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In the United States (US), biosafety and biosecurity oversight of research on viruses is being reappraised. Safety in virology research is paramount and oversight frameworks should be reviewed periodically. Changes should be made with care, however, to avoid impeding science that is essential for rapidly reducing and responding to pandemic threats as well as addressing more common challenges caused by infectious diseases. Decades of research uniquely positioned the US to be able to respond to the COVID-19 crisis with astounding speed, delivering life-saving vaccines within a year of identifying the virus. We should embolden and empower this strength, which is a vital part of protecting the health, economy, and security of US citizens. Herein, we offer our perspectives on priorities for revised rules governing virology research in the US.

Background: The dynamic nature of zoonotic emergence, spillover and spread necessitates multisectoral coordination beyond national borders to encompass cross-boundary and regional cooperation. Designated points of entry (POEs), specifically ground crossings, serve as critical locales for establishing and maintaining robust prevention, detection, notification, coordination, and response mechanisms to transboundary emerging and re-emerging disease threats. In order to better assess One Health capacities for transboundary zoonotic diseases (TZD) prevention, detection and response we adapted an existing tool, One Health Systems Assessment for Priority Zoonoses (OHSAPZ), for a cross-border, POE setting in North Africa. Methods: The One Health Transboundary Assessment for Priority Zoonoses (OHTAPZ) tool was used to support prioritization of transboundary zoonoses and analyze operational capacities between national and subnational-level human and animal health stakeholders from Libya and Tunisia. Country partners jointly identified and prioritized five TZDs of concern. Case study scenarios for each priority pathogen were used to elicit current disease operations, as well as multisectoral and bilateral engagement networks. Finally, a gap analysis was performed to determine bilateral strengths and weaknesses to TZDs. Results: The five priority TZDs jointly confirmed to undergo One Health assessment were avian influenza (low and high pathogenic strains); brucellosis; Rift Valley fever; Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever; and rabies. Using the qualitative information collected, a transboundary systems map schematic was developed outlining the movement of human patients, animals, diagnostic samples, and routes of communication and coordination both within and between countries for zoonotic diseases. Conclusions: Analysis of current operations (prevention, detection, surveillance, laboratory capacity, quarantine/isolation, and response) and the resulting transboundary systems map schematic helped identify existing capacity strengths for certain priority pathogens, as well as challenges to timely information-sharing and coordination. We developed targeted recommendations to address these limitations for joint action planning between Libya and Tunisia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the importance of proactive biological surveillance in detecting and containing infectious diseases. It emphasizes the limitations of event-based surveillance, which relies on individuals seeking healthcare, and proposes the use of pathogen agnostic wastewater surveillance as a proactive approach. Wastewater testing, coupled with next-generation sequencing (NGS), can detect a wide range of viruses and provide early warning of emerging and novel pathogens. The article suggests the development of national guidelines for pathogen agnostic wastewater surveillance in high-risk areas, such as locations with animal agriculture and international ports of entry. The implementation of such a system would require standardized protocols, bioinformatics pipelines, and interagency collaboration. The article concludes that shifting from event-based surveillance to proactive surveillance will greatly benefit global health and biological defense. [Extracted from the article]

H9N2 avian influenza A viruses are endemic in poultry of many Eurasian countries and have caused repeated human infections in Asia since 1998. To evaluate the potential threat of H9N2 viruses to humans, we investigated the replication and transmission efficiency of H9N2 viruses in the ferret model. Five wild-type (WT) H9N2 viruses, isolated from different avian species from 1988 through 2003, were tested in vivo and found to replicate in ferrets. However these viruses achieved mild peak viral titers in nasal washes when compared to those observed with a human H3N2 virus. Two of these H9N2 viruses transmitted to direct contact ferrets, however no aerosol transmission was detected in the virus displaying the most efficient direct contact transmission. A leucine (Leu) residue at amino acid position 226 in the hemagglutinin (HA) receptorbinding site (RBS), responsible for human virus-like receptor specificity, was found to be important for the transmission of the H9N2 viruses in ferrets. In addition, an H9N2 avian-human reassortant virus, which contains the surface glycoprotein genes from an H9N2 virus and the six internal genes of a human H3N2 virus, showed enhanced replication and efficient transmission to direct contacts. Although no aerosol transmission was observed, the virus replicated in multiple respiratory tissues and induced clinical signs similar to those observed with the parental human H3N2 virus. Our results suggest that the establishment and prevalence of H9N2 viruses in poultry pose a significant threat for humans. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The emergence of West Nile Virus lineage 2 (WNV-2) has contributed to multiple major human outbreaks in Greece since 2010. Studies to date investigating biological and environmental factors that contribute to West Nile Virus (WNV) transmission have resulted in complex statistical models. We sought to examine open publicly available data to ascertain if a predictive risk assessment could be employed for WNV-2 in Greece. Based on accessible data, factors such as precipitation, temperature, and range of avian host species did not yield conclusive outcomes. However, by measuring the average rate of temperature change leading up to peak caseloads, we found a predictive characteristic to the timing of outbreaks. Detailed evolutionary studies revealed possible multiple introductions of WNV-2 in Europe, and that Greece acts through a source-sink inversion model, thereby allowing continued reseeding of WNV transmission each year by overwintering the Culex pipiens mosquito vector. Greece has proven an excellent model in WNV surveillance and has demonstrated the importance of rapid reporting for proper preparedness and response to vector-borne diseases.

Before the Ebola virus disease (EVD) outbreak of 2014-2016, Guinea did not have an emergency management system in place. During the outbreak, Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA) 2014-2019 funds made it possible to rapidly improve the country's capacity to manage epidemics through the development of public health emergency operation centres (PHEOCs) at the national and district levels. Since the end of the response, the infrastructure, staff, and systems of these PHEOCs have been further reinforced and well-integrated in the daily activities of Guinea's National Agency for Health Security, the entity responsible for the management of epidemics. The development of PHEOCs as emergency management tools for epidemics in Guinea would not have been possible without a strong endorsement within the Ministry of Health. Guinea's PHEOC network is well-positioned to serve as a model of excellence for other Ministries in Guinea and Ministries of Health of other countries of West Africa.

The launch of the Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA) in February 2014 capped over a decade of global efforts to develop new approaches to emerging and reemerging infectious diseases-part of the growing recognition that disease events, whether natural, accidental, or intentional, threaten not just public health, but national, regional, and global security interests. In 2005, the United States, along with other Member States of the World Health Organization (WHO), adopted the revised International Health Regulations [IHR (2005)]. The IHR (2005) conferred new responsibilities on WHO and the global health community to coordinate resources for capacity building and emergency response, and on the now-196 States Parties to develop the core capacities required to detect, assess, report, and respond to potential public health emergencies of international concern. Both GHSA and the IHR aim to elevate political attention and encourage participation, coordination, and collaboration by multiple stakeholders, while leveraging previously existing commitments and multilateral efforts. GHSA and the IHR (2005) are platforms for action; how efforts under each will complement each other remains unclear. Mechanisms that measure progress under these 2 overlapping frameworks will aid in focusing resources and in sustaining political momentum for IHR implementation after 2016.

Background: Humans have faced 3 major influenza pandemics in the 20th century. In recent years, it has become evident that domestic poultry play an important role in the generation of novel influenza strains with the capacity to cross the species barrier and infect and kill humans at an alarming rate. There is particular concern that avian influenza viruses of the H5N1 subtype could cause a pandemic., Methods: A better understanding of the genetic factors that lead to interspecies transmission is essential to prevent the emergence of influenza pandemics. In addition, the stockpiling of antiviral drugs and development of vaccines against potentially pandemic viruses must be considered under the umbrella of pandemic plans., Results: The world is ill-prepared to face an influenza pandemic. Only a handful of countries have developed influenza pandemic plans, and even fewer are developing vaccines or stockpiling antiinfluenza drugs to ameliorate the impact of a potential pandemic. Currently the major undertaking in several at risk nations is to implement effective control measures to stop the spread of the virus at its source, that is, avian species. These measures include the culling of domestic poultry to contain the virus, a practice that could eventually bring these countries to a financial and social breaking point., Conclusions: Avian influenza disease is preventable in humans and birds with the concerted effort of governments and poultry producers, large and small, to improve biosecurity and education programs. Pandemic plans can reduce the impact of the pandemic; however, preventing avian influenza in poultry can avert a pandemic altogether.