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Political epistemology has become a popular field of research in recent years. It sets itself the ambitious task to intertwine epistemology with social and political theory in order to do justice to the relationships between truth and politics, or reason and power. Yet many contributions either expand arguments and concepts from traditional epistemology to political phenomena or use existing theories and frameworks from social and political theory to address the politics of epistemological questions. The former approach (prominent, e.g., in the epistemic injustice debate) leads to an epistemisation of political phenomena and concepts coupled with their de‐politicization, the latter approach (prominent, e.g., in Frankfurt School critical theory) leads to a politicization of epistemic phenomena and concepts coupled with their de‐epistemisation. Instead, it is argued that political epistemology requires reworking even basic concepts, due to its three foundational commitments: It is committed to the claim that socio‐material conditions of existence matter epistemically (minimal materialism), to the self‐reflection of the socio‐material conditions of political epistemology's own arguments and theories (radical self‐reflexivity), and to a specific form of epistemic humility (epistemic non‐sovereignty). Using the notion of normativity as an exemplary problem, the article closes by highlighting the difficulty of maintaining these three commitments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the concept of epistemic corruption and its relationship to non-ideal epistemology, focusing on the development and persistence of epistemic vices. It explores how social and environmental factors can influence the acquisition and reinforcement of epistemic vices, such as arrogance and closed-mindedness. The author suggests that understanding epistemic corruption is crucial for connecting character epistemology and social epistemology, highlighting the complexity of individual responsibility for epistemic vices. The article emphasizes the need for nuanced explanations of the origins and dynamics of epistemic vices in diverse social contexts, offering insights into the challenges of maintaining epistemic virtue in a corrupting world. [Extracted from the article]

This paper suggests that virtue epistemology can help decide how to respond to conflicts between different epistemic goals for social media. It is a contribution to critical epistemology of social media insofar as it supplements system-level consideration with insights from individualist epistemology. In particular, whereas the proposal of critical social epistemology of social media by Joshua Habgood-Coote suggests that conflicts between epistemic goals of social media have to be solved by ethical consideration, I suggest that virtue epistemology can also solve at least some of these conflicts fully within the epistemic realm. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I contend that the history of the development of 20th-century analytic philosophy is characterized by three main phases: (a) the turn towards analysis, (b) the linguistic turn, and (c) the naturalistic turn. In this article, I examine whether the recent interest in sub-disciplines such as (1) social epistemology, (2) social ontology, and the methods of "conceptual engineering" applied in fields like (3) philosophy of language, indicates that the current phase of development in analytic philosophy could be termed (d) the social turn. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Efforts to raise awareness about foreign disinformation might accidentally increase distrust towards legitimate media. We argue that state discourse on disinformation is comparable to strategic framing in journalists' coverage of political events, and that it might imbue audiences with cynicism. Furthermore, in contrast to an experimental paradigm that depicts disinformation audiences as passive, we suggest that news consumers actively appropriate and produce content themselves. Conceptualising media content as 'strategic' rather than sincere might influence audiences to share and produce media content strategically. This Machiavellian tendency leads to similar effects on bias as motivated reasoning. Most accounts of motivated reasoning assume that limits of psychological processing are the reasons for biased judgements of what is true and fake, however, we argue that biases can also be due to culturally acquired second-order beliefs about knowledge. To explain this, we build on ideas about 'folk epistemology' and propose the term 'strategic epistemology towards media'. Resistance-building efforts against disinformation risk promoting such a strategic epistemology towards media and this can have harmful effects on democratic dialogue. To avoid this, educational interventions should be premised on social epistemology rather than experimental psychology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We argue that one is likely to accept what a speaker says when the expected utility of accepting their testimony is greater than the expected utility of continuing inquiry. One virtue of our hypothesis is that it allows us to explain why confidence in experts has declined in recent years. In a traditional media landscape expert testimony is easy to find, and alternative sources of information are relatively costly to access. Hence, practical considerations largely favour accepting expert testimony. But on social media, alternative information is easy to find, and it is often practically rational to accept this information rather than to search for (and identify) genuinely expert testimony. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Misinformation in various guises has become a significant concern in contemporary society and it has been implicated in several high-impact political events over the past years, including Brexit, the 2016 American elections, and bungled policy responses to the Covid-19 pandemic in some countries. In this paper, I draw on resources from contemporary social epistemology to clarify why and how misinformation is epistemically bad. I argue that its negative effects extend far beyond the obvious ones of duping individuals with false or misleading beliefs. Misinformation has systemic effects on our information environments, making all of us worse off, including the epistemically vigilant. This paper does not offer measures or policies to fight misinformation, but aims to contribute to the prior goal of better understanding what's bad about misinformation. In doing so, it lays the groundwork for ameliorative projects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues that individuating practices are produced through iterative processes of community and agent-level interactions. This claim will be demonstrated by using three case studies from biology: The structuring of data categories for data collection tables and models; establishing spatial and temporal threshold markers or limits; and the comparative use of phenomenal characteristics as cues for object identification. By drawing from examples of data classification and comparative analysis in the biological sciences, I offer a view about ‘individuation’ as double-barreled according to the method of co-constitutive conceptual analysis. Specifically, the capacity—i.e., the ability to individuate—is co-constituted by community level choices and agent applications: Individuation’s evidential role is generated, revised, and refined by scientific communities and their members through an iterative process of community and agent-level interactions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Experts are sharply divided concerning the prevalence and influence of misinformation. Some have emphasized the severe epistemic and political threats posed by misinformation and have argued that some such threats have been realized in the real world. Others have argued that such concerns overstate the prevalence of misinformation and the gullibility of ordinary persons. Rather than taking a stand on this issue, I consider what would follow from the supposition that this latter perspective is correct. I argue that, if the prevalence and influence of misinformation are indeed overstated, then many reports as to the prevalence and influence of misinformation constitute a kind of higher-order misinformation. I argue that higher-order misinformation presents its own challenges. In particular, higher-order misinformation, ironically, would lend credibility to the very misinformation whose influence it exaggerates. Additionally, higher-order misinformation would lead to underestimations of the reasons favoring opposing views. In short, higher-order misinformation constitutes misleading higher-order evidence concerning the quality of the evidence on which individuals form their beliefs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Digital media have fundamentally altered how knowledge is produced and distributed, often being blamed for contemporary democratic problems. This short essay examines recent contributions to normative democratic theory, focusing on three questions: 1) characterization of media-related threats, 2) media and communication aspects supportive of democracy, and 3) diagnosis of democracy's core challenges. Our reading reveals that while digital media is seen to contribute to the epistemic crisis, the core problem can be traced back to the profound impact of communicative capitalism on our epistemic infrastructures. We call for political communication scholars to prioritize the study of epistemic inequalities by critically examining and addressing the pervasive influence of market logic in both our work and the subject of study. In doing so, we can make an empirically informed contribution to democratic theory's quest to defend democracy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article provides an overview of ideas and arguments developed in my book Prejudice: A Study in Non-Ideal (Oxford University Press, 2021; paperback edition, 2022). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article I argue that data-sharing risks becoming epistemically extractivist and is a practice sensitive to Linda Martín Alcoff´s challenges for extractivist epistemologies. I situate data-sharing as a socio-epistemic practice that gives rise to ethical and epistemic challenges. I draw on the findings of an institutional ethnography of an international social science research project to identify several ethical and epistemic concerns, including epistemic extractivism. I identify Alcoff's first and second challenge for extractivist epistemologies in the findings of the empirical investigation and argue that they are important considerations for the ethics and socio-epistemological functioning of data-sharing in social science. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The social epistemology of science has adopted agent-based computer simulations as one of its core methods for investigating the dynamics of scientific inquiry. The epistemic status of these highly idealized models is currently under active debate in which they are often associated either with predictive or the argumentative functions. These two functions roughly correspond to interpreting simulations as virtual experiments or formalized thought experiments, respectively. This paper advances the argumentative account of modeling by proposing that models serve as a means to (re)conceptualize the macro-level dynamics of complex social epistemic interactions. I apply results from the epistemology of scientific modeling and the psychology of mental simulation to the ongoing debate in the social epistemology of science. Instead of considering simulation models as predictive devices, I view them as artifacts that exemplify abstract hypothetical properties of complex social epistemic processes in order to advance scientific understanding, hypothesis formation, and communication. Models need not be accurate representations to serve these purposes. They should be regarded as pragmatic cognitive tools that engender rather than replace intuitions in philosophical reasoning and argumentation. Furthermore, I aim to explain why the community tends to converge around few model templates: Since models have the potential to transform our intuitive comprehension of the subject of inquiry, successful models may literally capture the imagination of the modeling community. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I draw attention to the phenomenon of warranted epistemic blame in order to pose a challenge for most forms of epistemic instrumentalism, which is the view that all of the demands of epistemic normativity are requirements of instrumental rationality. Because of the way in which the instrumentalist takes the force of one’s epistemic reasons to derive from one’s own individually held ends, the instrumentalist faces unique difficulties in explaining our standing to blame one another for violations of epistemic norms. In many cases, it is unclear why, according to the instrumentalist, we might be entitled to others’ adherence to epistemic norms at all. This is a serious problem. The upshot is that theorists of epistemic normativity should be prepared reject most forms of epistemic instrumentalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

People are manifestly polarized. On many topics, extreme perspectives are much easier to find than ‘reasonable’, ‘moderate’ perspectives. A natural reaction to this situation is that something epistemically irrational is afoot. Here, I question this natural reaction. I argue that often polarization is epistemically innocuous. In particular, I argue that certain mechanisms that underlie polarization are rational, and polarized beliefs are often fully justified. Additionally, even reflective subjects, who recognize themselves as in a polarized or polarizing situation shouldn’t necessarily reduce confidence in the relevant beliefs. Finally, I draw attention to some often overlooked epistemic benefits associated with polarization. A fuller understanding of the epistemology of polarization requires incorporating both the potential costs and the potential benefits, and being more precise about exactly what is—and is not—epistemically objectionable in these situations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper discusses disadvantaging situations that deaf students encounter in higher education in Sweden. We report two recent cases of deaf students’ academic welfare being put at risk. We foreground in these cases the ‘odd situations’ that arise when provisions that fail to access the particular nature of deaf experience also fail to secure deaf students’ participation rights, to be and become the deaf person they wish to be, lead the life they wish to live, and so on. Often, the ‘oddness’ of the situations that arise is in part indicated by no-one involved lacking in good intentions or not doing their very best: there is no lack of good will, but a lack of shared understanding. What deaf students know differently is rarely present in deliberation and not part of forward planning. We infer that situations of this sort reflect epistemic injustice. We propose that this form of formative epistemic injustice – educators not taking on board what deaf students know – can perhaps be overcome by higher education institutions proactively involving deaf students in matters that concern both them and future deaf students.

In this article, the authors review current philosophical discussions about the essence and specific features of conspiracy beliefs, the purpose of which is to formulate its relevant definitions. The parties to the discussion are grouped around two conventionally distinguished positions, designated by the terms «universalism» («generalism») and «particularism» («minimalism»). The purpose of the article is to reveal the content of the philosophical discussion of the question about preferable way to theorize conspiracy beliefs. The purpose of the study determines the choice of comparative analysis as a key method. Particularism and universalism are compared by the authors from the point of view of the views of their representatives on the genesis of the content of conspiracy beliefs, the characteristic mechanisms for justifying such beliefs, and a number of socio-epistemological problems that arise in connection with the study of conspiracy beliefs. Based on the comparative analysis carried out, the authors draw conclusions about the adequacy of the very distinction between theoretical positions in the discussion of conspiracy theories using the dichotomy «universalism – particularism». The novelty of the presented conclusions lies not only in highlighting the content of philosophical discussions around the issues of theorization of conspiracy beliefs, but also in the critical analysis of ideas about the opposition of particularism and universalism. The practical significance of the study is to identify the limitations of the conceptual apparatus used to discuss the philosophical reflection of conspiracy beliefs.

Central to the particularist project, one that has become the consensus in the philosophy of conspiracy theory theory, is the claim that a general dismissal of these things called `conspiracy theories' is unsustainable. That is, if we want to say a conspiracy theory is suspicious such that we should not believe it, then we have to engage in at least some investigation of it. Particularists have detailed just why a general attitude of skepticism towards conspiracy theories is implausible; they have, in effect, created the case against generalism. The case for particularism, then, has largely been about challenging and rebutting generalist arguments. But what of the bigger picture? If particularists argue that we should not assume conspiracy theories are mad, bad, or dangerous but, rather, investigate them, then how should we go about that investigation? In this paper I describe (some) of the preliminary concerns the particularist (and the generalist) needs to account for when developing an ethics of investigation into these things called `conspiracy theories.' Whilst this paper does not provide a framework for the investigation of conspiracy theories, it provides the framework for such a framework. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Educational research has pointed out the mediating role of professors' intuitive epistemologies in the teachinglearning processes of science. However, we find that research in this regard is scarce despite being essential to achieve changes in the teaching of natural and social sciences. The objective of this work is to examine the epistemological positions of teachers in the fields of science and philosophy to determine if the epistemological positions they hold vary depending on the domain of knowledge. To carry out this research, we used an instrument that consists of two parts: 1) items adapted from questionnaires in use about intuitive and self - developed epistemologies and 2) items from the Literature Epistemic Cognition Scale (LECS) questionnaire adapted to evaluate epistemic cognition in the context of philosophy. The data collected indicate that the participants in this research maintain a constant epistemological orientation in both the domain of science and philosophy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Under conditions of high social and political polarization, expressing political anger online toward systemic injustice faces an apparent trilemma: Express none but lose anger's valuable goods; express anger to heterogeneous audiences but risk aggravating inter-group polarization; or express anger to like-minded people but succumb to the epistemic pitfalls and extremist tendencies inherent to homogeneous groups. Solving the trilemma requires cultivating an online environment as a deliberative system composed of four kinds of groups—each with distinct purposes and norms. I argue that applying empirically-guided design principles to this systems framework provides political anger a place where its powers can serve justice without damaging the epistemic, ethical, emotional, and community resources required for a democratic path to correcting systemic injustice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans, and queer (LGBTQ+) people are experiencing increasingly varied visibility on social media due to ongoing digitalization. In this paper, I draw on social epistemology and phenomenological accounts of the digital (Frost-Arnold in: Lackey (ed) The epistemic dangers of context collapse online, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2021; Krueger and Osler in Philos Topics 47(2):205–231, 2019; Hine in: Ethnography for the internet: embedded, embodied and everyday, Bloomsbury, London, 2015), and argue that, for LGBTQ+ individuals, social media provides a space for connecting with people with shared lived experiences. This, in turn, makes it possible for social media to enable feelings of belonging. By interacting with other LGBTQ+ people online, LGBTQ+ individuals are enabled to imagine their own being in the world and to feel like they belong. This is especially important when we consider that, for LGBTQ+ identities, it may be more complicated to feel connected due to marginalization and (fear of) discrimination. This paper not only draws on literature from phenomenology and social epistemology on the digital, but also presents and analyzes interviews that were conducted in order to explore the social media experiences of LGBTQ+ people through a phenomenology and social epistemology informed framework. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper addresses how multiple individual credences on logically related issues should be aggregated into collective binary beliefs. We call this binarizing belief aggregation. It is vulnerable to dilemmas such as the discursive dilemma or the lottery paradox: proposition-wise independent aggregation can generate inconsistent or not deductively closed collective judgments. Addressing this challenge using the familiar axiomatic approach, we introduce general conditions on a binarizing belief aggregation rule, including rationality conditions on individual inputs and collective outputs, and determine which rules (if any) satisfy different combinations of these conditions. Furthermore, we analyze similarities and differences between our proofs and other related proofs in the literature and conclude that the problem of binarizing belief aggregation is a free-standing aggregation problem not reducible to judgment aggregation or probabilistic opinion pooling. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Philosophers who study conspiracy theories have increasingly addressed the questions of where conspiracy theories come from, what such theories do, and what to do about them. This essay serves as a commentary on the answers to these questions offered by contributors to this special issue. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Partisan epistemology – individuals granting greater credibility to co-partisan sources in evaluating information – is often taken to be evidence of directionally motivated reasoning in which concerns about group membership override concerns about accuracy. Against this dominant view, I outline a novel accuracy-based account of this mode of reasoning. According to this account, partisan epistemology stems from the inference that co-partisans are more likely to be right as they have superior epistemic access to the relevant facts and seek to realize the correct values. I argue that this theory fits better with relevant findings than motivated-reasoning theories of partisan epistemology. Finally, I suggest it has adequate explanatory power vis-à-vis patterns of misinformation belief. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How should we think about the ways search engines can go wrong? Following the publication of Safiya Noble's Algorithms of Oppression (Noble, 2018), a view has emerged that racist, sexist, and other problematic results should be thought of as indicative of algorithmic bias. In this paper, I offer an alternative angle on these results, building on Noble's suggestion that search engines are complicit in a racial contract (Mills, 1997). I argue that racist and sexist results should be thought of as part of the workings of the social system of white ignorance. Along the way, I will argue that we should think about search engines not as sources of testimony, but as information-classification systems, and make a preliminary case for the importance of the social epistemology of technology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The project of veristic social epistemology is based on the evaluation of social practices directed at acquiring knowledge and avoiding error. This research aims to analyse the social and technological dimensions of information processes. A number of practices in the network environment have a significant impact on the cognitive processes of individuals. They give rise to the acquisition of both true and false beliefs, ranging from reliable information practices to unreliable disinformation practices. The prevalence of phenomena such as echo chambers, fake news, clickbait or deepfakes indicates that the condition of the contemporary infosphere is under serious threat. Disinformation processes, reinforced by technological progress, prompt reflection on the reliability of social practices. In addition to the strictly veristic consequences, the importance of the phenomenon of epistemic injustice should also be pointed out. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article identifies two tendencies in left-wing approaches toward the social sciences. The first expresses skepticism towards science as a kind of product of the ruling ideology that solely reproduces the status quo. The second worries about the capacity of scientific inquiry to actually change people's ingrained beliefs and prejudices. Antonio Gramsci and W.E.B. Du Bois are representative of these two diverging approaches. Their views on science, however, offer more commonalities than at first meet the eye. They are both critical of sociological traditions that seek to discover universal laws of society, arguing that such an approach fails to grasp the complexity of causality and the role of human action in shaping their lives and history. On the other hand, both see the potential for rigorous and nuanced scientific analysis to offer grounds for concrete action and warn off wishful thinking. By combining their views, this article presents a conception of the role and potential of social scientific inquiry for progressive movements toward social change that navigates between the double-sided concerns represented by Gramsci and Du Bois. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Terms such as 'fake news' and 'post-truth' circulate freely today within the popular lexicon. It is an environment where objective facts have 'become less influential in shaping public opinion than appeals to emotion and personal belief' (OED). Central here is to understand the conceptual grounding of subjective opinion as a historically specific epistemological structure of social communication. My paper will draw on the Hegelian tradition of critical theory that has in unique ways unified an analysis of the nexus between socio-economic structures and epistemological frameworks. Here I name opinion as a historically specific epistemological structure of self-certainty, which receives validation within what Adorno called the Halbbildung of industrial culture, a form of social consciousness cultivated by the spread of information and economic imperative. It will be argued that the concept of opinion becomes a vital question for understanding, in this 'post-truth' landscape, current standards of instantaneous communication and cultural transmission. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper proposes epistemic environmentalism as a novel framework for accounting for the contribution of the environment – broadly construed – to epistemic standings and which can be used to improve or protect epistemic environments. The contribution of the environment to epistemic standings is explained through recent developments in epistemology and cognitive science, including embodied cognition, embedded cognition, extended cognition and distributed cognition. The paper examines how these developments support epistemic environmentalism, as well as contributes theoretical resources to make epistemic assessments of dynamic environments. The epistemic environmentalist procedure from the assessment of an individual environment to changes made to that environment based on promoting the attainment of epistemic goods is also discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the social epistemology of scientific knowledge, it is largely accepted that relationships of trust, not just reliance, are necessary in contemporary collaborative science characterised by relationships of opaque epistemic dependence. Such relationships of trust are taken to be possible only between agents who can be held accountable for their actions. But today, knowledge production in many fields makes use of AI applications that are epistemically opaque in an essential manner. This creates a problem for the social epistemology of scientific knowledge, as scientists are now epistemically dependent on AI applications that are not agents, and therefore not appropriate candidates for trust. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recently, some scholars have argued that testimonial injustice may not only be due to prejudice toward the speaker, but also prejudice toward the content of what the speaker says. I argue that such accounts do not merely expand our picture of epistemic injustice, but give us reason to radically revise our approach to reducing testimonial injustice. The dominant conception of this project focuses on reducing speaker prejudice. But even if one were to successfully do so, the frequency of content prejudice means that one would still commit testimonial injustice in many of the same circumstances. I argue that we must reorient the project of reducing testimonial injustice toward critiquing the ideologies that produce it. I conclude with a sketch of what such a research program might look like. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Made in languaging aims to help ecolinguists with recrafting ideation and human practices. Inspired by Alexander and Stibbe, I turn to how ecolinguistic expertise can favour life-sustaining relations. In approaching normative goals, I start with how knowledge is made, self-sustains and is disseminated. Ecolinguistic analysis of languages, discourse and narratives can thus be enriched by tracing how practices inform languaging. In turning to epistemic agency, I emphasise the following: (1) building corpora popularia, organised bodies, in order to enhance life-sustaining relations; (2) illuminating life from the inside; and (3) developing bioecological awareness. I contend that, while all living beings use coordinative activities to bring forth what appears to us, humans also use wording types and practices. As we use the already known, languaging enables subjecthood, a person's little worlds, and a group's common realities. Hence, what appears as (and to) experience is made in languaging. When linked to normative concerns, the resulting middle worlds also offer means of putting knowledge to work. As in social epistemology, one might regard 'wealth and well-being' as a marker of public good. Yet, critical work shows, appeal to these values is anthropomorphic. In order to encompass nonhumans and the biogenic, one can reject market orientatation by tracing languaging, and knowing, back to living. In showing benefits of so doing, I contrast two evolving wording types. The case of growthism, I suggest, attests to praxis and contrasts starkly with the ideational value of life-sustaining relations. Yet, in both cases, languaging meshes practices, happenings and the effects of action. The move shows how one can challenge the hypostatisation of ideology by pursuing how epistemic agency can contribute to the future of evolution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper argues for two propositions. (I) Large asymmetries of power, status and influence exist between economists. These asymmetries constitute a hierarchy that is steeper than it could be and steeper than hierarchies in other disciplines. (II) This situation has potentially significant epistemic consequences. I collect data on the social organization of economics to show (I). I then argue that the hierarchy in economics heightens conservative selection biases, restricts criticism between economists and disincentivizes the development of novel research. These factors together constrain economics' capacity to develop new beliefs and reduce the likelihood that its outputs will be true. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Some debates about the role of non-epistemic values in science discuss the so-called Value-Free Ideal together with the autonomy thesis, to the point that they may be assumed to be intertwined. As I will argue in this article, the two are independent from one another, are supported by different arguments, and ought to be disentangled. I will also show that the arguments against value-freedom and supporting a value-laden conception of science, are different from the arguments against autonomy, which support democratized science. Moreover, while some of the arguments against autonomy and for democratized science may actually be consistent with value-freedom, they conflict with some philosophical views about the internal diversity of well-designed epistemic communities. This article distinguishes the Value-Free Ideal and the autonomy thesis, as well as their antitheses, and investigates their relations to some of the socio-epistemological models of the social organization of scientific research. Its aim is to make explicit some incompatibilities between different normative frameworks developed in philosophy of science. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After the financial crisis of 2008, many economists expressed dissatisfaction with the state of macroeconomics. They criticised deficiencies in the dominant dynamic stochastic general equilibrium modelling approach and conceptions of good macroeconomic research behind that dominance. This paper argues that there is a deeper problem in macroeconomics, which remains unaddressed. I connect existing literature critical of the institutions of macroeconomics and of economics in general to the institutional preconditions of effective criticism outlined by the philosopher Helen Longino. I find that as an epistemic community, macroeconomics does not function in a way that adequately supports critical evaluation of established beliefs, norms and practices. This failure may partly explain why many views on macroeconomic modelling, the tenability of which economists questioned after the crisis, were able to persist for so long. My analysis gives additional support to several recent proposals for institutional reforms in economics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Psicoperspectivas is the property of Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Valparaiso, Escuela de Psicologia and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

While positive appraisals of testimonial knowledge by Enlightenment thinkers have recently begun to receive more attention, such discussions often operate at a very general level, leaving out much of the context and dynamics of specific types of testimonial interactions. Drawing on extended passages from Georg Friedrich Meier and Immanuel Kant, the present paper looks at the specific case of scholarly testimony and the various epistemic dangers that can befall the interaction between scholars (or, in modern parlance, ‘experts’) and lay audiences. While Kant recognises the imperfections of many expert testifiers (and pays special attention to the figure of the ‘pedant’), he is keenly aware of the – greater – risk of what may be called ‘epistemic populism’, which seeks ‘to make imperceptible the blatantly obvious inequality between loquacious ignorance and thorough science’ (AA, XI, 141). Furthermore, Kant suggests, those with superior epistemic authority can justifiably disengage from interactions with those who, as laypersons, arrogate to themselves equal epistemic standing and are unwilling to appreciate the rational force of evidence and argumentation. Prolonging interaction in such a scenario would be futile and may well be ‘contrary to the dignity of reason’ (AA, XI, 143). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A prominent question in social epistemology concerns the epistemic profile of groups. While inflationists and deflationists agree that groups are fit to constitute knowers, they disagree about whether group knowledge is reducible to knowledge of their individual members. This paper develops and defends a weak inflationist view according to which some, but not all, group knowledge is over and above any knowledge of their members. This view sits between the deflationist view that all group knowledge is reducible to individual knowledge, and the strong inflationist view that some such knowledge even fails to supervene on features of individuals. Thus, some group knowledge is irreducible, but all such knowledge is anchored in, and so doesn't float freely from, individual features. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to an argument that I will call the argument from loose lips , we can safely reject certain notorious conspiracy theories because they posit conspiracies that would be nearly impossible to keep secret. I distinguish between three versions of this argument: the epistemic argument, the alethic argument, and the statistical argument. I, then, discuss several limitations of the argument from loose lips. The first limitation is that only the statistical argument can be applied to new conspiracy theories. The second limitation is that no version of the argument suffices to rule out the existence of small initial conspiracies that have no need to add further conspirators. The third limitation is that no version of the argument is dialectically efficacious in the context of arguing with the relevant conspiracy theorists because nothing is said to address the alleged evidence that they cite. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Belief polarization (BP) is widely seen to threaten havoc on our shared political lives. It is often assumed that BP is the product of epistemically irrational behaviors at the individual level. After distinguishing between BP as it occurs in intra-group and inter-group settings, this paper argues that neither process necessarily reflects individual epistemic irrationality. It is true that these processes can work in tandem to produce so-called "echo chambers." But while echo chambers are often problematic from the point of view of collective rationality, it doesn't follow that individuals are doing anything wrong, epistemically speaking, in seeking them out. In non-ideal socio-epistemic contexts, echo chamber construction might provide one's best defense against systematic misinformation and deception. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I analyze some disagreements about scientific ontology as cases of disagreement between epistemic peers. I maintain that the particularities of these cases are better understood if epistemic peerhood is relativized to a perspective-like index of epistemic goals and values. Taking the debate on the metaphysics of laws of nature as a case study, I explore the limits and possibilities of a trans-perspective assessment of positions regarding scientific ontology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many extant theories of placebo focus on their causal structure wherein placebo effects are those that originate from select features of the therapy (e.g. client expectations or "incidental" features like size and shape). Although such accounts can distinguish placebos from standard medical treatments, they cannot distinguish placebos from everyday occurrences, for example, when positive feedback improves our performance on a task. Providing a social-epistemological account of a treatment context can rule out such occurrences, and furthermore reveal a new way to distinguish clinical placebos from standard medical treatments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I argue that there are irreducibly social epistemic values alongside more traditional epistemic values such as knowledge and true belief. In particular, I argue that what I call "epistemic convergence" is one such value, and that it can help us explain the badness of social epistemic pathologies, such as testimonial injustice and epistemic bubbles. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ignorance, or the lack of knowledge, appears to be steadily spreading, despite the increasing availability of information. The notion of informed ignorance herein proposed to describe the widespread position of being exposed to an abundance of information yet lacking relevant knowledge, which is tied to the exponential growth in misinformation driven by technological developments and social media. Linked to many of societies' most looming catastrophes, from political polarization to the climate crisis, practices related to knowledge and information are deemed some of the most imminent and daunting modern threats, evidenced by the latest report of the World Economic Forum, which has named misinformation the most severe short-term global risk. This paper's epistemic perspective links the properties of today's information culture and the ways in which it interacts with individual capacities and limitations in current technological and socio-political contexts. Such a position is analyzed through the lens of epistemic principles as a contemporary epistemic phenotype that emerges from an environment of ill-adapted and excessive information inputs and leads to a distinctive type of social injustice that is primarily epistemic in nature. While equity and accessibility are widely discussed as important contributing factors to epistemic discrepancies, other overlooked but fundamental issues underlying epistemic injustices are considered, such as information manipulation, cognitive limitations, and epistemic degradation. To effectively face this elusive threat, we propose an inclusive viewpoint that harnesses knowledge from cognitive science, science and technology studies, and social epistemology to inform a unifying theory of its main impacts and driving forces. By adjusting a modern epistemic framework to the described phenomena, we intend to contextually outline its trajectory and possible means of containment based on a shared responsibility to maintain ethical epistemic standards. In a time of international unrest and mounting civil acts of violence, it is pertinent to emphasize the ethical principles of knowledge systems and authorities and suggest policy adaptations to maintain a social contract based on the shared values of truth and freedom. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The increasing demand for transparency in AI has recently come under scrutiny. The question is often posted in terms of "epistemic double standards", and whether the standards for transparency in AI ought to be higher than, or equivalent to, our standards for ordinary human reasoners. I agree that the push for increased transparency in AI deserves closer examination, and that comparing these standards to our standards of transparency for other opaque systems is an appropriate starting point. I suggest that a more fruitful exploration of this question will involve a different comparison class. We routinely treat judgments made by highly trained experts in specialized fields as fair or well grounded even though—by the nature of expert/layperson division of epistemic labor—an expert will not be able to provide an explanation of the reasoning behind these judgments that makes sense to most other people. Regardless, laypeople are thought to be acting reasonably—and ethically—in deferring to the judgments of experts that concern their areas of specialization. I suggest that we reframe our question regarding the appropriate standards of transparency in AI as one that asks when, why, and to what degree it would be ethical to accept opacity in AI. I argue that our epistemic relation to certain opaque AI technology may be relevantly similar to the layperson's epistemic relation to the expert in certain respects, such that the successful expert/layperson division of epistemic labor can serve as a blueprint for the ethical use of opaque AI. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]