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After the end of the First World War in November 1918, the Allies were involved in a military campaign in the Ottoman lands, leading to a national resistance by Turks that would end in 1923. It is relevant to provide actual information on the outcomes of the Turkish War of Independence, since it was a longlived event that paved the way for further problems on the belligerents’ economies. Using unique data for the value of the gold from 1919 to 1925 at the İstanbul bourse, our analysis complements the historical arguments as historians may find political risks difficult to quantify. We observe that in 1921 the Turkish victories created expectations on the part of traders that the war could end soon, as is manifested in exchange rate fluctuations. The Turkish economy would have experienced higher financial instability with the Allies’ occupation and resistance in 1920, creating a lower chance to return the pre-war gold content of the belligerents’ currencies.

Over two decades from 1949 until the resumption of the diplomatic relations between these two countries in 1972, West German companies never gave up on the Chinese market despite substantial difficulties caused by Cold War frictions. This paper exams the payment transactions and terms of credits for financing industrial projects between the PRC and West German companies.

This article examines the research literature on the economic aspects of the “Sino-Soviet Alliance”, which lasted from the end of the Chinese Civil war until the Sino-Soviet split (1949-1960/63). The Soviet and Eastern European contribution to China’s industrialization, called the “largest technology transfer in human history” by some, still awaits detailed examination. This article aims to structure the field as well as inspire future research. The included studies range from on-the-ground microstudies of engineers at specific industrial construction projects to macro-perspectives on economic exchange, trade and governmental negotiations. In contrast to classical Cold War perspectives, which assume a primacy of (geo-)politics, the paper builds on more recent studies, arguing that economic rationales mattered in both the split and the forging of the alliance. The literature review suggests that the room for manoeuvre of actors beyond the Kremlin and party leaderships has to be measured anew, and that the impact of the alliance on Eastern Europe awaits further research. Finally, the influence of the West with its technologies and world markets becomes visible when these apparently exclusive East-East relations are examined more closely.