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[EN] Globalization is challenging the very core of cooperative governance and ownership decision, especially in Southern European countries, like Portugal, where a large number of producers are organized in traditional and Mediterranean-style agricultural cooperatives. This paper analyses the effects of governance and control variables related with size over two alternative indicators of performance: revenues transferred to members/patrons and capital structure. The results suggest that these cooperatives have difficulties being sustainable in the more competitive global wine markets, if they follow, essentially, a practice of maximum patronage refund, reducing their capacity to improve leverage and to finance more profitable, but risky, long run investments., [ES] La globalización está poniendo en cuestión la esencia de la gobernanza cooperativa y su estructura societaria, sobre todo en los países del Sur de Europa, como Portugal, donde muchos productores están organizados en cooperativas agrícolas tradicionales y de estilo mediterráneo. Este trabajo analiza los efectos de las variables de gobierno y control relacionados con el tamaño sobre dos indicadores de comportamiento alternativos: los ingresos transferidos a los miembros/socios y la estructura del capital. Los resultados sugieren que estas cooperativas atraviesan dificultades para mantenerse sostenibles en un mercado de vino global y más competitivo si siguen, en esencia, una política de máximo retorno al socio, reduciendo su capacidad para de mejorar la estructura de su deuda y capacidad para financiar inversiones más rentables, aunque con mayor riesgo, a largo plazo.

Globalization is challenging the very core of cooperative governance and ownership decision, especially in Southern European countries, like Portugal, where a large number of producers are organized in traditional and Mediterranean-style agricultural cooperatives. This paper analyses the effects of governance and control variables related with size over two alternative indicators of performance: revenues transferred to members/patrons and capital structure. The results suggest that these cooperatives have difficulties being sustainable in the more competitive global wine markets, if they follow, essentially, a practice of maximum patronage refund, reducing their capacity to improve leverage and to finance more profitable, but risky, long run investments.

Leverage is one of the most important financial factors to the survival and viability of agricultural cooperatives (e.g., wine cooperatives) during a period of intense competition. Leverage is influenced both by the behavior of managers and cooperative members. An empirical study for the Douro Demarcated Region Wine Cooperatives (DDRWC) supports the hypothesis that managers have a positive influence in the determination of the equity/total assets ratio and that individualistic behavior of cooperative members has a negative influence in the value of this ratio. This paper suggests that there may be value in reconsidering cooperatives in the context of a so-called Mediterranean model.

The United States Congress recently passed a law that creates an alternative to individual transferable quota (ITQ) management. The American Fisheries Act promises the ability to rationalise one of the world's largest fisheries, the North Pacific pollock fishery, without the overt appearance of allocating permanent property rights to a public resource. The Act enabled pollock fishers to form cooperative bargaining units that are guaranteed a fixed share of the total allowable catch providing they deliver to historic processors. This paper explores the political economy of policy change and the innovative use of fishery cooperatives to advance voluntary decapitilisation and rationalisation that Congress intended to benefit both vessels and processors. Game theory offers insights into the likelihood of achieving congressional intent. It is argued that the Act introduces a new market failure while attempting to rid the fishery of the open access externality. It is further argued that outcomes of voluntary agreements, whether targeting environmental concerns or natural resource management, are sensitive to market structure and institutional contexts.

The analytical approach to studying waste management is investigated here in the context of large scale dairying. The typical short-run approach that regards waste management as separable from primary production is contrasted with a longer-run systems approach in which waste management is regarded as an interdependent stage of production. Failure to consider interdependencies between waste management and agricultural production could compromise potential efficiencies in the overall system. Furthermore, cooperative waste treatment and disposal among livestock producers may contribute to greater efficiency and afford opportunities for resource conservation and recovery through waste utilization.

The Alaskan king crab industry collapsed in the early l 980s due to stock declines and overexploitation. That collapse caused a transition within the industry and motivated analysis of the fishery. Bioeconomic modeling of the industry is presented, illustrating the importance of incorporating both biological and economic factors into the management process.

The traditional cost effectiveness framework was broadened to incorporate some key motivations underlying the adoption of erosion control practices in irrigated agriculture. Selected financial factors were found to be important determinants of adoption. Failure to incorporate such factors promotes overestimation of cost effectiveness, improper ranking of BMPs, and ultimately faulty policy prescriptions.