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Knowing the importance that debates about the pornographic issue have for historical and contemporary feminisms, we take the work Only Words (1993), by Catharine MacKinnon, as focus. Through interpretative analysis we seek to reconstruct the author’s argument about the way pornography operates and what its consequences are for women’s experiences in the real world.In our analysis, we emphasize the importance that John Austin’s theory of speech acts has for the constitution of the author’s thought. Finally, we seek to demonstrate that in some ways Austin’s theory seems to guarantee the internal coherence of MacKinnon’s ideas. Conociendo la importancia que tienen los debates sobre el tema pornográfico para los feminismos históricos y contemporáneos, tomamos como foco la obra Only Words (1993), de Catharine MacKinnon. A través del análisis interpretativo, buscamos reconstruir el argumento de la autora sobre la forma cómo opera la pornografía y cuáles son sus consecuencias para las experiencias de las mujeres en el mundo real. En nuestro análisis, destacamos la importancia que tiene la teoría de los actos de habla de John Austin para la constitución del pensamiento de la autora. Finalmente, buscamos demostrar que en algunos aspectos, la teoría de Austin parece garantizar la coherencia interna de las ideas de MacKinnon. Sabendo da importância que os debates em torno da questão pornográfica possuempara os feminismos históricos e contemporâneos, tomamos a obra Only Words (1993), de Catharine MacKinnon, como foco. Através de análise interpretativa, buscamos reconstruir a argumentação da autora sobre a forma como a pornografia opera e quais suas consequências para as experiências das mulheres no mundo real. Enfatizamos em nossa análise a importância da teoria dos atos de fala de John Austin (1962) para a constituição do pensamento da autora. Por fim, buscamos demonstrar que em alguns aspectos a teoria de Austin parece garantir a coerência interna das ideias de MacKinnon.

The article discusses the work of feminist legal scholar Catharine MacKinnon and, in particular, her radical rejection of the liberal notion of “consent”. For the author, sexuality is an expression of male dominance; indeed, it reveals itself as “eroticization of domination”. In such society, there is no possibility of autonomous agency for women. We must undo the work of the internalization of dominant values, so that a genuine feminine consciousness can emerge. This is the backdrop of her controversial views on rape, pornography, prostitution or abortion. The article concludes that, while illuminating important aspects of domination, she simplifies in excess the discussion of autonomy in social agency., O artigo discute a obra da jurista feminista Catharine MacKinnon e, em particular, sua recusa radical à noção liberal de “consentimento”. Para a autora, a sexualidade é a expressão da dominação masculina; de fato, ela se revela como “erotização da dominação”. Numa sociedade assim organizada, não há possibilidade de agência autônoma para mulheres. É necessário desfazer o trabalho de introjeção dos valores dominantes, para que uma consciência feminina genuína possa emergir. Este é o pano de fundo das polêmicas posições de MacKinnon sobre estupro, pornografia e prostituição. O artigo conclui que, embora ilumine aspectos importantes da dominação, ela simplifica em excesso a discussão sobre a autonomia na agência social.

O presente trabalho se propõe a analisar se a pornografia consiste em um limite legítimo ao exercício do direito à liberdade de expressão e se, consequentemente, pode ser proibida a circulação de seu conteúdo. Ele se baseia na existência de uma parcela do movimento feminista que expõe a questão enquanto um problema de ordem político-igualitária, que vê na pornografia uma indústria que ameaça a busca pela igualdade entre homens e mulheres, bem como, no argumento de teóricos liberais, que se opõem a este posicionamento, acreditando que tal proibição representa uma censura. É diante disto que analisa o diálogo entre os autores norte-americanos Ronald Dworkin e Catharine MacKinnon, representantes de duas diferentes perspectivas acerca desta questão. Ambos são marcos teóricos da pesquisa. Ele se justifica pela importância da realização de estudos que discutam esse direito, bem como pelo crescimento dos movimentos feministas, os quais demonstram a sua relevância e atualidade, além da clara divergência existente a seu respeito. Para tanto adota como metodologia pesquisa bibliográfica, desenvolvendo estudo exploratório com base em material já elaborado. Diante disto, resta verificado que embora seja necessária a realização de uma crítica à cultura machista, não será por meio da proibição destes materiais que se atingirá o objetivo da igualdade de gênero. Não pode a censura ser utilizada como justificativa mesmo neste cenário, uma vez que as ideias que se acredita serem ofensivas são tão dignas de proteção quanto aquelas com as quais há concordância. This paper proposes an analysis of whether pornography constitutes a legitimate limit to the exercise of the right to freedom of speech and if the circulation of its content may be prohibited. Such research is based on the existence of a portion of the feminist movement that exposes the issue as a political-egalitarian problem, which sees in pornography an industry that threatens the pursuit of equality between men and women. As well as in the argument of liberal theorists, who oppose this position, believing that the prohibition represents a censorship. It is in face of this that an analysis is made of the dialogue between the American authors Ronald Dworkin and Catharine MacKinnon, representatives of two different perspectives on this question; therefore, being used as theoretical frameworks for the research. It is justified by the importance of carrying out studies that discuss this right,, as well as by the growth of feminist movements, which demonstrate its relevance and topicality, in addition to the clear divergence on it. For such, it adopts as methodology a bibliographical research, from the development of an exploratory study based on already elaborated material. Given this, it is evidenced that although it is necessary to make a critique of the macho culture, it will not be through the prohibition of these materials that the goal of equal gender will be achieved. Censorship cannot be used as a justification even in this scenario, since ideas believed to be offensive are as worthy of protection as those with which there is agreement.

This paper presents some aspects of the legal and philosophical thought of the American jurist Catharine MacKinnon, with a particular focus on her negative anthropology and on the reclaiming power of rights. Specific attention will also be given to her view of equality, which refuses the formal logic of the Aristotelian formula (“treating likes alike and unlikes unalike”) in order to emphasise the substantive elements rooted in the social background. Finally, some critical remarks and conclusive reflections will be presented.

This paper engages with the work of Catharine MacKinnon to consider three ways of understanding the phrase "judging women." First, when is it acceptable or necessary to make judgements about what women do? The paper argues that feminist analysis urges compassion and empathy for women, but also highlights the ways that choices are limited and shaped by patriarchy. Thus we cannot and should not avoid all judgment of women’s—and men’s—choices. Second, when can women engage in the act of judging? It is sometimes claimed that it is anti-feminist to engage in such judgment, and that feminists must above all else avoid being judgmental. The paper rejects this idea and argues instead that feminism should insist on women's right to exercise judgment: women’s voices matter. Third, how are we to judge who counts as a woman? MacKinnon’s work offers profound, sustained, rich analysis of these questions, but does not fully resolve them.

The philosophical, political, and legal impact of Catharine MacKinnon's groundbreaking work Toward a Feminist Theory of the State (1989) is discussed, specifically the merging of consciousness-raising of subordinated groups with critically informed scholarship, producing a problem-driven approach engaging in informed policy-making. As a comprehensive political theory of the relationship between male dominance and the state, one of Toward's central features was to draw from consciousness-raising as a feminist research method to further ground its approach to equality, particularly in its prescription for substantive equality laws. The article illustrates how such central concepts have influenced real changes in the world, specifically using legal challenges to pornography and prostitution as examples. Parts I and II demonstrates how Toward departed from conventional epistemologies, in part explaining its revolutionary appeal to students, practitioners, and scholars. Part III continues the analysis by using real world applications of its approach to pornography and prostitution, beginning with the anti-pornography civil rights ordinances drafted by Catharine A. MacKinnon and writer Andrea Dworkin in 1983, six years before the publication of Toward. Part III illustrates how the ordinances mobilized MacKinnon’s same cutting-edge approach to advancing women’s legal substantive equality about which she later theorized. A similar approach was instrumental in grounding a substantive equality prostitution law, proposed by MacKinnon in a public speech in Stockholm, Sweden, November 2, 1990, situating that law within her broader approach to equality. The Swedish national umbrella organization for women’s shelters, ROKS, lobbied for the law and rallied other actors to support it, precipitating its passing in Parliament in 1998, with the law taking effect in 1999. Similar laws have now been adopted by many more countries (attesting to MacKinnon’s extraordinary influence as a legal and social theorist), although not until ten years or more after Sweden’s law, which makes Sweden’s unique data availability a “revelatory case.” Part III concludes by analyzing its comparative impact in terms of reducing sexual exploitation and abuse and offering an exit for people in prostitution, thus promoting substantive equality.

According to Catharine MacKinnon, social reality is characterised by violent and discriminatory practices (as domestic violence) that express the factual hierarchical imbalance between sexes. Based on the practical meaning of the legal concept of “discrimination”, this essay aims at a possible application of MacKinnon’s arguments in the European legal context. Particular attention will be paid to the most recent legislative and case law instruments.

El propósito del presente texto es problematizar la noción de mujer-objeto bajo la perspectiva de las teorías feministas y los trabajos de Jean Baudrillard. Esto con el fin de mostrar que en los tres modos de producción como son el intercambio primitivo, el capitalismo y el post-fordismo, se identifican diferentes procesos de simbolización –prácticas y relaciones sociales– que son agenciados por la mujer durante los intercambios. Agenciamientos que demuestran como la definición economicista de mujer-mercancía es excedida por los matices de mujer-símbolo y mujer-signo. En ese sentido, se afirma que la desacreditada noción de mujer - objeto no se reduce a la noción de mujer-mercancía o mujer-objeto-sexual, ni a la historia de dominación y opresión en la que usualmente se le encasilla. The purpose of this article is to question the woman-object notion parting from the feminist theories and the works of Jean Baudrillard. The aim is to show that in the three modes of production (primitive exchange, capitalism and post-fordism), it is possible to identify several symbolization processes –practices and social relations- that are acted upon by women as agents during the exchanges. This last demonstrates as the economistic definition of woman-merchandise is exceeded by the nuances of woman-symbol and woman-sign. In that sense, it is proclaimed that the dismissed notion of woman-object is reduced neither to the notion of woman-merchandise, or woman-sexual-object, nor the history of domination and oppression in which it normally falls. Universidad del Rosario

This article offers a reflection about the symbolic function of law in Catharine MacKinnon’s work, with a focus on the case of pornography, conceived by the American scholar and jurist as a “three times” discriminatory act.

How can we eradicate violence against women? How, at least, can we reduce its prevalence? One possibility offered by Catharine MacKinnon is to harness international human rights norms, especially prohibitions on torture, and apply them to sexual violence with greater rigour and commitment than has hitherto been the case. This article focuses particularly on the argument that all rapes constitute torture in which states are actively complicit. It questions whether a feminist strategy to reconceptualise rape as torture should be pursued, suggesting that we retain the label ‘rape’ due to its gendered meaning and powerful associations. It is also claimed that we may lose sight of the commonality of rape in calling it torture, as well as obscuring the varied responses of women survivors. Finally, the article canvasses the idea that we recognise the different circumstances and contexts in which rape takes place, which may mean different criminal offences for different rapes; for example, preserving the label ‘torture’ for those rapes in which state officials are participants.