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This study examines an Islamic dialectical objection called kasr, or "breaking," as treated by the dialecticians and legal theorists Abū Isḥāq al-Shīrāzī (d. 1083 CE) and Abū al-Walīd al-Bājī (d. 1081 CE). Kasr has both legitimate and illegitimate applications, and we confront the fallacious modes denounced by our theorists with deontic paradoxes and puzzles falling under the rubric of logical extrapolation fallacy. Our primary claim is that, whereas logical extrapolation produces fallacies or paradoxes by unsafely applying inference rules of standard alethic and/or logical necessity to the deontic realm, the fallacies generated by illegitimate modes of kasr in Islamic legal theory (wherein logical rules are expressed dialectically) constitute a genuine source for reflecting on what patterns of reasoning should be endorsed for determining causality in legal-and, perhaps, natural-epistemological contexts. Ultimately, this is the first step towards a larger study of kasr, which will compare it with other dialectical objections and treat relevant critical discourses from later Muslim legal theorists and dialecticians.

International audience; The present contribution delves into a recent development of the dialogical rules for proof-theory penned by Ansten Klev that arose from Per Martin-Löf's take on assertoric knowledge as involved in the correctness criterion for assertion. The main aim of our paper is to set out the central steps towards a new Dialogical Framework called Immanent Reasoning II, which on the one hand integrates some of the CTT-rules developed by Klev, but on the other, develops further the general tenets of the dialogical perspective on meaning and logic. In contrast to Klev's approach, IR-II contains rules that indicate how to develop plays and winning strategies for a thesis.

This study examines an Islamic dialectical objection called kasr, or "breaking," as treated by the dialecticians and legal theorists Abū Isḥāq al-Shīrāzī (d. 1083 CE) and Abū al-Walīd al-Bājī (d. 1081 CE). Kasr has both legitimate and illegitimate applications, and we confront the fallacious modes denounced by our theorists with deontic paradoxes and puzzles falling under the rubric of logical extrapolation fallacy. Our primary claim is that, whereas logical extrapolation produces fallacies or paradoxes by unsafely applying inference rules of standard alethic and/or logical necessity to the deontic realm, the fallacies generated by illegitimate modes of kasr in Islamic legal theory (wherein logical rules are expressed dialectically) constitute a genuine source for reflecting on what patterns of reasoning should be endorsed for determining causality in legal-and, perhaps, natural-epistemological contexts. Ultimately, this is the first step towards a larger study of kasr, which will compare it with other dialectical objections and treat relevant critical discourses from later Muslim legal theorists and dialecticians.

Talk presented at the Workshop on Arabic Logic in honour of Tony Street University of California, Berkeley, 24-25 April 2022; International audience; The present study, focused on Shihāb al-Dīn Suhrawardī Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq, develops some preliminary explorations on his remarkable epistemology of presence, in light of his postulate of the priority of the experience of unity by presence. Furthermore, the paper should pave the way for responding to the challenges of Tony Street and others on the compatibility of Suhrawardī's critique of Ibn Sīnā with the development of a temporal and modal syllogism that seems quite close to that of Ibn Sīnā. Suhrawardī's modalities are to be understood as the different ways a predicate relates to its subject rather than as propositional operators. Necessarily necessary modality relates unconditionally the subject-term with the predicate-term; in contrast, necessarily contingent modality relates conditionally these terms. Moreover, necessarily necessary predication either admits simple conversion (corresponds to definition) or not (corresponds to genus). Necessarily contingent predication can also be declined in admitting simple conversion (corresponds to proprium) and not admitting this conversion (corresponds to accident). Necessarily contingent predication includes acquired potentialities or capacities such as literacy; and natural or not-acquired, such as breathing. Whereas predicating a not-acquired capacity of an actual individual involves time as focusing in one particular individual-e.g. laughing/breathing is necessarily but contingently said of humans since there must be at least one time when laughing is present, and one when it is absent concerning each individual; predicating an acquired capacity amounts to asserting such a contingency with regard to the whole genus-e.g., predicating literacy of humans assumes that at least one individual in at least one time actualizes literacy iff there is another human who does not-there are some variants related to commitment to either strong or Weak Plenitude (only acquired capacities seem to admit Weak Plenitude). We will put this at work in Suhrawardī's own (sketchy) framework for syllogism.

International audience; The present study, focused on Shihāb al-Dīn Suhrawardī Ḥikmat al-Ishrāq, develops some preliminary explorations on his remarkable epistemology of presence, in light of his postulate of the priority of the experience of unity by presence. Furthermore, the paper should pave the way for responding to the challenges of Tony Street and others on the compatibility of Suhrawardī's critique of Ibn Sīnā with the development of a temporal and modal syllogism that seems quite close to that of Ibn Sīnā. Suhrawardī's modalities are to be understood as the different ways a predicate relates to its subject rather than as propositional operators. Necessarily necessary modality relates unconditionally the subject-term with the predicate-term; in contrast, necessarily contingent modality relates conditionally these terms. Moreover, necessarily necessary predication either admits simple conversion (corresponds to definition) or not (corresponds to genus). Necessarily contingent predication can also be declined in admitting simple conversion (corresponds to proprium) and not admitting this conversion (corresponds to accident). Necessarily contingent predication includes acquired potentialities or capacities such as literacy; and natural or not-acquired, such as breathing. Whereas predicating a not-acquired capacity of an actual individual involves time as focusing in one particular individual-e.g. laughing/breathing is necessarily but contingently said of humans since there must be at least one time when laughing is present, and one when it is absent concerning each individual; predicating an acquired capacity amounts to asserting such a contingency with regard to the whole genus-e.g., predicating literacy of humans assumes that at least one individual in at least one time actualizes literacy iff there is another human who does not-there are some variants related to commitment to either strong or Weak Plenitude (only acquired capacities seem to admit Weak Plenitude). We will put this at work in Suhrawardī's own (sketchy) framework for syllogism.

The present project is twofold. First, it gives a thorough representation of the concept of analogical reasoning in law by introducing and comparing contemporary theories regarding the subject. Second, it provides an independent analysis of analogies in the framework of immanent reasoning. The first part provides explanations and comparison of six contemporary theories of analogical reasoning in law. These theories are categorised into schema-based theories and inference-based theories. Schema-based theories of analogical reasoning capture the notion of analogy by a description of a rule or 'schema'. Inference-based theories on the other hand explain analogical reasoning as a distinct way of reasoning. Based on this distinction, the project compares the theories by how they handle the notions of horizontal and vertical relations and by how they analyse multiple competing analogies. The second part of the project provides an independent analysis of analogies by utilising the framework of immanent reasoning. Immanent reasoning is described, together with an explanation of other notions that are relevant for the given analysis. The project then introduces two kinds of analogical reasoning, general precedent-based reasoning and precedent-based reasoning with heteronomous imperatives. These kinds are first analysed in the general formulation of constructive type theory and is then given an alternative formulation in its dialogical interpretation. Following this, we introduce a discussion on the advantages of utilising this framework for analysing legal reasoning in general and analogical reasoning in particular.Based on a variant of the principle of proportionality, the present project provides a new analysis of analogical reasoning in the framework of immanent reasoning. By utilising the formalisation of moral conditionals, we show how we can arrive at a precise analysis of the concept of analogical reasoning. Because of the particular notion of dependent types in CTT, this approach also allows for formalising initial conditions and thereby an explicit notion of permitted analogy. The dialogical interpretation takes this one step further as this allows for representing this feature as individual conditions for the particular form of the introduced analogy.The inclusion of initial conditions is a new feature not known to have been previously introduced in any other contemporary analyses of analogy and the particularity of this project is that it provides further meaning explanations of analogical reasoning that includes an initial permission in a simple and natural way, closely related to actual legal practice.; Le présent projet se compose de deux objectifs. Premièrement, il entend donner une représentation approfondie du concept de raisonnement analogique dans le contexte du droit en introduisant et en comparant les théories contemporaines sur le sujet. Deuxièmement, il entend proposer une analyse indépendante de l'analogie dans le cadre du raisonnement immanent.La première partie fournit des explications et une comparaison de six théories contemporaines du raisonnement analogique en droit. Ces théories sont classées en deux catégories, les théories basées sur des schémas et les théories basées sur l'inférence. Les théories du raisonnement analogique basées sur les schémas définissent la notion d'analogie par la description d'une règle ou d'un schéma. D'autre part, les théories basées sur l'inférence permettent de présenter le raisonnement analogique comme un mode de raisonnement unique. Sur la base de cette distinction, le projet offre une comparaison sur les théories à partir de la manière dont elles permettent le traitement des notions de relations horizontales et verticales et de la manière dont elles livrent une analyse de multiples analogies incompatibles. La deuxième partie du projet propose une analyse indépendante des analogies en utilisant le cadre du raisonnement immanent. Le raisonnement immanent est décrit, parallèlement à l'explication d'autres notions pertinentes pour l'analyse donnée. Le projet introduit ensuite deux types de raisonnement analogique, le raisonnement général basé sur les précédents et le raisonnement basé sur les précédents avec des impératifs hétéronomes. Ces types sont d'abord analysés dans la formulation générale de la Théorie Constructive des Types et reçoivent ensuite une formulation alternative dans l'interprétation dialogique du raisonnement immanent. Enfin, on présentera une discussion sur les avantages de l'utilisation du raisonnement immanent comme cadre d'analyse du raisonnement juridique en général et du raisonnement analogique en particulier. Basé sur une variante du principe de proportionnalité, le présent projet propose une nouvelle analyse du raisonnement analogique. En utilisant la formalisation des conditionnels moraux, nous pouvons parvenir à une formalisation du raisonnement analogique. En raison de la particularité de la notion de types dépendants, cette approche à également permis de formaliser les conditions initiales et donc une notion explicite d'admissibilité de l'analogie. L'interprétation dialogique va encore plus loin car elle permet de représenter cette fonctionnalité comme des conditions individuelles pour la forme particulière de l'analogie introduite. L'inclusion de conditions initiales est une nouvelle fonctionnalité qu'on ne trouve pas dans d'autres analyses contemporaines de l'analogie. La particularité de ce projet est qu'il permet de décrire ce trait d'une manière simple et naturelle, étroitement liée à la réalité pratique légale.

In this article, I review the new book by C. D. Novaes, The Dialogical Roots of Deduction: Historical, Cognitive, and Philosophical Perspectives on Reasoning (2020). I reconstruct the main themes and arguments presented in the work and critically assess its results.

International audience; This paper is at the same time a first step towards an "implementation" of the inferentialist view of meaning and a first proposal for a logical structure which describes an argumentation. According to inferentialism the meaning of a statement lies in its argumentative use, its justifications, its refutations and more generally its deductive relation to other statements. In this first step we design a simple notion of argumentative dialogue. Such dialogues can be either carried in purely logical terms or in natural language. Indeed, a sentence can be mapped to logical formulas representing the possible meanings of the sentence, as implemented with some categorial parsers. We then present our version of dialogical logic, which we recently proved complete for first order classical logic. Next we explain, through examples, how argumentative dialogues can be modeled within our version of dialogical logic.Finally, we discuss how this framework can be extended to real argumentative dialogues, in particular with a proper treatment of axioms.

Nowadays, there is a quite considerable amount of literature on the use of analogy or more generally of inferences by parallel reasoning in contemporary legal reasoning, and particularly so within Common Law. These studies are often motivated by researches in artificial intelligence seeking to develop suitable software-support for legal reasoning. Recently; Rahman/Iqbal/Soufi (2019) developed a dialogical approach in the framework of Constructive Type Theory to what in Islamic Jurisprudence was called qiyās or correlational inferences. In their last chapter the authors suggested that such an approach contributes to the study of patterns of reasoning by precedent cases within contemporary common Law. In the present paper we will further motivate the deployment within Civil and Common Law of the dialog-ical framework developed. After a presentation of Scott Brewer's take on analogy within Common Law, that has striking structural similarities to reasoning by precedent case rooted in ratio legis (known in Islamic Jurisprudence as qiyās al-'illa or correlational inference by the occasioning factor), we will illustrate the implementation of the framework with a brief discussion of some cases of legal reasoning based in Spanish Civil Law but where the accent is put in the emerging ruling rather than in the existing of a case as in Common Law. Moreover; quite surprisingly, the case under study suggests that even cases of Law-interpretation fit the argumentation pattern of qiyās al-'illa. The present paper is a follow up of the paper "Parallel Reasoning by Ratio legis in Contemporary Jurisprudence. Elements for a Dialogi-cal Approach" by M.-D. Martínez Cazalla, T. Menéndez & S. Rahman (2020). More precisely the present paper works out the details of the dialogical structure studied in by M.-D. Martínez Cazalla, T. Menéndez & S. Rahman (2020). Spelling out the dialogical structure stresses the reasoning patterns shared by classical Islamic Jurisprudence and contemporary Law.

The main aim of the present paper is to show that the recently developed dialogical approach to Martin-Löf's Constructive Type Theory (CTT), called Immanent Reasoning, provides, the means for distinguishing François Recanati's process of free enrichment and saturation, meets his own objections against perspectives based on unarticulated constituents, and opens a new venue to pragmatic modulation, where the speaker-receiver interaction is integrated into the notion of enrichment. In such a setting enrichment operates on proof-objects that make fully articulated event-propositions true. The point is that by distinguishing what makes a proposition true from the proposition made true offers a simple and clean way to avoid conflating the contextual elements that enrich a proposition with the proposition itself. Such a framework abounds in means for expressing reference structures such as anaphora, including time and/or location reference. Furthermore, the notion of dependent types of CTT (absent in Montague-style semantics) and the associated formation rules allow a straightforward analysis of composition of meaning at work in Recanati's cases concerning occasion meaning as determined by context. The brand of dialogical contextualism, grounded on the play-level (where propositional content is not necessarily truth-conditional), advocated herewith is not a form of propositional syncretism. The framework offers a straightforward response to the failure of third excluded in some instances of faultless disagreement without giving up the notion of propositional content. More generally, this suggests an alternative way to tackle the interface pragmatics semantics underlying the notion of pragmatic modulation by integrating into the interface the dialogical game of asking and giving reasons.

Nowadays, there is a quite considerable amount of literature on the use of analogy or more generally of inferences by parallel reasoning in contemporary legal reasoning, and particularly so within Common Law. These studies are often motivated by researches in artificial intelligence seeking to develop suitable software-support for legal reasoning. Recently; Rahman/Iqbal/Soufi (2020) developed a dialogical approach in the framework of Constructive Type Theory to what in Islamic Jurisprudence was called qiyās or correlational inferences. In their last chapter the authors suggested that such an approach contributes to the study of patterns of reasoning by precedent cases within contemporary common Law. In the present paper we will further motivate the deployment within Civil and Common Law of the dialogical framework developed in Rahman/Iqbal/Soufi (2020). After a presentation of Scott Brewer's take on analogy within Common Law, that has striking structural similarities to reasoning by precedent case rooted in ratio legis (known in Islamic Jurisprudence as qiyās al-'illa or correlational inference by the occasioning factor), we will illustrate the implementation of the framework with a brief discussion of some cases of legal reasoning based in Spanish Civil Law but where the accent is put in the emerging ruling rather than in the existing of a case as in Common Law. Moreover; quite surprisingly, the case under study suggests that even cases of Law-interpretation fit the argumentation pattern of qiyās al-'illa. A caveat: in the present paper we will focus mainly in discussing the dynamics of the meaning constitution involved rather than in setting the rules of the underlying dialogical framework, the latter is the subject of a follow-up paper.

Resumen Para presentar la incidencia del giro dinámico en la lógica de la investigación científica, en este artículo comenzamos con una sección que trata de los juegos lógicos como desencadenantes de este giro dinámico en la lógica contemporánea, junto con el programa de dinámica lógica de la información y la interacción. Sucintamente presentamos las principales características de la lógica favorable a la independencia y la semántica juego-teórica (IF-logic y GTS, respectivamente, en Hintikka y Sandu 1997), de la lógica dialógica (Redmond y Fontaine 2011), así como los elementos esenciales de dicho programa. Si bien a partir de cualquiera de estos puntos de vista se cuenta con un elenco de herramientas lógicas para abordar cuestiones más claramente epistemológicas, destacamos el papel de la lógica epistémica dinámica (LED), a la que dedicamos la siguiente sección. Sigue otra en la que entramos en los estudios lógicos de la abducción como uno de los problemas fundamentales de la epistemología contemporánea y, en una nueva sección, en términos de los constructos teóricos de las secciones precedentes, presentamos y explicamos un fenómeno surgido en el campo de la lingüística, el caso del descubrimiento de la lengua amazónica pirahã, que debería ser considerado una anomalía en el marco de la teoría chomskiana. Abstract In order to present the incidence of the dynamic turn in the logic of scientific research, we begin with a section, in this article, that deals with logical games as triggers of this dynamic turn in contemporary logic, together with the program of logical dynamics of information and interaction. We briefly introduce the main characteristics of the logic favorable to independence and the game-theoretical semantics (IF-logic and GTS, respectively, in Hintikka and Sandu 1997), of dialogical logic (Redmond and Fontaine 2011), as well as the essential elements of this program. Although from any of these points of view we have a list of logical tools to deal with more clearly epistemological issues, we highlight the role of dynamic epistemic logic (DEL), to which we dedicate the following section. There follows another one in which we enter the logical studies of abduction as one of the fundamental problems of contemporary epistemology and, in a new section, in terms of the theoretical constructs of the preceding sections, we present and explain a phenomenon that emerged in the field of linguistics, the case of the discovery of the Amazonian language pirahã, which should be considered an anomaly within the framework of the Chomskian theory.