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A widely-held perception is that the image of North Korea among most Chinese people has changed from that of a socialist comrade and ‘little brother’ to an idiosyncratic, trouble-making neighbor. This research questions the homogeneity of Chinese people’s viewpoints towards North Korea. Concepts of state and popular nationalism are used to examine differences and similarities between the Chinese state and its people in their perceptions and sentiments towards North Korea, mainly focusing on the period of succession from Kim Jong-il to Kim Jong-un. Examining online discussions representing Chinese popular nationalism demonstrated that Chinese netizens’ political viewpoints are diversified along the ideological spectrum of left and right and that only the ‘moderate left’ netizens hold an image of North Korea which is close to that of their political authorities. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The present study investigated the relationship between Hong Kong people's stereotype toward Mainland people and their own national attachment (i.e., national identity, constructive patriotism, and uncritical patriotism). The role of inter-group relationship as mediator and age as moderator of that relationship were also tested. A total of 1753 local Hong Kong people aged 17-80 (mean age = 20.35 years, SD = 5.02) completed anonymous questionnaires regarding their stereotypes toward Mainland people, inter-group relationship with Mainland people, and national attachment. As expected, stereotypes toward Mainland people, inter-group relationship and national attachment showed significant positive associations with each other. More interestingly, it was found that the inter-group relationship mediated the relationship between stereotypes toward Mainland people and three domains of national attachment, with this indirect link being weaker for younger Hong Kong adults than for older Hong Kong adults. Implications of the present findings for future research are discussed, as well as potential interventions for increasing subjective national attachment to China, especially in young Hong Kong people. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Scholars tend to overlook the overseas Chinese press as a communicative tool for Chinese nationalism. This paper takes media history as its focal point to demonstrate the contextual influences that shaped the operations of Chinese print media and gave rise to the manifestation of the overseas Chinese (huaqiao) identity in Japan. In particular, it emphasises that the mobilisation of the modern Chinese nationalism movement of the time was not the sole determinant of Chinese identity. It was also influenced by the way in which Chinese ethnic boundaries came to be shaped and reshaped in different historical periods through the dynamics between overseas Chinese communities and Japanese society. I use two overseas Chinese publications from different periods to illustrate the impacts of modern Chinese nationalism and the changing social and political context of Japan on the Chinese press. Finally, I present a synthetic narrative to account for the history of the overseas Chinese press in Japan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper critically assesses the issues surrounding nineteenth-century Chinese migration to British colonies, especially Australia. The issues discussed in the paper include the origin of the term “sojourner” and its relationship to Western colonialism, and the origin of the termhuaqiao(overseas Chinese) and its relationship to Chinese nationalism. By being critical of the narrative of the “sojourner” for its cultural essentialist approach to Chinese migration, the paper highlights two important aspects of Chinese migration patterns and behaviour that are often neglected by the sojourner narrative: socioeconomic circumstances at the origin of migration and Western colonialism at the destination of migration. The paper argues that the Chinese publications by the migrants and what happened in Hong Kong at that time demonstrate the consequences of the combination of these two aspects of history. The paper finally observes that the little understood behaviour of the Chinese peasantry migrants appears to be post-modern and transnational. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine consumer ethnocentrism (CE) in China and clarify whether CE impacted on Chinese consumers’ product preferences between local and foreign products.Design/methodology/approach Street surveys and mall intercepts were conducted, 367 questionnaires were collected with 170 from Shenyang – Northern China and 197 from Shenzhen – Southern China.Findings CE is low in China, it poses no serious threat to foreign products. Consumers living in second tier Northern city like Shenyang have higher ethnocentric beliefs than those living in a first tier like Shenzhen in Southern China. CE’s impact varies between product categories and availability of domestic alternative could be a key issue. Age and education level have significant moderating effects.Research limitations/implications It only collected from two Chinese cities, distribution pattern of CE data determined non-parametric data analysis methods were adopted.Practical implications Regional differences in China matters, first tier Southern cities like Shenzhen could be less challenging destinations for foreign retailers. Targeting young and highly educated consumers could be more effective. Although CE level is low in China, a cautious approach beyond first tier cities is recommended, especially when facing competent local rivals.Originality/value It clarified that CE did affect product preferences amongst Chinese consumers, highlighted China’s regional differences in terms of North-South divide and first and second tier cites. It also identified that availability of domestic alternative is a key factor that cannot be ignored. This study provided evidence to demonstrate that with unprecedented uncertainties on global free trade, there is no grassroots support for protectionism and isolationism in China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper takes a reflective look at the notions of identity, ‘race’ and ethnicity using a few ancient and modern Chinese ‘texts’. It begins with an examination of the reforms known as ‘adopting the costume of barbarian/foreign people and practicing mounted archery [hufuqishe]’ carried out by King Wuling 武靈王 (in reign 325–299 BCE) in 307 BCE as described in theZhan Guo Ce戰國策 and theShiji史記 by Sima Qian 司馬遷 (c.145-c.87 BCE). Its cultural and educational significance is then discussed in order to show how the issues faced by King Wuling are still relevant to the educational scene in the contemporary world. Some recent materials from Hong Kong school textbooks relating to the issues on identity and ‘race’ are then used to contrast and compare with the approach taken by King Wuling. This study argues that the inability to take a critical stance toward categories such as ‘race’ (zhongzu) risks perpetuating dated and ethically questionable mentalities. In addition, the importance of taking into consideration issues pertaining to purpose and evaluation in the context of education is highlighted. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The purpose of this study is to explore how nationalism shapes the public perception of multinational corporations' crises on Chinese social media. Using qualitative content analysis, this study examines 1000 public comments from the top 10 hashtag posts and explores the interaction between nationalist expression (i.e., content and sentiment of nationalism) and the public's perception of the United Airlines crisis in 2017. The findings demonstrate how nationalist content impinged upon the interpretation of United Airlines' misconduct. Six concrete emotions (anger, hared, amusement, pride, encouragement, and disgust) were identified from the sample comments, which were categorized into inward-directed and outward-directed nationalist sentiments. Given the findings, this study argues that nationalist expression has driven the evolution of the United Airlines crisis beyond the discussion of organizational misconduct. While inward-directed sentiment served to strengthen the Chinese public's national identity, outward-directed sentiment was utilized to exclude multinational corporations as "out-groups." The theoretical and practical implications are also discussed. • Nationalism provokes an emotional rather than rational understanding of organizational crises. • Inward-directed nationalist sentiments served to strengthen the Chinese public's national identity. • Outward-directed nationalist sentiments were utilized to exclude multinational corporations as "out-groups". • Nationalist sentiments as permanent emotions can lead to the public's emotional-based coping of organizational crises. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Employing national identity theories and survey data in Taiwan, this article explains national identity shift in Taiwan. Descriptively we find that most Taiwanese people reject being called ‘Chinese’ (zhongguoren) when asked about their national identity. However, they do not deny their ethnic and cultural Chinese identity. What they object to is being called Chinese nationals, especially this China which is internationally recognized as the People’s Republic of China. In other words, most Taiwanese people do not identify themselves with the mainland Chinese state even though they still associate themselves with the Chinese nation. It is also noted that there is no consensus with regard to national identity in Taiwan, since close to one third of the population still do not object to be called zhongguoren. The author’s analytical findings further confirm that external sovereignty-related factors are related to the Taiwanese national identity shift. Specifically, a changed state boundary, separation desire from mainland China, and recognition of Taiwan as a sovereign state, not the distinctive cultural reconstruction inside Taiwan, contribute to the national identity shift in Taiwan. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

If the twenty-first century will be a Chinese one, what will its anthropology bring? The new realities of life in China have fundamentally reshaped the anthropology of modern China. With die disappearance of the planned economy, a whole range of structures, networks, organizations, and practices has emerged at the interface of state and society. Moreover, Chinese society is shaped by globalization, transnationalism, and cosmopolitanism to a degree never seen before. What happens under the impact of these changes is new and unique for the People's Republic of China, both recognizably Chinese and genetically modern. Anthropological research on these changes will impact the discipline of anthropology as a whole, just as China's rise will change the world order. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since Hong Kong's reunification with the People's Republic of China in 1997, debates about patriotism have erupted from time to time in Hong Kong. Considering Hong Kong's socio-political background, the feelings and attachment of Hongkongers towards their motherland are unsurprisingly complex. We therefore need a multidimensional concept to capture the complexities of Hong Kong patriotism. Based on survey data, we propose that the term ‘liberal patriotism’ best describes the type of patriotism in Hong Kong society, which is that love of the homeland and the state are qualified by liberal democratic values. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The notion of a Chinese popularity function may seem surprising, given its authoritarian nature. However, exploring the possibility of indirect popularity functions in nondemocratic systems, we articulate a model of national government support in China. The model argues that sociodemographics, political attitudes, and performance issues mold central government satisfaction. Drawing on a countrywide 2008 public opinion survey, we conclude that regional differences, national trust, and local policy success are of special importance in shaping national government support. The findings, which exhibit theoretical and statistical appeal, lay the groundwork for further investigation of popularity functions in China. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Following the revolution of 1932 that ended absolute monarchy in Siam, a new government came into power that sought to legitimize its rule by encouraging mass identification with the state. Practically, the expansion of a wage economy and the development of a state-led education system were seen by government officials as central to promoting a sense of citizenship to as yet disinterested rural communities. Throughout its first decade in power, the government thus set up projects to provide such groups with skills that might contribute to their overall material advancement. Following the lead of similar endeavours, particularly in India, one of the principal ways in which it would do this was through the production and bringing to market of cotton textiles. However, with foreign imports both superior in quality and cheaper than anything produced internally, the state struggled to establish a public relations message that might convince consumers to purchase Thai-produced textiles. As a result of specific limitations rooted in Thailand's ambiguous status globally, this meant that Thai leaders struggled to replicate the success of such movements elsewhere. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study investigates how multicultural citizenship education is taught in a Chinese Christian school in Jakarta, where multiculturalism is not a natural experience. Schoolyard ethnographic research was deployed to explore the reality of a ‘double minority’ — Chinese Christians — and how the citizenship of this marginal group is constructed and contested in national, school, and familial discourses. The article argues that it is necessary for schools to actively implement multicultural citizenship education in order to create a new generation of young adults who are empowered, tolerant, active, participatory citizens of Indonesia. As schools are a microcosm of the nation-state, successful multicultural citizenship education can have real societal implications for it has the potential to render the idealism enshrined in the national motto of ‘Unity in Diversity’ a lived reality. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article reflects on the representations of overseas Chinese in Chinese political and popular discourses from the late Qing to World War II. It argues that contraly to prevalent views, which credit the success of the Chinese nationalist discourse in mobilizing the overseas Chinese to their re-incorporation into the Chinese nation, extraterritorial Chinese nationalism depended not so much on the rhetoric of inclusion, but rather on the separation of the overseas Chinese as a sub-ethnic group, particularly after they were "rebranded" as huaqiao, or Chinese sojourners. This analysis begins by looking at the key reasons for Chinese political activists' newfound interest in the diasporas - in soliciting huaqiao contributions to China's state-building projects - and argues that they imbued huaqiao with certain positive qualities only insofar as these made them relevant to China. The truth is, prejudices against the emigrants have persisted and Chinese within China continue to view huaqiao as uncouth, uncultured, and even "unChinese." [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article looks at politics and society in China as of 2013, focusing on the role that different forms of nationalism play. It cites the national pride of Chinese, especially the ethnic Han majority, and continuing anger over the 19th-20th century period of foreign intervention in China's sovereignty, but also notes that some Chinese have adopted a critical stance toward nationalism and a view of patriotism that allows for dissent toward the Chinese government. It discusses conflicted mainstream Chinese attitudes toward Tibet, Hong Kong, and Japan.

This article reexamines the anti-Chinese movement in Mexico through a discussion of a failed anti-Chinese campaign in Baja California. It argues that Chinese migrants organized in the face of Sinophobic aggression and that the national and international implications of anti-Chinese violence forced diplomats and government officials to grapple with Chinese demands for equal treatment in the U.S.-Mexico borderlands. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Empirical evidence concerning the demographics and development of Chinese nationalism is sparse but important for scholarship and policy. Its collection entails methodological challenges in access and reliability. We conducted a field experiment to measure nationalism in incentive-compatible choices among a diverse group of 447 Chinese subjects in a field setting. Our results demonstrate greater nationalism in female, older, less affluent and more rural respondents. We also find support for nationalism in professional and educated individuals. Our results provide qualified support for a middle-class nationalism in China. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The 2005 anti-Japan protests in China inaugurated a new era of Chinese popular nationalism with their pervasive visuality and virtuality. The outpouring of emotions in cityscapes and cyberspaces – anger, outrage, zealousness and even pleasure – requires us to take emotion, passion, hope or sheer delight seriously and to recognize the power of some of the more alarming forms of popular nationalist sentimentality. This chapter analyses one instance of Sino-Japanese relations: the epithet of ‘riben guizi’ or Japanese devils in Chinese popular culture in four historical moments: late-Sinocentric imperium, high imperialism, socialist nationalism and post-socialist globalization. I want to suggest that while this ‘hate word’ performs an affective politics of recognition stemming from an ineluctable trauma of imperialist violence, it ultimately fails in establishing a politics of reconciliation. I argue that anti-Japanism in China is less about Japan than China's own self-image mediated through its asymmetrical power relations with Japan throughout its modern history. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Anti-Chinese riots broke out in Rangoon on 26 June 1967. The riots, which resulted from Chinese students' defiance of the Burmese government's ban on wearing Mao badges in school, led to the deterioration of Sino–Burmese relations, symbolised by the cessation of ‘Pauk Phaw’ ties and the subsequent shift in China's foreign policy which included open intervention in Burma's civil war. The riots contributed to estranged relations between Beijing and Rangoon throughout the 1970s and 1980s despite the normalisation of bilateral ties in 1970. While the roots of the Rangoon riots lay in Burma's political economy and tensions within the local Chinese community in the context of Cold War international relations, Beijing bore primary responsibility, however, due to its export of the Cultural Revolution. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Historically speaking, the self-identification process of Russia has revolved around the West–East axis. However, there has been a considerable asymmetry in the impact of these two poles. In this article I will argue that “the West” was a dominating concept in the self-narration of Russians and “the East” was mostly a function of the interaction between Russia and the West. The difference in the level of attention and emotions which Russia manifests towards the West and the East has been caused by the religious factor, which was crucial for shaping Russia's identity and her sense of uniqueness. While the West and Western Christianity presented a challenge to the Orthodox fundamentals of Russia's self-image, China was neutral in terms of religious identity. The negligible importance of the religious factor added to rationality in Russian policy towards China. In the article I analyze the Chinese factor in Russia's self-identification process in the context of Moscow's attitude towards the West and the East by using two main elements: identity and fear. Comparing the historical pattern with the present one, I attempt to determine the consequences of these two factors for the Russian Federation. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Around 1930, at a time of rising nationalisms in China and India, English-educated Chinese and Indians in the British colony of Singapore debated with great intensity the issue of national identity. They sought to clarify their own position as members of ethnic communities of immigrant origin, while remaining individuals who identified the territory of British Malaya as their home. Readers' letters published in the Malaya Tribune, an English-medium newspaper founded to serve the interests of Anglophone Asians, questioned prevailing assumptions of how to define a nation from the perspectives of territory, political loyalty, race, and language. Lived circumstances in Malaya proved that being Chinese or Indian could encompass a range of political, cultural, and linguistic characteristics, rather than a homogenous identity as promoted by nationalist movements of the time. Through these debates, Chinese and Indians in Malaya found ways to simultaneously reaffirm their ethnic pride as well as their sense of being ‘Malayan’. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

In Autobiography of A Chinese Woman (1947), Yang Buwei (1889-1981) asserted that her husband, Zhao Yuanren, "found his work and his country ... because he found me," that is to say, because Yang, a "thoroughly Chinese" woman, rekindled his interest in Chinese dialects and thus "repatriated" this "English-speaking and American-feeling" man. Yet scrutiny of Yang's representation of their marriage belies her claim to an uncomplicated link between their shared mother tongue and their national identity. To be sure, her narrative gestures and topos widely differed from those of the more "Americanized" Zhao. Rather than looking to a Western model as legitimization of their unconventional marriage, Yang deployed the figure of her female Chinese colleague, a "traditional lady," as a foil against which she painted herself as a liberated and self-reliant modern Chinese woman favored by Zhao. However, she also published different versions of her autobiography in Chinese and English. Thus, despite her linguistic and narrative maneuvers, Yang could accomplish only a partial reconciliation of conflicting gender and national identities through the written word. By telling the story of a happy marriage of Chinese and American values she temporarily acquired a fluidity that enabled her to redefine and cross national and gender boundaries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the deployment of religion in the effort to raise nationalist consciousness among the Chinese community in colonial Singapore in the early twentieth century. It has often been noted that religion played a significant role in the emergence of nationalism in colonised Asia. However, the religions usually thought of in this context have been Islam and Buddhism, rather than Confucianism (Chong 2009: 2). With the formation of the Young Men?s Buddhist Association in 1906 which inaugurated moves towards nationalist consciousness in Burma, or the organisation of the Sarekat Islam in 1912, which was an early milestone in the development of the Indonesian nationalist movement, Buddhism and Islam demonstrated their dynamic potential in the realm of politics. Confucianism, on the other hand, has generally had a reputation as an ossified, elitist and obsolescent form of religion. In fact it has been quite common for Western commentators to deny that it was a religion at all. This paper focuses on the intellectual contributions of an outstanding Chinese Singaporean community leader, Lim Boon Keng. Lim looked to Confucianism as a source of national pride for the diasporic Chinese community living under British colonial rule in Singapore. Directly contradicting Western assumptions about the rigidity and authoritarianism of Confucianism, Lim offered an interpretation which highlighted its dynamic, progressive political potential. In particular, he developed the case for Confucianism as a source of democratic political impetus, and thus as a challenge to the autocratic, elitist nature of the British system of colonial rule. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on racial theories in the People's Republic of China wherein race was viewed as a concept capable for the promotion of nationalism after the collapsed of Qing Empire in 1911. The notion of race, which was often mixed to the politics of nationalism, adjusts continuously to various social and political contexts from the reformist movement in 1980s to the Chinese Communist Party's eugenic policies. It mentions that the race concept emerged as a powerful and cohesive form of identity due to the diversity of religion, family structures, and regional cultures of Chinese. Racial theories were distributed through school textbooks and travel literature. Moreover, the term Chinese was assumed as a language, culture, and a race even the members were scattered across the globe.

The author focuses on how China viewed Taiwan and the people of Taiwan between 1931, the year Japan invaded Manchuria, and 1941, the year the U.S. entered World War II. Some of the subjects considered include nationalism, Chinese identity, Chinese political thought, and the ideology of nation-building and cultural identity. An overview of the historiography of competing Chinese and Taiwanese national identity exemplified in the writings of historians Emma Jinhua Teng, Alan M. Wachman, and Steven E. Phillips, is presented.

In 1892, Terrien de Lacouperie (1845-1894), professor of Chinese at University College in London, set out to prove that the Chinese migrated from Mesopotamia in prehistoric times. Despite mixed responses from his colleagues, Lacouperie's "Sino-Babylonianism" found its way into China and captured the imagination of Chinese historians from the 1900s to 1930s. Whether they supported or opposed Lacouperie's view, Chinese historians were intrigued by his boldness in linking early China to the global network of trade and cultural exchange. This article examines how Chinese historians adopted, transformed, and appropriated Sino-Babylonianism in their discourse on the nation. It argues that the rise and fall of Sino-Babylonianism coincided with the Chinese perceptions of the world system of nation-states. Sino- Babylonianism was warmly received when the Chinese perceived the world system of nation-states as a hierarchy in temporality, prescribing a process of evolution that all human communities must follow. Sino-Babylonianism was fiercely rejected when the Chinese saw the world system of nation-states as a hierarchy in space, characterized by incessant territorial expansion of imperialist powers. In both instances, Sino-Babylonianism was no longer what Lacouperie had proposed in the late nineteenth century. Rather, it was an important benchmark for the Chinese understanding of the modern global order. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the belief systems of Chinese youth and their attitudes toward the state. Youth in China are generally described as having an internationalist outlook, being pragmatic and materialistic, and embracing nationalism, patriotism, and altruism. The post-1980s attributes of generations of Chinese youth are discussed. The article suggests that contemporary youth are not an immediate threat to China's regime in 2009 and that they believe that China will overtake the United States as the leading superpower. Anniversaries of events and protests in China that concern the political leadership such as the 1919 May Fourth Movement are mentioned. The reason why Chinese youth join the Communist Party is also mentioned.

The article focuses on the historical fiction "A Bit of Earth," by Suchen Christine Lim which provides an opportunity to question the past and the identities that have crystallized around the archive. It is stated that "A Bit of Earth" depicts the emergence of anti-imperialist feeling, self-realization, and national consciousness in 19th-century Malaya, celebrating nationalist feeling as a commendable gesture beyond the self towards a larger sociality. Moreover, "A Bit of Earth" shows itself to be more certain of its stand on women and its vision of modern Chinese identity than of its position vis-à-vis multiracial possibilities.

In 1944, a rebellion in China's northwestern Xinjiang Province prompted Chiang Kai-shek to send his most trusted lieutenant, Zhang Zhizhong, to negotiate with the rebels and to attempt to consolidate Nationalist China's hold over the perennially restive frontier province. Zhang's innovative adaptation of tested Soviet models of minority representation tapped into and reinterpreted a long tradition of established cultural paradigms for digesting and representing the internal "other" within China. The most visible and widely disseminated projects that Zhang sponsored in the waning days of Nationalist China represent a determined eleventh-hour propaganda attempt to integrate the seldom-seen Central Asian frontier into the greater conception of a unified Chinese republic. This effort also marks one of the earliest instances of the Chinese state attempting to employ mass propaganda media to disseminate—among a large and diverse audience—a modified version of established modes of ethnic representation previously in currency only among a limited subsection of elite and official society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Considering how nationalism has flourished in China since the 1990s, it should not come as a surprise that intellectuals there have been vigorously debating its political meaning and significance to the Chinese people. Since the turn of the century nationalist trends have become even stronger and more powerful on account of China's putative rise to great-power status. One way to understand the complexity of nationalist expressions in China today is to explore how official and nonofficial nationalist discourses supplement and affect each other and how they are connected through debates within the intelligentsia. My aim is to question the assumption that nationalism in China is only imposed by the state on society and to suggest that it is also shaped by longstanding and widespread notions of China's proper place in the world as an important and leading country. At the same time, however, I want to outline the two major limitations of some nationalist arguments: one being that they take an essentialist approach to understanding the Chinese nation, and the other being that they remain evasive concerning the undemocratic political condition of much of the current nationalist fervor. Given the murky public space occupied by openly voiced speech and expression, nationalism in China today is neither just a spontaneous outpouring of patriotic enthusiasm nor merely a diversionary plot devised by the Communist Party to maintain its authoritarian regime. It is both of these, and this is substantiated and confirmed by the delicate interaction of the official and nonofficial versions of nationalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the Chinese diasporic culture and national identity in Singapore. The section reflects on the importance of the Tiger Balm Gardens or Haw Par Villa, built in the 1930s by overseas Chinese pharmaceuticals tycoon Aw Boon Haw, in Singapore's Chinese community area. According to the report, during the colonial era, the garden marked the success not only of Aw Boon Haw but also of the Chinese migrant community in Singapore, which was renovated into an orientalized theme park and then resuscitated as the repository of diasporic Chinese entrepreneurship.

The current study examined national culture differences between US American and Chinese participants (N = 317) regarding face need concerns and apology intention, based on positive and negative face needs (Brown & Levinson, 1987) and concerns for self-face and other-face (Ting-Toomey, 2005). Participants read vignettes that varied in relationship types (in-group vs. out-group members) and situation types (negative face vs. positive face threatening) and responded to scales measuring realism of the vignettes, intention to apologize, and five types of face need concerns. The findings showed that Chinese participants, compared to US Americans, had stronger intentions to apologize when their acts threatened the other person's positive face, while US American participants, compared to Chinese, had stronger intentions to apologize when their acts threatened the other's negative face. Other findings and implications thereof are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Chinese nationalism has ignited much debate among academics and the general public in both China and the West. Rather than search for the true core of Chinese nationalism, this essay will examine the curious custom of National Humiliation Day as an oblique entry into the politics of identity. The nation is not simply a question of people or territory, the author contends, but of time: the national time scripted by events such as National Humiliation Day. By comparing the differing practices of the holiday as it was celebrated in the early twentieth century and is observed in the early twenty-first century, the author argues that in the early twentieth century the political performances aimed to produce a proper Chinese nation out of the clashes between the Qing dynasty, northern warlords, and foreign empires. The goal was to construct a “China” worthy of being saved. When National Humiliation Day was revived in China at the turn of the twenty-first century, the political performances were more focused on containing the nation through a commemoration of the various crises of the early twentieth century. Thus the essay will argue that the nation does not arise from the ideology of its leaders, as much as through popular performances such as National Humiliation Day. Hence it shows how politics is best analyzed as a series of performances, not just by state actors in official sites like the Foreign Ministry, but also through the cultural governance of less official sites in art, film, literature — and public holidays. In this way, National Humiliation Day activities go beyond producing and containing nationalism; Chinese people are also consuming nationalism as part of a symbolic economy that generates identity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article compares and contrasts the Internet-based national identity projects of overseas Chinese and near abroad Russians. Our study, which is based on two diasporic communities of similar size and both characterized by a historical weakness of national identity, finds that while Internet use seems to be increasing nationalism and reifying national identity among the ethnic Chinese living in the Pacific Rim, it is paradoxically dampening nationalism and weakening national identity among the Russians living in post-Soviet space. Our thesis is that this divergence results from a combination of factors rooted in the real world, not the virtual. These factors include: the perceived benefits of stressing national identity in ingroup/outgroup interactions, conflicts or competition with other identity anchors, and the political and economic stature of their respective ethnic homelands. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The fall of the Qing dynasty (1644-1911) and the founding of the modem Chinese nation-state brought both opportunities and challenges to Chinese Muslims. No longer having to deal with emperorship and its foundational ideology, Confucianism, they were soon confronted with new state ideological impositions, namely, Han nationalism and socialism, imposed by the Republican and Communist regimes. These new challenges were both threatening and promising, for although the new ideologies were fundamentally antithetic to Islam, the new regimes promised an equal status to Chinese Muslims and saw how they could aid national diplomacy and international relations with Muslim countries. Within this context, China's Muslim intellectuals tried to reorient and reposition Muslims and Islam by minimizing differences and maximizing commonalities during both the Republican and the Communist regimes. By studying Ma Jian (1906-78), one of modern China's most influential and representative Muslim intellectuals, as well as his juxtaposition of Islam and China, I look at the way of being a modem Chinese Muslim intellectual in China's post-1949 internal and international contexts. The Turkic Muslim communities in Xinjiang and elsewhere in China are excluded from this study. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article provides information of the essential principles of patriotic education for the Chinese nationality. The goals of developing patriotic education include the inspiration of national spirit, promotion of national cohesion, and foster national pride and dignity. Another principle involve the adherence to the policy of focusing on nation-building. It also strengthens the leadership and patriotic consciousness, sets up patriotic education bases, and creates a societal atmosphere for patriotic education.