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A look at the effects of terrorism and its own distinctive challenges for international business is discussed. A complete agenda was set up for future research about international business and terrorism's relationship. The agenda highlights the effects of terrorism, company strategy and performance, organizational preparedness, global supply chain and distribution channels.

This study re-examines the influence of business campaign contributions on congressional voting behavior. We find that previous empirical work has not fully considered the distinct funding mechanisms campaign contributors use to channel funds to representatives or the diversity of legislative policy instruments used to reward contributors. We correct these shortcomings by analyzing both individual and PAC campaign contributions from business interests and building several indexes of macro business policy votes in the 105th Congress. These improved measures are used in conjunction with an assumption of 'tactical rationality' that predicts legislators utilize diverse policy instruments to balance benefits and costs associated with rewarding business campaign contributors. This theoretical claim is than tested in vote choice models that, in all, account for over fifty business policy votes. Our primary findings are that businesses apparently use campaign contributions to influence favorable regulatory and tax policy votes, but are much less influential on votes for direct government expenditures that benefit business. This difference in influence by policy instrument is especially pronounced regarding contributions from individuals with business interests. We find these results to be entirely consistent with a view of rationality in which representatives seek to trade votes for campaign contributions without the appearance of an embarrassing quid pro quo.

This article explores how bargaining advantages arising from the process of public-private coordination of interests enable local government to contain business influence in urban development. A theoretical framework highlights how the scope of business demands and the impact of policy on political coalitions empower local officials as Brokers, Organizers, Entrepreneurs and Promoters. Each role affords different pathways for state power in competition with business. This is illustrated by surveying transportation politics during the industrial age in New York City. The city's experience demonstrates alternative local public-sector foundations for governmental power in growth politics. As such, it qualifies theories of business privilege in democratic politics and identifies how the dynamics of the public sector empower local officials.

This article strives to deepen our understanding of the nature and role of businesses and Business Leadership Coalitions (BLCs) in public-private partnerships (PPPs) and in the formation and operation of urban governance regimes in major American cities. Our research reveals a greater heterogeneity and diversity of engagement and partnering types than is generally recognized in traditional regime typologies. An engagement portfolio framework for analyzing civic activism is proposed to encompass the diverse motives, activities, and partnering configurations exhibited by businesses. The findings suggest the need for changes in regime theory frameworks to capture the full richness and realities of business sector participation in PPPs.

Much of the recent literature about local governance of Britain's cities has examined the power of a newly evolving `business elite'. However, in trying to understand changing governance forms, these analyses have generally lacked sensitivity to the role of actors (businesspeople) and their representative organizations. Analytical categories drawn from social movement theory (SMT) are introduced to develop a more actor-centred approach to the role of business interests in urban management. While not attempting to claim that business represents a social movement within Britain's cities, it does illuminate how effectively or otherwise businesspeople develop an identity based around their representative organizations and specific business agendas, define non-business actors as opponents, and deploy and implement the agendas they create. We then use these SMT categories to examine the creation of business agendas in three English towns -- Bamsley, Mansfield and Accrington. Dernierement, la plupart des textes parus sur la gouvernance locale des villes britanniques ont etudie le pouvoir d'une `elite economique' qui s'est recemment degagee. Cependant, dans leurs tentatives de comprendre les formes evolutives de gouvernance, ces analyses ont generalement ignore le role des acteurs (dirigeants d'entreprise) et celui de leurs organismes representatifs. Les categories analytiques tirees de la theorie des mouvements sociaux sont appliquees ici afin d'aborder le role des interets economiques dans la gestion urbaine en s'attachant davantage aux acteurs. Sans conclure que les milieux d'affaires representent un mouvement social au sein des villes de Grande-Bretagne, l'article explique a la fois comment les dirigeants d'entreprise mettent plus ou moins effectivement au point une identite basee sur leurs organismes representatifs et leurs programmes professionnels specifiques, comment ils identifient les acteurs autres que des entreprises comme des rivaux, et comment ils articulent et mettent en oeuvre les programmes qu'ils elaborent. L'article utilise ensuite ces categories pour examiner la creation des programmes d'entreprises dans trois villes anglaises -- Barnsley, Mansfield et Accrington.

This article examines whether a political business cycle existed while Boris Yeltsin was president of Russia, in order for him to increase his electoral chances. Results seem inconclusive, due to the lack of state resources or their appeal to voters; statistical analysis of real wages during electoral period, federal budget spending and average monthly pensions only show weak levels of manipulation.

This article discusses the impact private business sectors have on the government and policy making in Jordan and Kuwait. The author argues the business sector of the developing world has the power to implement economic reform based on effective lobbying, which is crucial to business-state relationships.

In synthesizing recent studies of the relationships between British businesses and British governments during decolonization, the article takes issue with the 'gentlemanly capitalism' paradigm. Imperial business and imperial government did not represent a cohesive elite; private and public agencies were frequently divided on key tenets of decolonization strategy; and, more often than not, it was broader macroeconomic and geostrategic factors rather than the agendas of particular business interests, that informed imperial policy.

A political history of broadcasting and pay-TV policy-making in Australia since the mid-1970s is provided, with special attention to how governments of varying philosophies interacted with Kerry Packer and Rupert Murdoch.

The economic crisis of Russia can be overcome only through consistent liberalization of the economy and reduction of the burden of state spending. The criteria for economic security established by Russian economist Sergei Glazev are critically evaluated. Major discrepancies exist between publicly announced data on the state of the Russian economy and society and official data. Using official statistical data, the criteria of economic security Glazev proposed are satisfied for at least eight of the 25 indicators. Data for many countries, both developing and industrialized, are compared.

The role violence, including coercion and racketeering, has in Russian business relations has been investigated. It has been exaggerated recently, but, although use of forcible means has gone down in recent years, pressure is still there, though somewhat more civilized. When spheres of influence were being established between the legal and illegal areas and among criminal groups, violence was more common. The smaller cities permit a higher level of local criminal activity than do larger urban areas. State enforcement agencies seem to embrace mentality and values of criminal activity, not of law-governed society.

The shadow economy and informal markets have emerged, contrary to expectation, as a feature of Russian capitalism since Post-Soviet economic reform began. Liberalization has been incomplete, but an important secondary cause has been the failure on the part of the state to give adequate guarantees and protection in areas where freedom formally is permitted. Interdependencies of businesspeople and government officials play a role. The state has too great a role in the economy. In the shadow investment mechanism, reform has preserved one of the pathologies it was to get rid of.

Experiential learning is one process by which companies adapt to political changes. This process is based on past corporate experiences in dealing with changes, company preferences and strategies and previous successes or failures. Since experiential learning is incremental, firms are not always able to respond quickly to shifts in the political environment.

Government is often negatively viewed as a regulator, but the government is the largest procurer of commercial goods and the government market merits more attention to its changing requirements. Government purchasing is not motivated by economic considerations or by production and distribution. The rewards and risks vary considerably to those associated with the private sector.

The growth of political lobbying has increased the influence business has on European Union policy. The European Commission openly encourages lobbying, allowing 200 businesses to form direct links for lobbying through the Single European Agreement (SEA) of 1987. The SEA has led to the introduction of over 3,000 lobbies, both economic and public. Levels of influence are governed by the political power of the lobbying group, with direct lobbying strategies the most effective. Companies need to have access to lobbying services to ensure a voice within the market.

Globalization has been presented as undermining the power of national government, and this representation is said to explain why governments have moved to the political right. There are problems with this view, such as the limited extent of globalization, and corporate practice, trade and production are still affected by national boundaries. There is a also a wide range of government responses and relationships with business. Some countries are better able to adapt to changes in the internetional econmies than others. Adaptive responses may increase national differences.

The effects of political change on two West African business organizations in Benin and Togo have been examined. The political response of these business associations to government collapse and reconstruction has varied according to their organizational composition. Togolese association has embraced the authoritarian regime while Benin's organization has protested against the shift of government reign. The role of the social movements in the African civil society in connection with these political changes is also analyzed.

The Western Australian concept that business methods can be applied to government processes is refutable on several accounts. Authority should be provided to the public to preserve accountability, and profit should not be the priority in governmental procedure. A clear and specific mandate is also necessary to maintain integrity. These practices conflict with traditional business methods.

Entrepreneurship has been studied extensively in the West. It is assumed in the current literature that the focal entrepreneur operates in a market-based economy where property rights are protected and [...]

The development of political corruption brings about important changes in the political system and, in particular, in the characteristics of the political class. Using evidence from research carried out in Italy - based on judiciary documents, press review, parliamentary commissions' reports, and in-depth interviews - the article describes the emergence of a class of 'business politicians', the resources they invest in their political careers, and their functions in producing consensus and loyalty resources for the illegal exchanges. The crisis of the mass parties brings about the emergence of politicians who see politics as 'one business among others'. Investing in their political careers the resources they gain in the illegal market, business politicians expand their power in the party system and public administration, competing successfully with 'traditional' politicians. Their growing power contributes to a profound transformation in the rules of the political game, developing an alternative value system where illegal activities are not stigmatized, and transforming the political parties into socializing agencies for illicit activities.

The post-Soviet Russia is searching for a new identity that is based on a national security concept emerging out of a political, economic and social consensus. The new concept must discard chauvinistic nationalism and take into consideration the historical mission of Russia, which professes a holistic approach towards human culture and civilization. An emerging Russian ideology, based on a judicious mix of modernity and tradition, may discard Western materialism and embrace a socially oriented market economy.

This article reviews the literature on business-government-society relations during the past three decades. It describes the growth of scholarship on business power, business political activity, the changing political agenda, interest group representation, and changing social expectations and explores in detail three approaches to the study of the political and social role of business: a comparative perspective, an emphasis on the contemporary political and social environment of business, and an exploration of the nature of business power. While we have clearly learned much about this important subject, the intellectual fragmentation of this field prevents it from realizing its full scholarly potential. (Reprinted by permission of the publisher.)

Objective. The issue of whether state-sponsored investment incentives stimulate the formation of new businesses has not been resolved for a lack of adequate measures of state policy activity and because researchers have failed to consider the effects of other, perhaps more important, features of states' political economies. The purpose of this research is to examine the political-economic determinants of new business formation across the American states between 1970 and 1985. Methods. This research tests the effects of a new measurement model of states' economic development policies and other factors suggested by Gordon, Edwards, and Reich's framework of social structures of accumulation using pooled cross-sectional time series analysis techniques. Results. Results show that new business formation is related to several dimensions of states' political economies, including the organizational capacity of labor, social wage policies, fiscal capacities, and the political/electoral context of states. By contrast, state-sponsored economic development policies have minimal effects. Conclusions. Findings attest to the severe problems that states face in trying to replace businesses lost to deindustrialization. They likewise cast doubt on the conventional wisdom of 'state entrepreneurship.'

Effective privatization can be implemented by reducing the influence of politicians on the firm's management. A comparison of two types of management control, by politicians and managers, indicate that politicians are more interested in getting votes than improving the firm's efficiency. Managers, especially of firms with profit-conscious owners, tend to improve the firm's efficiency and implement restructuring. Strict monetary policies also contribute to the effectiveness of privatization.

Since the early 1970s, government responsibility for creating hospitable 'business climates' has gradually shifted from the national level to the state level under the New Federalism. Ironically, it was precisely when the New Federalism was culminated during the Reagan Administration that many states experienced record rates of business failure. I extend Gordon, Edwards, and Reich's (1982) historical model of social structures of accumulation to analyze state differences in business failure rates between 1970 and 1985. I hypothesize that the threats to business survival posed by working-class power and welfare provisions were neutralized under the New Federalism, but that, nonetheless, corporate survival became more precarious because the New Federalism created local fiscal crises and promoted ineffective state economic development policies. Results from a pooled, time-series analysis basically corroborate these hypotheses.

We present a model of bargaining between politicians and managers that explains many stylized facts about the behavior of state firms, their commercialization, and privatization. Subsidies to public enterprises and bribes from managers to politicians emerge naturally in the model. We use the model and several extensions to understand why commercialization and privatization might work, and what forces contribute to effective restructuring of public enterprises. We illustrate the model using examples from several countries., I. INTRODUCTION Economists traditionally view public enterprises as curing market failures [Atkinson and Stiglitz 1980]. Public enterprises are controlled by governments maximizing social welfare, and improve on the decisions of [...]

A study analyzed the timing of union wage contracts in relation to electoral uncertainty. Results indicate that economic agents prefer to delay contract negotiations until election results are known. This observation does not support the rational-partisan theory of the political cycle. Examining investment in a temporal agglomeration model indicates that rational behavior that looks to the future strongly affects the political cycle.

The public service sector is reorganizing its management strategy and it is relying increasingly on a marketing approach to make its decisions. Such an approach as proven beneficial in many cases. However, it must be remembered that the needs of a consumer and of a citizen are sometimes different. Public service is the responsibility of the state and must therefore be managed primarily by political decisions. Marketing, although having a place in public service, should play only a secondary role to political decision-making.

Small and medium sized entrepreneurial operations in Chihuahua, Mexico, voted for the opposition Partido Accion Nacional (PAN) in the 1992 elections. Entrepreneurs were expected to vote for the ruling Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), because the PRI had ingratiated itself to the business community since the 1986 elections. However, small entrepreneurs voted for PAN not because of its industrial policies but because of its commitment to democracy. Small entrepreneurs feel that greater democracy is integral to their future success.

Our present understanding of the antigrowth movement in local government is limited. In this article we argue that while the importance of progrowth entrepreneurs has been discussed in the analysis of the growth machine, present studies of the antigrowth movement fail to identify the critical role of antigrowth entrepreneurs. Fundamentally, it is not enough that the objective conditions in a given community may support an antigrowth movement - an antigrowth entrepreneur may be a necessary catalyst for change. Our empirical results show that the incentives and obstacles inherent in the local political structure are more important than economic and demographic factors in explaining the emergence of entrepreneurial leaders who launch challenges to progrowth policies.

This article examines business donations to the Conservative Party during the Thatcher era. It argues that these donations cannot be treated as equivalent to PAC (political action committee) contributions in the United States. On the basis of data collected for the largest 500 British firms, the article argues that beyond market characteristics, it is also important to look at the motivations of businessmen and what the party can do to encourage donations. This represents an alternative explanation to Useem's influential inner circle thesis for why firms contribute to the Conservative Party.

This paper considers how the presence of multinational firms influences international trade policy that is determined as the outcome of political competition. Multinational firms have plants to protect in all policy jurisdictions, and hence are more protectionist than national firms which at least have an interest in free trade in export markets. Nonetheless because of changed incentives for firms to provide political support for free-trade and protectionist candidates an increased multinational presence via either merger or direct foreign investment has a liberalizing influence on trade policy.

This paper argues that the deterioration of Latin American private investment in the 1980s may have been largely due to debt difficulties and not the concurrent wave of democratization. After reviewing why more political systems may actually be conducive to investment, we test an investment function for seven countries over 1973-86 that includes traditional economic factors, two debt measures, and several political variables, including measures of democracy, worker power, International Monetary Fund support, and risk. The results are quite congenial for our hypothesis: under several reasonable alternative specifications for the economic determinants, our democracy measure is positively signed and significant.

A model describing political business cycle is presented. The model is based on partisanship and credibility arguments which govern pre-election behavior of inflation, output and money growth. The approach incorporates elections and macroeconomic effects into governmental reputation. The model exhibits forecasts similar with those of earlier manipulative models.

Cooperation between political science and business is becoming more posssible as the global economic arena becomes the norm. Political scientists must accept that a relationship between political science and business is desirable and they must be willing to research topics of interest to business. In addition, they must present political science curriculum as useful for the business workplace. Thus, political research must be related to forward looking risk potential and examine political effects on business.

US companies have realized the importance of developing environmental management programs that oversee operations management to accomplish goals such as entry into new markets and protection of current markets. Corporations encounter problems such as competition and government regulation. In order to respond to these challenges, corporations express their political views, as guaranteed under the First Amendment, in order to achieve their marketing and managerial objectives.

San Francisco is in transition between two urban regimes, a crumbling business-dominated progrowth regime and an emerging progressive slow-growth regime, which is best described as an antiregime because it functions mainly to obstruct the exam of power. To convert an urban movement into a regime, the city's progressive leaders must reconcile the divergent political interests of coalition elements, renegotiate a partnership with the private sector that is consistent with slow-growth objectives, and settle disputes surrounding Mayor Agnos's tenure. The progressive coalition's exclusive reliance upon a small-business economy is not sufficient to resolve contradictions between materialist and postmaterialist goals in the progressive agenda.

The memory of the fiscal mismanagement of the industrial economy in New York City during the 1970's was obliterated. Improved economic conditions enabled the city to sell its general obligation bonds, and its redirected economy helped it regain its reputation as a global city. That growth ended rapidly. A majority of the economic indicators went down after the 1987 stock crash. New York experienced a downward trend in employment, a real estate slump and shortfall in tax revenues. Thus, fiscal crisis was resurrected as a major issue in New York politics.

During the last 15 years, a powerful concept in the analysis of local politics has been the 'growth machine': the potent coalition of government officials and local business elites united in the pursuit of economic development. Growth policies were often supported by residential members of communities, who sought better services and lower taxes through economic growth. While the growth machine is undoubtedly still among the most potent forces in local politics, in many communities residential support for pro-growth policies has been replaced by strong opposition. Using a sample of approximately seven hundred suburban municipalities, I show that the flow of fiscal benefits to communities from economic development has slowed during the last 15 years. Given the mounting costs of growth and the increasing costs of pro-growth policies, the lack of significant fiscal payoffs helps explain growing disaffection with the growth machine and the rise of the antigrowth movement.

Unions are shown to have a sophisticated understanding of the political process, and to allocate their political resources based on this understanding. Two different tests of this hypothesis are presented. First, using a chi-square test, we show union contributions go disproportionately to members of committees with legislative and regulatory jurisdiction over their activities. Second, using logistic regression analysis, we demonstrate that this result is robust with respect to the inclusion of other institutional variables such as seniority, voting record, party, and electoral competitiveness. (Reprinted by permission of the publisher.)

Political ideologies are as relevant in organizations as they are in national affairs. An organization has political features, and determining these characteristics can help promote organizational development. The political ideologies that can be applied to organizations include the conservative, radical, dictatorial/autocratic and republican approaches. These ideologies can affect employee development.