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States attempting to peacefully coerce an adversary by building military power face a dilemma. Build too little and the adversary may challenge because the state is too weak. Build too much and the adversary may challenge because it thinks the state is bent on aggression and will attack no matter what the adversary does. We develop a model of this dilemma and show under what conditions it makes peaceful coercion impossible. We then extend the model to show how threats and assurances can help commit a state to fight challenges but not attack in the absence of a challenge, ameliorating the dilemma. We discuss insights from the model in the context of the 1930's appeasement crises, Cold War Europe, and the Gulf War. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Vienna Convention was the culmination of an unusually long process. The issue of codifying diplomatic law occupied minds in the later nineteenth century, fell victim to the problems of the League of Nations and then had to wait for the cold war to rea ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the end of the Cold War international law seems to be facing ever more serious challenges in both substance, compliance and normativity. Despite this more faith is being placed in its ability to solve an increasing range of problems. This paper seek ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Most of the critical discussion on securitization theory has emphasised the need of refining ourunderstandings of the acts or performances of securitization and the role of audiences in variousways. While the criticism has focused on acts or their contexts in a theoretical vein, the majority ofempirical analysis guided by the approach has focused on regional and state level securitizationdynamics. An increase of interest in global or system level empirical dynamics and the theorizationof larger wholes can however be detected in the recent work of the leading figures of the'Copenhagen School'. Accordingly, this paper examines a securitization process of global scope interms of its referent objects. Looking both into the past and an aesthetisation of possible futures, thepaper traces the resets of the 'Doomsday Clock' as securitization/desecuritization moves withglobal referent objects.The Doomsday Clock is one of the most recognized aesthetisations of the possibility of a globalcatastrophe wiping out human civilization. While the Cold War and the 'Global War on Terror' canbe deemed more or less successful 'macrosecuritizations', what can the Clock tell us aboutsecuritization/desecuritization moves with global referent objects, which have not been all that'successful'? ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A conference paper about the role of ideology in the origins and implementation of the containment doctrine during former U.S. President Harry S. Truman's administration is presented which is prepared for presentation at the American Political Science Association Conference, in Toronto, Ontario, on September 2-6, 2009. The paper discusses topics including the origins of containment and the Cold War.

This paper examines whether foreign aid, like oil revenue, decreases the likelihood of regime transitions. It tests the hypothesis that with respect to aid, it is donor intent rather than the money itself that determines whether or not aid is associated with a decreased likelihood of regime change. By examining the impact of aid on the likelihood of regime transitions in both the Cold War and post-Cold War period, support is found for the central role of donor intent. During the Cold War, when Western donors gave aid in order to prop up friendly regimes, the negative effect of aid on the likelihood of a regime transition surpassed that of revenue from state-owned enterprises. In the post-Cold War period, when donors have lost their desire to use aid to prop up regimes, there is no significant association between aid receipts and the likelihood of regime change. This suggests that as long as donor intentions are benign, it is possible to give aid to authoritarian regimes without decreasing the chances of a democratic transition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union in the 1990s, the field of international relations has increasingly examined the related topics of intra-state conflict and identity. This shift away from the classic IR focus on conflicts between states and the realist assumption of the state as an unitary actor brings ‘IR’ scholarship into the ‘territory’ of ‘comparative’ and/or ‘peace and conflict resolution’ studies. There is much to be gained theoretically and practically from IR scholars examining existing work on nationalism, identity, and ethnic-based conflict and of scholars of peace and conflict studies and those examining identity and nationalism from exploring each others’ work. In particular, because different theoretical and disciplinary approaches to the problem of intra-state or ethnic conflict make different assumptions and explore different aspects of the ‘same’ problem, their respective analyses make different contributions to knowledge. This paper seeks to highlight the contributions of peace and conflict resolution research (i.e. human needs theory) as well as theoretical frameworks for studying identity found in geopolitics and political sociology (i.e. the role of discourse, institutions and policies in ‘bounding’ identities) to IR scholarship on ‘intra-state’ or ‘ethnic’ conflict. After discussing the theoretical literature on issues related to intra-state and identity-based conflict, I will look briefly at the case of the current Iraq war as an way to illustrate how a boundary-focused approach to identity and an application of theoretical concepts from peace and conflict resolution might shift the analytical lens and perhaps provide different insight into the complex challenges facing scholars, policy makers and military leaders. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the end of the Cold War, multilateral organizations have frequently authorized military forces to prevent, manage and/or resolve civil conflicts. Military commanders are asked to respond to the orders of both their national governments and the multilateral organization to which their countries belong. These efforts pose significant challenges to all involved, particularly the lead military commander. Surprisingly, however, few scholars or practitioners have examined the political circumstances confronting military commanders engaged in multilateral interventions. In this paper, we explore the principal-agent dynamics associated with the Kosovo conflict. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I will examine "American exceptionalism" historically,update it post Cold war with Clinton and Bush 2 and contrast it wih an opposing Islamic worldview. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The end of the Cold War ushered in an unexpected period of multilateralism. Organizations in particular benefited because they became repositories of legitimacy, both symbolizing the newfound emphasis on cooperation and providing sanction for international action, notably the use of force. But was the growth of multilateralism merely a luxury indulged because the great powers faced minimal threat? America’s behavior over the last few years suggests that cooperation may have been an act of convenience rather than commitment. Or does it? In spite of its go-it-alone stance, the US has discovered that it needs other nations and organizations in order to accomplish many of its goals. Multilateralism may, therefore, be more entrenched in the international system than is often thought. Even nations that possess dominant power on a global or regional basis now find themselves operating under significant restrictions, and institutions are surprisingly relevant even though they are often dismissed. This paper will analyze US behavior in the Middle East and Nigerian behavior in West Africa to test the hypothesis that the norm of multilateralism now restricts and shapes hegemonic behavior, even in cases where the hegemon appears to pursue unilateral interests. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The end of the Cold War changed many things about the world;to include the theories that explain and predict state behavior. The theories of Structural Realism, as developed during the Cold War, predicted two possible courses of action when the USSR & Warsaw Pact collapsed, leaving the United States as the sole super-power. The United States allies in Europe would either remain within the US’s strategic institution of NATO (band-wagon) or they would form a new alliance oriented against the overwhelmingly powerful US (balance). Strangely, the European states did both. Not only did those 15 states remain in NATO; three more states joined NATO; and 27 states joined the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC)(NATO-lite), but the European Union, with 11 of its 15 members also belonging to NATO, formed a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) with defense implications. This riddle of geographically overlapping security institutions does not negate the usefulness of the theory of Structural Realism. Rather, just like the rest of the world, the theories need to adapt and change to the Post-Cold War. I will use a combination of theoretical pattern-matching to illustrate which tenets of Structural Realism remain valid and explanation-building to modify the theory to account for the puzzle of the NATO & CFSP in Europe-- making the theory a good tool for these new times. I will look at the North Atlantic Area in three distinct time periods: 1948-1967 Deter, 1968-1989 Deter & Détente and 1990- 2001 Post-Cold War. I will show that Structural Realism can accurately explain and predict inter-state competition and cooperation in defense, security, political/diplomatic and economic sectors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study will attempt to review and analyze how bipolar competition effectively internationalized the Angolan Civil War. In the cold war era, the ideological confrontation between East and West placed a premium on maintaining order and stability among states and allies. However, super-power rivalries in Angola fuelled one of Africa’s longest and most deadly conflicts. Angola’s nationalist groups received military and monetary assistance. With the end of the cold war, external intervention has diminished but has not disappeared. In the competition for oil, diamonds and other precious resources in Angola, interests external to Angola continue to play a large and decisive role, both in suppressing conflict and in sustaining it. Hence, one of the key objectives of this project is to assess the internal and external mechanisms used to end the conflict. In addition to the peace-keeping missions, other diplomatic relations will be evaluated together with the impact on the economy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper deals with the evolution of the American foreign policy towards unilateral secession from the cold war to the post-cold war. It also produces empirical generalizations about the United States’ reaction to secessionist attempts, and general statements concerning the political process leading the US to grant international recognition to secessionist movements. Using a case-oriented research analysis of the secession of Bangladesh, and of Slovenia and Croatia, I demonstrate that the American policy of recognition has evolved over years. Short term power politics during the cold war was the crucial factor undermining the American policy towards secession. Though, the end of the cold war marked a shift in the U.S. policy of recognition. As empirical evidences show, the current unipolar order makes the United States very concerned about regional stability when dealing with secessionist issues. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As a result of the end of the cold war and rise in comparative American power, some analysts concluded that a possible Sino-Russian alliance might arise as a means of balancing the power of the United States in the international system. Relations between the two countries warmed during the Yeltsin regime in Moscow, and increased Russia-China trade and strategic cooperation has occurred since the 1990s. However, possible balancing behaviour between the countries has been countered by the numerous regional-level factors which have prevented the formation of a stronger alliance between Russia and China. These have included concerns over strategic competition in Central Asia, regional economic rivalries, and the increased presence of American interests in Asia. It is due to these factors that balancing behaviour from a Sino-Russian partnership will remain limited in the short term. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

That German foreign policy was constrained by Cold War bipolarity never precluded vigorous debate among German policy makers about the requirements of domestic and European political order. Party politics also contributed to such disputes, but an emergent pattern in the debates over East-West relations and unification is better explained by a constructivist approach that links public order to the way language functions to create rules (and thus rule). This perspective accords an independent role to ideas and to policymakers as political agents, but it also explores constraints on what it was possible to say, and to think, in postwar Germany. In previous rounds of debate, exponents of a Kantian institutional approach to order squared off against Lockeans who emphasized rights and agency. In general, the Kantians (Adenauer, Brandt, and Kohl) prevailed over the Lockeans (Schumacher, Kiesinger, and Lafontaine), resulting in a Germany that built institutions first and asked questions about national rights later. But, can this pattern be expected to continue in the post-Cold War era, or should we prepare ourselves for a reassertion of a Hobbesian world view (characterized by coercion, the issuance of directives, and demands for compliance)? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The era in which Ralph Bunche played a major role in the founding and early evolution of peacekeeping has passed, but does the legacy remain? The UN is seen as the preeminent guardian of international peace and security, however, currently the dynamics of war and global norms regarding the use of force are undergoing a profound transformation that question previous shibboleths. Part of the new landscapes of contemporary conflict is the presence of private corporate forces with significant military capabilities. Starting with the end of the Cold War, international politics has produced a configuration of interests and power that have seen the development of numerous private military companies (PMCs). Increasingly, and especially in the wake of the lack of protection afforded to local populations during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, the UN and other humanitarian agencies are exploring the possibilities of contracting PMCs to provide protection and other supporting services in war-torn areas. This paper will trace the seeds of peacekeeping sowed by Ralph Bunche and compare and contrast it with present peacekeeping mechanisms and realities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the conclusion of the Cold War, the United States has engaged in an aggressive foreign policy. Evidence from a previous study (Tures et al., 2003) indicates that 44 percent of all United States military operations (USMOs) from 1991 to 2002 were deployed in a country considered Not Free by Freedom House. Another 35 percent of all American interventions in the post-Cold War era involved a partly free country. The remaining 21 percent of cases involved American actions within a free country. What remains unclear from this analysis is whether American operations have a positive impact upon democracy. In other words, are American actions promoting democracy, or do these operations preserve these partly free or less free governments? Do liberal targets become less liberal after the American presence? This study looks at the pre- and post-USMO character of target regimes to build upon Kegley and Hermann’s (1998) research concerning whether recipients of American actions abroad (a) preserve the status quo, (b) become more democratic, or (c) less democratic, in the post-Cold War era. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The demise of the Cold War is commonly associated with the collapse of the Soviet empire in East Europe in late 1989 or with the disintegration of the Soviet Union and of Communism in 1991. However, judging from the rhetoric and actions of important observers and key international actors at the time, the Cold War essentially ended in the spring of 1989, well before these momentous events took place. This suggests that the Cold War was principally (or even entirely) about an ideological conflict, and not about the military, nuclear, or economic balance between the East and the West, Communism as a form of government, the need to move the world toward democracy and/or capitalism, or, to a degree, Soviet domination of East Europe. The Cold War was not about these issues because it came to an end before any of them was really resolved. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A core premise behind NATO and EU enlargement has been the notion that the rational, pluralist economic and security community that the West created and strengthened during the Cold War could help stabilize the East in the post-Cold War world and squelch potentially dangerous nationalisms that might emerge. We argue that despite a common belief that nationalism has been submerged in Europe, at least four types of nationalisms have emerged across the continent as states and groups develop strategies in the shadow of an enlarging Union. We discuss in depth one of these types - what we call virtual nationalism - as it has developed in Hungary over the past decade. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A natural affinity exists between the interests of policy makers and scholars of security studies. Nowhere has this affinity been more evident than in Cold War studies of coercion. Yet it has grown strained recently as a tendency towards the quantitative over the contextual in political science has coincided with the absence of a dominant threat in the political arena. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]