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This article identifies four articulations of the growing 'postsecular' condition of social and political thought, and places the idea of sociology in relation to them, I identify and critically engage with those aspects of poststructuralist vitalism, transcendental realism, multiculturalist thinking, and the recent 'dialogical' sentiments of Habermas that might undermine sociology's definitive (but broadly conceived) secularism/naturalism. This implies that if we are concerned about advancing the role of 'public sociology' then we should be actively engaged in countering antisecular and anti-naturalistic elements of the postsecular climate. Yet we must avoid anthropomorphizing sociology as a public player, and accept too that the postsecular reconsideration of faith versus reason' stretches beyond the confines of epistemotogical and explanatory considerations per se. KEY WORDS Habermas / multiculturalism / naturalism / postsecular / public sociology / realism

ABSTRACT. In recent years a general consensus has been developing in the philosophy of science to the effect that strong social constructivist accounts are unable to adequately account for scientific [...]

One of the most significant problems confronted by states in an anarchic environment is the uncertainty over others' intentions and motives that can lead to counterproductive policies and suboptimal outcomes, and this issue is central for both offensive and defensive realism. Reassurance can be achieved without increased vulnerability when offense and defense are distinct, and the balance between them is neutral.

A study analyzes relationalist approaches to social sciences in terms of a conceptual distinction between ephilosophizing sociologyE and esociologizing philosophyE, which mark two different attitudes towards philosophical metaphysics and ontological commitments. It contrasts its methodological relationism of Deweyan origin with Pierre BourdieuEs namesake, arguing that even though BourdieuEs theories are of practice, they remain rather unpractical as regards to appropriately serving actual research work.

In her book Being Human (2000), Margaret Archer presents intriguing pragmatist emphases on practice, embodiment and non-linguistic knowing-how, as regards to understanding humanity. However, as Archer attempts to conjoin these ideas with the morphogenetic realism she has been working on for the last few decades, she ends up holding on to a subject-object dualism, which makes things complicated. The authors' alternative pragmatist account defended in the article flows from Deweyan pragmatist and Rortian antirepresentationalist insights. The main issues in the article concern Archer's complicated tripartite concept of knowledge, which is contrasted with a (Deweyan-Rylean) distinction between linguistic knowledgethat and embodied knowing-how. It is argued that knowledge is a natural, sophisticated tool that human organisms use when coping with their environment; it is always acquired on the strength of embodied knowing-how, from some actor's point of view, but the term 'knowledge' itself should be reserved for the propositional, linguistic knowledge-that.

In this paper I draw on some of the work of John McDowell in order to develop a 'realist' account of normative reasons for action. On the view defended here, there can be correct moral judgments that capture the reasons there are for acting in certain ways; and the reasons themselves are just some of the morally relevant facts of the situation about which the judgment is made. Establishing this account relies crucially, I argue, on an appeal to substantive ethical theory, to a theory that allows for the attribution of truth to the judgments in question. The account defended here can in fact be equally well supported by ethical theories as otherwise diverse as those of Aristotle and Kant. The resulting account is a version of moral realism, but one that is not committed to defending a realist account of the nature of moral value.

The realism and anti-realism debate is understood as a debate about the nature of reality and it is to be characterized as a debate concerning essential independence. Quasi-realist is a character designed to illustrate the difficulties of giving a proper account of the debate between the realist and the anti-realist.

My aim is to arrive at a better understanding of the distinction between direct realism and representationalism by offering a critical analysis of Steven Nadler's account in Arnauld and the Cartesian Philosophy of Ideas. I argue contrary to Nadler that Descartes and Arnauld are representationalists, and I also argue that Aquinas is a representationalist.

Since the death of positivism in the 1970s, philosophers have turned their attention to scientific realism, evolutionary epistemology, and the Semantic Conception of Theories. Building on these trends, Campbellian Realism allows social scientists to accept real-world phenomena as criterion variables against which theories may be tested without denying the reality of individual interpretation and social construction. The Semantic Conception reduces the importance of axioms, but reaffirms the role of models and experiments. Philosophers now see models as 'autonomous agents' that exert independent influence on the development of a science, in addition to theory and data. The inappropriate molding effects of math models on social behavior modeling are noted. Complexity science offers a 'new' normal science epistemology focusing on order creation by self-organizing heterogeneous agents and agent-based models. The more responsible core of postmodernism builds on the idea that agents operate in a constantly changing web of interconnections among other agents. The connectionist agent-based models of complexity science draw on the same conception of social ontology as do postmodernists. These recent developments combine to provide foundations for a 'new' social science centered on formal modeling not requiring the mathematical assumptions of agent homogeneity and equilibrium conditions. They give this 'new' social science legitimacy in scientific circles that current social science approaches lack.

'Room at the Top' was published in 1957, and the 1959 film adaptation was widely regarded as one of the first British movies to adopt a realistic approach to human behavior. The film rejected social orthodoxy and portrayed sex frankly, and was praised by approximately 90% of British critics.

The author reviews Lloyd Gruber's book 'Ruling the World: Power Politics and the Rise of Supranatural Institutions' and tackles the issue of contemporary realism in relation to the balance of power and international co-operation. The author finds that Gruber's work contributes to the growing trend of generalizing realist claims which reduces them to a cost-benefit criteria with unclear outcomes and explaining that international and supranational institutions as motivated by self-interest rather than power compulsions.

Distinguishing between refuting a paradoxical argument and explaining where the paradox fails is important, a point some analysts have not grasped. Contingent claims cannot be correct in every possible world, so Putnam's Paradox does not hold.

The argument earlier advanced against Putnam's Paradox is fallacious since few realists would say humans cannot inhabit a world different from this one. Nowhere does Putnam's argument support the notion of the necessary truth of an ideal theory.

Some analysts too readily dismiss the model-theoretic argument against metaphysical realism raised by Putnam's Paradox. The counter-argument to Putnam fails because it accepts a position Putnam does not.

Slave narratives in the 19th century, such as that of Frederick Douglass, began the use of realism in American literature. Combining marketing techniques and the arousal of sympathy through realistic portrayals of suffering, slave biographies became the first successful African American literature.

The author examines the use of realism and identity in the motion picture The Passenger. Topics include character development and motivation, directing, and storytelling.

The methods used for exact sciences confine their findings within limited areas, so the results only describe small parts of the real world. Acceptance of universality for any exact science is a poor approach to creating an improved world.

Claude Bernard's philosophy of science applies realism to scientific theories while rejecting realism in the case of unobservable entities. This approach is best described as 'fictionalism.'

This article characterizes D. Z. Phillips as a philosopher who would not clearly establish his position in the post-foundational theological debate. Phillips' commitment to faith after foundationalism, his separation of faith from rationality, and his use of Wittgensteinian language games are discussed.

As a die-hard supernaturalist, someone 'at two with nature' (Woody Allen) who would be at one with God, the author has mixed feelings about Theodore Nunez's defense of 'naturalism.' Unlike neopragmatists, the author is not troubled by Nunez's general realism about value; he takes exception not to Nunez's theoretical account of truth, but to his specific axiology. He does not share Nunez's confidence that 'projective nature' can provide reliable moral inspiration, suggesting instead that such inspiration can arise only from trust in the holiness of God. KEY WORDS: intrinsic value, neopragmatism, realism, supernaturalism, theocentrism

Nancy Frankenberry's anthropocentric assumptions are worrisome. From her neopragmatist viewpoint, the value of nature can only be interpreted in the context of human values and purposes. As such, her statement that conservation and environmentalism are deeply human projects seems too much like an empty compliment. Timothy Jackson, on the other hand, rightfully asserts that environmental ethics is about appreciating values and purposes not of our own making. His theologically oriented stance, however, precludes other options such as Rolston's cruciform naturalism.

Dreyfus and Spinosa's 'Coping with Things-in-themselves' assumes that the line between the familiar and the strange coincides with the line between the 'for us' and the 'in itself'. But their opponents would urge that the familiar-strange distinction be dealt with pragmatically rather than ontologically.

Realism is usually regarded as a dominant - and monolithic - approach in the study of international relations. In the past few years, however, some of the most vigorous and [...]

It is a privilege to have others comment upon one's own work, and I am extremely grateful to Allin Cottrell, Zohreh Emami, Tim Riordan, Roy Rotheim, and Alex Viskovatoff. I [...]

Tony Lawson's investigations into 'economics and reality' represent a transfer and extension into the domain of economics of a set of ideas first developed by Roy Bhaskar (1978) in relation [...]

I. INTRODUCTION As the title of this article implies, our primary focus in exploring the ideas proposed by Tony Lawson is the relationship between his perspective and teaching. Parker Palmer, [...]

Traditional realism should be replaced by the view allowing global relations between models and the world. The concept of structural realism was first advanced by John Worrall in 1989, when he argued the most accurate representation of reality was to emphasize the structural, or mathematical, content of theories. However, this requires that the structure of a mind-independent world must be imaginable in terms of experiential categories.

Entity realism and structural realism contain each other, a position that can be called semirealism. Entity realism maintains that most concepts in scientific theories exist in the natural world, while structural realism takes the view that most structures of physical theories accurately describe relations between parts of the natural world. Yet each theory is the same idea from differing points of view.