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This article examined the relationship between ideology and conspiratorial thinking and the related mediating effect of ingroup favoritism in a non-Western society. We investigated patriotism and nationalism as two favorable orientations toward national ingroups. We also examined their relationship with the general conspiracy mentality and the specific conspiracy beliefs that have emerged during the COVID-19 pandemic. The results revealed that conservative ideology was associated with conspiratorial beliefs in China regardless of the specific conspiracy theories related to ingroups or outgroups, which indicates such tendencies may exist universally across cultures. Patriotism was not associated with conspiracy theories about the origin of COVID-19, whereas nationalism was negatively associated with the conspiracy theories about China (an ingroup) and positively associated with conspiracy theories about the US (an outgroup). Moreover, nationalism mediated the relationship between ideology and specific conspiracy beliefs during the pandemic. The general conspiracy mentality did not predict conspiracy theories about the origin of COVID-19. The results indicate that believing conspiracy theories is not only the result of a stable conspiracy mentality but is also influenced by ideology and intergroup relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An essay is presented that traces out the reception of one protest event, which is titled "Anti-Right-wing Japanese Action" of April 16, 2005, in Shanghai, China. Topics mentioned include the role of the state in instigating, shaping, and/or repressing such protests, contradictory ideas within the central messages of Chinese nationalism, and the multiple forms of participation in protests.

Although Singapore currently makes it impossible in the male descent line, departing from Chineseness has been a common phenomenon in Southeast Asian history. In modern nationalist times the paucity of alternative terms in Southeast Asian and European language has made the overused Cina a problematic label, impossible to detach from a very large northern neighbour and from many cultural stereotypes. Naturally many local-born and culturally hybrid citizens have sought to escape from it. The best documented mass case is the nineteenth century Philippines. Peranakan Indonesians have not found it so easy to shed this inappropriate label even though it has occasionally been wielded as a death threat. 'Outsider' status also has its uses. This presentation will be chiefly concerned with the obstacles for Peranakan in departing from Chineseness. It will argue nevertheless that many Indonesians are quietly succeeding in taking this path. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With the rise of China, the importance of understanding Chinese nationalism increases. Assessing Chinese nationalism, many people claim that it has grown stronger and more intense in recent years. Some believe that this is the case because the Chinese Government deliberately promotes nationalism to serve its own purposes. This paper argues that the reality with Chinese nationalism is much more complicated than many assume. It has grown stronger in some respects but weaker in others. The role of the Chinese Government is at best mixed. In explaining the development of Chinese nationalism, one needs to look at external as well as internal and historical causes. Only by doing so can one gain a fuller and more balanced understanding of this intriguing phenomenon. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the role of nationalism in shaping Chinese foreign policy in the history of contemporary China over the last 100 years. Nationalism is used here as an analytical term, rather than in the usual popular pejorative sense. By tracing the various expressions of contemporary Chinese nationalism, this article argues that nationalism is one of the key enduring driving forces which have shaped Chinese foreign policy over the period; as China increasingly integrates herself into this globalized and interdependent world and Chinese confidence grows, the current expression of Chinese nationalism is taking a more positive form, which incorporates an expanding component of internationalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the extent to which China's 'Fourth generation' leadership might be inclined to place a greater emphasis on nationalist rhetoric both in China's international relations and in domestic policy. It explores two different views of nationalism, namely state-centred and popular. With the decline in the public impact of official ideology, the Party-state has given tacit recognition to nationalism as one potential source of regime legitimisation. However, this article argues that by placing the Party at the centre of the official discourse the state-centred view of nationalism restricts the extent to which the Party-state can mobilise nationalist symbolism in support of its leadership and makes the Party vulnerable to criticism from more popular conceptions of nationalism. The priority given to developing the economy means China's leaders must downplay popular criticism which can focus on the negative consequences of China's growing interaction with the wider world. Under China's 'Fourth generation' leadership this tension may deepen. China's new leadership are unlikely to resort to 'wrapping themselves in the flag' as some commentators have suggested. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The study of Chinese nationalism is very popular--both in China and the West. This article introduces a special section of seven articles (four of which are in this issue) on 'The Limits of Chinese Nationalism', arguing that our understanding of nationalism in China is problematic. This special section aims to explore the limits of many of the statements about Chinese nationalism that have now become 'common sense': the rise of Chinese nationalism, nationalism filling an ideological vacuum, elites manipulating nationalism to gain legitimacy, and so on. Using critical IR theory this Introduction explores the concept of limits to argue that borders in China are not just territorial, but cultural, economic and thus political. It seeks to change the objective of our discussion of Chinese nationalism from seeking an Answer--either as a measure of the objective nature of Chinese nationalism or as a moral judgment of it as good or evil--to seeing 'nationalism' as a provocation which pushes us to think about China and identity in a host of different and productive ways. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Explores how humiliation has been an integral part of the construction of nationalism in China. Social theory; Domestic and international political consequences of the deployment of shame and humiliation; National insecurities in China.

After having been sidelined and overwhelmed several times, the gathering momentum of liberalism and social democracy in China today may constitute the most profound change in Chinese intellectual development since the mid-nineteenth century. However, it is a daunting task for both liberalism and social democracy to win the minds of the majority of Chinese intellectuals by breaking down the barriers of state socialism, nationalism, and cynicism. It is not easy to determine the political persuasions or ideological beliefs of many intellectuals in contemporary China: Are they liberals, socialists, or nationalists? One can easily find devotees of liberalism, socialism, or nationalism among intellectuals in modern and contemporary China; the problem lies in the heterogeneous nature of their ideological beliefs and political persuasions. As a pattern, many of these intellectuals are, or intend to be, liberals, socialists, and nationalists at the same time, without fully understanding the tensions or contradictions between these different ideologies. One consequence is repeated bewilderment at many historical junctures, when such elite display political precariousness and ideological bankruptcy. These intellectuals may subscribe to liberal and democratic values, but in the end cannot resist the seduction of state socialism and nationalism. The combination of these three political beliefs has actually formed a hierarchy in the ideological structure of progressive Chinese intellectuals in modern times. Nationalism came first, followed by socialism and liberalism in order of relative importance. It is impossible to find any influential political or intellectual leaders in modern China who are not nationalist. The strong commitment of the elite to nationalism has not only eventually led to the prevalence of state socialism over any other brands of socialism, but has also set a "clear limit on the development of liberalism. There is now a real possibility that liberalism will prevail over both nationalism and state socialism in China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper provides a historical overview and theoretical interpretation of the issue of national identity in Taiwan. The author demonstrates how the idea of "orthodoxy" in the dynastic tradition has shaped various projects of Chinese nationalism in the twentieth century. Taiwan has surpassed this dynastic mind-set by transforming cultural nationalism into civic nationalism. Taiwan's new political order, which is centered on popular elections of the president, is interpreted as the institutionalization of plebiscites which has forged a new national identity. Theoretical reflection on the relationship between the civic nationalism of Taiwan and tile cultural nationalism of China is also provided. The author contends that a mode of heterocentric self-understanding is needed to resolve the ideological conflict between China and Taiwan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]