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The distribution of identical data to multiple parties using the conventional point-to-point communication paradigm makes inefficient usage of resources. The redundancy in the copies of the data can be exploited in multicast communication by forming a group consisting of users who receive similar data, and sending a single message to all group users [1]. Access control to multicast communications is typically provided by encrypting the data using a key that is shared by all legitimate group members. The shared key, known as the session key (SK), will change with time, depending on the dynamics of group membership as well as the desired level of data protection. Since the key must change, the challenge is in key management- the issues related to the administration and distribution of keying material to multicast group members. In order to update the session key, a party responsible for distributing the keys, called the group center (GC), must securely communicate with the users to distribute new key material. The GC shares keys, known as key encrypting keys (KEKs), that are used solely for the purpose of updating the session key and other KEKs with group members. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There has been significant advancements in building a global wireless infrastructure that will free users from the confines of static communication networks. Users will be able to access the Internet from anywhere at anytime. As wireless connections become ubiquitous, consumers will desire to have multicast applications running on their mobile devices. In order to meet such a demand, there has been increasing research efforts in the area of wireless multicast [75-77]. In wireless networks, where bandwidth is limited and transmission error rate is high, the design of key management schemes need to consider the transmission of the rekeying messages. When the design of key management schemes can take advantage of the broadcast nature of wireless media as well as the wireless network topology, the communication overhead introduced by key management can be reduced. As a direct consequence, the reliability of key distribution can be greatly improved. In this chapter, some important properties of tree-based centralized key management scheme will be exploited. Based on these properties, the concept of topology-aware key management will be introduced. A specific design of such topology-aware key management scheme is then presented in detail, followed by performance evaluation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this chapter, we describe two contributory schemes that employ novel tree structures and rekeying algorithms, with the aim to achieve the low bound of rekeying cost. Particular, the first method, referred to as JET [60, 63], uses a special join-tree/exit-tree topology and takes advantage of cost amortization. This method can significantly reduce the rekeying cost for user join. The second method is consist of a new key tree structure, called PFMH, and a key agreement protocol, called PACK [64, 65]. This method only needs O(1) rounds of two-party DH upon any single user join event and O(log n) rounds of two-party DH upon any single user leave event, which achieves the lower bound described in the previous paragraph. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Remote sensing applications are becoming an increasingly important area for research and development due to the critical need for applications that will perform environmental monitoring, provide security assurance, assist in healthcare services and facilitate factory automation. In remote sensing scenarios, one or more applications are connected to a sensor network through a communication network. The sensors in the sensor network make measurements, such as local temperature or barometric pressure, and communicate this data with the appropriate application via the network. Providing security mechanisms for sensor networks is of critical importance since sensors will ultimately be used to assist in our daily lives. The authentication of the data source as well as the data are critical concerns since adversaries might attempt to capture sensors and tamper with sensor data. Traditional authentication frameworks based on public key cryptography are not suitable for sensor networks since the sensor network will ultimately consist of small, low-powered devices that are mobile. The limited computational and storage resources available to sensors necessitates alternatives to authentication based on public key certificates. Recently, a set of security protocols for sensor networks, known as SPINS, has been proposed [163]. SPINS addresses authentication on limited resource sensor networks by introducing two security protocols that rely on the presence of a more powerful basestation and an initial shared secret between the basestation and each participating sensor node: SNEP and μTESLA. SNEP is a simple protocol that provides data confidentiality, two-party data authentication, and evidence of data freshness using only symmetric keys and counters. μTESLA is a modified version of the TESLA protocol, which performs bootstrapping without using a public key infrastructure (PKI) and discloses one key each epoch independently of the packet rate to provide broadcast authentication. Another work that focused on authentication for ad hoc networks was presented in [164]. In this chapter, a distributed light-weight model for authentication was presented that involves network nodes requesting trust references from neighboring nodes in order to establish the trust relationships needed for network authentication. Each entity maintains a list of trusted entities, and using these lists trusted communication paths between two arbitrary entities can be derived. One drawback of this method, however, is its scalability. For large networks, the size of the trust tables can become prohibitive. Another work on authentication for ad hoc networks that addressed the issue of scalability was presented in [165], which introduced the use of cluster heads to reduce the amount of control packets needed. In this work, the network is divided into cluster regions, and cluster heads are elected from the regular network nodes within each cluster. Authentication is provided by using a public key infrastructure that, unfortunately, is not suitable for small sensor devices. These methods focus on ad hoc networks employing a flat topology. However, ad hoc networks have been recently shown to have capacity limitations, and one approach to address this drawback is to employ a hierarchical ad hoc network. In this chapter we will further explore the advantages of hierarchical ad hoc networks, particularly focusing on the advantages of the hierarchical ad hoc sensor network for performing authentication when compared with flat ad hoc networks. Authentication in hierarchical ad hoc networks has been essentially untouched, and we are aware of only one work in this direction [166], which focused on a military environment.… [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this chapter, our objective is to present strategies that reduce the delay associated with multicast authentication, make more efficient usage of receiver-side buffers, make delayed key disclosure authentication more resilient to buffer overflow denial of service attacks, and allow for multiple levels of trust in authentication. Throughout this chapter, we will focus our discussion on the popular multicast authentication scheme, Timed Efficient Stream Loss Tolerant Authentication (TESLA), though our techniques can apply to other authentication methods based upon the delayed key disclosure principle. Like other schemes based upon delayed key disclosure, TESLA is susceptible to DoS attacks and is not well-suited for delaysensitive applications. At the heart of our approach is a modification to TESLA, which we call Staggered TESLA, that employs several message authentication codes (MACs) that correspond to authentication keys that are staggered in time. Staggered MACs provide notions of partial authentication and allows for forged packets to be more readily removed from the buffer, thereby improving usage of the receiver's buffer. A benefit of partial authentication is that one may define security policies that allow for partially authenticated packets to pass through the buffer, and thus packets will remain in the buffer for a shorter duration. In many scenarios accepting partially authenticated packets is unacceptable, and therefore we present two further techniques that may be used to reduce the delay needed for full authentication. The first strategy requires that the source has a guarantee that there are no adversaries within a certain network distance of the source. By having a guarantee of proximity protection, partially authenticated packets may be accepted as fully authentic. The second strategy for reducing full authentication delay that we present involves replicating the key distribution functionality within the network, and having a set of distributed key distributors transmit the key seeds. A benefit of all of these strategies is that they mitigate the threat of a buffer overflow DoS attack since an adversary must conduct a DoS attack at a higher attack rate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many existing key management schemes focus on maintaining key secrecy and reducing the communication overhead associated with updating the associated keys [78] [7] [56]. However, it is found that key management can disclose information about dynamic group membership to both insiders and outsiders. In other words, while the content of group communication is protected by encryption using the secret keys, group dynamic information is disclosed through key management. Group dynamic information (GDI) is the information that describes the dynamic group membership, including the number of users in a multicast group as a function of time, and the number of joining or departing users in a time interval. In many secure group applications, group dynamic information should be kept confidential [123, 124]. Key management is a technology that enables key updating in real time as group membership changes. Future commercial multicast services, which could occur in non-traditional broadcast media such as Internet and 3G/4G wireless networks, will allow a user to subscribe to an arbitrary set of programs and change his/her subscription at any time [125] [10]. The users can choose to pay for exactly what they get, instead of a fixed monthly fee. This new type of services give the most flexibility to users, as well as opportunities to new business models. Over the non-traditional broadcast media, the global media giants as well as small multimedia producers can be the service providers. The service providers perform group management and have the knowledge of GDI, i.e audience statistics. However, it is highly undesirable to disclose instant and detailed GDI to competitors. Assume a competitor can monitor the audience statistics of the service provider X. Then, the competitor may broadcast its programs at different time slots and see how it affects its own and X's audience statistics. As a consequence, the competitor can develop the best program schedule to compete with X. This example also shows that GDI should also be concealed from insiders. A regular user, who receives the multicast content, should not know the overall audience statistics. Otherwise, the competitor can send one of its employees to register as X's member for a small cost, and collect valuable audience statistics from X. In addition, there are multicast communication scenarios where GDI represents sensitive deployment information about the network. For example, in a sensor network, the base station sends many broadcast messages to sensors. The base station and sensors form a secure multicast group. If some sensors are compromised, the group key should be updated such that the compromised sensors cannot decrypt future multicast messages from the BS. One possible way to update group keys is to use group key management schemes. In such an application scenario, GDI represents the number of sensors deployed in an area, and the number of revoked sensors. In this example, if GDI is not protected, attackers can obtain sensor deployment information by exploiting the key management scheme. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many group applications contain multiple related data streams and group members have different access privileges. These applications are prevalent in various scenarios.Multimedia applications distributing data in a multi-layer coding format [114]. For example, in video broadcast, users with a normal TV receiver can receive the normal format, while others with HDTV receivers can receive the normal format and the extra information needed to achieve HDTV resolution.Multicast programs containing several related services, such as weather, news, traffic and stock quote.Communications in hierarchically managed organizations where participants have various access authorization. In these scenarios, group members subscribe to different data steams, or possibly multiple of them. In other words, the access control mechanism needs to supports multi-level access privilege. This is referred to as the hierarchical group access control [115, 116]. Traditional key management schemes are not designed to handle key management issues associated with multiple services occurring concurrently that have correlated memberships. Although access control for individual data stream can be managed separately using existing key management schemes, this leads to inefficient use of keys and does not scale well when the number of data streams increases. In this chapter, we formulate the hierarchical group access control problem and presents the solutions [115, 116] in both centralized and contributory environments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Prior to the delivery of data intended for a group of recipients, it is necessary to initially establish keying material used to secure the group application. In this chapter we investigate the initial key agreement problem for both homogeneous and heterogeneous networks, whereby the members of a group each make contributions to establishing secret information that may be used to form a group encryption key. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One of the most important challenges for securing group-oriented communications is the issue of key management. As we outlined in the introductory chapter, managing keys in a group-oriented scenario is harder than traditional key management services. In this chapter, we explore the challenges associated with centralized key management for group-oriented applications. We will begin with an overview of the fundamental limits governing centralized multicast key distribution, and then provide a survey of several approaches that exist in the literature.We then develop a new framework for multicast key management that reduces the communication overhead associated with key management, and show how to best tune this key management scheme to reduce communication overhead. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Communication technologies are rapidly maturing, and already the past decade has witnessed new forms of communication services being deployed. The deployment of various broadband communication technologies, such as digital subscriber line (DSL) and fiber optical communications, has led to a rapid price drop for bandwidth. Access networks, such as wireless local area networks (WLAN), are now commonplace and are rapidly evolving into metropolitan-style mesh networks. Parallel to the rapid development of communication technologies, has been a surge in information applications. Multimedia content has become ubiquitous. Content editing software and hardware, such as digital cameras, are allowing for users to easily create. The availability of the Internet and the Web has encouraged artists, both professional and amateur, to share their creative expressions. This combination of application and communication technologies has created opportunities for new businesses to meet the growing global demand for information and entertainment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Much research on mitigating threat posed by insiders focuses on detection. In this chapter, we consider the prevention of attacks using access control While recent work and development in this space are promising, our studies of technologists in financial, health care, and other enterprise environments reveal a disconnect between what "real world" practitioners desire and what the research and vendor communities can offer. Basing our arguments on this ethnographic research (which targets both technology and the human business systems that drive and constrain it), we present the theoretical underpinnings of modern access control, discuss requirements of successful solutions for corporate environments today, and offer a survey of current technology that addresses these requirements. The paper concludes by exploring areas of future development in access control that offer particular promise in the struggle to prevent insider attack. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Insider Attack & Cyber Security is the property of Springer eBooks and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Insider Attack & Cyber Security is the property of Springer eBooks and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

"An insider attack, sometimes referred to as an inside job, is defined as a crime perpetrated by, or with the help of, a person working for or trusted by the victim" [1]. This one-sided relationship of trust makes the insider attacks particularly insidious and difficult to protect against. This article motivates the need for secure and tamper-resistant storage of the secret information that is impenetrable even by the operating system and efficient ways of meeting this need. It highlights innovative new work being developed in the context of the Trusted ILLIAC project at the University of Illinois. A progression of techniques is presented providing increasing levels of security starting from a purely software-based approach, to hardware/software partitioned and hardware-only mechanisms. This is to guard the system effectively against insiders having increasing levels of intrusive access from user-level, administrative up to even physical access to the system under threat of attack. Techniques covered include software- and hardwarebased memory randomization, hardware for a threshold cryptography enabled mechanism to allow tamper-proof key management and support the software technique. Further, we describe an Information Flow Signatures based technique to provide runtime data integrity guarantees. Reconfigurable hardware is used to ensure the secure computation of critical data. In order to enable this trusted computing hardware we explore requirements for securely initializing it under the threat of an insider attack. The unique advantage of a hardware implemented mechanism is that the secret, either the key or the code that operates on securitycritical data, cannot be revealed or modified even by the operating system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Insider Attack & Cyber Security is the property of Springer eBooks and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Insider Attack & Cyber Security is the property of Springer eBooks and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This paper surveys proposed solutions for the problem of insider attack detection appearing in the computer security research literature. We distinguish between masqueraders and traitors as two distinct cases of insider attack. After describing the challenges of this problem and highlighting current approaches and techniques pursued by the research community for insider attack detection, we suggest directions for future research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Insider Attack & Cyber Security is the property of Springer eBooks and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

A study conducted by the U.S. Secret Service and the Carnegie Mellon University Software Engineering Institute CERT Program analyzed 150 insider cyber crimes across U.S. critical infrastructure sectors. Follow-up work by CERT involved detailed group modeling and analysis of 54 cases of insider IT sabotage out of the 150 total cases. Insider IT sabotage includes incidents in which the insider's primary goal was to sabotage some aspect of the organization or direct specific harm toward an individual. This paper describes seven general observations about insider IT sabotage based on our empirical data and study findings. We describe a System Dynamics model of the insider IT sabotage problem that elaborates complex interactions in the domain and unintended consequences of organizational policies, practices, technology, and culture on insider behavior. We describe the structure of an education and awareness workshop on insider IT sabotage that incorporates the previously mentioned artifacts as well as an interactive instructional case. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Insider Attack & Cyber Security is the property of Springer eBooks and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In recent years, privacy-preserving data mining has been studied extensively, because of the wide proliferation of sensitive information on the internet. A number of algorithmic techniques have been designed for privacy-preserving data mining. In this paper, we provide a review of the state-of-the-art methods for privacy. We discuss methods for randomization, k-anonymization, and distributed privacy-preserving data mining. We also discuss cases in which the output of data mining applications needs to be sanitized for privacy-preservation purposes. We discuss the computational and theoretical limits associated with privacy-preservation over high dimensional data sets. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Handbook of Database Security is the property of Springer eBooks and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Effective delivery of location-based services (LBS) requires efficient processing of access requests to find the past, present and future location of the mobile customers (or moving objects) that match a certain profile. However, this gives rise to a number of security and privacy concerns because LBS may need to locate and track a mobile customer, and gain access to his/her profile. Location information has the potential to allow an adversary to physically locate a person, and user profile information may include sensitive attributes such as name, address, linguistic preference, age group, income level, marital status, education level, etc. As such, mobile customers have legitimate concerns about their personal safety, if such information should fall into the wrong hands. One way to take these concerns into account is by establishing security policies and enforcing them for every access. A comprehensive security policy can encode spatiotemporal restrictions on access to location and profile. To incorporate security, an appropriate access control mechanism must be in place to enforce the authorization specifications reflecting the above security and privacy policies. Serving an access request requires to search for the desired moving objects that satisfy the query, as well as identify and enforce the relevant security policies. While this solves the security problem, it creates a performance problem. Often, enforcing security incurs overhead, and as a result may degrade the performance of a system. Thus, one way to alleviate this problem and to effectively serve access requests, is to efficiently organize the mobile objects, authorizations as well as mobile customers' profiles. The key insight is to realize that a lot of duplicate work is performed while searching for the relevant authorizations and mobile objects. In this book chapter, we present the different solutions proposed by researchers in a response to address the above issue. The solutions specifically propose unified index schemes for organizing moving object data, authorizations and profiles of users. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Advancements in location technologies reliability and precision are fostering the development of location-based services that make use of the location information of users. An increasingly important category of such services is represented by Location-based Access Control (LBAC) systems that integrate traditional access control mechanisms with access conditions based on the physical position of users and other attributes related to the users location. Since privacy is extremely important for users, protection of their location information is paramount to the success of such emerging location-based services. In this chapter, we first present an overview of Location-based Access Control systems and then characterize the location privacy protection problem. We then discuss the main techniques that have been proposed to protect location information, focusing on the obfuscation-based techniques. We conclude the chapter by showing a privacy-aware LBAC architecture and describing how a location-based access control policy can be evaluated. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The adoption of location-based services (LBS) brings new privacy threats to users. The user location information revealed in LBS requests may be used by attackers to associate sensitive information of the user with her identity. This contribution focuses on privacy protection through anonymity, i.e., keeping individual users indistinguishable in a large group of people that may have issued the same request. The contribution identifies different privacy threats to LBS users, discusses techniques for protecting user privacy under different threats, and gives a performance evaluation of the mentioned protection methods. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Given a microdata table T, the objective of privacy preserving publication is to release a distorted version T′ of T such that T′ does not allow an adversary to confidently derive the sensitive data of any individual, and yet, T′ can be used to analyze the statistical patterns significant in T. The existing methods of privacy preserving publication is essentially the integration of an anonymization framework and an anonymization principle. Specifically, a framework describes how anonymization is performed, whereas a principle measures whether a suficient amount of anonymization has been applied. In this chapter, we will discuss the characteristics of two existing frameworks: generalization and anatomy, and of two most popular principles: k-anonymity and l-diversity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]