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The article reports on the Jason group of the U.S. Institute of Defense Analyses, and its involvement with the U.S. Army during the war in Indochina. Some of the works of this group, with its members mostly young scientists, focus on the development of the concept of the electronic battlefield, on the problems of counter-insurgency and application of lasers. The group has been considered a symbol of social irresponsibility among scientists because of the part it played on the use of sophisticated technology by the U.S. forces against Vietnam.

The article focuses on the issue regarding the conflict between the scientific and technological weapons of the U.S. military forces against the less technical innovations of the guerilla forces in Vietnam in 1971. According to source, in the present war in Vietnam, the use of sophisticated weaponry and the rapid development of new weapons and supporting equipment required a new staff position to assist the field commander. However, it was observed that communist sources offer considerable evidence that the intense bombing has been ineffective against the legion of coolies. Moreover, it is stated heavy reliance by U.S. forces in Indo-China on computers has not given them the edge against the elusive guerilla forces of the enemy.

The article focuses on the study of the destruction in Indochina after the war conducted by the Stanford Biology Study Group. The report aims to evaluate the extent and seriousness of the said destruction. The people in Southeast Asia whose area has been part of the destruction have been subjected to intense deprivation and sufferings up to this time. Social destruction concerning the ecological damage in Southeast Asia and its effect on people living there is also discussed in the study. It stresses that U.S. policies are destroying the Vietnamese culture and social organization. Long-term effects and aftermath of the said destruction were evaluated in the study.

The article discusses the author's perspective to the foreign policy of the U.S. federal government after the war in Vietnam. He points that the highest levels of decision making in the country are directly involved in local conflicts with its own military forces. He adds that it is possible to expect the difficulty that the country may experience, once it decides not to use its military forces in deciding on any purposeful action. He also notes that one of the positive exercises of its policy would be a fresh appraisal of the whole notion of sides and the imperatives of conflict-control.

The article discusses the attempt of U.S. to establish anti-communists government in Vietnam. The attempts to establish an anti-communist form of government started five years before the Geneva convention and initially with the support of French government. The U.S. broadened its bombings in the North and South and increases its fighting forces that insisted a greater military power to abide and attain their suitable position. The unsuccessful establishment left two significant political legacies, first Vietminh assumed overriding control on Vietnamese nationalism and most of rural Vietnam got accustomed to the administration of the Vietminh.

The article reports on the condition of war in Vietnam. U.S. to send a brigade of marines to garrison the De- Nang air base in central Vietnam. Soviets had just called for convening the U.N. Disarmament Commission for practical purposes. The U.S. had introduced an organized ground combat unit into Vietnam and there were air strikes against military targets deep in North Vietnam and not directly linked to the North Vietnamese supply lines to the guerillas in the South. The government edge away from the general endorsement of nonlethal gas warfare.

The article discusses the author's perspective on the need for a permanent and workable peace in the world. He points that a peaceful world order must be built around something more concrete by negotiating a series of arms limitation treaties which would culminate in a multilateral agreement bringing about general and complete disarmament. He also mentions that the fate of the Geneva Agreements of 1954 in Switzerland concerning Vietnam is an excellent example of how an elaborate multilateral treaty agreement can be made, simply by the actions of one nation working for what it deemed to be its own self-interest.