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Israel's relationship with the West during the first half of the 1950s was not a walk in the park. Economic relations fitted into this general picture. Both Britain and France were sceptical as far as Israel's potential was concerned. Their early prognoses tended to be quite gloomy. Simultaneously, economic relations provided a convenient communication channel at a time when overt association with the Jewish state was not desirable. The progress in Franco-Israeli economic ties during the years 1953-1955 illustrates this ambivalence in full. While prudence remained, the increase in bilateral trade managed to warrant the military supplies. Britain, constituting a traditional market, surpassed France as a trading partner. Given British political aloofness, the instrument of trade served primarily its immediate economic purpose. Based on archival sources gathered in all of the three countries, the paper traces the interplay of trade and diplomacy in the early years of Israel's foreign relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the past decades, we have witnessed the global re-emergence of the political meaning of both nationalism and religion. This paper explores contemporary fragments of this trend across three European countries: France, Poland and the United Kingdom. The discursive occurrences brought into the analysis are taken from state-centered political arenas as well as from more diffused or marginal sociological elements. While the approach is primarily set in the perspective of nationalism studies, the final aim of the paper is to nourish the reflection on the negotiations of political and social significations between religion and nationalism. To what extent are religious discourses inherent to the resurgence of nationalist discourses and social practices? Reversely, are nationalistic phenomena inherently religious in nature, hence favorable to combinations between religious and nationalist discursive elements? Are the contemporary dimensions of the relationship between religion and nationalism, such as those presented in this paper, tokens of a new (or renewed) syncretism of a reactionary grid of social significations? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

On the basis of a study of American, British and Canadian records, this article examines the relationship of France to the negotiation of the North Atlantic Treaty from the perspective of the ‘ABC’ countries, particularly Canada. How did the perceived vulnerability of France influence the approach of the members of the ‘North Atlantic Triangle’ to the justification, timing and contents of the proposed pact? How did France's inclusion in Western Union and its exclusion from the preliminary talks in the Pentagon affect American, British and Canadian attitudes to the development of the draft alternatively known as the ‘Pentagon Paper’ or the ‘State Department Draft’? These questions are addressed, as well as the impact on the later ambassadorial talks of France's priority to immediate rearmament and its determination to include the departments of Algeria within the defensive perimeter of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. Finally, the article assesses the extent to which France and its requirements influenced the policies and actions of the Canadian government throughout the negotiation of the North Atlantic Treaty. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This paper underlines Vattel's commitment to maintaining the sovereignty of Europe's small states by enunciating the duties he deemed incumbent upon all political communities. Vattel took seriously the threat to Europe from a renascent France, willing to foster an equally aggressive Catholic imperialism justified by the need for religious unity. Preventing a French version of universal monarchy, Vattel recognised, entailed more than speculating about a Europe imagined as a single republic. Rather, Vattel believed that Britain had to be relied upon to prevent excessive French ambition, and to underwrite the independence of the continent's smaller sovereignties. Against those who saw Britain as another candidate for the domination of Europe, Vattel argued that Britain's commercial interests explained why it was a different kind of state to the great empires of the past. The paper goes on to consider the reception of Vattel's ideas after the Seven Years War. Although further research is required into readings of Vattel, especially in the smaller states of Europe in the later eighteenth century, the paper concludes that by the 1790s Vattel was being used to justify war to defeat the gargantuan imperialist projects of newly republican France, in order to maintain Europe itself, and the smaller states within it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Brexit has been a game-changer for Britain, and its key partners. Strategic shifts as well as historic relations have impacted the UK's relationship with France in a number of unexpected ways. This article explores some of the key historical events that have caused both agreement and strife between the two states, looking at the bilateral treaties established to deepen cooperation on security and defence, specifically the Lancaster House agreements, and considers the series of intriguing accords and conventions that have arisen from the mid-1980s, as well as the logistical challenges of the shared border and juxtaposed border controls of Britain and France. Post-Brexit diplomatic forums in which Britain and France are joined by Germany are then explored, before assessing Britain's attempts to forge its new role in relation to long-standing commitments to France and an evolving relationship with the EU. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose is to investigate the peculiarities of the formation and implementation of the European regional security concepts of France, Germany, and Great Britain in their comparison in the historical context of the foreign policy of these states with an emphasis on the period 2014--2022. The research methodology was formed by the principles of historicism, systematicity and impartiality, general scientific methods of logic, comparative analysis, and special historical methods (historiographical analysis, historical-systemic, chronology, historical-genetic, retrospective analysis, comparative-historical). The scientific novelty lies in the study of the implementation history of the theoretical approaches of France, Germany, and Great Britain to the European regional security policy in the context of the history of their foreign policy in a comparative dimension. The transformation of three national paradigms of European security in the context of changes in the system of modern international relations in the conditions of the Russo-Ukrainian war, which actually began in 2014, was traced. Particular attention is paid to the influence of these paradigms on Ukraine's international position and changes in the system of international relations and European security. Conclusions. Th roughout the entire history of European integration, each of the three leading states of Western Europe tried to realize leadership ambitions in regional politics in their own special way, compensating for the loss of global status. France, Germany, and Great Britain represent diff erent paradigms of foreign policy -- Eurocentric, Euro-Atlantic (intermediate), and Atlantic, respectively. Th roughout the development of the EU's security policy, France and Germany played the role of apologists and initiators of reforms, while Great Britain played the role of an antagonist of integration. The process of forming the EU's foreign and security policy was reduced to the search for a compromise, which led to its incompleteness. Diff erences in views on the European integration of political elites did not allow the three states to form an eff ective regional security core without the participation of the United States. Even in the studied period of 2014--2022, marked by a sharp aggravation of the crisis of the European security system, diff erences between Great Britain, France and Germany remained insurmountable regarding the current problems of international relations. Current events related to Ukraine and the mechanisms of their resolution were no exception. Although the large-scale aggression of Russia against Ukraine in 2022 contributed to the consolidation of the views and approaches of the politicians of the vast majority of Western states regarding the need to review the system of regional policy and oppose Russian aggression, the Russo-Ukrai nian war illustrates the problems of preserving the conflictual nature of the interaction of existing European security paradigms and leaves open the question of the possibility of forming a new, eff ective comprehensive system of regional security in the short term without a final answer. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

At the end of April 1922, S.P. Waterlow of the Central Department of the Foreign Office, which dealt with Franco-German relations and European security, put up a memorandum. This claimed: “Except on paper and as an expedient for minor purposes or an escape for some dilemma, we have not taken the League [of Nations] seriously.” It contrasted London's indifference with the active use which Paris was making of the League, asserted that “the objects of British policy and those of the League are broadly speaking identical,” and urged: “let us institute a genuine and energetic League of Nations policy.” This recommendation was strongly endorsed by the Assistant Under-Secretary, Sir William Tyrrell, who believed that such a policy would secure almost universal popular support for co-operation with France, and he proposed making a joint declaration that for the purpose of maintaining the frontiers created by the Treaty of Versailles: “the two countries would place at the disposal of the League all their resources for the enforcement of its decisions.”1 [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The involvement of urban and regional governments in transnational cooperative arrangements and policy networks has led to considerable debate regarding the political and theoretical implications. This paper examines networking and cooperation between urban areas and regions in the UK and France with a shared sea border. Such cross-border cooperation involving local authorities in Europe is a growing phenomenon and has certain implications for the analysis of local and urban politics. Three study areas are examined in detail: the Transmanche region involving Kent County Council and the French region Nord-Pas-de-Calais; the Transmanche Metropole which includes Southampton, Portsmouth, Bournemouth and Poole in Britain and Caen, Rouen and Le Havre in France; the cooperative initiative between the English county of East Sussex and the French de partements of Somme and Seine-Maritime. In all three case studies, the development of cooperation has been influenced by the availability of funds from the European Union Interreg programme which supports transfrontier networking. A number of political consequences of cross-border cooperation are identified. The implications of these policy initiatives for theories of urban politics are considered, including a discussion of the political and economic construction of competition and cooperation between cities and regions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article looks at an episode which though it happened in Tunisia had a direct link to the Algerian War of Independence (1954–62), and thus propelled the war to an international conflict that pitted the Western powers, namely; France, Britain and America against each other. By the time the incident occurred the Algerian War had been going on for just over three years with the French seemingly gaining the upper hand. This article endeavours to show how this incident complicated the Algerian conflict and how the episode was viewed internationally, especially from the British Government and media perspectives both had keen interest on the Algerian conflict as a result of their own empire in other parts of Africa. The article is based largely on archival research at the Public Record Office at Kew, (England) and Newspaper archives at Colindale. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article contends that the revolutionary event in 1870, as far as British foreign policy was concerned, was the collapse of French power, rather than the unification of Germany. By focusing on the unification of Germany and Anglo-German relations, historians have missed the centrality of France in nineteenth-century British foreign policy. Despite friction over Belgium, Britain and France co-operated on many issues in the eighteen-sixties, most notably checking Russian ambitions in the Near East. Once French power collapsed in 1870, Britain could no longer resist Russian revisionist claims in the Black Sea. At the same time, Britain was forced to compromise with the United States over outstanding differences dating from the civil war. Isolated on the international stage, the British government had to reorient its policy around the world and the events of 1870 shaped the options open to policymakers in subsequent years. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents an examination of the impact that World War I had on the establishment of peace in Europe in the years following the war, international politics and the European balance of power. It explores these issues by examining how the English and the French approached the issue of air power. It explores the national strength and power that was attributed to air power and discusses how France and Great Britain differed in their approaches to technology, industrial capacity and military mobilization.

Several historians have suggested that Austen Chamberlain's Francophile tendencies during his period as foreign secretary between 1924 and 1929 were the defining features of his European diplomatic strategy. By examining four key events: the rejection of the Geneva Protocol, the conclusion of the Treaty of Locarno, the Anglo–French Compromise on disarmament and the negotiation of the Kellogg-Briand Pact, this article argues that Chamberlain's relationship with the French was not entirely harmonious. After the high point of Locarno, Britain's relations with France became increasingly tense because of Chamberlain's growing disillusionment with Briand's willingness to pursue a diplomatic agenda that did not have at its heart a reinvigorated Entente Cordiale. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The period of tenure of Anthony Eden and Yvon Delbos as the foreign ministers of their respective countries coincided with a remarkable improvement and convergence in Anglo–French relations. This was no accident. Both men had similar ideas in relation to the challenges confronting Britain and France in international affairs. Neither wanted really close relations with Soviet Russia and both supported non-intervention in the Spanish Civil War despite their growing concern over German and Italian intervention. Delbos was highly critical of Mussolini's Italy and was firmly opposed to a Franco–Italian rapprochement while Eden, having originally given the Duce the benefit of the doubt, came to distrust him and to oppose even conversations with Italy without prior concessions, such as the withdrawal of Italian volunteers from Spain. Finally, both supported the appeasement of Nazi Germany, including colonial concessions, although Delbos towards the end of his period as foreign minister became more sceptical as to the prospects for success. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

At the end of the Second World War, British society's hostility and resentment towards France's military defeat and the French state's collaboration with Germany were strong. In order to deflate this enmity and thus prepare the ground to forge western European co-operation, the French and British governments co-operated and developed gendered public and media strategies within which citizens, and, in particular, former female resistance fighters, were central to the dissemination of positive images of France. This article takes seriously these strategies and adds nuance to understandings of modern foreign policy in terms of methods and actors. The article elaborates on neglected agents of diplomacy, such as female members of civil society, and the significance of rhetoric, gendered performance, and appearances that contributed to the restoration of the image of France in Britain. By doing so, the article also sheds light on the efforts of French and British authorities to construct a narrative of binational unity that disrupted the tenacious idea that Britain had fought alone during the war. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines mid-nineteenth-century Anglo-French relations through the prism of musical standardization. Bringing together perspectives from musicology, history of science, and political history, it demonstrates the holistic value of musical practices for the study of processes of political integration. In 1859, Napoléon III's government determined a national pitch to which musicians should tune their instruments. The following year, Britain's Society of Arts attempted to emulate this standard. Amid tense Anglo-French relations, British audiences interpreted the French pitch as a measure of the country's autocracy, and these political anxieties materialized through a redefinition of the standard. The challenges of introducing a musical pitch within a liberal political framework encountered in 1859 were subsequently echoed in debates over the reform of weights and measures following the 1860 free trade treaty between Britain and France. Both the economic and artistic integration of these countries involved the problem of how to regulate society within a laissez-faire state. Musical standardization has received little historiographical attention, but the regulation of this art offers insights into mid-nineteenth-century Anglo-French political culture. Entangled within complex network of industrial, institutional, and social structures, musical pitch demonstrates how problems of economic and social integration were inseparable from international and socio-political contexts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Social scientists have long been aware of the need to improve our ability to predict the effect of divergent preference orderings on policy choices made by coalitions. More recently scholars have demonstrated the crucial role of differing assumptions about risk-taking preferences for predicting foreign policy choice. In this paper a theoretical approach for analyzing collective choice in the presence of risk and conflicting preferences is presented and then applied to a series of policy choices in Britain, France, and Germany in two historical periods: one, the three decades before World War I; the other, the decades after World War II. Although the specific cases examined all involve foreign and defense policy options that were embroiled in domestic disputes over extraction, the assumptions and hypotheses presented are designed to be applicable to collective decisionmaking in a wide variety of substantive areas. Indeed, they appear to provide a theoretically grounded interpretation for some characteristic patterns of policy choice that have long intrigued students of comparative foreign policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the height of the Cold War, major democratic arms suppliers have claimed that they take into consideration the human rights records of existing and potential purchasing states. After the Cold War, supplier policies suggested an increased focus on matters of human rights. But do their records match their rhetoric and their formal policies? We examine the arms transfer patterns of the four major democratic suppliers between 1976 and 2009. We argue that, if practice matches policy, then democratic suppliers should not transfer weapons to states violating human rights. However, because the global interests of these suppliers shift over time, we expect some transfers of major weapon systems to states that violate human rights, but not of the types most implicated in human rights abuses. Thus, we build on the existing arms transfer literature by disaggregating exports based on weapons type. The ordered logits we run for each major democratic supplier from 1976 to 2009 show that the major democratic suppliers generally do not account for human rights violations in the importing state, with the one exception being the United States transfer of land weapon systems. This research is important not only to arms and human rights research, but to foreign policy scholars in general. The patterns of supply and the continued preference of states to provide major conventional weapons to states with poor human rights records reveal important policy priorities for these democratic states. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the relationship between geopolitical change and the evolution of French grand strategy from Iraq to Libya. While the European Union (EU) and the bilateral relationship with Germany continue to feature high in French grand strategy, France has in the space of just a few years substantially strengthened its Atlantic connection (with the US, Britain and NATO) and upgraded its relationship with other European powers – particularly Russia. It is argued that the driving reason behind this diversifying trend is the weakening of the US-led West, both globally and in Europe. If US military power laid the foundations of order in and around Europe, America's shift of geostrategic attention eastwards is underpinning a political destructuring of Europe and its broader neighbourhood. For one thing, Europe is moving towards a more multipolar balance, as evidenced by Russia's resurgence in the east and southeast, Turkey's drifting from the EU and growing influence in the continent's southeast and, crucially, Germany's increasing influence over the direction of the EU. For another, France's so-called axis of strategic priority (Northern Africa, the Sahel, Levant, Horn of Africa/Red Sea and the Gulf) is characterised by mounting instability and increasing penetration by external powers. Against this backdrop, the special relationship with Germany and the EU are insufficient to guarantee French influence in Europe, the stability of Europe's broader neighbourhood or France's aspirations to global power. In an increasingly uncertain global and regional environment, France is seeking to reconcile a deeper politico-military relationship with Britain (and the United States), a special relationship with Germany in the politico-economic sphere and strong ties with Russia, thereby positioning itself as a sort of spider in an increasingly multipolar European geopolitical web. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article investigates the impact of US stock market openings on linkages between the UK and French markets. Using intraday data over the period December 2004 to March 2009, we find significant time-varying dependence between the UK and French stock returns, which alter according to the state of the US market. Indeed, not only does the opening of the US market itself significantly affect the UK stock dependency, but such linkages also seem to be closely dependent on bearish or bullish US market trends. Interestingly, the estimation of a two-regime Threshold Autoregressive (TAR) model indicates that the bearish US trends are a source of minor linkage (lower regime), whereas the bullish US trends involve higher interdependency (upper regime). This finding is particularly interesting as following the US trend expectations enables us to better forecast future European stock prices and to calculate the level of their potential contagion effects. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The study registers the first moments which defined the process of European contruction, and the necessity of its rise, then, it points the most meaningful moments in which France interceded by its foreign policy in this process. France abndoned the desire to find in Great Britain a partner for its foreign policy, De Gaulle refocused his policy to an agreement with West Germany, his success being explained by his excellent relation with Chancellor Adenauer. By its foreign policy in the process of Eurpean construction, France pursued the fulfilment of the national interests and the conception of an European frame in which France to be the spokesperson of Europe. As predited by De Gaulle, the process of European construction evolved from „The Six” to its twenty- seven members, France supporting by its policy the extension of the European Union, and the famous Gaullist formula „Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals” is about to turn into reality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The brief war between Georgia and Russia in August 2008 provoked vigorous international reactions among the European states as consequence of the sudden shift in the strategic balance. This article argues for a focus on the great powers France, Germany and Britain as crucial actors for understanding the policy reactions towards Russia. It argues furthermore that reactions must be explained from the perspective of experience based on past geopolitics which translate the external pressures into concrete foreign policy: France oriented towards the creation of a strong EU as global actor, Germany influenced by her self-imposed restraint in foreign affairs and Britain influenced by Atlanticist commitments in her balancing behaviour. Beyond the Russo-Georgian war, the article points to an interest-based foreign policy approach towards Russia in the longer term driven by a great power concert with the Franco-German axis as stable element but increasingly with backing from Britain, thus contributing to transatlantic foreign policy convergence on the issue. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Against the background of conflict in the Great Lakes Region, the UK and France promised, at their 1998 Saint-Malo summit, to set aside rivalries and cooperate on Africa. In subsequent Anglo-French gatherings, they singled out the DRC and pledged to work together there to promote peace and tackle poverty. This article asks whether this coordination took place and whether it involved a ‘deconflictualisation’ of approaches, ‘coincidental’ cooperation, or ‘sustained and reciprocal’ collaboration. It looks for evidence of institutionalisation of UK-French ties and policy cooperation in the fields of peacebuilding and poverty reduction. It then identifies the pressures for, and barriers to, collaboration, focusing particularly on the role of interests, foreign policy norms, institutional factors and resource constraints. It concludes by setting out the wider implications of UK-French cooperation and the limited prospects of closer future collaboration. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article discusses Marianne, an allegorical figure and political caricature of the state of France featured in the German periodical "Kladderadatsch" during the early 20th century. According to the author, the character reflected Germans' ambivalent attitudes towards France. It is suggested that France was often shown as a victim of Britain or Russia, whose portrayal was more consistently negative in the magazine. Details related to domestic issues in Germany, including debates on German identity, are presented. Other topics include World War I, the French provinces of Alsace and Lorraine, and the British symbol of John Bull.

In the late nineteenth century the yachting world was the scene of intense debate. For certain of the French participants in regattas, the main objective was to fight against the hegemony of the British and the imposition of their rules. This topic was the subject of much discussion in the nascent international sailing organisations, which were created at that time. In order to diminish the influence of British regulation, French representatives suggested rules that were developed in France but were inspired by American standards. In fact, the French position revealed the fact that there was more at stake than yachting alone and the controversy extended into questions of social status and international politics. French organisers saw this as an opportunity to strengthen their power within French yachting at a time when this activity was still developing and establishing its own institutions. Above all, French regatta competitors asserted their elite status within French society, reinforcing the idea that their group represented an increasingly important class. Their established geopolitical connections enabled them to promote and impose their values, and serve their own interests and ideas at the national economic and political level, where they had vested interests. In particular, these sportsmen were influenced by the widespread Anglophobia in France at the end of the nineteenth century, which balanced the better-known Anglophilia of figures such as Pierre de Coubertin. Thus, the role of French navigators in international institutions was part of a wider concern to solidify their elite status. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The argument that multipolar international systems are less stable because certain states have an incentive to externalize the costs of defense to other states has been built on interpretations of the behavior of France, Russia, and especially Great Britain between the two World Wars. This article addresses flaws in both the use of the French and Russian cases, but is most tightly focused on the British case, which was the strongest, prima facie, of the three. This article demonstrates how the British scheme for defense against Germany was not a policy of attempted externalization on either the political or military level. Consequently, the long debate over the relationship between systemic structure and systemic stability, which has been heavily influenced by the belief in the existence of an incentive to externalize defense costs under multipolarity, must be re-examined, with new tests run and new conclusions explored. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Italy's invasion of Abyssinia in October 1935 prompted a major European crisis. This article applies the main theories of foreign policy analysis to the British Government's handling of this crisis. It argues that bureaucratic politics existed, but had little impact on outcomes. Domestic politics had more influence, but did not provide detailed instructions on how to act. The perceptions of key actors, informed by reasoned judgement, determined this. Fears of the threat posed by rival states coalesced with concerns about Britain's own military weakness, leading decision-makers to emphasise the need to act in tandem with France. British policy was therefore motivated by the tension between the public's desire to see action against Italy and the Government's wish to minimise any breach with her allies. These findings highlight the weaknesses of the bureaucratic politics model and show how domestic politics can affect foreign policy outcomes. They also demonstrate the interaction between rational analysis defined in terms of reasoned judgement, and actors' perceptions. It is thus argued that benefits are to be gleaned from combining these theories. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article examines British involvement in solving the Vilnius dispute in 1920-1923, where Britain was caught between its desire to maintain Allied solidarity with the French and its own foreign policy prescriptions. In the context of the complexities of the relationship between the two Allied Powers that often took a 'friend-but-foe' form, tension between the two goals conditioned the ultimate fiasco of British dispute mediation initiatives. Britain's desire to act entirely in accordance with France led the former to renounce many feasible dispute settlement initiatives, including the possibility of forestalling conflict, whilst the lack of similar devotion to Allied solidarity on the French side and the atmosphere of mistrust between the two Allied Powers undermined the British initiatives for which it was prepared to stand. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After 1911, Germany felt increasingly threatened by the Triple Entente. Secret intelligence from the Russian embassy in London revealed a growing cohesion among the Triple Entente partners: Britain, Russia, and France. In particular, Berlin feared the success of Raymond Poincaré of France, first as premier and then later as President, as he worked to convert the entente with London into an alliance and to reinforce alliance ties with Russia. In the summer of 1914 came the murders at Sarajevo of Habsburg Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife. When Vienna decided to punish Serbia, Berlin agreed to support them in the belief that Russia would not back Serbia. But even if Russia did support Serbia, better a war now than later. Rather than be intimidated, Russia took escalatory actions of its own to help Serbia and their French ally. The First World War was the result. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article traces international activities of regional governments in Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Great Britain, and Italy. We describe how intensively the regions are investing in economic, cultural, and political activities, and how broad the different activities are spread. Then we analyze preconditions for strong activities by using the fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis. Two assumptions about causal configurations are confirmed. First, high economic interdependencies in combination with large financial capacities are in most cases sufficient for setting up many promotional offices abroad. Second, a high level of policy autonomy, in combination with strong competencies in foreign affairs, is almost always sufficient for having a well-staffed office in Brussels. In contrast, partnerships with foreign political entities are not a result of a cultural causal configuration. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]