Search

The Defence White Paper 2013 is the latest in a long series of Australian Government Defence White Papers outlining defence policy, projected defence funding, structural reform proposals and expected savings plans, but lacking a budget sufficient to implement the plan. The impact of the decisions taken in the Defence White Paper 2013 for aerospace forces is at first glance positive, but in reality damaging. The government has committed billions of dollars to the Super Hornet acquisition to address an undefined transition risk at the end of this decade, while deferring the purchase of the full Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) capability promised in the 2009 Defence White Paper to around 2030. As a result of operating a mixed fleet of Super Hornets and JSFs in the mid to late 2020s, Australia will have many fewer than the '100' JSFs originally planned for, and will therefore have a reduced fifth generation fighter capability to address an uncertain future security environment. The mixed fleet will also result in increased operating overhead costs that will compound existing concerns regarding budget pressures and associated force capability risks. Australia's security depends on having realistic goals matched by achievable funding commitments. Merely aspiring to be a middle power will not make it so. If one accepts that the strategic risk analysis contained in the 2009 Defence White Paper was valid for Australia's role as a middle power, then the ADF should be resourced accordingly. If not, then government must recalibrate its aspirations, accept that Australia's future is not as a middle power in the region, and redesign strategy, concepts and force structure accordingly. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Indian Ocean is a region of increasing importance, with booming economic opportunities, shifting power dynamics and rising geopolitical competition. To manage this transition some Australian policy-makers are advocating the practice of defence diplomacy as a mechanism to help mould cooperative practices and to build regional trust while dissipating potential or ongoing regional flashpoints. Australia's 2013 Defence White Paper identified Australia as an agent who can play a critical part in the emergence of certain types of norms as a means of conflict prevention and crisis management in the Indo-Pacific region. This paper explores the use of defence diplomacy as a means for seeking regional influence. It uses an innovative new framework of norm entrepreneurship to examine the choices facing Australian policy-makers in increasingly complex security environment. This paper argues that while Australia should aim to promote defence diplomacy as a central part of rising security dialogue and practice with ‘like-mined’ countries, there must also be careful reflection to ensure that this objective is a constructive use of a middle power's limited resources and influence. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Asia's middle powers face a trilateral dilemma stemming from their relationships with the U.S. and China. This paper uses the Australian example to examine the dilemma. It shows that Australia has bound itself to the U.S. because of domestic political factors, cost considerations, a belief that it can keep its interests separate, and its perception of regional threats. The paper then argues that others are likely to resolve their trilateral dilemmas in ways that make the regional strategic dynamic more competitive. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Australian policymakers have always harboured a desire to ‘punch above their weight’. On occasions they have succeeded. At a time when Australia's strategic, economic and environmental future is inextricably bound up with that of its immediate neighbours and the wider world, there are compelling reasons for hoping that they still can. This paper explores some of the most important aspects of Australian foreign policy during the Rudd era and asks whether the Australian government can play a constructive—even an exemplary—role in finding solutions for some of the planet's most pressing problems. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

For a middle power with a relatively short history of framing a self determined foreign policy, Australia has actively sought to engage with both its immediate region and the wider world. Elite agreement on this external orientation, however, has by no means entailed consensus on what this orientation might involve in terms of policy. Consequently, two, often conflicting, traditions and their associated myths have informed Australian foreign policy-making. The most enduring tradition shaping foreign policy views Australia as a somewhat isolated bastion of Western civilisation. In this mode Australia's myth is pragmatic, but uncertain and sees Asia as both an opportunity and a potential threat which requires the support and counsel of culturally similar external powers engaged in the region to ensure stability. Against this, an alternative and historically later tradition crafted a foreign policy that advanced Australian independence through engagement with a seemingly monolithic and increasingly prosperous Asia. This paper explores the evolution and limitations of these foreign policy traditions and the myths that sustain them. It further considers what features of these traditions continue to have resonance in a region that has become more fluid and heterogeneous than it was during the Cold War and which requires a foreign policy flexibility that can address this complex and strategically uncertain environment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article argues that middle power theories can be tested by looking at the practice of negotiating multilateral treaties on conventional weapons. Three recent treaties are noteworthy, regulating landmines, cluster munitions and the arms trade. They are noteworthy because they were negotiated through multilateral diplomacy by coalitions of countries often identified as middle powers, and resulted in humanitarian, effects-based regulations. Canada and Australia actively participated in all three and are regularly cited as exemplars of middle powers. On landmines and the arms trade, both behaved as middle power theories would anticipate, embracing multilateralism and seeking a principled outcome. On cluster munitions, neither country conformed to expectations and instead unsuccessfully sought an incremental approach in line with their US ally. These cases therefore offer promising terrain to test claims around middle powers, multilateralism, and principled approaches to world affairs. This article sheds light on these inconsistencies by identifying the contextual changes behind these differing postures through a 'contexts of diplomacy' framework. This article also highlights the strategies and tactics of Canada and Australia. This serves two purposes. First, it helps address some of the issues raised in middle power theories. Second, it helps identify modes of middle power diplomacy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines Australian national identity in the context of the Asian Century. It addresses whether national identity plays a significant role in shaping Australia's engagement with Asia. The core of Australian national identity lies in the Western political tradition. Australia is outward-looking country embracing a policy of multiculturalism. The article argues that Australia's identity is increasingly evolving into a more inclusive pluralistic identity. This process is gradual and does not constitute abandoning Australia's core values and traditions. The article outlines the evolution of national identity and examines Labor and Coalition governments' views on identity, Australia's place in the region and globally, as well as the linkage between the national identity and national interest. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents an overview and analysis of the foreign policy stance taken by China since the mid-1990s. Various outside perceptions of China's power and influence are reviewed. The nation's deliberate adherence to a "middle power" strategy of fostering a global image of caution and pragmatism in security issues is introduced and explained. Further analysis is offered relating this doctrine to those of Australia and South Korea, showing where their respective approaches to the region's geopolitics are in agreement and in conflict.

This article examines why Asia-Pacific middle powers cooperate with each other on security issues. The article challenges the assumption that middle powers are primarily influenced by great-power structural factors in their security relations with each other. It argues that the dominant structural explanations of security cooperation between secondary states—balancing against the rise of China, responding to burden-sharing pressure from the United States, or hedging during a period of great power transition—have not been sufficiently tested. Using the 2009 Australia-South Korea security cooperation agreement as a representative example of middle power security cooperation, it finds that inter-personal leadership preferences played a key intervening role in filtering existing structural incentives into actual policy cooperation. It shows how congruence in leadership preferences shapes when and with whom middle powers are likely to cooperate on security issues. The article opens up the research agenda on middle powers by examining how they approach security relations in bilateral and horizontal contexts with each other. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores the efforts of Japan and Australia to enhance the naval capability of third countries-specifically the Philippines-threatened by the rise of China. Considered as middle powers, both countries are members of two associations of maritime democracies, namely: the Democratic Security Diamond (DSD), and the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD). Since the formation of their special strategic partnership, Japan and Australia have jointly assisted in building up the capabilities of the Philippine Navy (PN), Philippine Coast Guard (PCG), and the Philippine Air Force (PAF). The recent dramatic shift in Philippine foreign policy direction fosters this triangular security relationship. On the one hand, President Rodrigo Duterte, in distancing the Philippines from the United States (the country's traditional ally) favors closer security ties with Japan and Australia. On the other hand, Japan and Australia want to prevent the Philippines from gravitating closer to China's orbit of influence and power. Gradually, however, this development can either modify or erode the American hub-and-spoke system of alliance in East Asia and increase the spoke-to-spoke links leading to the creation of minilateral and plurilateral security arrangements in the Indo-Pacific region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Australian Journal of International Affairs is the property of Routledge and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The article discusses Australian foreign policy in relation to the notion that Australia is a middle power. Topics include Australia's military relations and involvement in the Asia-Pacific region, the views of former Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd on foreign policy, and the significance of Australia's economy.

Australia faces a complex set of dilemmas in foreign, defence, and economic policy. Australian governments have traditionally relied on the United States to underwrite the country's defence policies, and have regularly demonstrated loyalty to the bilateral strategic alliance. Yet, Australia's economic security has become more dependent on China, a country with which the US has a competitive relationship. This article first reviews theories of competition among great powers. It then analyses key factors that are shaping the region and the Australian policy environment. It is argued that Australia may have much to gain from acting collaboratively with other middle powers within multilateral institutions. In this context, Australia may also benefit from a more robust recognition of its own distinctive national interest. 澳大利亚面临外交、防务、经济政策上一系列的复杂难题。澳政府以往一直是依赖美国为澳国的防务政策签字画押，而且一直对双边战略联盟忠诚不二。但澳大利亚的经济安全却更依赖同美国有着竞争关系的中国。本文梳理了有关大国竞争关系的各种理论，分析了构成地区以及澳大利亚政策环境的诸多因素。作者认为，与中等强国进行多边体制内的合作，会让澳大利益受益非强。坚定不移的强调自己的国家利益，对澳大利亚也是有益的。 [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The material transformation of the Chinese economy is forcing a concomitant process of political adjustment-and not just in China. Other states are being forced to accommodate the 'rise of China'. In this context, this article first presents a comparative analysis of China's impact on two countries, Australia and South Africa, which have little in common other than a wealth of natural resources and a possible status as middle powers; this is a particularly useful exercise because these states are geographically distant and have very different political structures and general developmental histories. Second, the authors consider how China's bilateral ties look from a Chinese perspective in these two very different relationships. Such an analysis serves as a reminder that resource dependency is a two-way street. The article argues that underlying material realities are constraining and to some extent determining the domestic and foreign policies of three very different states that otherwise have little in common. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article critically evaluates Australia's ‘creative middle power diplomacy’, encapsulated in the three pillars of the Labor government's foreign policy platform. It notes that each pillar has been accorded specific roles in the implementation of Australian foreign policy and makes particular reference to the government's preference for multilateral engagement. The article subsequently demonstrates that such an agenda actually impedes a creative approach to key issues such as trade, climate change and non-proliferation challenges, as well as Australia's participation in Asia-Pacific order-building. It then offers some suggestions for a more flexible posture that is not inconsistent with past Labor approaches, but which also better appreciates regional and global complexities. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Australia has often been identified as a middle power in foreign policy terms. This article assesses the worth of the concept in understanding the role of Australia in global environmental governance. Using a case study of the role played at the World Summit on Sustainable Development, it assesses whether Australia conformed to a classic middle power role, building coalitions as a ‘good international citizen’ or whether its role was more like a veto state, preventing positive change. This is done via a reflection of Australia's Summit priorities and an assessment of its impact over the Summit outcomes. The article shows that Australia was able to offer leadership in certain specific areas, but overall domestic policy preferences, a growing mistrust of multilateralism, and a strong defence of the national interest meant that Australia played the role of a veto state, often in coalition with the United States of America. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]