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At the end of Treatise 38 (VI 7), Plotinus presents an original analysis of the activity of the intellect. The intellectual activity of the soul cannot produce its object and thinks what is in the Intellect from which it comes. On the contrary, the Intellect produces its object (οὐσία) and its intellection is not the act of a substrate (ὑποκείμενον), as in the preceding case. In this context, Plotinus uses, to account for this particular form of intellect, a very rare notion in his work, that of συνυπόστασις. In our opinion, its use is at the origin of a true explanatory model that Plotinus uses in particular in Treatise 39 (VI 8) to think how the One can be what he wants to be. The use of this notion can therefore help us understand the meaning of freedom and will attributed to the first principle.

The article is devoted to Hervaeus Natalis, also known as Hervaeus drom Nedellec, who was an outstanding theologian at the end of 13th — beginning of 14th centuries (c. 1260–1323). Brief biographical information about Hervaeus is provided and his importance for medieval thought is emphasized. The subject matter of the article is the consideration of a formal difference, or formal distinction in God. The introduction of this concept is usually associated with the name of Duns Scotus, and there is every reason for this: although Duns was not the inventor of formal distinction as such, it was he who put it at the heart of his trinitarian theology. The concept of formal difference is inextricably linked to the concept of formalities, which in this context mean those ontological subunits in a concrete single essence between which there is a formal difference. The basic impetus to the introduction of both concepts was the necessity for rational expression of distinction between common divine nature and those relations by which Persons are constituted (relations of fatherhood, sonship, etc.), and also between different divine attributes. The task was, on the one hand, not to destroy the absolute real unity in God, and, on the other hand to explain certain differences that exist in him before any act of intellect, even divine intellect. Therefore, the notion of formality as a correlate “from the nature of the thing”, which corresponds to any attribute or relation, is conceivable in a separate concept.

Pavel Florensky in “The Pillar and Ground of the Truth: An Essay in Orthodox Theodicy in Twelve Letters” in “Letter Two: Doubt” describes the complex epistemic structure of religious experience. The article shows that the central element of this structure is the act of “inactive effort”, which does not give a clear result, but gives rise to a “tone of hope” in the mind of the subject, the expectation of discovering the possibilities of comprehending the object, whichcannot be obtained in the way of the usual rational method of cognition. According to the thoughts of Florensky, the presence of such an act is due to the fact that the object of religious experience (in this case, dogmas) is beyond what is possible for rational cognition, and nevertheless it must be somehow captured and expressed by this cognition. As a result of the analysis of Florensky’s text, the article formulates an epistemological model of cognitive acts of this kind, which require great effort from the cognitive, but at the same time are devoid of any signs of action. In addition to the subject of cognition and its object, the structure of such an act contains a third element, the “tone of hope,” which allows the act of cognition carried out by the intellect to go beyond the intellect into the realm of transcendental. This model, obtained in the analysis of religious experience, may be useful for describing some cognitive events that are not related to religion. For example, in a situation where the conditions of cognition do not allow for obtaining a reliable result, but the subject continues to carry out cognitive acts according to the model of “inactive effort”, and suddenly, without sufficient reason, receives knowledge that exceeds all expectations. This opens up the possibility of significantly expanding the problem field of epistemology.

Empiricism is a claim about the contents of the mind: its classic slogan is nihil est in intellectu quod non fuerit in sensu, “there is nothing in the mind (intellect, understanding) which is not f...

Though Plato's Phaedo does not focus on pleasure, some considerable talk on pleasure takes place in it. Socrates argues for the soul's immortality and, while doing so, hopes to highlight to his companions how important it is to take care of our soul by focussing on the intellect and by neglecting the bodily realm as far as is possible in this life. Doing philosophy, so his argument goes, is something like dying, if we grant that death is the separation of the soul from the body and notice that genuine philosophers wish nothing else than to be detached from the bodily realm. For indulging into bodily pleasures has detrimental consequences on the soul, impeding the search of truth and distorting reality, and so philosophers should undertake to purify themselves from all bodily concerns and gratifications and love the objects of learning and knowledge without deviation and distraction. On the contrary, ordinary people fall for the bodily realm as the only real domain that should therefore be of priority and of their earnest concern.

Did Florensky bring something new to the field of philosophy of culture? His merit lies primarily in his intentional use of the concept of ὁµοουσία, oneness-in-substance, in both metaphysics and cosmology. Florensky wrapped his philosophical and cosmolo-gical visions into "a religious garment" and theological terminology and attempted, in his unique approach, to solve the problem of "universal unity", "all-human consciousness", especially "all-human principles", questions which had engaged numerous Slavophilia philosophers earlier. His philosophy of culture is not about despising the world, but about the bright and loving adoption of life which enriches man, if he rises to a higher level of existence and desires to unite with the "other" invisible world. According to Florensky, all philosophical systems can be classified into two groups. They either acknowledge ὁµοουσία, the oneness-in-substance, or restrict themselves to ὁµοιουσία, the similarity-in-substance. Only a philosophy that recognises the oneness-in-substance is, according to Florensky, the philosophy of true culture, that is, the philosophy of "ideas and the true intellect, the philosophy of person and true self-realization".

Why is the human mind able to perceive and understand the truth about reality; that is, why does it seem to be the mind's specific function to know the world? Sean Kelsey argues that both the question itself and the way Aristotle answers it are key to understanding his work De Anima, a systematic philosophical account of the soul and its powers. In this original reading of a familiar but highly compressed text, Kelsey shows how this question underpins Aristotle's inquiry into the nature of soul, sensibility, and intelligence. He argues that, for Aristotle, the reason why it is in human nature to know beings is that 'the soul in a way is all beings'. This new perspective on the De Anima throws fresh and interesting light on familiar Aristotelian doctrines: for example, that sensibility is a kind of ratio (logos), or that the intellect is simple, separate, and unmixed.

RESUMO O propósito do texto é investigar se a relação entre o intelecto humano e o intelecto agente, apresentada por Avicena no Livro sobre a alma V (Kitāb al-Nafs), comprometeria a autonomia epistemológica do intelecto humano. Partindo de uma discussão prévia1 acerca da atividade colaborativa entre a alma racional e os sentidos internos, a análise que se segue é inteiramente devotada a apresentar os limites da interação causal entre os dois intelectos. Para isso, é necessário compreender o tipo de causalidade realizado pelo intelecto agente a partir da analogia com o sol e a visão tal como Avicena a emprega. ABSTRACT The aim of the following lines is to investigate whether the relation between the human and the agent intellect found in Avicenna’s On Soul V (Kitāb al-Nafs) could compromise the epistemological autonomy of the human intellect or not. Since I have already discussed the collaborative activity between the rational soul and the internal senses, the following analysis is entirely devoted to the limits of the causal interaction between both intellects. Finding these limits requires understanding the type of causality performed by the agent intellect from Avicenna’s use of the analogy between the sun and the vision.

L'épistémologie péripatéticienne de l’Aquinate suppose l'existence d'une distinction ontologique entre la partie sensitive et la partie intellective de l'âme. L'âme sensitive est mobile et corruptible alors que l'intellect est immobile et incorruptible. Considérant cela, il semble évident que la saisie des données de l'intellect, à savoir les espèces intelligibles, ne devrait pas être affectée par la corruption du corps. Or, la réalité est tout autre: les pertes de mémoire sensible affectent l’activité de la mémoire intellective. Étant donné que l’intellect est immuable, le fait que celui-ci puisse oublier laisse présager une dépendance structurelle de l'intellect en regard à son corps, qui serait le foyer de l’oubli. Cette recherche tente de mettre au jour la nature et la logique de cette dépendance structurelle. Plus précisément, elle tâche de répondre à la question suivante : est-ce que l’âme doit toujours se tourner vers les phantasmes lorsqu’elle pense les intelligibles et, si tel est le cas, comment le fait-elle? Les littératures premières et secondaires montrent sans équivoque que Thomas croit que l’intellect doit toujours se retourner vers les phantasmes pour penser. Or, déterminer la manière dont ce retour s’exécute est une autre paire de manches. Comme le montre Piché (2019), la conversio ad phantasmata, ou reflexio, est décrite de deux manières différentes tout au long du corpus thomasien : soit le retour aux phantasmes s’effectue par accident lorsque l’intellect agent saisit l’universel, soit la conversio est un processus d’autoréflexivité de l’intellect sur son propre acte d’intellection. Bien que les commentateurs (Gilson, Kretzmann, Lonergan et Pasnau) n’aient pas catégorisé dichotomiquement les explications de Thomas tel que l’a fait Piché, tous semblent abonder dans le sens de la première explication que fournit l’Aquinate. Nous entendons construire notre texte selon le plan qui suit : après une brève introduction, nous exposerons les traits saillants de l’épistémologie telle que développée par Thomas d’Aquin afin de révéler les liens structuraux présents entre les puissances de l’intellect et de la sensibilité. Ensuite, nous montrerons que l’intellect effectue toujours un recours aux phantasmes lors de son activité. Puis, nous confronterons les explications possibles quant à la manière dont s’exécute ce recours. Enfin, en guise d’ouverture, nous exposerons l’aporie, relative aux modalités, qui découle nécessairement du rapport existant entre la sensibilité et l’intellect., The Peripatetic epistemology of Aquinas supposes an ontological distinction between sensitivity and the intellect within the soul. The sensitive soul is mobile and corruptible while the intellect is immobile and incorruptible. In regard to this, it seems evident that the grasp of intellectual data, the species intelligibiles, shouldn’t be affected by the body’s corruption. However, it isn’t the case : the sensible memory losses affect the intellective memory’s activity. Since the intellect is immutable, the fact that it forgets points to a structural dependency of the intellect to its body, which would be the origin of omission. This research tries to excavate the nature and the logic of this structural dependency. More precisely, it tries to answer the following question : does the soul always need to turn towards phantasms when it thinks the intelligible species and, if so, how does it do it? The first and second literature show distinctly Thomas’ belief that the soul must always turn toward phantasms to think. Nevertheless, how it happens is a whole different issue. As shown by Piché (2019), the conversio ad phantasmata, also called “reflexio”, is described in two different ways all along the Thomasian corpus : either the return toward phantasms happens by accident when the intellect grasps the universal, either the conversio is an autoreflexive process achieved by the intellect toward its own intellectual act of thinking. Although the commentators (Gilson, Kretzmann, Lonergan and Pasnau) haven’t categorized Thomas’ explanations in terms of a dichotomy as Piché did, they all seem to agree with the first explanation provided by Aquinas. We will build our text according to the following plan : after a brief introduction, we will expose the salient features of Thomas Aquinas’ epistemology to reveal the structural links in between the intellect and the sensible soul. Then, we will show that the intellect always turns toward phantasms while it’s active. Thereafter, we will confront the possible explanations relative to the way this turn occurs. Finally, we’ll expose the modality aporia, as I call it, which ensues necessarily from the relationship in between the sensible soul and intellect.

The intellect is beset with numerous problems and shortcomings some of which have been historically noted by Plato, Bacon, Locke and others. A particularly challenging problem in reasoning, is the problem of (colored) ‘lenses’ whose source is culture, broadly construed. While the vital role of culture in reasoning may have been alluded to by philosophers, it has not been closely analyzed or theorized. Through two empirical case studies drawn from the field of educational anthropology, I demonstrate how cultural lenses block reasoning altogether or severely constrain it. This poses a particular challenge for the cultivation of the intellect in education—a goal universally advocated by historical and contemporary philosophers of education.Current educational programs aiming towards the cultivation of the intellect, namely, through critical thinking and through an initiation into the disciplines, while they have their merits in helping students think more effectively, are insufficient in helping students to overcome the barrier of lenses (as theorized herein). And they fail because current educational programs focus on argument identification and evaluation. But problems of reason are not limited to problems of argument and reason is not limited to argument evaluation. Hence, what is required is a philosophy of education for the full cultivation of the intellect based on a broader conception of reason; a conception of reason which I demonstrate through empirical case studies.To achieve the goal of the fuller cultivation of the intellect in education, I indicate a pedagogical direction for a possible educational program. I also recommend a focused research program in (i) the philosophical study of reason in a broader sense than just evaluation of arguments, (ii) a multidisciplinary study of various problems facing reason and (iii) an empirical study of educational methods for overcoming problems of reason. The implications of the present work are not just limited to students’ reasonings but have relevance to teachers’ and policy makers’ reasonings and indeed to the reasonings of philosophers of education as well.

This article contrasts two beliefs about the relation between the emotions and the intellect. Each sees emotional responses as fundamental and primary sources of thinking. Each sees a different role for the intellect following emotional responses to worldly phenomena. L. S. Vygotsky, articulating a belief common at his time, sees the intellect as a disciplining force, one that, after a pause or interlude, serves to temper emotions to produce a "catharsis" and what he calls "intelligent emotions," those subjected to rational thought and a higher plane of cognition than either emotion or intellect could produce alone. Jonathan Haidt, following Vygotsky by nearly a century, asserts that emotions control cognition, rather than as Vygotsky conceives, being subordinated by reason. Haidt, in the tradition of David Hume and with more empirical data than Vygotsky provides for his view, sees the passions ruling human thought and action. Any accompanying reason serves to rationalize gut feelings rather than to control them; reason, Haidt argues, is a "rationalist delusion" that gives emotional thinking the veneer of reason. This article outlines both positions and attempts to reach a synthesis of their views.

William of Ockham (d. 1347) was among the most influential and the most notorious thinkers of the late Middle Ages. In the twenty-seven questions translated in this volume, most never before published in English, he considers a host of theological and philosophical issues, including the nature of virtue and vice, the relationship between the intellect and the will, the scope of human freedom, the possibility of God's creating a better world, the role of love and hatred in practical reasoning, whether God could command someone to do wrong, and more. In answering these questions, Ockham critically engages with the ethical thought of such predecessors as Aristotle, Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, and John Duns Scotus. Students and scholars of both philosophy and historical theology will appreciate the accessible translations and ample explanatory notes on the text.

Why should mindfulness and meditation be taught at universities? What impact could the establishment of such programs have on students and on the education system itself? Andreas de Bruin showcases the remarkable results of the first ten years of the Munich Model »Mindfulness and Meditation in a University Context« - a program started in the year 2010 in which 2000 students have already participated. Through meditation-journal entries featured in the book, students describe the effects of mindfulness and meditation on their studies and in their daily lives. In addition to an overview of cutting-edge research into mindfulness and meditation, along with in-depth analyses and explanations of key terms, the book also contains numerous practical exercises with instructions.

This paper resolves some puzzles regarding Spinoza’s appropriations and rejections of various aspects of Bacon’s methodology, and uses these solutions to resolve some long-standing puzzles concerning Spinoza’s modus operandi in the TTP. We argue first that, appearances to contrary, Spinoza takes a consistent line in his assessment of Bacon’s epistemic approach. We argue that Spinoza follows Bacon in grounding his overall epistemic method in a “historiola mentis” (a brief account or history of the mind), and that differences between Spinoza’s and Bacon’s respective historiola mentis can explain Spinoza’s embrace of this inductive method for his interpretation of Scripture in the TTP, as well as his general abandonment of Bacon’s inductive method in the metaphysical investigation of the Ethics. In short, we argue that the “historiola mentis” constructed by Bacon depicts the intellect as an error-prone faculty that needs be continuously restrained by observation and experimentation—a depiction which motivates Bacon’s reformed inductive empiricism. Spinoza accepts this depiction in regard to a subset of the mind’s ideas—the ideas of the imagination, and hence sees the inductive method as suitable for interpreting Scripture. But contra Bacon, Spinoza’s “historiola mentis” also shows that the human mind includes a subset of ideas that yield true, certain knowledge of things “infinite” and sub specie aeternitatis. Spinoza finds these “intellectual” ideas to be quite useful for systematic metaphysics, but of limited use for interpreting historical texts like Scripture.

In this chapter, Karin de Boer traces Kant’s attempts to come to terms with the role of experience in metaphysics. From the 1760s onward, Kant embraced the scientific model represented by Newtonian physics because it provided the means to challenge the assumption on the part of Wolffian metaphysics that a priori cognition of objects could be achieved by the intellect alone. De Boer argues, however, that Kant was not prepared to elevate experience into the absolute touchstone of metaphysics, for this would threaten the very possibility of a priori cognition and, hence, the notion of an immaterial soul, of freedom, and morality. Focusing on the Prize Essay (1764), Dreams (1766), and the Critique of Pure Reason (1781), the chapter examines Kant’s successive efforts to solve the tension between experience in its capacity as touchstone of truth and experience in its capacity as threat to the core assets of metaphysics. These efforts are shown to culminate in Kant’s claim, put forward in the Critique of Pure Reason, that the synthetic a priori cognition to which metaphysics aspired is warranted only insofar as it pertains to possible experience.

One of the greatest achievements of the human intellect is the ability to project, away from the world we are familiar with, to situations which are totally beyond our experience. People like Isaac...

This study examines how Ibn Ḥazm (d. 456 AH/1064 CE) articulated his nominalist critique of Platonic realism in the context of a larger rejection of ontological dualism in philosophy. It draws on evidence in Al-Fiṣal fī l-Milal wa-l-Ahwāʿ wa-l-Niḥal (The Book of Opinions on Religions, Heresies, and Sects) and his Marātib al-ʿUlūm (Categories of the Sciences). In response to those who “claim to follow philosophy (falsafa),” and in dialogue with earlier theologians and philosophers such as al-Bāqillānī (d. 403/1012–1013) and al-Kindī (d. 258/873), Ibn Ḥazm redefined the universal soul (al-nafs al-kulliyya) and universal intellect (al-ʿaql al-kullī) as linguistic references to the total of all particular souls and particular intellects, which he defined as corporeal accidents inhering in the body. Ibn Ḥazm’s identification of souls and intellects as corporeal was part of his larger conception of the world as discrete and finite in both space and time. The world, in other words, is measurable in numbers and therefore limited by the volume of its visible and invisible air-like corporeality to the exclusion of philosophical notions of a perfect void or prime matter. In his additional critique of contemporary Muslim epistemology and the theologians’ reliance on dialectical argumentation, Ibn Ḥazm held that a true scholar of Islam should turn to logic-oriented deductive methods and scriptural evidence together in order to ascertain the possibilities and, more importantly, the limits of human knowledge about both the corporeal created world and the ontological unknown (ghayb) of the divine realm.

Structure and content The soul’s journey into God work fully reflects the atmosphere of stigmatization of Francis. The image of the six wings of seraphim served as a point of reference for Bonaventure for the construction of the treatise, and St. Francis’ spiritual experience became a source of its content. The pilgrimage of man to God goes through six stages, and then, at the very end of the road, goes to the last, which is rest in the Trinity and pure contemplation. In this spiritual journey, the Incarnate Word fulfills an important role. However, the basic tool that allows man to recognize and meditate on the mysteries of God are the authorities of the soul and the intellect.

Henri Bergson is generally recognized as one of the most influential philosophers in the history of historical avant-gardism. Nevertheless, it has been widely neglected that Bergson’s philosophy also played a crucial role for the radically new concept of art that Marcel Duchamp developed based on his critical attitude towards the avant-gardes. First and foremost, this is apparent in view of Duchamp’s paintings The Passage from Virgin to Bride and Bride of 1912, as they both feature an idea of transition laying the foundation for his Large Glass and associated works. But there is also another cross-connection that one wouldn’t expect at the first glance. As this paper argues, Duchamp paradoxically also draws on Bergson’s ideas with his ready-mades, pointing to that productive interplay of intuition and intellect, which Bergson defined as a vital source for any kind of imagination and agency. Thus, Duchamp’s idea of choosing his ready-mades in terms of a “rendezvous with fate,” which he also reflected in his writing experiments The and Rendezvous, can be closely linked to his declared interest in Bergson’s “primacy of change,” leading him to explore the idea of “plastic duration.”

This paper addresses one of the themes of the 2018 CSSP Conference: understanding the legacy of the Scottish tradition. In doing so I suggest that we find some Scottish heirlooms in early American education. To make this case I will start with a text that has been largely refuted and establish a starting point for a legacy of the Scottish tradition with what I believe to be the weakest case: the almost unknown Glaswegian philosopher George Jardine (1742–1827).