Search

The Indian realists argue for the unique claim that universals are perceptible. The possibility of allowing perceptual access to universals puts pressure on the Nyāya theory of perception. The Nyāya philosophers introduced the notion of nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa (non-conceptual perception) to accommodate the perceptibility of universals. Since there is no direct introspective evidence for non-conceptual perception, it is difficult, if not impossible, to specify the content of nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa or non-conceptual perception. This paper addresses this concern by turning to Ned Block's work in contemporary philosophy of perception. Using Block's arguments, I propose that we have an independent empirical route to specify the content of a non-conceptual perception which is not subject to the ‘myth of the given’ objection. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article offers a new argument that there must be something rather than nothing, grounded in the PSR. Inspired by the rationalist tradition running from Parmenides to Spinoza and Leibniz, I argue that there must be something rather than nothing because the contrary would constitute a violation of the PSR. In particular, I argue that, if there was nothing, there could be no sufficient reason for it, since nothing at all would exist to serve as a sufficient reason. Therefore, given the PSR, something must exist after all. After presenting and explaining this new argument, I consider a series of objections and replies, and develop some of its broader philosophical implications. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Kant worries that if we are not free, morality will be nothing more than a phantasm for us. In the final section of the Groundwork, he attempts secure our freedom, and with it, morality. Here is a simplified version of his argument: A rational will is a free will A free will stands under the moral law Therefore, a rational will stands under the moral law In this paper, I attempt to defuse two prominent objections to this argument. Commentators often worry that Kant has not managed to establish that we are rational beings with wills in the first place, and that he equivocates in his use of 'free' between premise 1 and 2. I argue that both of these objections can be overcome, and thus seek to offer some hope for Kant's approach in Groundwork III. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Hyperagency objections appeal to the risk that cognitive enhancement may negatively impact our well-being by giving us too much control. I charitably formulate and engage with a prominent version of this objection due to Sandel (2009) —viz. that cognitive enhancement may negatively impact our well-being by creating an "explosion" of responsibilities. I first outline why this worry might look prima facie persuasive, and then I show that it can ultimately be defended against. At the end of the day, if we are to resist cognitive enhancement, it should not be based on a Sandel-style hyperagency argument. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Ideal Worlds objection is an objection that purports to identify a potentially fatal flaw in some of our most influential moral theories: including, among others, rule consequentialism, Kant's Law of Nature Formula of the Categorical Imperative and Scanlonian contractualism. In this article, I offer an account of the objection, a survey of some of the ways defenders of affected theories have sought to avoid it, and the problems that those responses can encounter. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I analyse Émilie Du Châtelet’s (1706–49) account of causation which, in turn, is crucial for understanding her philosophical main work, the Institutions de physique (1740/1742). So far, the topic of causation in Du Châtelet’s thought has received but little attention despite its importance. I will show that Du Châtelet’s account of physical causation is that of physical influx much in line with the position taken by some of the most prominent eighteenth-century German metaphysicians at the time of the publication of her Institutions: Martin Knutzen (1713–49), Johann Peter Reusch (1691–1758) and the pre-Critical Immanuel Kant (1724–1804). I will argue that physical influx takes place at the level of simple substances or physical monads, and I will defend my interpretation against the main objection to physical influx: that it conflicts with Leibniz’s non-transfer argument. The ultimate metaphysical details regarding how physical influx has to be understood remain an issue, that of understanding the causality of the cause. This, however, is an issue that other causal theories face, too (in their own way). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Mind wandering is a pervasive feature of experience. But why does the mind wriggle about rather than stay focused? The answer depends on understanding mind wandering as task‐unrelated thought. Despite being the standard view of mind wandering in cognitive psychology, there has been no systematic elaboration of the task‐unrelated thought view of mind wandering. I argue for the task‐unrelated thought view by showing how mind wandering reflects a distinctive form of non‐vigilant thinking. This argument defuses several objections to the task‐unrelated thought view. The account of mind wandering defended here is also compatible with a naturalistic account of subjectivity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Anselm described god as "something than which nothing greater can be thought" [1, p. 93], and Descartes viewed him as "a supreme being" [7, p. 122]. I first capture those characterizations formally in a simple language for monadic predicate logic. Next, I construct a model class inspired by Stoic and medieval doctrines of grades of being [8, 20]. Third, I prove the models sufficient for recovering, as internal mathematics, the famous ontological argument of Anselm, and show that argument to be, on this formalization, valid. Fourth, I extend the models to incorporate a modality fit for proving that any item than which necessarily no greater can be thought is also necessarily real. Lastly, with the present approach, I blunt the sharp edges of notable objections to ontological arguments by Gaunilo and by Grant. A trigger warning: every page of this writing flouts the old saw "Existence is not a predicate" and flagrantly. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A standard approach to neutral value suggests that it can be understood in comparative terms by reference to value relations. I develop some objections to the standard approach based on assumptions about value facts being closely connected to fittingness facts. I then suggest that these objections give us reasons to amend the standard approach with a noncomparative understanding. The claim is that if an item has neutral value, then it is a fitting target of indifference, where this is understood not as an absence of attitudes but a discrete type of reaction or evaluation. By leaning on some general insights from philosophical psychology about the evaluative role of indifference, I then attempt to give some hints as to how we might understand its nature. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Arts Magazine is the property of Thamar University and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Despite the advance of the Open Access (OA) movement, most scholarly production can only be accessed through a paywall. We conduct an international survey among researchers (N = 3304) to measure the willingness and motivations to use (or not use) scholarly piracy sites, and other alternatives to overcome a paywall such as paying with their own money, institutional loans, just reading the abstract, asking the corresponding author for a copy of the document, asking a colleague to get the document for them, or searching for an OA version of the paper. We also explore differences in terms of age, professional position, country income level, discipline, and commitment to OA. The results show that researchers most frequently look for OA versions of the documents. However, more than 50% of the participants have used a scholarly piracy site at least once. This is less common in high-income countries, and among older and better-established scholars. Regarding disciplines, such services were less used in Life & Health Sciences and Social Sciences. Those who have never used a pirate library highlighted ethical and legal objections or pointed out that they were not aware of the existence of such libraries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Adab Al-Kufa is the property of Republic of Iraq Ministry of Higher Education & Scientific Research (MOHESR) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Does Seneca entirely reject the utility of dialectical study for moral improvement? No, I argue here. Focusing on Letter 87, I propose that Seneca raises and disarms objections to formal Stoic arguments to help moral progressors avoid backsliding and advance towards ethical knowledge. I trace this method back to Chrysippus and show that reading Letter 87 in this Chrysippean framework yields a satisfying explanation of its otherwise puzzling features. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article "Desired C-section" is about a legal dispute in which the plaintiff sues the defendants for alleged treatment and disclosure errors during childbirth. The plaintiff claims that he had requested a cesarean section, which is disputed by the defendants. It is determined that the settlement between the parties is valid and that the plaintiff's declaration of annulment is ineffective. It is also noted that errors regarding motives or calculations in a settlement are irrelevant. The article also contains information about the course of the birth and the medical measures taken. The plaintiff was born with Apgar scores of 6/6/8 and was transferred to the neonatology department due to respiratory adaptation disorder. Movement restrictions of the right arm and diaphragmatic paralysis were detected. The plaintiff was fed through a tube and had to be treated in the pediatric intensive care unit for almost four weeks. The plaintiff claims that the treating doctors should have performed a cesarean section as his mother was recommended to do so due to his sister's previous difficult birth. The court dismissed the lawsuit as no treatment error was proven. In the present case, it concerns a medical treatment during childbirth that resulted in complications. An expert determined that the treatment was appropriate and no errors were made. In particular, the administration of the medication Cytotec for labor induction was considered professional. Furthermore, no connection could be established between the use of Cytotec and the occurring complications. The court also decided that the disclosure regarding labor induction was sufficient. The appeal does not raise any legal objections to the findings of the district court and also does not contain any specific objections to the court's evaluation of evidence. The court does not doubt the correctness and completeness of the findings of the district court. It assumed the mother's consent to the intake of the medication Cytotec based on the disclosure form and the mother's statements. Even if the disclosure about the effects of the medication should not have been sufficient, this would not result in liability of the defendants. Liability due to a lack of disclosure about a primary cesarean section as an alternative treatment also does not arise. Finally, the court rightly denied liability due to disregarding an expressed desire for an elective cesarean section and failing to disclose its risks. In the present case, it concerns a lawsuit regarding an alleged vaccine injury after a COVID-19 vaccination. The plaintiff completed training as a nurse for the sick and elderly and was vaccinated against COVID-19 with the BioNTech/Pfizer vaccine by the defendants. The plaintiff had previously received an information leaflet and filled out the medical history form. After the vaccinations, a vaccine reaction was observed in the plaintiff. The court decided that administering COVID-19 vaccines is a sovereign activity and therefore the state is solely liable. Self-liability of the sovereign actor is not possible. [Extracted from the article]

In this article I argue that justice often requires that candidates who are sufficiently qualified for jobs be hired via lottery on the basis that this is the best way to recognise each candidate's equal moral claim to access meaningful work. In reaching this conclusion I consider a variety of potential objections from the perspectives of the employer, of the most qualified candidate, and of third parties, but ultimately reject the idea that a person's status as the most qualified candidate can explain why they ought to be appointed over other sufficiently qualified candidates. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted a question seldom addressed in a straightforward manner by political theorists: whether populism is intrinsically anti-science. This article identifies three different ways in which populist actors worldwide have grounded their scepticism, distrust, or hostility to scientific inputs, to the extent that they are relevant for political action: (1) they raise a moral objection against scientists who have been allegedly corrupted by foreign interests, turning them into enemies of the people; (2) they present a democratic objection against the technocratic claim that scientific experts should rule regardless of the popular will; and (3) they employ an epistemic argument against scientific reasoning, which is said to be inferior to common-sense and folk wisdom, and antithetical to the immediateness of political action. While these objections have been wielded in a selective and unsystematic way, they all speak to the core feature of populism, which is the people versus elites divide: the moral objection targets scientists as members of an elite in cahoots with alien powers; the democratic objection targets an unelected elite that seeks to undermine the people's rule; the epistemic objection questions that the standard to validate knowledge-claims is a complex and detached-from-ordinary-experience rationality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the late nineteenth century, scholars have formulated theories about the role and placement of organs in the St. Matthew Passion, using them to interpret the work's theological message and anchor broader ideas about how Bach positioned his other players and singers for performances in the Thomaskirche. The church housed two permanently fixed organs: a large one in the west gallery and the misleadingly labeled swallow's nest organ in a gallery on the east wall. The latter, smaller organ has become the central point in debates about the Passion, leading to a variety of interpretations. The current evidence, reviewed here in substantial detail, does not unequivocally prove any of the main theories. Yet not all are equally strong, By examining the history of scholarship on the St. Matthew Passion and by carefully reexamining the evidence, we can grow more aware of weaknesses stemming from the enduring influence of older scholar ship, based on questionable premises, outdated information, or seemingly unintentional misreading. The results argue strongly against one of the most common theories, which posits a small auxiliary role for the east gallery organ, along with a "third choir," for most of Bach's performances. Proponents of this theory have sometimes harnessed it to add another layer of theological symbolism to Bach's music. This too is questionable. Musical evidence may also argue against it. Bach's changing approach to scoring the chorale "O Lamm Gottes, unschuldig in the opening movement shows that the melody does not work in dialectic opposition to the two main choruses, as sometimes claimed, but emerges from within the group. In place of this theory, two alternatives stand out: either the full separation of the two choirs beTween the two galleries of the Thomaskirche or the positioning of all performers in the west gallery, with no role for the east gallery or its organ for any of Bach's Passion performances. Though neither fully accounts for every detail in the evidence nor answers all possible objections, they do offer more satisfying explanations than the alternatives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the present work I will try to explain two lines of interpretation of the discussed article that regulates the crime of feminicide in our Penal Code, making known the consequences that would follow from accepting them, in addition to some objections to them. Much of the essay will examine the best interpretation of the criminal offense and then the strongest objection that must be faced; I consider the latter the real problem of feminicide. Finally, I will suggest an interpretation of feminicide and the conclusions will be compiled. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We access most of our most cherished beliefs via testimony. Philosophy is no exception. We treat spoken and written philosophical testimony as evidence for philosophical claims. Nonetheless, this paper argues that philosophical testimony is unable to justify philosophical beliefs. If testimony is the only evidence we have to justify philosophical beliefs, this entails skepticism about philosophy. Call this the testimony challenge. First, the paper argues that philosophical testimony does not meet the conditions under which evidence can justify our beliefs. Second, it shows that philosophical testimony cannot provide preemptive epistemic reasons as science and mathematics do. Finally, it answers the self‐defeat objection and a set of objections aiming to block the thesis that philosophical testimony does not justify philosophical beliefs. The paper aims to rethink the role of philosophical testimony in philosophy and reinforce the skeptical worries raised by methodological and disagreement challenges. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Laborde contrasts Default Republicanism with Labordian Republicanism. The latter view 'answers' the Probabilistic and the Anti-Psychology Objections to Default Republicanism. The former objection holds that the mere possibility of unconstrained intervention does not matter for unfreedom, whereas the latter contends that it is by virtue of the experience-independent fact of servitude that one is unfree. I argue that people sympathetic to these objections should have reservations about Labordian Republicanism. In any case, republicans should reject the Anti-Psychology Objection. More generally, Pluralist Republicanism might be preferable to Labordian Republicanism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to the principle of indifference, when a set of possibilities is evidentially symmetric for you – when your evidence no more supports any one of the possibilities over any other – you're required to distribute your credences uniformly among them. Despite its intuitive appeal, the principle of indifference is often thought to be unsustainable due to the problem of multiple partitions: Depending on how a set of possibilities is divided, it seems that sometimes, applying indifference reasoning can require you to assign incompatible credences to equivalent possibilities. This paper defends the principle of indifference from the problem of multiple partitions by offering two guides for how to respond. The first is for permissivists about rationality, and is modeled on permissivists' arguments for the claim that a body of evidence sometimes does not uniquely determine a fully rational credence function. The second is for impermissivists about rationality, and is modeled on impermissivists' arguments for the claim that a body of evidence does always uniquely determine a fully rational credence function. What appears to be a decisive objection against the principle of indifference is in fact an instance of a general challenge taking different forms familiar to both permissivists and impermissivists. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent years, narrative accounts of the self have gained increasing attention. It is widely accepted that humans are storytelling creatures, that stories shape our self‐conception, and that we fail to be agents without a narrative framework. While there is less agreement on what constitutes a narrative, it is generally understood to be more than a chronological listing of life events; it is also an account of the explanatory relationships among these events—a story of how events lead to other events. However, specifying the nature of this explanatory relationship has proven difficult. As critics have pointed out, narrativists often resort to simplistic notions of narrative when faced with criticism. The concept of narrative explanation needs to be elaborated in a way that is both substantive enough to exclude trivial behaviours from being considered narratives and nonrestrictive enough to accommodate ordinary lives that may not be particularly story‐like. In this paper, I review existing accounts of narrative explanation and propose a teleological account, according to which narratives consist of goal‐directed explanations of a sequence of events. I argue that a teleological account of narrative explanation can be a fruitful way to clarify the concept of "narrative" in the context of the narrative self by addressing the most common objections. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One crucial premise in the argument from illusion is the Phenomenal Principle. It states that if there sensibly appears to be something that possesses a sensible quality, then there is something of which the subject is aware that has that sensible quality. The principle thus enables the inference from a mere appearance to an existence (usually a mental one). In the argument from appearance, a similar move is taken by some philosophers—they infer a content from a mere appearance. There are two kinds of defences for the Phenomenal Principle in the literature, namely, the epistemological one (e.g. H.H. Price) and the semantic one (e.g. Frank Jackson). I argue that neither consolidates the Phenomenal Principle. I particularly demonstrate that the appearance verb in premise 1 of the argument from illusion is not used in the phenomenal sense as it is used in the Phenomenal Principle, which renders the argument essentially invalid. To avoid invalidity, the proponents either give up the phenomenal use, which makes the argument unable to serve its original purpose, i.e. inferring an unusual existence, or they insist on the phenomenal use in all premises of the argument, which will trivialise the argument. I also demonstrate that a similar objection applies to the argument from appearance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After examining the problem that gratuitous suffering poses for Nietzsche's notion of life affirmation, I mount a skeptical response to this problem on Nietzsche's behalf. I then consider an orthogonal objection to Nietzschean life affirmation, which argues that the need to justify life is symptomatic of life denial and show how strengthening the skeptical defense sidesteps this worry. Nietzsche's skepticism about our all‐too‐human, epistemic position thus aids his project of life affirmation in two ways. First, it suggests that we are unable to determine reliably whether a given instance of suffering is, in fact, gratuitous. Second, it provides a corrective to the moralistic need to redeem life, showing that all attempts to justify life as a whole are epistemically fraught. Before concluding, I examine Nietzsche's reasons for advancing such an epistemological argument and suggest how we might approach life affirmation in nonrational terms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Sufficientarian theories of distributive justice are often considered to be vulnerable to the 'blindness to inequality and other values objection'. This objection targets their commitment to holding the moral irrelevance of requirements of justice above absolute thresholds of advantage, making them insufficiently sensitive to egalitarian moral concerns that do have relevance for justice. This paper explores how sufficientarians could reply to this objection. Particularly, I claim that, if we accept that the force of the aforementioned objection comes from relational, and not distributive, inequalities, different strategies are open for sufficientarians in order to be sensitive to these concerns. Drawing on recent literature about the relation between distributive and relational egalitarianism, and the possibility of reducing one to the other, strategies of 'internalizing' and 'externalizing' relational egalitarian concerns to a distributive sufficientarian framework are explored. In turn, I suggest that both strategies fail in their standard versions, but argue that a particular 'hybrid view' about justice is an attractive candidate for the sufficientarian theorist. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Necmettin Erbakan University School of Law Review is the property of Necmettin Erbakan University School of Law Review and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In his contribution to this special issue, Hindriks considers the Security Principle, an account of pro tanto obligations based on our account of reasons (Gunnemyr and Touborg 2023a). According to the Security Principle, you have a pro tanto obligation not to perform an action that makes a harm more secure. Hindriks raises two objections to this account. First, that it is too flexible; second, that it gives wrong verdicts when agents are robustly unwilling to act in a certain way. Here, we respond to Hindriks' objections and argue that Hindriks' account, the Threshold Principle, gives counterintuitive verdicts in preemption and low-probability cases. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Revista de Derecho Comunitario Europeo is the property of Centro de Estudios Politicos y Constitucionales and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of FinanzRundschau is the property of De Gruyter and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Pierre-Sylvain Regis, once a well-known defender of Cartesianism, offers an unusually rich and innovative refutation of Spinoza. While many of his early modern contemporaries raised narrower objections to particular claims in Spinoza's Ethics , Regis develops a broader anti-Spinozistic position, one that threatens the very core of Spinoza's metaphysical ambitions and offers a philosophically robust alternative. However, as with any far-reaching philosophical commitment, Regis's gambit comes with substantive costs of its own, including creating instabilities within the core of his own philosophical system. Far from diminishing the significance of Regis's anti-Spinozism, this critical appraisal helps us better appreciate both the conceptual pull of Spinozism within early modern metaphysics and one sweeping, albeit costly way of escaping its orbit. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Are certain characteristics of dispute resolution procedures associated with higher levels of procedural justice? We address this question through a quantitative analysis of real-world experiences of 194 professional legal representatives with the objection procedures of 81 Dutch administrative authorities. In our analysis, two general procedural characteristics are taken into account: the involvement of an independent third party and the extent to which the procedure is focused on the conciliation of competing interests. The involvement of an independent third party was not associated with higher levels of procedural justice. Procedures that were perceived to be more focused on the conciliation of competing interests were evaluated as more procedurally just, even more so in disputes where the administrative authority was perceived to have a higher degree of discretion and in disputes that ended in a negative result for the litigant. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Criminal law abolitionists claim that legal punishment cannot be morally justified and that we should therefore abolish criminal law. While this is still a minority position in the current debate, the number of proponents has been increasing, and even opponents have developed a certain degree of sympathy for such claims in recent years. Yet one of the reasons many remain hesitant regarding the abolition of criminal law appears to be the lack of a thought-through alternative, in addition to abolitionists disagreeing considerably amongst themselves on what an alternative should look like. I will call this the missing alternative objection. To address this central concern, I will argue in this paper that the most prominent versions of abolitionism actually converge on the same alternative core to criminal law — even though they are driven by vastly different motivations. This core that current abolitionist theories converge on is two-fold: first, the claim that the state should compel offenders to provide restitution for the victim; second, the claim that restorative processes should be used wherever possible when addressing criminal wrongdoing. This common core is enough to reject the missing alternative objection. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article "Parfit's Mixed Maxim Objection against the Formula of Universal Law Reconsidered" examines Derek Parfit's criticism of Kant's Formula of Universal Law (FUL) and its implications for Kantian ethics. Parfit argues that FUL should be revised and that the concept of a maxim should be abandoned. However, contemporary Kantians have not taken Parfit's criticism seriously and believe that his project is too different from Kant's to engage in fruitful dialogue. The article explores Parfit's "Mixed Maxims Objection" and proposes a response to it, arguing that a notion of maxims as policies can still be ethically evaluated. The author distinguishes different versions of the objection and focuses on the version that poses a fundamental challenge to Kant's ethics. They argue that Kantians can respond to some versions of the objection but must address the version that questions the bridge between evaluating maxims and evaluating actions. The article concludes that it is possible to evaluate maxims as policies while making plausible judgments about the morality of actions. [Extracted from the article]

In a previous article, I developed transcendental arguments to refute several versions of Nick Bostrom's simulation hypothesis. I called some of these arguments the SIM-style argument. In this article, I have four main aims. First, I employ the SIM-style argument to remedy a defect in Hilary Putnam's brain-in-vat argument. Second, I show that the most radical skepticism, which Tim Button called the nightmarish Cartesian skepticism, can be refuted by the SIM-style argument or by another transcendental argument I develop here. Third, I compare my approach to radical skepticisms with Donald Davidson's, as it is often regarded as an exemplar of transcendental arguments. Fourth, I explain how the prominent objections, mainly developed by Barry Stroud, to transcendental arguments can incur two undesirable results: psychologism and Kantian skepticism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Revue Electronique Internationale Pour la Publication de Recherches Juridiques is the property of Revue Electronique Internationale Pour la Publication de Recherches Juridiques and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

A theme running through Katherine Hawley's recent works on trust and trustworthiness is that thinking about the relations between these and Miranda Fricker's notion of testimonial injustice offers a perspective from which we can see several limitations of Fricker's own account of testimonial injustice. This paper clarifies the aspects of Fricker's account that Hawley's criticisms target, focusing on her objections to Fricker's proposal that its primary harm involves a kind of epistemic objectification and her characterization of testimonial injustice in terms of prejudicial credibility deficits. I also offer an assessment of the potency of Hawley's objections, concluding that they do point to genuine limitations of Fricker's account, but that we can appreciate Hawley's points without adopting her trust-centric approach to testimonial injustice, or her specific commitment-based accounts of trust and trustworthiness. However, in the last section I examine the positive picture of testimonial injustice that emerges from Hawley's discussion of unequally distributed obstacles to both being trustworthy and maintaining a reputation for trustworthy testimony in her recent book How To Be Trustworthy, considering how this picture contrasts with Fricker's account and where it might have important affinities with other accounts in the literature. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

At first glance the understandings of theological authority in Eastern Orthodoxy and Protestantism are quite different. This fact has the potential to hinder effective dialogue between the two traditions. This article examines the possibility of the Protestant understanding of theological authority being read and interpreted through the reformer’s doctrine of the Testimonium Spiritus Sancti Internum (the Inner Witness of the Holy Spirit) such that it meets the Eastern Orthodox objections. Applying the teaching of the Spirit’s witness provides an opportunity to emphasise some important features and highlight nuances in the understanding of authority that otherwise could be easily neglected. While it does not solve all the problems in the dialogue, this approach could possibly lead to important rapprochement of the two positions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Romanian Case Law Review / Revista Română de Jurisprudenţă is the property of Universul Juridic Publishing House and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

There are two justifications for the major questions doctrine. The first justification, vigorously offered by Justice Neil Gorsuch, might be described as Lockean; it sees the doctrine as an effort to preserve legislative primacy and to reduce the policymaking authority of the executive branch. On the Lockean view, the major questions doctrine is a clear-statement principle, and it is in evident tension with textualism. The second justification, vigorously offered by Justice Amy Coney Barrett, might be described as Wittgensteinian; it sees the doctrine as an effort to capture Congress's likely instructions. The Wittgensteinian justification fits comfortably with textualism, and it does not operate as a clear-statement principle at all. The Court can be seen as having adopted an incompletely theorized agreement in favor of the major questions doctrine, but at some point, the two justifications might lead in different directions. While neither justification is implausible, both of them run into serious objections. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Aufklärung: Revista de Filosofia is the property of Aufklarung: Revista de Filosofia and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Revista CIENCIA UNEMI is the property of Universidad Estatal de Milagro (UNEMI) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Problematic content on social media can be countered through objections raised by other community members. While intended to deter offenses, objections can influence the surrounding audience observing the interaction, leading to their collective approval or disapproval. The results of an experiment manipulating seven types of objections against common types of offenses indicate audiences' support for objections that implore via appeals and disapproval of objections that threaten the offender, as they view the former as more moral, appropriate, and effective compared to the latter. Furthermore, audiences tend to prefer more benign and less threatening objections regardless of the offense severity (following the principle of "taking the high road") instead of objections proportionate to the offense ("an eye for an eye"). Taken together, these results show how objections to offensive behaviors may impact collective perceptions on social media, paving the way for interventions to foster effective objection strategies in social media discussions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Revista de Derecho Fiscal is the property of Revista de Derecho Fiscal and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The “special military operation” (SVO) launched by Vladimir Putin against Ukraine on February 24, 2022, took most Russians by surprise. They had to be persuaded of its correctness, by any means. This article details the Russian state’s methods for sustaining its changing official narrative about the “SVO” as well as the ways and means the dissident portion of Russia’s citizenry made their objections to the war in Ukraine heard during its first year. The Kremlin’s already firm grip on the distribution of information was tightened; Russia’s wordsmiths were silenced, jailed, or forced to flee the country. School curricula were reorganized so that they became incubators of young Russian patriots. The article concludes with conjecture on why the state’s message found such a welcoming audience among Russians, at least during the first year of the war. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I examine a type of objection lodged against the central premise in Hartshorne's reconstruction of Anselm's ontological argument. The main claim that the proponents of this type of objection have in common is that owing to the logical status of terms such as "exists" or "necessary existence," no legitimate inference can be made from Anselm's Principle to the actual existence of a Perfect Being. I will examine versions of this "logical leap" objection as set forth by Alston, Shaffer, and Hick. I argue that given a certain plausible interpretation of Anselm's Principle and of the necessity operator involved, the objections fail to undermine Anselm's Principle or the relevant inferences the argument draws from it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is, on a given moral view, an agent‐centered restriction against performing acts of a certain type if that view prohibits agents from performing an instance of that act‐type even to prevent two or more others from each performing a morally comparable instance of that act‐type. The fact that commonsense morality includes agent‐centered restrictions is often seen as a decisive objection to act‐consequentialism. Despite this, I'll argue that agent‐centered restrictions are more plausibly accommodated within an act‐consequentialist framework than within the more standard side‐constraint framework. For I'll argue that when we combine agent‐relative act‐consequentialism with a Kantian theory of value, we arrive at a version of consequentialism—namely, Kantsequentialism—that has several advantages over the side‐constraint approach. What's more, I'll show that this version of consequentialism avoids the disadvantages that critics of consequentializing have presumed that such a theory must have. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Traditionally, nature has often been thought to be structured by essential forms providing the generic features of natural things and thus the foundations for scientific explanations. In contrast, human history and the social domain have been thought to be the realm of ever‐changing appearances, where contingency prevails. The paper argues that the existence of essential forms is compatible with the contingent, mind‐dependent and historical character of the social world, and that essential forms can also be found in the social domain. Two categories of entities are discussed that suggest themselves to be identified as social forms, namely social kinds and social identities. To this end, it is shown that standard arguments for the existence of essential forms also apply to the social domain, and objections to the existence of social forms are rebutted. Particular attention is paid to the explanatory appeal of social forms. The paper concludes by suggesting that, far from being oppressive, essential social forms are presupposed by liberating social practices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]