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Der vorliegende Beitrag widmet sich der historischen Entwicklung der mit Mittelstreckenraketen ausgerüsteten Einheiten der Strategischen Raketentruppen der UdSSR zwischen 1956 und 1991. Damit soll deutlich gemacht werden, dass zu dieser Teilstreitkraft der Sowjetarmee nicht nur die Interkontinentalraketen gehörten, sondern auch die Fernlenkwaffen mittlerer Reichweite eine wichtige Rolle spielten, da mit ihnen gleichfalls strategische Fragen gelöst werden konnten, die für die Umsetzung der sowjetischen Nuklearwaffenstrategie von entscheidender Bedeutung waren. Zudem wird der Frage nachgegangen, welche Konzepte die Militärführung der Sowjetarmee beim Aufbau der Mittelstreckenraketen-Einheiten verfolgte und warum es wichtig war, von Anfang an auf eine rasche Entfaltung und hohe Gefechtsbereitschaft dieser Truppenteile bereits auch in Friedenszeiten zu setzen. Ferner wird skizziert, wie die politische Führung versuchte, die noch junge Waffengattung zur Lösung außenpolitischer Fragen einzusetzen und welche Rückwirkungen dies auf die Kampf- und Einsatzbereitschaft der Raketentruppen hatte. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article comments on the necessity for a Strategic Arms Limitation Talk (SALT) II agreement between the U.S. and Soviet Union. It is better to have a treaty which seeks to control arms, though imperfect, than none at all. Contrary to the assertion of the American Right that SALT II only benefits the Soviets, the agreement benefits both parties. Ultimately, the success of SALT II depends on the political will of both superpowers to reduce, regulate and control nuclear weapons that threaten the survival of mankind.

The article assesses the state of Japan's defense planning and readiness of Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF), focusing on air and maritime capabilities. It highlights gaps among policy, force structure, and operational readiness. It argues that that the JSDF lacks the operational and tactical doctrines essential to enhancing its readiness in the air and maritime domains.

The author emphasizes the role of the U.S. Naval War College in enhancing readiness and lethality among its students. To better prepare students of the College the course of study at the College was redesigned with the introduction of additional war fighting-focused studies, the College also provided greater focus on understanding present-day threats while improving combat readiness and the expansion of the Russia Maritime Studies Institute.

The article offers information on the future of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) following the end of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) operations in 2014. It mentions that NATO is the successful and one of the powerful military alliance around the world. It offers information on the defence and operational planning of NATO.

The article discusses the importance of the role of airfield ground support services in the combat readiness of aircraft operated by Air Force units. It also examines the structure and purpose of aviation complexes and the role of airfield towing services within the system of preparing equipment according to the specific operations of the aviation complex. It also presents recommendations for designs of towing vehicles to prepare the aviation complex against large-scale guided weapons attacks.

The author reflects on the collaboration between statisticians and the defense test-and-evaluation (T&E) community. He focuses on operational testing which is used to conduct operational readiness of a product, service or system as part of a quality management system. He mentions some research regarding reliability-growth methods and models applicable to defense systems. He outlines some effective design of operational tests for the major defense systems

The article reports on the manner in which the Swedish military élites assessed the new states of Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland through the military attachés from a strategic point of view from 1919-1939. It provides a background of the concept of total war in relation to the Swedish military attachés' assessment of other states. It also looks at the military capacity of the Baltic armies.

Resources are diminishing. The Department of Defense has been saying it for years... program offices must produce more with less. As a U.S. Army acquisition community, we must stand firm in our charge to provide the soldier with the most lethal and secure warfighting systems while meeting our obligations to the taxpayer. Behind each fielded system, embedded in acquisition requirements, can be found lengthy test programs. To the novice engineer, these tests can be an impressive display of the utilization of his part in an overarching system: a piece of software, a novel sensor, a propulsion system. To the Program Manager, these tests can make or break a program, with the end result leading to a fielded system or a trip back to the drawing board. In the fiscal year 2013 (FY13) Department of Defense President's budget, the President requested a total of $69,408,000,000 to support research, development, test and evaluation (RDT&E) activities across the Department and the Services. While this is down slightly from the $71,375,000,000 received in FY12, it still represents a large budgetary item supporting basic research, applied research, systems development, and test and evaluation of defense systems. Summarizing the resources provided to support the developmental costs associated with test and evaluation of developmental systems is difficult, since these numbers are generally wrapped into the larger program budget. However, it should equal, if not exceed, the $185,268,000 (Budget of the U.S. Government 2012 p. D-16A), which has been requested for defense operational test. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The author reflects on the factors that caused so much strain on the Armed Force in the U.S. He cites the culture of the Americans who are prone to technological optimism, leveraging technology to gain qualitative superiority over its enemies. However, the author asserts that such approach has resulted to the escalating procurement costs and logistics needs of the military.

The article focuses on the military responses and capabilities of the national security policy in Canada after the September 11, 2011 terror attacks in New York. It notes that Canada's federal government has tightened up financial restrictions on potential fund-raising by identified terrorist groups, introduced new legislation and bureaucratic structures focusing on security issues. The author suggests that the Canadian military is reasonably prepared for a military response to the eventuality of a terrorist incident or an act in the country.

The article discusses the military strategies in war and peace. It explores the wrong use of the word strategy and how two well-known modern commanders, Erich Ludendorff in World War I and Bernard Montgomery in World War II have also never understood the term. It states that the Centre for Military and Strategic Studies at the University of Calgary has conducted an international Strategy Workshop which asked students about their notion of military strategies and establish a definition of national policy. It states that policy and strategy were closely intertwined along with alliance-building and alliance-denial.

The article discusses the strategic military planning implored by France in 1914. It explores the inconsistencies between French foreign policy and military planning and how the country make bad choices. It mentions the research paper presented by the Royal Military College (RMC), which offers details on the French military strategy in 1914 and the cognitive processes that made French leaders comfortable with their strategy. The author affirms that it is important for French soldiers to clearly and carefully think about the possible nature of future war.

The article discusses the significance of the Balkans as a strategic operational area for over 3,000 Bundeswehr servicemen and women who have been deployed in the region since 1995. It mentions that the Bundeswehr has faced two other challenges since 1989, which include the unification of the two German states and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. It states that the changes in foreign affairs policy had implications for the home affairs situation, with the public showing concern over the consequences of the fundamental changes in the political and military foundations of the country.

The article discusses the strategy implored by the Soviet Union for the war in June 1941. It mentions that despite poor operational-strategic deployment and operations and tactical inadequacies during the Operation Barbarossa, the Red Army was able to survive two seasons in 1941 due to implementing a combination of improvements at the operation and tactical levels. It states that the union launched the Five-Year Plans of 1928, which aims towards the long-term defense and expansion of heavy industry in the state.

The article discusses thoughts on the grand strategy and the condition of the U.S. in the 21st century. It mentions that the strategy is said to be more often than not about the ability to adjust to the reality that resources, will, and interests will inevitably find themselves out of balance in some areas. It states that it demands a recognition of and ability to react to the ever-shifting environments of war and peace. It explores how the U.S. develop effective approaches to grand strategy in meeting the demands of war and gain military effectiveness.

The Director of Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E) has begun four T&E initiatives. The initiatives are far reaching and will influence the conduct of T&E across the defense establishment. The initiatives begin with support for our forces: "T&E is to help get the capability needed by our fighting forces to them as quickly as possible." The initiatives extend the boundaries for testers to engage in areas not typically the domain of T&E, such as "Review requirements as they are developed to assess whether they are unambiguous, testable, and relevant to accomplishing missions in combat." They promote new methods to improve T&E efficiency and effectiveness, through integrated testing. Finally, they sustain the important past T&E priorities of working with developmental testers to incorporate a reliability growth curve or software failure profile, reliability tests during development, and evaluation of reliability growth and reliability potential during development in the Test and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses new approaches to the assessment and calculation of combat worthiness which is an indicator showing the combat potential of military units. It discusses combat readiness, or readiness to fight, which is another type of combat potential indicator. Furthermore, it states that the goal of assessing the combat readiness of military formations is to indicate the type of mission they are ready to accomplish at any time and up to what extent.

The article focuses on the assessment and calculation of the combat worthiness level of military subunits and units. It presents several things to consider in assessing combat worthiness of subunits which include the exclusion of battle readiness in the calculation, the five components of combat worthiness such as the state of the personnel, and the levels of these components. It notes that the combat worthiness of a particular unit depends on the combat worthiness level of its various subunits.

The article focuses on identified Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) by the Congress and senior defense officials as a means of responding to future threats to U.S. space systems. The ORS focus includes the ability to launch, activate and employ low-cost, militarily useful satellites to provide surge capability, reconstitute or augment existing constellations, or provide timely availability of tailored or new capabilities.

Testing and evaluation (T&E) of the effectiveness of unmanned autonomous systems (UAS) is a very serious challenge. UAS are ideal target platforms for implementation of intelligent and cognitive capabilities. UAS are often used in hostile and harsh environments where human presence is not desirable, including air, space, surface, or undersea operations. This requires a high degree of UAS autonomy and human independence. To increase effectiveness, UAS may exhibit some social behavior, interacting with each other in a dynamic and flexible fashion. Finally, UAS are capable of carrying lethal weapons. Design and implementation of such intelligent systems is a very difficult task indeed, but even more difficult is the task of T&E of capabilities and operational readiness of these systems. In this article we attempt to lay the system-theoretic foundation for analysis and testing of cognitive and social capabilities of UAS. We propose a cognitive analysis framework and then show how this leads into analysis of the social interaction capabilities of UAS. This cognitive framework is a key to development of comprehensive UAS T&E methodology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the problems encountered in the organization of joint coordinated actions of multi-agency military formations in Russia Federation during a special operation. These problems were classified as legal, theoretical, organizational and technical. Also examined were the combat training system for multi-agency military units.

The article provides an analysis regarding the deployment of the joint grouping of aviation and air defense troops and the qualifying features and conditions for the realization of military activity modes. It examines the necessity of using radio-technical formations as well as electronic warfare units in air battles. It stresses the significance of a common design and elaborated plan for the deployment of the joint grouping of aviation and of air defense troops in the operation.

The article discusses the theory of interaction on the concept of operation of military troops. It reveals the essence of interaction pertaining to military activities including that it is a solution of a contradiction between centralization of control and flexibility, build up horizontal control of military operations, and the coordination in the actions of troops is achieved through preparation of an operation. Three models on interaction are given.

The article focuses on the analysis of the military activity in the context of military sciences using various methods of disciplines such as philosophy, psychology, and sociology. It points out that an approach to the military activity concept is not at all casual in society since it stems from the previous development stages of the native scientific idea. However, such interpretation of the relations between culture and military science is overcome as it lacks adequate conformity.

The article discusses the form of defense, a type of combat action in which one of the opposing sides realizes its combat capability. It is noted that defense operations are always a retaliatory reaction to initiative displayed by an advancing adversary. The ultimate objective of the defense will be neutralization of an attacking force. The main method of achieving defense objectives is depriving the adversary of its offensive capability.

The article discusses the importance of strategic training among echelons of command and troops of the Russian Federation (RF) Armed Forces towards succeeding combat operations. The authors account on the Great Patriotic War and several combat activities that RF Armed Forces should learn. The author also a presentation in an attempt to alert RF defense capability in countering possible aggressions.

Ideally, early warning analysis provides information in a form that is easily digested by senior decision makers, serving as a first step in planning conflict prevention and preparedness measures. This paper outlines how practical early warning analysis can be undertaken, identifying seven central early warning factors within which individual indicators can be aggregated. While we can continue to search for the holy grail of early warning – that is the parsimonious polynomic equation which yields robust predictions, this should not come at the cost of the policy relevant tin cup that can be used today. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]