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This study discusses a diagnostic approach to examining the lifecycle support system of a weapon system- specifically illustrating the approaches for the US Navy Phalanx Close-in Weapon System (CIWS). The study gauges the status of current readiness and analyzes a snapshot of cost structures. The study identifies the program's influential cost factors and system performance drivers. As a diagnostic approach to the lifecycle support of the Phalanx Weapon System, the study creates a hypergraph describing the relation between factors and drivers and their effect on operational readiness. The research also suggests areas for further study. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Testing and evaluation (T&E) of the effectiveness of unmanned autonomous systems (UAS) is a very serious challenge. UAS are ideal target platforms for implementation of intelligent and cognitive capabilities. UAS are often used in hostile and harsh environments where human presence is not desirable, including air, space, surface, or undersea operations. This requires a high degree of UAS autonomy and human independence. To increase effectiveness, UAS may exhibit some social behavior, interacting with each other in a dynamic and flexible fashion. Finally, UAS are capable of carrying lethal weapons. Design and implementation of such intelligent systems is a very difficult task indeed, but even more difficult is the task of T&E of capabilities and operational readiness of these systems. In this article we attempt to lay the system-theoretic foundation for analysis and testing of cognitive and social capabilities of UAS. We propose a cognitive analysis framework and then show how this leads into analysis of the social interaction capabilities of UAS. This cognitive framework is a key to development of comprehensive UAS T&E methodology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Protected core networking (PCN) is a con- cept intended to be used to implement a flexible transport infrastructure that supports future mil- itary operations based on network enabled capa- bility (NEC). PCN is based on creating a loose coupling between information domains and the transport infrastructure, and focusing on the provision of high service availability, also in high-threat environments. This architectural approach highlights a number of emerging and novel concepts where research and development is needed to properly support NEC. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the draft proposal, in which administration officials termed as "status of forces agreement" (SOFA) of the U.S. government for Iraq. The author explains that provisions of the draft include a guarantee of immunity for American troops and civilian contractors, broad U.S. authority to conduct combat operations, and the right to detain Iraqi prisoners. Iraq's Kurdish Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari emphasizes that the agreement is a continued commitment by the U.S. government to stand by the Iraqi government against foreign and internal threats.

Over the last decade the US. Department of Defense (DoD) has moved to a network-centric environment in which the sensors, weapons, and command and control systems are networked for executing military missions at tactical and operational levels. Although not all systems are Internet Protocol based, they are all networked with different means, including data links. This reality makes the operations of combatant commands and the Services vulnerable to network attacks by casual hackers as well as nation states. Information assurance, which consists of protection, detection, and reaction, has become a critical test issue for net-centric systems, whether it is a sensor, weapon, or command and control system. Information assurance must be assessed systematically during operational test and evaluation. Technical aspects of information assurance (availability, confidentiality, integrity, authentication, and non repudiation) are generally assessed during developmental test and evaluation or during the certification and accreditation process, which supports interim/final authority to operate certification. The emphasis of this article is on subsequent information assurance assessments during operational test and evaluation, focusing on system operation after receiving the authority to operate. Information assurance posture is not just dependent on system designs, but also involves how systems are networked and operated; hence, information assurance is dependent on the abilities of system operators, systems administrators, and network designers to detect, protect from, and react to potential attacks. This article references the policies and guidelines issued by the DoD, operational metrics to be used in evaluation, and the process to conduct operational test and evaluation for most acquisition programs. The article also references a congressionally-mandated effort underway in which fielded systems are assessed for information assurance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As the Defense Information Systems Agency's Operational Test Agency since 1987, the Joint Interoperability Test Command (JITC) has integrated operational realism into major test programs and efforts through a variety of methods and strategies. Developing and using net- centric test approaches is a fundamental concept that JITC uses to enhance the operational testing environments for Information Technology and National Security Systems. Complementing JITC's net-centric testing strategies are three other key mission activities that enable JITC to assess and test Information Technology and National Security Systems in operationally realistic environments. JITC's roles and responsibilities with numerous military exercises around the globe, JITC's core mission of interoperability certification through testing, and expanding and executing the Department of Defense Interoperability Communications Exercise. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article provides information about the Operational Test and Evaluation Force (OPTEVFOR) headquartered in Norfolk, Virginia. OPTEVFOR is the U.S. Navy's sole independent Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E) command that ensures all system be effective, suitable, and survivable and convey their capabilities and limitations to the warfighter. Moreover, OPTEVFOR is engaged in developing methods, procedures, and policies for the Department of Defense (DoD) and the Department of the Navy.

Copyright of UNISCI Discussion Papers is the property of Unidad de Investigaciones Sobre Seguridad y Cooperacion International (UNISCI) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Focusing on four critical components of combat cohesion--leadership, morale, trust, and training--the author argues that under Boris Yeltsin, combat cohesion deteriorated to the point where the Russian military was not in a position to carry out combat operations--as demonstrated by the army's poor showing in the First Chechen War. As a result, the military that Putin inherited was in shambles. Planes were not flying, ships were not sailing, and soldiers were not training. While the outcome is not assured, Putin has provided the generals with the two factors they value the most: stability and predictability. For the first time since the collapse of the USSR, the steep decline in combat readiness has begun to be reversed--even so, success is not assured, and there is a long way to go before Moscow will be able to boast of an army approaching that fielded by the Soviets. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents a theoretical discussion of military logistics. The author begins by broadly defining logistics as the link between a state's general economic resources and its defense-military subsystems. He follows this with a discussion of both the Prussian and the French schools of logistics. He illustrates the importance of logistics in modern warfare with an analysis of some combat variables, then dwells on the phenomenon of the logistic vacuum, and describes the way military logistic systems function. Finally, he presents a case study analysis of the German attack on the Soviet Union in 1941, otherwise known as Operation Barbarossa.

On the basis of archival and printed sources, this article examines the role that Russian military intelligence played in miscalculating the Japanese threat before the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese war of 1904–05. The treatment focuses on three general problem areas: assessments of Japanese military and naval strength and combat readiness; perceptions of war imminence and the related possibility of surprise; and Japanese intentions. Evidence indicates that the overall quality of intelligence was uneven, although reasonably accurate with regard to the Japanese navy. However, genuine situational and structural constraints clouded perceptions of the Japanese ground forces. Still other constraints obscured Russian perceptions of war imminence and Japanese intentions. The cumulative result was that Russia would enter far eastern conflict at a substantial disadvantage. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Soviets developed heavy mortars to destroy enemy field fortifications. In the late 1970s, Soviet designers began work on a precision-guided mortar round. The Soviet "Daredevil" 240mm high-precision mortar round has an optical-electronic tracking head that is guided onto the target by a laser beam. The 240mm mortar is mounted on a tracked chassis called the 2S4 "Tulip". In 1985, the Soviets sent the round to Afghanistan for combat testing. The article discusses the successful combat testing of the round in the Pandjshir Valley of Afghanistan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ideally, early warning analysis provides information in a form that is easily digested by senior decision makers, serving as a first step in planning conflict prevention and preparedness measures. This paper outlines how practical early warning analysis can be undertaken, identifying seven central early warning factors within which individual indicators can be aggregated. While we can continue to search for the holy grail of early warning – that is the parsimonious polynomic equation which yields robust predictions, this should not come at the cost of the policy relevant tin cup that can be used today. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents information on a research regarding the motivational factors referred in the U.S. narrative accounts of the ground war in Vietnam. The researchers examined eighteen works written by the participants of the Vietnam that include the combat experiences of the participants during the ten-year period of the war. The study analyzes ten motivational factors that motivated the soldiers during the war period. It is noted that the ground level participants of the war were not properly informed about the goal. The unit spirit is considered as one of the ten important motivational factors of the primary group in the war.

Presents information on a study which discussed the optimization of hybrid electric vehicle components for combat missions. Mission sequences; Results; Conclusions.

The problem of optimally (re)allocating Navy personnel to combat units is compounded by several considerations: availability of trained personnel, staffing of positions by occupation groups or ranks, and maintaining an acceptable level of readiness. In this paper we model this problem as a nonlinear nondifferentiable optimization problem. A reformulation of the nonlinear optimization problem as a network flow problem is then developed. The formulation results in a network flow problem with side constraints. An additional, nonnetwork, variable measures the readiness level. This new formulation permits the use of network optimization tools in order to solve effectively very large problems. We then develop two numerical methods for solving this problem. One method is based on a heuristic that solves (approximately) the nondifferentiable problem. The second method is based on a Linear-Quadratic Penalty (LQP) algorithm, and it exploits the embedded network structure by placing the side constraints into the objective function. The resulting nonlinear network program is solved using a simplicial decomposition of the network constraint set. Numerical results indicate the viability of this approach on problems with up to 36,000 arcs and 17,000 nodes with 3,700 side constraints. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article evaluates the performance of the U.S. Army and Marine units in the Chosin Reservoir in Korea between November 27 and December 3, 1950. All the commanders of the U.S. Marine Division and its regiments were experienced in combat and saw action in World War II. However most of the commanders of the U.S. Army divisions and regiments had no such experience. The experienced senior Marine commanders took care of their men and their equipments in Chosin. The Army with inexperienced commanders lost all its equipment and almost half of its men. Army selected officers who were inexperienced in combat to command its units while Marine Corps assigned commands to officers who had previous combat experience.

Since World War II we have felt compelled for the first time in our history to maintain large standing forces. It is technology though. not numbers. that provides our edge in the continuing military competition with the Soviet Union. Acquiring advanced weapons is a complex process greatly complicated by our governmental system. which intentionally fragments political power. Mechanisms for improving the efficiency of the weapons acquisition process. however. threaten the very values that we seek to protect with our military power. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines the use of deterrent forces and the difficulties of convincing the public of the need for a strong military apparatus during times of relative peace. Motivation is a factor that must be addressed, since the maintenance of combat readiness while serving a deterrent role is complex. Citing the military services of the U.S. and Great Britain, the complexity of training, including appropriate training areas for the British Army, and incentives for volunteer deterrent forces are examined and possible solutions discussed.

The article discusses trends and problems in small combat tactical unit training for the U.S. Army, as well as the complexities of field testing these methods. The successes of the REALTRAIN simulated combat exercises training program, as well as the Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP), are discussed. The author maintains that the enhanced training achievements in these programs are an essential element of combat training but concludes that the potential effectiveness of REALTRAIN has been diminished by the way the program has been implemented.

The article discusses the REALTRAIN simulated combat training program and shows how it improves tactical effectiveness as well as the work-related attitudes of U.S. Army soldiers. The REALTRAIN program resulted in heightened participant responsiveness and a higher level of satisfaction and improvement when compared with the classic training paradigm. According to the author, these findings demonstrate that intrinsically rewarded military exercises are an essential part of successful combat training.