes in full, sometimes in part or in summary-in the present volume. The work itself is an elaboration of a paper presented in I905 by Cyrus Adler at the meeting of the American Jewish Historical Society (subsequently published as Volume XV of the Society's Publications2) and also of a later

This paper examines the contention that between 1896 and 1898 the main object of Menelik's foreign policy was expansion westwards in collaboration with the French. It concludes, from both European and African evidence, that on the contrary Menelik subordinated his territorial aspirations in the Nile Valley to the promotion of good relations with the Khalifa; and that he frustrated rather than assisted the French missions to the Nile. The overriding anxiety of the Negus was that ‘Abdallāhi should not be distracted from his struggle with Kitchener by fears for security of his eastern frontier. Menelik saw in a Mahdist victory the best insurance against a renewal of European aggression in Ethiopia, fearing as he did that the subjugation of Ethiopia was the ultimate objective of British action in north-east Africa.

This paper has two closely related purposes, both of which, if accomplished, may help to accelerate the development of international relations as an empirically based discipline. One is to identify the shifting and expanding membership of the international system during the 125 years between the end of the Napoleonic Wars and the outbreak of World War II. The other is to classify all such members of the system according to their attributed importance or status during the same period. In each case, the intent is not only to provide certain data which may be useful to the discipline, but to describe in considerable detail the procedures by which such data were gathered or, more accurately, “made.”

Open diplomacy, negotiation under the scrutiny of the public, has long fascinated students.1 Conference diplomacy is one form, though not the only one, of open diplomacy, and to its study Professor Birn made a contribution in CSSH for July 1970; as appropriate in this journal, his essay was accompanied by comments from Professor Singer. Enlightening though both essays are, these remarks are provoked by the belief that their main point is not established. Professor Singer's, while in form a comment on Professor Birn's, made little reference to it. Indeed it had comparatively little to say about conference diplomacy at all. Rather it was a restatement of what some students of public opinion believe that the effect of public opinion on the conduct of foreign policy has been. There are few areas in which large and unsupported generalizations are more freely advanced. Neither in Professor Birn's paper, nor in the history of modern international relations, is there evidence to substantiate them. Before we can consider the effect of public opinion, we need some general model of conference diplomacy. The term 'conference', as commonly used, is applied to a meeting of a group of nations. One might have a conference of two, but one would hardly describe it as such. Now specific issues in international affairs are not usually of primary concern to more than two parties. Therefore they are not dealt with in conferences. When a dispute between two states over a specific issue is coming to a head, they are not able to take part in a conference, least of all a disarmament conference; they are arming. In their very nature, the subjects of conferences are general-disarmament, monetary arrangements, the law of the sea, or the like.2 Yet if every state in the world were content with the international situation, we may reasonably suppose that the level of armaments would give no cause for concern. A disarmament conference is possible, and offers 1 Elaborate notes are out of place in a short analytical piece such as this. Many of my citations would be those listed by Professor Singer. General references would take us no further; more specific comment would take me too far afield. 2 The peace conference after a general war is clearly a special case. It seems likely that its character as a conference, given to it by the fact that there are several participants, will dominate its character as a settlement between victors and vanquished.

With the Kangwha treaty in 1876 Korea ended its period of isolation and became exposed to foreign pressures. In 1906, after a period of turmoil in Asian international affairs, Korea was declared a Japanese protectorate, and in 1910 it became a colony of that country. Korea remained a Japanese possession until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. This essay is concerned with some of the economic and social changes that took place in Korea under Japanese rule. The first part of the paper discusses the reorganization of the traditional economy by changes in institutional control over it, and the second part describes the growth of the economy during these years.

The existence of Modern Israel, or Jewish society colonized in Palestine during the past century, is usually interpreted in two different ways. On one hand, it is regarded as a product of international politics of modern Western world, while it claims to be the realized form of Jewish aspiration throughout the long history of the world. The former view is right as far as this society concerns with international political history, but is insufficient to explain its own history induced by the inner elements of this regional society. The latter, which comes from the Zionists' ideology, does not fail to notice the individuality of this society, but can not get rid of the illusional concept peculiar to the Zionists' thought, the “national” unity of World Jewry.The writer believes, Modern Israel should be studied not only in the context of international politics, but also of its own evolution. We may conclude from the examination of the history of Jewish colonization in Palestine, that Modern Israel was the heir of the Zionist movement but this society itself brought forth the domestic elements which have turned Modern Israel relatively independent of the international framework of the Zionist movement. Thus the state of Israel, the present political establishment of this society, stands for the complex of various elements. In this paper, the writer intends to explain the nature of leading political ideas in Modern Israel, with reference to the ideological peculialities of the past Zionists' thought.

A SIGNIFICANT factor in the understanding of international relations is the perception of countries and issues by those in a position to make policy. The more policy formulation is restricted to one man or a small group, the more important this factor becomes. The conduct of foreign relations by a dictator can often be understood only by reference to his image of the outside world, an image that acts as a filter distorting the realities he sees. This is particularly true for Adolf Hitler whose views on most matters changed very little during his adult life, and who was little affected by experience which leads other men to adjust erroneous perceptions to facts. Because of its emphasis on the unearthing of new documentary evidence, the study of diplomatic history has often tended to attempt a reconstruction of events on the basis of knowledge subsequently attained by the scholar though contemporaneously unknown to the actors. Even when allowance for this factor has been made, the information known at any given time is frequently seen only through the eyes of the writer without regard to the perception of that information by the man making the decisions. This attempt to trace Hitler's image of the United States is designed to illustrate an avenue for examining the diplomatic history of the recent past. This essay, therefore, will be no survey of German-American relations, but an analysis of the particular and personal perspective of Adolf Hitler on the United States and the implications of his image of America for his policies. Hitler did not leave an extensive correspondence with friends, relatives, and officials, which might provide a basis for assessing his attitudes. Nor, to judge by available evidence, did he make marginal comments on papers submitted to him for information or decision. He left two books, a few memorandums, a small number of private documents. All the rest consists of public speeches and private talk, recorded by others; even the books are really speeches reduced to writing and provided with some continuity. Since Hitler never earned a reputation for excessive veracity, the scholar faces the question of the reliability of his evidence. There is a rule of thumb that can be used to good advantage. Before I933

This paper is based on a lecture given by the author at the Army War College on January 3, 1956. In it Dr. Almond describes problems of public opinion and national security policy-problems which come of this policy's technical character, its element of secrecy, and the gravity of the stakes involved. He prescribes four lines of action for strengthening the democratic political process in the making of security policy. The author is a research associate and Professor of Public and International Affairs at the Center for International Studies of Princeton University.

The prediction of future world events is frequently an exercise in political sociology. Or perhaps more accurately, it is a problem in political ecology, one concerned with the relationship between the political system and its social and physical environment. A statement that nothing will change over the next few decades would hardly be credible, and anyway it would be boring. On the other hand, to quote one of my favorite books on prediction, "If a man predicts large but not very large changes, the public will regard him as a man of imagination; but if he predicts extremely large changes, his audience will replace imagination by phantasy."' I would like, in this paper, to avoid both extremes. In any case, my recent menus have offered neither sheep livers nor chicken entrails, so I am unable to engage in prophecy. I will not attempt to foretell a specific event on a specific occasion, nor to paint a detailed picture of a particular political future. But I am a restrained believer in the outlook aptly labelled by Charles Burton Marshall as "the limits of foreign policy."2 Without getting into the determinist-free will debate-which in the still youthful state of our sciences is

ALTHOUGH the literature on the isthmian canal diplomacy is extensive,' another addition to the numerous articles and books already written on the subject may be useful for the following reasons: While much attention has rightly been paid to the part played by this phase of United States diplomacy on the emergence of the United States as a world power, far less study has been devoted to the changing course of British policy. It is not always sufficiently recognized that vital British interests were also involved in the solution of the canal question and that the role of giving up rights hitherto enjoyed is at least as difficult as the assumption of fresh responsibilities. Moreover, today, of less importance appear purely rnational gains and of far more significance the development of grood Anglo-American relations, for the Anglo-American alliance forms the very cornerstone of the defense of the free world. The sig,nature of the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty in i9OI markedand the British cabinet was in no doubt about this-the conscious British recognition of the eventual United States supremacy in the Western Hemisphere and thus entailed a fundamental change in the relations of the two countries. The danger of an Anglo-American collision over a struggle for predominance in Central America and in the Caribbean was removed and the basis of the later alliance was laid in these years. There are few more decisive events in the history of international relations in the twentieth century. Yet the American side of the story is much better known than the British. The State Department records and the private papers of the principal American negotiators-Hay, Choate, and Henry White-have been available for some time, but the British Foreign Office archives for this period have

This paper is an earnest consideration of what students of international affairs have thought the role of public opinion is and should be in the international arena. It emphasizes the importance of raising the competence of the public in order to make it a vital force for supporting progress in international institutions and organizations. Dr. Herbericlhs holds an official position with the Council of Europe, has been a student of law and political science in the Netherlands and France, and is now engaged in an extended study of the role of public opinion in international organization.