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Prison sentences that exceed the natural lifespan present a puzzle because they have no more power to deter or incapacitate than a single life sentence. In three survey experiments, we tested the extent to which participants support these longer-than-life sentences under different decision contexts. In Experiment 1, 130 undergraduates made hypothetical prison sentence-length recommendations for a serious criminal offender, warranting two sentences to be served either concurrently or consecutively. Using a nationally representative sample (N = 182) and an undergraduate pilot sample (N = 260), participants in Experiments 2 and 3 voted on a hypothetical ballot measure to either allow or prohibit the use of consecutive life sentences. Results from all experiments revealed that, compared to concurrent life sentences participants supported the use of consecutive life sentences for serious offenders. In addition, they adjusted these posthumous years in response to mitigating factors in a manner that was indistinguishable from ordinary sentences (Experiment 1), and their support for consecutive life sentencing policies persisted, regardless of the default choice and whether the policy was costly to implement (Experiments 2 and 3). These judgment patterns were most consistent with retributive punishment heuristics and have implications for sentencing policy and for theories of punishment behavior. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

UnlabelledThe evolved capacity for third-party punishment is considered crucial to the emergence and maintenance of elaborate human social organization and is central to the modern provision of fairness and justice within society. Although it is well established that the mental state of the offender and the severity of the harm he caused are the two primary predictors of punishment decisions, the precise cognitive and brain mechanisms by which these distinct components are evaluated and integrated into a punishment decision are poorly understood. Using fMRI, here we implement a novel experimental design to functionally dissociate the mechanisms underlying evaluation, integration, and decision that were conflated in previous studies of third-party punishment. Behaviorally, the punishment decision is primarily defined by a superadditive interaction between harm and mental state, with subjects weighing the interaction factor more than the single factors of harm and mental state. On a neural level, evaluation of harms engaged brain areas associated with affective and somatosensory processing, whereas mental state evaluation primarily recruited circuitry involved in mentalization. Harm and mental state evaluations are integrated in medial prefrontal and posterior cingulate structures, with the amygdala acting as a pivotal hub of the interaction between harm and mental state. This integrated information is used by the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex at the time of the decision to assign an appropriate punishment through a distributed coding system. Together, these findings provide a blueprint of the brain mechanisms by which neutral third parties render punishment decisions.Significance statementPunishment undergirds large-scale cooperation and helps dispense criminal justice. Yet it is currently unknown precisely how people assess the mental states of offenders, evaluate the harms they caused, and integrate those two components into a single punishment decision. Using a new design, we isolated these three processes, identifying the distinct brain systems and activities that enable each. Additional findings suggest that the amygdala plays a crucial role in mediating the interaction of mental state and harm information, whereas the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex plays a crucial, final-stage role, both in integrating mental state and harm information and in selecting a suitable punishment amount. These findings deepen our understanding of how punishment decisions are made, which may someday help to improve them.

Abstract We analyzed sentencing data from sixteen years of criminal trials in the State of Colorado, consisting of almost 3,000 individual sentences, and discovered an interaction effect of harm, gender, [...]

INTRODUCTION 243 I. EXPLORING MENTAL STATE ATTRIBUTION 245 II. THE SIX EXPERIMENTS 254 A. Experiment 1: Attributing Mental States Using 254 MPC Definitions B. Experiment 2: Subjects' Unguided Moral Intuitions [...], A central tenet of Anglo-American penal law is that in order for an actor to be found criminally liable, a proscribed act must be accompanied by a guilty mind. While it is easy to understand the importance of this principle in theory, in practice it requires jurors and judges to decide what a person was thinking months or years earlier at the time of the alleged offense, either about the results of his conduct or about some elemental fact (such as whether the briefcase he is carrying contains drugs). Despite the central importance of this task in the administration of criminal justice, there has been very little research investigating how people go about making these decisions, and how these decisions relate to their intuitions about culpability. Understanding the cognitive mechanisms that govern this task is important for the law, not only to explore the possibility of systemic biases and errors in attributions of culpability but also to probe the intuitions that underlie them. In a set of six exploratory studies reported here, we examine the way in which individuals infer others' legally relevant mental states about elemental facts, using the framework established over fifty years ago by the Model Penal Code ("MPC"). The widely adopted MPC framework delineates and defines the four now-familiar culpable mental states: purpose, knowledge, recklessness, and negligence. Our studies reveal that with little to no training, jury-eligible Americans can apply the MPC framework in a manner that is largely congruent with the basic assumptions of the MPC's mental state hierarchy. However, our results also indicate that subjects' intuitions about the level of culpability warranting criminal punishment diverge significantly from prevailing legal practice; subjects tend to regard recklessness as a sufficient basis for punishment under circumstances where the legislatures and courts tend to require knowledge.

This Article empirically tests two key questions. First: How sensitive are jurors to variations in the language that delineates the criminal mental state categories? Second: To what extent do jurors [...]

INTRODUCTION The movement that calls itself "therapeutic jurisprudence" (1) is both ineffective and dangerous, in almost the same way that its predecessor--the rehabilitative movement that became popular in the 1930s [...]

LAW WITHOUT VALUES: THE LIFE, WORK AND LEGACY OF JUSTICE HOLMES. By Albert W. Alschuler. (†) Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 2000. 325 pp. I. INTRODUCTION In 1888, Oliver [...]

The Murrows' paper, 'A hypothetical link between dehumanization and human rights abuses', in which they propose that neuroscience may answer some difficult public policy questions, including questions about the First Amendment, is an unfortunate foray into law and public policy unjustified by the current state of neuroscience. Neuroscientific insights may one day have important implications for the law, and for some of the folk psychological assumptions embedded in the law, but they will never change the words of the written Constitution, or answer difficult policy questions in the interstices of those words. Suggesting that neuroscience can today inform these questions does a disservice to science, law and the complexity of the human condition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]