Search

We propose a dual-channel reverse supply chain consisting of a formal and an informal electric vehicle battery recycler under government intervention with a subsidy-and-penalty policy. By comparing and analyzing the equilibrium results, profits, and environmental impacts, we discuss the two members��� competition and cooperation strategies under government intervention. Analytical results show that government subsidy to the formal recycler (penalty to the informal recycler) increases (decreases) the two members��� recycling prices at differed rates. Government intervention increases (reduces) the recycling quantity in the formal (informal) recycling channel. The two members can reach a consensus on cooperation only if the subsidy and penalty are set at sufficiently high levels. In this case, the government should push them up as high as its budget allows for environmental benefit.

The newsvendor problem is formulated with the focus theory of choice in which instead of using the expected utility in the existing approaches, the optimal order quantity is determined as per which order quantity’s focus (the most salient demand) is the most preferred. This new formulation is a bilevel optimization problem in which the lower level chooses the focus of each order quantity and the upper level determines the optimal order quantity. The proposed model has maximin upper and lower level programs that are nonsmooth. We derive the optimal order quantity under this new framework and characterize the properties of the optimal solution. The proposed model provides a new perspective to analyze the newsvendor problems.