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The system‐property or 'cybernetic' theory of goals and goal‐directedness became popular in the twentieth century. It is a theory that has reductionist and behaviourist roots. There are reasons to think that the system‐property theory needs to be formulated in terms of counterfactuals. However, it proves to be difficult to formulate a counterfactual analysis of goal‐directedness that is counterexample‐free, non‐circular, and non‐trivial. These difficulties closely mirror those facing reductionists about dispositions, though the parallels between the two debates have been overlooked in the literature. After outlining those parallels, the paper considers what goal theorists might learn from the dispositions debate. In particular, the paper discusses the need for a realist, non‐reductionist account of goal‐directedness, and explores the idea that properties of goal‐directedness are themselves dispositions or 'powers' of a certain sort. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article aims to challenge the prevailing dichotomous approaches to goal-directedness across diverse scientific disciplines. To that effect, it focuses on establishing the interconnectedness of diverse notions of purposiveness by examining the relationship between variational principles in physics and life sciences. Thus, the article aims to uncover a unifying aspect of goal-directedness that transcends the varying levels of complexity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper addresses the conceptualisation and measurement of goal-directedness. Drawing inspiration from Ernst Mayr’s demarcation between multiple meanings of teleology, we propose a refined approach that delineates different kinds of teleology/teleonomy based on the temporal depth of generative models of self-organising systems that evince free energy minimisation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Jablonka and Ginsburg's target paper (2022) argues that (a) consciousness is closely tied to goal-directed behavior and an open-ended capacity for learning and adaptation driven by exploration-and-stabilization dynamics; and (b) consciousness has this essential dynamical nature due to its emergence in evolution from the spontaneous exploration-and-stabilization dynamics of animal life, which the authors term vivaciousness. In this commentary, I explore these two claims with relation to two features of experience that are of clear importance to goal-directed behavior both phenomenologically and biologically: (1) the role of probabilistic expectation, and (2) the role of available energy. Applying Jablonka and Ginsburg's framework, I argue that these two features are substantive and potentially universal examples of consciousness being shaped by biology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The concept of teleonomy has been attracting renewed attention recently. This is based on the idea that teleonomy provides a useful conceptual replacement for teleology, and even that it constitutes an indispensable resource for thinking biologically about purposes. However, both these claims are open to question. We review the history of teleological thinking from Greek antiquity to the modern period to illuminate the tensions and ambiguities that emerged when forms of teleological reasoning interacted with major developments in biological thought. This sets the stage for an examination of Pittendrigh's (Adaptation, natural selection, and behavior. In: Roe A, Simpson GG (eds) Behavior and evolution. Yale University Press, New Haven, pp 390–416, 1958) introduction of "teleonomy" and its early uptake in the work of prominent biologists. We then explore why teleonomy subsequently foundered and consider whether the term may yet have significance for discussions of goal-directedness in evolutionary biology and philosophy of science. This involves clarifying the relationship between teleonomy and teleological explanation, as well as asking how the concept of teleonomy impinges on research at the frontiers of evolutionary theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper illuminates primary epistemic functions of teleological characterizations in ecology through discussion of the historical and conceptual origins of the theoretical branch of ecology (§§1–2). I subsequently defuse enduring confusions about the use of teleological characterizations in ecology; with a focus on recent critical arguments by Sagoff in this journal (Sagoff, Synthese 193:3003–3024, 2016) and some other places (e.g., his Sagoff, Ethics, Policy, and Environment 16:239–257, 2013 and Sagoff, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C, 2017) (§3). The paper then culminates by collecting five generalizable novel insights attained through the forgoing discussion and outlining avenues for follow-up work that can build on the arguments laid out in this paper (§4). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper evaluates recent work purporting to show that the "agency" of organisms is an important phenomenon for evolutionary biology to study. Biological agency is understood as the capacity for goal-directed, self-determining activity-a capacity that is present in all organisms irrespective of their complexity and whether or not they have a nervous system. Proponents of the "agency perspective" on biological systems have claimed that agency is not explainable by physiological or developmental mechanisms, or by adaptation via natural selection. We show that this idea is theoretically unsound and unsupported by current biology. There is no empirical evidence that the agency perspective has the potential to advance experimental research in the life sciences. Instead, the phenomena that the agency perspective purports to make sense of are better explained using the well-established idea that complex multiscale feedback mechanisms evolve through natural selection., (© The Author(s) 2024. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the European Society of Evolutionary Biology.)

Teleology has a complicated history in the biological sciences. Some have argued that Darwin's theory has allowed biology to purge itself of teleological explanations. Others have been content to retain teleology and to treat it as metaphorical, or have sought to replace it with less problematic notions like teleonomy. And still others have tried to naturalize it in a way that distances it from the vitalism of the nineteenth century, focusing on the role that function plays in teleological explanation. No consensus has seemed possible in this debate. This paper takes a different approach. It argues that teleology is a perfectly acceptable scientific notion, but that the debate took an unfortunate misstep some 2300 years ago, one that has confused things ever since. The misstep comes in the beginning of Aristotle's Physics when a distinction is made between two types of teleological explanation. One type pertains to artifacts while the other pertains to entities in nature. For Aristotle, artifacts are guided by something external to themselves, human intentions, while natural entities are guided by an internal nature. We aim to show that there is, in fact, only one type of legitimate teleological explanation, what Aristotle would have considered a variant of an artifact model, where entities are guided by external fields. We begin with an analysis of the differences between the two types of explanation. We then examine some evidence in Aristotle's biological works suggesting that in his account of the natural-artifactual distinction, he encountered difficulties in trying to provide teleological accounts of spontaneous generation. And we show that it is possible to resolve these difficulties with a more robust version of an artifact model of teleology, in other words, with an externalist teleology. This is McShea's model, in which goal-directed entities are guided by a nested series a of upper-level fields. To explain teleological behavior, this account invokes only external physical forces rather than mysterious internal natures. We then consider how field theory differs from other efforts to naturalize teleology in biology. And finally, we show how the account enables us to grapple with certain difficult cases—genes and intentions—where, even in biology today, the temptation to posit internal natures remains strong. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We assessed the influence of instrumental outcomedivergence – the extent to which actions differ in terms oftheir outcome probability distributions – on behavioralpreference in a two-alternative forced choice task. We foundthat participants preferred a pair of available actions with highdivergence to a pair with low divergence. The effect ofoutcome divergence, dissociated here from that of othermotivational and information theoretic factors, potentiallyreveals the value of flexible control.

There is a certain metaphor that has enjoyed tremendous longevity in the evolution of ageing literature. According to this metaphor, nature has a certain goal or purpose, the perpetuation of the species, or, alternatively, the reproductive success of the individual. In relation to this goal, the individual organism has a function, job, or task, namely, to breed and, in some species, to raise its brood to maturity. On this picture, those who cannot, or can no longer, reproduce are somehow invisible to, or even dispensable to, the evolutionary process. Here, I argue that the metaphor should be discarded, not on the grounds that it is a metaphor, but on the grounds that this particular metaphor distorts our understanding of the evolution of ageing. One reason the metaphor is problematic is that it frames senescence and death as nature’s verdict on the value of older individuals. Instead, we should explore a different metaphor: the lengthy post-reproductive period in humans and some other animals is not an accident of culture, but designed by nature for the purpose of supporting and guiding younger generations. On this alternate picture, different stages of life have their own evolutionary rationales, their distinctive design features, their special mandates. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Marmoset monkeys show high levels of proactive prosociality, a trait shared with humans, presumably because both species rely on allomaternal care. However, it is not clear whether the proximate regulation of this convergent trait is also similar, in particular with regard to intentionality, which is a defining characteristic of prosocial behavior in the human literature. The aim of this paper was to investigate whether marmoset monkeys' prosociality fulfils the criteria of intentionality developed in primate communication research. The results show that marmoset prosocial behavior (i) has some degree of flexibility, since individuals can use multiple means to reach their goal and adjust them to specific conditions, (ii) depends on the presence of an audience, i.e. potential recipients (social use), and (iii) is goal-directed, because (a) it continues exactly until the putative goal is reached, and (b) individuals check back and look at/for their partner when their prosocial actions do not achieve the putative goal (i.e. if their actions don't lead to the expected outcome, this elicits distinct reactions in the actor). These results suggest that marmoset prosociality is under some degree of voluntary, intentional control. They are in line with other findings that marmosets perceive each other as intentional agents, and only learn socially from actions that are perceived as intentional. The most parsimonious conclusion is, therefore, that prosocial behavior is fundamentally under voluntary control in marmosets, just as it is in humans, even though our more sophisticated cognitive abilities allow for a far more complex integration of prosociality into a broader variety of contexts and of behavioral goals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, we attempt at developing a scenario for the self-organization of goal-directed systems out of networks of (chemical) reactions. Related scenarios have been proposed to explain the origin of life starting from autocatalytic sets, but these sets tend to be too unstable and dependent on their environment to maintain. We apply instead a framework called Chemical Organization Theory (COT), which shows mathematically under which conditions reaction networks are able to form self-maintaining, autopoietic organizations. We introduce the concepts of perturbation, action, and goal based on an operationalization of the notion of change developed within COT. Next, we incorporate the latter with notions native to the theory of cybernetics aimed to explain goal directedness: reference levels and negative feedback among others. To test and refine these theoretical results, we present some examples that illustrate our approach. We finally discuss how this could result in a realistic, step-by-step scenario for the evolution of goal directedness, thus providing a theoretical solution to the age-old question of the origins of purpose.

Organisms play, explore, and mimic those around them. Is there a purpose to this behavior? Are organisms just behaving, or are they trying to achieve goals? We believe this is a false dichotomy. To that end, to understand organisms, we attempt to unify two approaches for understanding complex agents, whether evolved or engineered. We argue that formalisms describing multiscale competencies and goal-directedness in biology (e.g., TAME), and reinforcement learning (RL), can be combined in a symbiotic framework. While RL has been largely focused on higher-level organisms and robots of high complexity, TAME is naturally capable of describing lower-level organisms and minimal agents as well. We propose several novel questions that come from using RL/TAME to understand biology as well as ones that come from using biology to formulate new theory in AI. We hope that the research programs proposed in this piece shape future efforts to understand biological organisms and also future efforts to build artificial agents. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents the Homeo-Heterostatic Value Gradients (HHVG) algorithm as a formal account on the constructive interplay between boredom and curiosity which gives rise to effective exploration and superior forward model learning. We offer an instrumental view of action selection, in which an action serves to disclose outcomes that have intrinsic meaningfulness to an agent itself. This motivated two central algorithmic ingredients: devaluation and devaluation progress, both underpin agent's cognition concerning intrinsically generated rewards. The two serve as an instantiation of homeostatic and heterostatic intrinsic motivation. A key insight from our algorithm is that the two seemingly opposite motivations can be reconciled—without which exploration and information-gathering cannot be effectively carried out. We supported this claim with empirical evidence, showing that boredom-enabled agents consistently outperformed other curious or explorative agent variants in model building benchmarks based on self-assisted experience accumulation.

There is an ongoing debate how one can integrate the subjective (first-person) dimension of experiences more thoroughly into neuropsychological research. In cognitive experimental memory research, for instance, cognitive psychology begins by separating the act of recollection from the context where recollections occur, so as to make memory research suitable for study in the experimental conditions of the laboratory. It is the claim of this article that the challenge for memory research consists not merely in the (possible) loss of meaning entailed by transforming embedded recollected experiences into operationalized cognitive functions. Rather, from the outset, the first-person experiential basis of the entire research procedure is often insufficiently elaborated and hence risks neglecting or misrepresenting significant dimensions of the phenomena it studies. I demonstrate this with regard to habits understood as procedural memories. Research based on the paradigm of embodied cognition and phenomenology has shown that procedural memory-based skills and habits are not necessarily confined to sub-personal (unconscious) processing mechanisms. This paradigm states that some cognitive processes involve not only the brain but also the pre-reflectively experienced lived-body. The key idea is that we have experiential access to bodily processes that are not yet conceptualized or reflexively mediated. In the final part of my paper, I delineate how such experiences can be integrated into the neuropsychological study of habits via the method of ‘front-loaded phenomenology.’

This paper presents the Homeo-Heterostatic Value Gradients (HHVG) algorithm as a formal account on the constructive interplay between boredom and curiosity which gives rise to effective exploration and superior forward model learning. We offer an instrumental view of action selection, in which an action serves to disclose outcomes that have intrinsic meaningfulness to an agent itself. This motivated two central algorithmic ingredients: devaluation and devaluation progress, both underpin agent's cognition concerning intrinsically generated rewards. The two serve as an instantiation of homeostatic and heterostatic intrinsic motivation. A key insight from our algorithm is that the two seemingly opposite motivations can be reconciled—without which exploration and information-gathering cannot be effectively carried out. We supported this claim with empirical evidence, showing that boredom-enabled agents consistently outperformed other curious or explorative agent variants in model building benchmarks based on self-assisted experience accumulation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is an ongoing debate how one can integrate the subjective (first-person) dimension of experiences more thoroughly into neuropsychological research. In cognitive experimental memory research, for instance, cognitive psychology begins by separating the act of recollection from the context where recollections occur, so as to make memory research suitable for study in the experimental conditions of the laboratory. It is the claim of this article that the challenge for memory research consists not merely in the (possible) loss of meaning entailed by transforming embedded recollected experiences into operationalized cognitive functions. Rather, from the outset, the first-person experiential basis of the entire research procedure is often insufficiently elaborated and hence risks neglecting or misrepresenting significant dimensions of the phenomena it studies. I demonstrate this with regard to habits understood as procedural memories. Research based on the paradigm of embodied cognition and phenomenology has shown that procedural memory-based skills and habits are not necessarily confined to sub-personal (unconscious) processing mechanisms. This paradigm states that some cognitive processes involve not only the brain but also the pre-reflectively experienced lived-body. The key idea is that we have experiential access to bodily processes that are not yet conceptualized or reflexively mediated. In the final part of my paper, I delineate how such experiences can be integrated into the neuropsychological study of habits via the method of ‘front-loaded phenomenology.’ [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A popular approach to emotion regulation is that this is a second-order process which is different from emotion and which is driven by the goal of modifying it in some way. The separation between emotion and emotion regulation has been challenged by the fact that emotion regulates itself through different feedback loops. However, the relevance of these counter-examples is doubtful. Emotional feedback is different from standard instances of regulation in that it often involves no representation of a goal. I will employ a cybernetic approach to goal-directedness in order to show that goal representation is not necessary for regulation. Additionally, the view implies that regulation is a constitutive aspect of the goal-directedness of emotions themselves. Thus, it is not only the case that emotional feedback is a genuine type of regulation but it is also a constitutive aspect of emotion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A new theory that naturalizes biological function is explained and compared with earlier etiological and causal role theories. Etiological (or selected effects) theories explain functions from how they are caused over their evolutionary history. Causal role theories analyze how functional mechanisms serve the current capacities of their containing system. The new proposal unifies the key notions of both kinds of theories, but goes beyond them by explaining how functions in an organism can exist as factors with autonomous causal efficacy. The goal-directedness and normativity of functions exist in this strict sense as well. The theory depends on an internal physiological or neural process that mimics an organism's fitness, and modulates the organism's variability accordingly. The structure of the internal process can be subdivided into subprocesses that monitor specific functions in an organism. The theory matches well with each intuition on a previously published list of intuited ideas about biological functions, including intuitions that have posed difficulties for other theories. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

All seemingly teleological systems share a common hierarchical structure. They consist of a small entity moving or changing within a larger field that directs it from above (what I call “upper direction”). This is true for organisms seeking some external resource, for the organized behavior of cells and other parts in organismal development, and for lineages evolving by natural selection. In all cases, the lower-level entity is partly “free,” tending to wander under the influence of purely local forces, and partly directed by a larger enveloping field. The persistent and plastic behavior that characterizes goal-directedness arises, I argue, at intermediate levels of freedom and upper direction, when the two are in a delicate balance. I tentatively extend the argument to human teleology (wants, purposes). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The causal structure of Darwinian evolution by natural selection is investigated. Its basic scheme is reproduction resulting from a feedback loop driven by internal and external causes. Causation internal to the loop connects genotype, development, phenotype, and fitness, with environmental constraints on the latter preventing runaway reproduction. External causes driving the core loop are environmental change and genetic change (mutation, used broadly as including recombination and other mechanisms). This basic causal structure is complicated by modern additions such as control of mutation rate, niche construction, interactions between evolution and development, and epigenetic effects. In this article it is argued that at least one of these additions, control of mutation rate, produces an additional feedback loop incorporating a continual, targeted modulation of stochasticity, and thereby produces an unusual form of causation. This form of causation entangles deterministic and stochastic causation in such a way that it imposes, in effect, an active, goal-driven role on the organisms in a line of descent. The goal is defined by the factor driving the stochasticity, which must be regarded as an intrinsic estimate made implicitly by the organism of its own fitness. The estimator itself is an evolved property of the organism, and is aligned with the apparent (not real, post hoc) goal-directedness of natural selection. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The present study explores the processing of temporal information in event knowledge by focusing on the transition from an earlier, source state to a later, goal state. Participants were presented with an event verb followed by antonymous adjectives or adverbs denoting an earlier state and a later state. The states were presented either chronologically (to cook: cold - hot) or inversely (to cook: hot - cold) with regard to the denoted event. Participants were asked to identify either the earlier or the later state. We found that later states are identified faster and more accurately than earlier states. Later states presented chronologically were identified even more quickly than later states presented inversely. We attribute our results to the fact that directedness towards the goal state is a general principle of cognition which plays a fundamental role in language and in simulation, whereby language processing provides faster and more direct access to goals even than simulation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Movement perception facilitates spatial orienting of attention in infants (Farroni, Johnson, Brockbank, & Simion, 2000). In a series of 4 experiments, we investigated how orienting of attention in infancy is modulated by dynamic stimuli. Experiment 1 (N = 36) demonstrated that 5-month-olds as well as 7-month-olds orient to the direction of a dynamically grasping human hand. Experiment 2 (N = 36) showed that 7-month-olds orient covertly to direction of a geometrical shape moving on the trajectory of the grasping movement, but 5-month-olds do not. Experiment 3 (N = 18) showed that mere linear translating object movement does not elicit covert orienting of attention in 7-month-olds. In Experiment 4 (N = 18), we found that 7-month-olds process both grasping direction and movement direction, which resulted in increased reaction times when these cues conflicted. These findings suggest that orienting of attention reflects rapid detection of goal-directed agents. Five-month-olds need the information of both movement and grasping direction, whereas 7-month-olds can use each of these directional cues in isolation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: Wants, preferences, and cares are physical things or events, not ideas or propositions, and therefore no chain of pure logic can conclude with a want, preference, or care. It follows that no pure-logic machine will ever want, prefer, or care. And its behavior will never be driven in the way that deliberate human behavior is driven, in other words, it will not be motivated or goal directed. Therefore, if we want to simulate human-style interactions with the world, we will need to first understand the physical structure of goal-directed systems. I argue that all such systems share a common nested structure, consisting of a smaller entity that moves within and is driven by a larger field that contains it. In such systems, the smaller contained entity is directed by the field, but also moves to some degree independently of it, allowing the entity to deviate and return, to show the plasticity and persistence that is characteristic of goal direction. If all this is right, then human want-driven behavior probably involves a behavior-generating mechanism that is contained within a neural field of some kind. In principle, for goal directedness generally, the containment can be virtual, raising the possibility that want-driven behavior could be simulated in standard computational systems. But there are also reasons to believe that goal-direction works better when containment is also physical, suggesting that a new kind of hardware may be necessary. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Abstract: Infants need to analyze human behavior in terms of goal-directed actions in order to form expectations about agents’ rationality. There is converging evidence for goal encoding during the first year of life from looking time as well as social learning paradigms using imitation procedures. However, conceptual interpretations of these abilities are challenged by low-level motor resonance accounts that propose task-specific lower level sensorimotor associations underlying looking time tasks rather than abstract conceptual knowledge. To test the differential predictions derived from the two accounts, we investigated within-child consistency of performance on different, but conceptually related, tasks requiring goal encoding. This study presented seven-month-old infants with a looking time task and an imitation task, both testing their ability to encode an action goal based on a reaching action, as well as a working memory task to control for the influence of general cognitive capacity. Results showed inter task convergence to be independent of working memory: infants who spent more time looking at goal change events in the looking time task were more likely to selectively reproduce the goal in the imitation task when the model had performed an intentional grasping action rather than a back-of-hand object contact. These findings support the view that low-level motor resonance mechanisms are not sufficient to explain the capacities of action understanding in infants. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

How shall we understand apparently teleological systems? What explains their persistence (returning to past trajectories following errors) and their plasticity (finding the same trajectory from different starting points)? Here I argue that all seemingly goal-directed systems-e.g., a food-seeking organism, human-made devices like thermostats and torpedoes, biological development, human goal seeking, and the evolutionary process itself-share a common organization. Specifically, they consist of an entity that moves within a larger containing structure, one that directs its behavior in a general way without precisely determining it. If so, then teleology lies within the domain of the theory of compositional hierarchies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Determining the best way to utilize on-line media for advertising purposes is a critical question. This research, based on the Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM), incorporates consumer goal-directedness and involvement as moderators influencing when a particular advertising strategy (i.e., variation strategy vs. appeal strategy) will be appropriate for Web advertisements. The results of a laboratory experiment supported the use of ELM in the Web environment and showed how advertising strategies should be designed and implemented in accordance with consumer goal-directedness and involvement to achieve Web advertising effectiveness. The results demonstrated the uniqueness of the Web media and the importance of goal-directedness and consumer involvement in the Web advertising context. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract: A theory of the dynamics of dyadic interaction is presented, based on the concepts of “concern” (i.e., intentions, goals, and interests), “appraisal” and “contagiousness”. Differences between children who participate in a specific interaction are linked to differences in social competence and social power. An overview is given of the social psychological underpinnings of these concepts and of their developmental trajectories. The theory is transformed into a mathematical, dynamic systems model of dyadic interaction. The model describes the time evolution of an “involvement” variable, which is defined as “the number of actions of an individual that are explicitly aimed at the interaction partner”. In order to illustrate the veracity and applicability of the mathematical model, an empirical study is described that applies the model to a dyadic play situation in children of different sociometric statuses. Most of the predictions generated by the model are verified. The conclusion addresses, among others, the use of dynamic systems models in the study of social development and a number of applied issues. A final point concerns the necessity of coupling models of short-term dynamics, such as the one presented in the current article, with models of long-term dynamics, i.e., of developmental change. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

Twelve- to fourteen-month-old infants’ reactions to violations of the principle of rational action [Cognition 56 (1995) 165] were studied in two experiments, using humanlike puppets and human agents rather than computerized shapes as stimuli. In Experiment 1, infants watched a puppet approaching another puppet on a stage, while in Experiment 2 a videotaped sequence of a person approaching another person was shown. In both experiments, a rational and a non-rational approach condition were contrasted in the habituation phase. In the rational approach condition, an obstacle had to be overcome by climbing or jumping. In the non-rational approach condition, the agent made a detour approach in the absence of an obstacle. In the test phase, infants watched direct and indirect-approach events. In both experiments, infants in the rational approach condition looked significantly longer at indirect-approach than at direct-approach test events, while no difference between the two types of test events was observed in the non-rational approach condition. These findings support the assumption that one-year-old infants have principled expectations about rational goal approaches of human agents. [Copyright &y& Elsevier]

In this article, we attempt at developing a scenario for the self-organization of goal-directed systems out of networks of (chemical) reactions. Related scenarios have been proposed to explain the origin of life starting from autocatalytic sets, but these sets tend to be too unstable and dependent on their environment to maintain. We apply instead a framework called Chemical Organization Theory (COT), which shows mathematically under which conditions reaction networks are able to form self-maintaining, autopoietic organizations. We introduce the concepts of perturbation, action, and goal based on an operationalization of the notion of change developed within COT. Next, we incorporate the latter with notions native to the theory of cybernetics aimed to explain goal directedness: reference levels and negative feedback among others. To test and refine these theoretical results, we present some examples that illustrate our approach. We finally discuss how this could result in a realistic, step-by-step scenario for the evolution of goal directedness, thus providing a theoretical solution to the age-old question of the origins of purpose. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we analyze Nikolai Bernstein's notion of the activity of living organisms, which he introduced at the end of his career. Bernstein did not leave a systematic description of his last thoughts, but many remarks in his writing, especially in his last book [Bernstein, 1966], show that he thought deeply about the biological significance of the ideas that he developed while studying motor control. He accepted that negentropy (the tendency towards probabilistic determinacy, orderliness, free energy expenditure) is a hallmark of all life processes but wrote extensively about the insufficiency of this property and searched for a more complete definition of living organisms. This definition would include the goal-directedness of development, anticipation, persistence, tendency toward autonomy, initiative, and more. Thus, this paper is an attempt to present the definition of the activity of living organisms from Bernstein's later work to English-speaking readers., (Copyright © 2021 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.)

Purpose in life is one of the six dimensions of psychological well-being. It refers to the sense that life has meaning and direction, and that goals have been achieved or are attainable., Objective: To perform the semantic-cultural validation and internal consistency analysis of the 10-item Purpose in Life scale of Ryff and Keyes., Methods: Data were drawn from an eight-year follow-up of older adults aged ≥80 in the FIBRA Study, conducted in Campinas, Brazil., Results: The mean age of participants (N=187) was 83.81 (±3.60), mean number of years of education was 4.38 (±3.76), and mean income was 3.49 minimum wages (±2.61), comprising 125 (66.8%) females (mean purpose = 3.51 ±0.68) and 62 (33.2%) males (mean purpose = 3.58±0.60). There was no significant difference in the purpose between men and women or between educational levels. For age and income, purpose was higher in the 80- to 84-year-old group (younger age) and with income of 3-5 minimum wages (higher income). Cronbach's alpha for the scale was 0.628, indicating moderate internal consistency., Conclusion: The Purpose in Life scale was translated, adapted for use in Brazil and applied in a sample of old-old adults. Purpose seemed to be influenced by age and income., Competing Interests: Disclosure: The authors report no conflicts of interest.