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Representing the nation in sports mega events has become a highly contested issue with the acceleration of the transnational movement of athletes. This research has examined Chinese people's attitudes to the naturalization of football players. The article discusses the findings in the context of the qualifying stages for the 2022 FIFA Men's World Cup by presenting and analysing data collected from semi-structured interviews and social media extracts. Two main issues were debated by Chinese people concerning the identity of naturalized athletes. One was the ethnicity of the naturalized footballers in relation to nationality, with some people questioning whether they belong to China and can represent China. The other issue concerned the players' skills and ability which influenced considerations of how much they could help China to qualify for the World Cup Finals. In relation to Chinese nationalism, national identity and Chinese sports, this study reveals, through the window provided by the presence of these naturalized footballers, how football, instrumentalism, nationalism and naturalization have been inextricably linked and have interacted with one another within the current context. The article analyses how pragmatic values have negotiated with ethno-cultural nationalism and impacted on the Chinese public's attitudes towards naturalized athletes, their image being presented in variable and dynamic ways by football fan netizens after each qualifying game. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As sport has become more globalized, there has been an increase in the number of athletes who have changed their nationality to maximize their chances to compete in international competitions. In order to maximize its chances at its home hosted Winter Olympic Games, the Chinese government authorized many foreign-born athletes to gain Chinese citizenship to compete for China. The purpose of the study was to explore how Chinese social media users perceived athlete naturalization of Chinese athletes during the 2022 Beijing Olympic Games. Through sentiment analysis and thematic analysis, results found that Chinese spectators generally had positive emotions toward these naturalized Olympians. Online discussions mainly focused on three topics: expressing their attitudes toward athlete naturalization, questioning the legitimacy of the strategy, and discussing athletes' heritage and cultural identities. This research hopes to broaden our understanding of the sport migrant issue in China, the perceptions of athletes who have naturalized, and the sentiments that Chinese consumers have of naturalized athletes at the Winter Olympic Games that were held in their country. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article sheds light on the intricate relationship between the revival of Hanfu, traditional couture from the Han Dynasty, and rising Chinese nationalism among Chinese youth living in the United Kingdom. Mobilizing the theoretical tool 'affective economies', we explore how particular feelings and values are assigned and attached to Hanfu, and thereby circulate among young Chinese migrants. We begin by examining the Hanfu movement to interrogate how Hanfu is reinvented based on a selective historicity of the past, serving as a specific cultural product for China's rejuvenation. We then move on to analyze a series of in-depth interviews conducted between December 2019 and July 2020. We probe the lived experiences of young Hanfu supporters, who are members of the UK Han Culture Association, and the cultural events organized by the Association, in order to scrutinize the ways Hanfu conjures up an imagined community suffused with nationalism. Drawing upon on the affective economies of Hanfu, we discern the following three key findings: First, we argue that there are both positive and negative affective attachments to Hanfu, such as homesickness, loneliness, alienation, happiness, pride and beauty, which impinge on migrant bodies, assigning values to Hanfu and the Hanfu-related cultural events. Second, we show through the analysis of the fieldwork materials the paradoxical desire for chuguo (going abroad) and huiguo (returning to the nation) in the hearts of the young migrants. Finally, we argue that Hanfu circulates as a 'mnemonic thing' that signifies a specific imaginary of Ancient China, where young migrant's aiguo (love of the nation) sentiments are then 'stuck' to this reinvented fashion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study aimed to reveal the relationships between a Chinese influencer’s “kimchi” video content on YouTube, news reports about it in portals, and online nationalism, which will help explore how the issues of history and traditional culture in portal news reports are conveyed and understood. The results demonstrated that the correlation of nationalism and the Chinese Northeast Project, and responsibility frames was the largest in the Naver portal. The more the origin and pride of kimchi are emphasized, the more the kimchi issue is attributable to the Chinese Northeast Project, which is one of China’s policies. This is the responsibility of China and affects anti-Chinese sentiment in Korea. As Chinese government officials accelerate this issue, it is ultimately amplified to develop into public opinion. On the other hand, the correlation between the anti-Korean sentiment and conflict frames in the Baidu portal was the largest, which means that shifting the responsibility for conflict between Korea and China tends to enhance anti-Korean sentiment inside China, resulting in enhanced cohesion of the Chinese people. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this case study, the authors examined media representations of two Chinese female athletes—state athlete Ding Ning and professional athlete Li Na—in China, a nation undergoing social transformation and a sport-reform initiative. Analyzing stories from two Chinese web portals (i.e., Sina and Tencent), the authors analyzed how (a) gender, (b) nationalism, and (c) the individualism–collectivism continuum entered into media representations of these two female athletes. Notable differences emerged in all three conceptual areas. A fourth theme, which the authors have identified as the commercialized athlete, also emerged. Possible explanations and implications are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Research on public opinion and foreign policy in China has focused on nationalism as the driver behind public support for the use of force. However, nationalism is just one of many potentially significant factors that can increase support for military deployments. In this article we build a mediation model to test the relative effects of psychological predispositions, foreign policy attitudes, perceptions of the opposing state and calculations about the likely outcome of the conflict on support for China sending naval forces to the disputed Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. We find that dislike of the Japanese government and a belief that China would be victorious in a conflict with Japan are both powerful predictors of support for the use of force. Nationalism and militarism directly increase support but also indirectly increase it via different pathways. Nationalists are more confident in a Chinese victory while militarists have a stronger dislike of the Japanese government. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article adopts the notions of chronotope and scalar intimacy to discuss collective identification, in particular Hanfu identity among Chinese youth in the context of contemporary Chinese nationalism. Drawing upon ethnographic interviews and observations of self-identified Hanfu fans in Beijing, China, this paper analyzes how they, through invoking and shifting back and forth across multiple spatiotemporal scales, discursively enact collective and intimate identification among individuals, among Hanfu fan groups (on a local scale), and the general Chinese population (on a larger, national scale). This paper suggests that the great ancient China chronotope (GACC) has played a crucial role in establishing continuity between the present (or other time-spaces) and the 'past,' ultimately legitimizing the inseparable link between Hanfu groups and collectives and solidifying great China and collective identity ideologies. It also demonstrates that modern Chinese youth are internalizing the Chinese nationalist ideology in order to establish a sociocultural relationship of belonging to and sharing with Chinese collectives as a way to empower themselves to cope with uncertainty. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

At the theoretical level, Bartsch shows that Plato's I Republic i and the creation myth underpinning the ideal city, Kallipolis, have been the subject of considerable discussion in China. I Plato goes to China i is an expanded version of the Martin Lectures that Shadi Bartsch delivered at Oberlin College in 2018. [Extracted from the article]

As the Covid-19 pandemic has swept across the world, the wearing of medical facemasks has become a hot topic on social media. In China, the relevant discourses are entangled with codes of medical science, national self-esteem and appropriated modernity. These discourses can be dated back to the narrative established by Dr Wu Lien-teh, the great fighter in the Manchurian plagues of 1910–1911 and 1920–1921. This paper reveals that Wu and his colleagues used different strategies when displaying to the Western world their achievements in the anti-plague battle and when proving the effectiveness of the Western medical and hygienic system to Chinese people. Wu and his colleagues used metonymies, analogues and metaphors on or related to medical facemasks to illustrate the possibility of building a modernised nation with sovereignty. Because the construction of a sanitary system in China has always been labelled as a patriotic movement (Rogaski, Ruth. 2004. Hygienic Modernity: Meanings of Health and Disease in Treaty-Port China. Berkeley: University of California Press, 285–298), the wearing of medical facemasks has constituted an important part of the narrative of nationalism and hygienic modernity. This discourse continues to play a significant role in today's campaign against the coronavirus. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China's recent termination of strict COVID-19 control necessitates taking a booster vaccine shot as a precaution against the pandemic as quickly as possible. A large body of research has examined people's attitudes toward and intentions for the booster shot. However, most studies failed to explore how China's sociopolitical context has shaped their attitude regarding the booster jab take-up. The current study utilizes data from a national survey adopting quota sampling to analyze the Chinese public's medical and non-medical considerations to determine their intention for the third dose of the COVID-19 vaccine. The study found that thanks to China's initial successful lockdown policies, personal risk and benefit perceptions did not dominate their views regarding booster vaccination. Instead, respondents' gender, nationalism, endorsement of the zero-COVID policy, self-efficacy regarding vaccination, and perceived infection severity were the major factors underlying their booster shot intention. The situation highlights how the politicized context of China's COVID-19 control has impacted people's plans to practice preventive behaviors. It is necessary to offset the negative consequences. One strategy is to educate the Chinese public with more medically relevant information to help them make rational choices regarding vaccination and other protective measures. On the other hand, such education can utilize this nationalistic mental status to enhance the persuasion effect. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is of great significance and value to build an index system of the Chinese nation’s strong sense of community. First, it is conducive to safeguarding the fundamental interests of all ethnic groups; second, it is conducive to realizing the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation; third, it is conducive to consolidating and developing ethnic relations; fourth, it is conducive to creating a new situation in the party’s ethnic work. The evaluation index system for creating a strong sense of community for the Chinese nation can be constructed from the perspectives of “five dimensions”, including political guidance, cultural infiltration, development cohesion, the promotion of “three cross-links” and the maintenance of the rule of law, from the perspective of “one mechanism”. The evaluation index system needs to be continuously improved in practical application in order to be more perfect: firstly, the construction of the evaluation index system should be holistic and common; secondly, the content of related evaluation index and the related data collection should be operable; thirdly, the assessment and evaluation of the consciousness of the Chinese national community should be oriented. The author believes that we should deeply understand that creating a strong sense of community for the Chinese nation is the “main line” and “program” of the party’s ethnic work in the new era, correctly understand that the “five dimensions” of the evaluation index system for casting the consciousness of community for the Chinese nation are essentially a “symbiotic relationship”, and effectively grasp the interaction between the evaluation index system of creating a strong sense of community for the Chinese nation and creating a strong sense of community for the Chinese nation. “The Evaluation Index System for creating a strong sense of community for the Chinese Nation” aims to explore a comprehensive, systematic, fair and objective evaluation index system, with which to assess and evaluate the work and implementation performance of the units engaging in creating a strong sense of community for the Chinese Nation at different levels and different types in China’s ethnic minority areas. It provides academic support and decision-making reference for the formulation of the relevant ethnic policies of the party and the government in the future, and the implementation of ethnic work by local party committees and governments at all levels. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Over a hundred thousand US servicemen were stationed in post–World War II China, resulting in the largest grassroots interactions in Sino-US history. Reexamining this unprecedented encounter in the context of American global military empire, this article investigates the sociocultural tensions caused by GIs' sexual relations with Chinese women between 1945 and 1949. While conservatives maligned "Jeep girls" out of racial and sexual anxieties, liberals and self-identified Jeep girls invoked the language of modernity and patriotism. However, in the wake of the Peking Rape incident in 1946, the once diverse debate quickly ended as nationwide protests raged against American imperialism. In contrast with previous studies highlighting how Communist propaganda led to new anti-American sentiments, this research, by uncovering the complexities of Chinese women's experiences and their stories—which have been muffled or filtered through patriarchal agendas—foregrounds the key role of gendered nationalism in Sino-US relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the post-COVID era, the prevalence of "fandom nationalism" on Chinese social media has led to the development of two distinct attitudes toward Squid Game among Chinese netizens. Some nationalist netizens are dedicated to accusing Squid Game of plagiarism or dismissing it as a "cultural invasion." Another group of fans, due to the ever-tightening Chinese Internet governance, use fandom nationalism as a disguise to protect themselves against cyberbullying by declaring an anti-Korean political stance before posting positive comments about Squid Game. Therefore, two such divergent attitudes eventually led to a negotiation between fan culture and state power, where on the one hand fandom nationalistic practices were accepted by the mainstream for party-state propaganda, but on the other, in order to prevent being censored, fan culture had to be subordinated to the state's governance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Nationalism today interacts in complicated ways with advanced information and communication systems, regularly leading to unanticipated consequences. Popular online nationalism in the People's Republic of China (PRC) is a case in point: In the PRC, digital nationalism has become a central feature of political discourse and decision‐making, at times powerfully shaping the state's policy efforts. This article explores a missing puzzle piece in how state‐led and popular nationalism interact in Chinese politics: the role that advanced information and communication technologies play in such processes. This is a question that is not only relevant to scholars of China but also to anyone interested in the role that digital media and communication play in the formation and spread of contemporary nationalism. How do interactions in complex sociotechnical systems affect nationalism today? To answer this question, the article analyses and traces interaction and feedback loops in Chinese digital environments during Sino‐Japanese disputes over the East China Sea. It shows how the interactions between humans, organisations and technologies create unexpected variations in outcome that resonate through China's internet and create the conditions from which digital nationalism can powerfully emerge to shape legitimation and policy‐making processes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Schools worldwide have long engaged in various forms of 'war education'. In China, an extensive 'Patriotic Education' campaign and an expanded 'National Defense Education' curriculum have led to an increase in youth-oriented military programs in the 2000s. Previous work on the implementation of these programs in Chinese schools has mostly focused on urban elite youth, while overlooking the reception of these programs by non-urban, non-elite populations. The present study addresses this issue by examining youth perceptions and experiences of military training courses in urban and rural high schools. Drawing on the analysis of Chinese publications in the 2000s and on data from field interviews with students of different backgrounds, the study finds that youth military training constitutes a contentious program. Although the Chinese government promotes the program as crucial for military strengthening and the fostering of a patriotic spirit, PRC academic and media writers provide alternative rationales for the program, which at times undermine the logic of government articulations. Meanwhile, interviews with youth document divergent attitudes and even resentment towards the program, especially among city youth. This finding casts doubt on the assumption that military-training courses necessarily contribute to the increased 'militarization' of Chinese youth and education. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Native-place associations have played an indispensable role in the global migration of ethnic Chinese. Although there has been growing attention to their political role in advancing the Chinese state's interests, few studies have looked into how they are organized and how they operate vis-à-vis the state. This article focuses on post-handover Hong Kong, where native-place associations, despite their long presence, are still growing in number and sophistication after the 1997 handover. It posits that native-place associations there are forming a "cultural nexus" through which the Chinese state fosters political mobilization in support of its interests and policies. Based on an original set of event and biographical data, it shows that native-place associations are consolidating into a massive network connected by power-seeking elites. It also demonstrates how these associations seek to renew the significance of native-place and national identities. The findings point to how native-place associations may serve as a powerful cultural space for the Chinese state to project its influence offshore. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

By conducting discourse analysis on quotidian expressions of nationalism of Chinese netizens and analyzing their "Liking" behavior, this article tries to inductively explore during the COVID-19 pandemic what and how Chinese netizens say about nationalism. This article finds that during the pandemic, Chinese netizens show a confident and rational but confrontational and xenophobic posture in their quotidian discourses. They value reasoning and deliberation in their expressions of nationalist discourses. In the quotidian discourses, they maintain a confident tone when comparing China's performance with other countries during the pandemic, but show vigilance and even hostile sentiments toward external provocations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the history of China from 1600-1949. By using a psychohistorical approach to understand the deep humiliation enacted upon the Chinese at the hands of primarily the British and the Japanese, we understand how the Chinese Communist Party was so successful in establishing their Cultural Revolution. As a cultural anthropologist, I examine my time in Suzhou, China in October 2019, during the celebration of the 70th anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party and question the Chinese sense of national identity and how they will collectively define themselves going forward. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Militaries are sustained by public money that is diverted away from other domestic ends. How the public react to the "guns-versus-butter" trade-off is thus an important question in understanding the microfoundations of Chinese military power. However, there are few studies on public attitudes towards military spending in China, whose rising power has been a grave concern to many policymakers around the world. We fielded a national online survey to investigate the nature of public support for military spending in China. We find that Chinese citizens support military spending in the abstract, but their support diminishes when considered alongside other domestic spending priorities. We also find that public support for military spending coexists surprisingly with anti-war sentiments and a significant strain of isolationism. In addition, while the conventional wisdom suggests that nationalism moves a state towards bellicosity and war, we find that Chinese citizens with a stronger sense of national pride report stronger anti-war sentiments than other citizens. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the 1990s, the Chinese party-state has attempted to teach its youth how to think and speak about the nation through a "patriotic education" campaign waged in schools, the media and on public sites. The reception of these messages by youth of different social backgrounds remains a disputed issue, however. Drawing on a multi-sited field study conducted among rural and urban Han Chinese youth attending different types of schools, this article explores the effects of the patriotic education campaign on youth conceptions of the nation by examining the rhetoric high-school students employ when asked to reflect upon their nation. The study reveals that a majority of youth statements conform to the language and contents of the patriotic education campaign; however, there are significant differences in the discursive stances of urban youth and rural youth and of those attending academic and non-academic, vocational schools. These findings call into question the party-state's current vision of China as a "unified" national collectivity. They highlight the existence of variances in the sense of collective belonging and national identity of Chinese youth, while underscoring the importance of social positioning and perceived life chances in producing these variances. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article uses the sociological/philosophical theory of liberal communitarianism to analyze existing trends in global affairs. The European Union (EU) has often erred by expanding its missions without also recognizing the pull of nationalism and conducting community-building to strengthen the bonds among member nations. EU nations and countries around the world are retreating to nationalism. Rather than bringing the world together to fight a common enemy, the COVID-19 crisis has accelerated these global trends. The rise of nationalism has not increased domestic cohesion, but has led to high levels of domestic polarization. International communities seem a long way off, and the world order in the near future may depend to a considerable extent on whether the United States will permit China to increase its influence in the Western Pacific, which would allow for collaboration on most other matters. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Be loved by the people, the Romance of the Three Kingdoms has wide influence in the Korean peninsula. It promotes the creation of Korean historical novels into a prosperous period. Korean Chinese historical novels had been greatly influenced by the Romance of the Three Kingdoms in terms of writing patterns, ideological theses, story plots and characters. Korean Chinese historical novels embody the unique national consciousness and cultural psychology of the Korean nation. They are the crystallization of cultural exchange between China and Korea in ancient times. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why do citizens in authoritarian countries support democracy more than the status quo? Modernization theory, the theory of redistribution, and the culturalist approach all focus on state-level social structural changes or on historical legacies. However, in this article, we bring international factors into the discussion and suggest that the "democratic demonstration effect" of global democracies, in addition to the two mechanisms of "coercion" and "competition", is the key reason behind the strengthening of the wishes of the masses in autocracies to "imitate" democracies. Furthermore, due to greater "soft power" and successful "public diplomacy", we believe that democratic superpowers, as well as democracies in neighbouring states, will have a greater chance to stimulate the aspirations for democracy of the citizens in authoritarian countries through their own democratic practices. At the same time, however, we also believe that patriotism and nationalism will weaken the "democracy demonstration effect" on popular support for democracy. To illustrate our theory and test our hypothesis, we take Mainland China, the United States, and Taiwan as cases of authoritarian regimes, democratic powers, and democratic neighbours, and analyze three waves of public opinion data conducted in Mainland China in 2011, 2015, and 2019. We show that differences in democratic quality assessment between Mainland China and its democratic counterparts significantly raises people's liberal and democratic values, and reduces their preference for one-party regimes. In addition, we have found that the patriotic and nationalistic sentiments of the Chinese people tends to neutralize the demonstration effects of the United States and Taiwan on popular support for democracy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the book "Dongfang shi ri tan" or "An Eastern Decameron," by Jiao Naifang. The author explains that the book comments on the relationship between sex and identity in modern China, explores the social aspects of sexual behavior in Chinese history, and discusses how Jiao's work provides a Chinese reception of the book "Decameron," by Giovanni Boccaccio.

This article surveys the challenge to China's "one country, two systems" principle that has underpinned Hong Kong existence and prosperity since 1997. Domestic dissatisfaction with structural inequalities, disillusionment with power-sharing and governance issues along with external geopolitical factors exacerbated a strong anti-Chinese Hong Kong nationalism to ignite the 2019 crisis. This article provides an analysis of the issues at stake, and maps out the dilemmas and challenges facing China and Hong Kong for the foreseeable future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why have separatist sentiments increased in Hong Kong despite of China's growing economic attractiveness? This question is critical for China–Hong Kong relations. However, few studies have explored it from a comparative perspective. This study compares Hong Kong and mainland college students' national identities by making a series of interlocked surveys and interviews from 2012 to 2016. It shows that Hong Kong students have a much lower sociopolitical identity with China, which proves to be the primary cause for their separatist tendencies. Although they hold a comparably strong pan-Chinese economic identity, it does not strengthen their sociopolitical identity as it does for mainland students. This can be attributed to their post-materialist framework through which they are unlikely to believe that economic development alone can bring sociopolitical improvements. The findings imply that China faces serious difficulties in turning its economic strength into political charm in societies with strong post-materialist values. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Scholars tend to overlook the overseas Chinese press as a communicative tool for Chinese nationalism. This paper takes media history as its focal point to demonstrate the contextual influences that shaped the operations of Chinese print media and gave rise to the manifestation of the overseas Chinese (huaqiao) identity in Japan. In particular, it emphasises that the mobilisation of the modern Chinese nationalism movement of the time was not the sole determinant of Chinese identity. It was also influenced by the way in which Chinese ethnic boundaries came to be shaped and reshaped in different historical periods through the dynamics between overseas Chinese communities and Japanese society. I use two overseas Chinese publications from different periods to illustrate the impacts of modern Chinese nationalism and the changing social and political context of Japan on the Chinese press. Finally, I present a synthetic narrative to account for the history of the overseas Chinese press in Japan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Employing national identity theories and survey data in Taiwan, this article explains national identity shift in Taiwan. Descriptively we find that most Taiwanese people reject being called ‘Chinese’ (zhongguoren) when asked about their national identity. However, they do not deny their ethnic and cultural Chinese identity. What they object to is being called Chinese nationals, especially this China which is internationally recognized as the People’s Republic of China. In other words, most Taiwanese people do not identify themselves with the mainland Chinese state even though they still associate themselves with the Chinese nation. It is also noted that there is no consensus with regard to national identity in Taiwan, since close to one third of the population still do not object to be called zhongguoren. The author’s analytical findings further confirm that external sovereignty-related factors are related to the Taiwanese national identity shift. Specifically, a changed state boundary, separation desire from mainland China, and recognition of Taiwan as a sovereign state, not the distinctive cultural reconstruction inside Taiwan, contribute to the national identity shift in Taiwan. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

If the twenty-first century will be a Chinese one, what will its anthropology bring? The new realities of life in China have fundamentally reshaped the anthropology of modern China. With die disappearance of the planned economy, a whole range of structures, networks, organizations, and practices has emerged at the interface of state and society. Moreover, Chinese society is shaped by globalization, transnationalism, and cosmopolitanism to a degree never seen before. What happens under the impact of these changes is new and unique for the People's Republic of China, both recognizably Chinese and genetically modern. Anthropological research on these changes will impact the discipline of anthropology as a whole, just as China's rise will change the world order. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since Hong Kong's reunification with the People's Republic of China in 1997, debates about patriotism have erupted from time to time in Hong Kong. Considering Hong Kong's socio-political background, the feelings and attachment of Hongkongers towards their motherland are unsurprisingly complex. We therefore need a multidimensional concept to capture the complexities of Hong Kong patriotism. Based on survey data, we propose that the term ‘liberal patriotism’ best describes the type of patriotism in Hong Kong society, which is that love of the homeland and the state are qualified by liberal democratic values. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The notion of a Chinese popularity function may seem surprising, given its authoritarian nature. However, exploring the possibility of indirect popularity functions in nondemocratic systems, we articulate a model of national government support in China. The model argues that sociodemographics, political attitudes, and performance issues mold central government satisfaction. Drawing on a countrywide 2008 public opinion survey, we conclude that regional differences, national trust, and local policy success are of special importance in shaping national government support. The findings, which exhibit theoretical and statistical appeal, lay the groundwork for further investigation of popularity functions in China. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article reflects on the representations of overseas Chinese in Chinese political and popular discourses from the late Qing to World War II. It argues that contraly to prevalent views, which credit the success of the Chinese nationalist discourse in mobilizing the overseas Chinese to their re-incorporation into the Chinese nation, extraterritorial Chinese nationalism depended not so much on the rhetoric of inclusion, but rather on the separation of the overseas Chinese as a sub-ethnic group, particularly after they were "rebranded" as huaqiao, or Chinese sojourners. This analysis begins by looking at the key reasons for Chinese political activists' newfound interest in the diasporas - in soliciting huaqiao contributions to China's state-building projects - and argues that they imbued huaqiao with certain positive qualities only insofar as these made them relevant to China. The truth is, prejudices against the emigrants have persisted and Chinese within China continue to view huaqiao as uncouth, uncultured, and even "unChinese." [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article looks at politics and society in China as of 2013, focusing on the role that different forms of nationalism play. It cites the national pride of Chinese, especially the ethnic Han majority, and continuing anger over the 19th-20th century period of foreign intervention in China's sovereignty, but also notes that some Chinese have adopted a critical stance toward nationalism and a view of patriotism that allows for dissent toward the Chinese government. It discusses conflicted mainstream Chinese attitudes toward Tibet, Hong Kong, and Japan.

Empirical evidence concerning the demographics and development of Chinese nationalism is sparse but important for scholarship and policy. Its collection entails methodological challenges in access and reliability. We conducted a field experiment to measure nationalism in incentive-compatible choices among a diverse group of 447 Chinese subjects in a field setting. Our results demonstrate greater nationalism in female, older, less affluent and more rural respondents. We also find support for nationalism in professional and educated individuals. Our results provide qualified support for a middle-class nationalism in China. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The 2005 anti-Japan protests in China inaugurated a new era of Chinese popular nationalism with their pervasive visuality and virtuality. The outpouring of emotions in cityscapes and cyberspaces – anger, outrage, zealousness and even pleasure – requires us to take emotion, passion, hope or sheer delight seriously and to recognize the power of some of the more alarming forms of popular nationalist sentimentality. This chapter analyses one instance of Sino-Japanese relations: the epithet of ‘riben guizi’ or Japanese devils in Chinese popular culture in four historical moments: late-Sinocentric imperium, high imperialism, socialist nationalism and post-socialist globalization. I want to suggest that while this ‘hate word’ performs an affective politics of recognition stemming from an ineluctable trauma of imperialist violence, it ultimately fails in establishing a politics of reconciliation. I argue that anti-Japanism in China is less about Japan than China's own self-image mediated through its asymmetrical power relations with Japan throughout its modern history. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Anti-Chinese riots broke out in Rangoon on 26 June 1967. The riots, which resulted from Chinese students' defiance of the Burmese government's ban on wearing Mao badges in school, led to the deterioration of Sino–Burmese relations, symbolised by the cessation of ‘Pauk Phaw’ ties and the subsequent shift in China's foreign policy which included open intervention in Burma's civil war. The riots contributed to estranged relations between Beijing and Rangoon throughout the 1970s and 1980s despite the normalisation of bilateral ties in 1970. While the roots of the Rangoon riots lay in Burma's political economy and tensions within the local Chinese community in the context of Cold War international relations, Beijing bore primary responsibility, however, due to its export of the Cultural Revolution. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Historically speaking, the self-identification process of Russia has revolved around the West–East axis. However, there has been a considerable asymmetry in the impact of these two poles. In this article I will argue that “the West” was a dominating concept in the self-narration of Russians and “the East” was mostly a function of the interaction between Russia and the West. The difference in the level of attention and emotions which Russia manifests towards the West and the East has been caused by the religious factor, which was crucial for shaping Russia's identity and her sense of uniqueness. While the West and Western Christianity presented a challenge to the Orthodox fundamentals of Russia's self-image, China was neutral in terms of religious identity. The negligible importance of the religious factor added to rationality in Russian policy towards China. In the article I analyze the Chinese factor in Russia's self-identification process in the context of Moscow's attitude towards the West and the East by using two main elements: identity and fear. Comparing the historical pattern with the present one, I attempt to determine the consequences of these two factors for the Russian Federation. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article focuses on racial theories in the People's Republic of China wherein race was viewed as a concept capable for the promotion of nationalism after the collapsed of Qing Empire in 1911. The notion of race, which was often mixed to the politics of nationalism, adjusts continuously to various social and political contexts from the reformist movement in 1980s to the Chinese Communist Party's eugenic policies. It mentions that the race concept emerged as a powerful and cohesive form of identity due to the diversity of religion, family structures, and regional cultures of Chinese. Racial theories were distributed through school textbooks and travel literature. Moreover, the term Chinese was assumed as a language, culture, and a race even the members were scattered across the globe.

The author focuses on how China viewed Taiwan and the people of Taiwan between 1931, the year Japan invaded Manchuria, and 1941, the year the U.S. entered World War II. Some of the subjects considered include nationalism, Chinese identity, Chinese political thought, and the ideology of nation-building and cultural identity. An overview of the historiography of competing Chinese and Taiwanese national identity exemplified in the writings of historians Emma Jinhua Teng, Alan M. Wachman, and Steven E. Phillips, is presented.

In 1892, Terrien de Lacouperie (1845-1894), professor of Chinese at University College in London, set out to prove that the Chinese migrated from Mesopotamia in prehistoric times. Despite mixed responses from his colleagues, Lacouperie's "Sino-Babylonianism" found its way into China and captured the imagination of Chinese historians from the 1900s to 1930s. Whether they supported or opposed Lacouperie's view, Chinese historians were intrigued by his boldness in linking early China to the global network of trade and cultural exchange. This article examines how Chinese historians adopted, transformed, and appropriated Sino-Babylonianism in their discourse on the nation. It argues that the rise and fall of Sino-Babylonianism coincided with the Chinese perceptions of the world system of nation-states. Sino- Babylonianism was warmly received when the Chinese perceived the world system of nation-states as a hierarchy in temporality, prescribing a process of evolution that all human communities must follow. Sino-Babylonianism was fiercely rejected when the Chinese saw the world system of nation-states as a hierarchy in space, characterized by incessant territorial expansion of imperialist powers. In both instances, Sino-Babylonianism was no longer what Lacouperie had proposed in the late nineteenth century. Rather, it was an important benchmark for the Chinese understanding of the modern global order. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the belief systems of Chinese youth and their attitudes toward the state. Youth in China are generally described as having an internationalist outlook, being pragmatic and materialistic, and embracing nationalism, patriotism, and altruism. The post-1980s attributes of generations of Chinese youth are discussed. The article suggests that contemporary youth are not an immediate threat to China's regime in 2009 and that they believe that China will overtake the United States as the leading superpower. Anniversaries of events and protests in China that concern the political leadership such as the 1919 May Fourth Movement are mentioned. The reason why Chinese youth join the Communist Party is also mentioned.

In 1944, a rebellion in China's northwestern Xinjiang Province prompted Chiang Kai-shek to send his most trusted lieutenant, Zhang Zhizhong, to negotiate with the rebels and to attempt to consolidate Nationalist China's hold over the perennially restive frontier province. Zhang's innovative adaptation of tested Soviet models of minority representation tapped into and reinterpreted a long tradition of established cultural paradigms for digesting and representing the internal "other" within China. The most visible and widely disseminated projects that Zhang sponsored in the waning days of Nationalist China represent a determined eleventh-hour propaganda attempt to integrate the seldom-seen Central Asian frontier into the greater conception of a unified Chinese republic. This effort also marks one of the earliest instances of the Chinese state attempting to employ mass propaganda media to disseminate—among a large and diverse audience—a modified version of established modes of ethnic representation previously in currency only among a limited subsection of elite and official society. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Considering how nationalism has flourished in China since the 1990s, it should not come as a surprise that intellectuals there have been vigorously debating its political meaning and significance to the Chinese people. Since the turn of the century nationalist trends have become even stronger and more powerful on account of China's putative rise to great-power status. One way to understand the complexity of nationalist expressions in China today is to explore how official and nonofficial nationalist discourses supplement and affect each other and how they are connected through debates within the intelligentsia. My aim is to question the assumption that nationalism in China is only imposed by the state on society and to suggest that it is also shaped by longstanding and widespread notions of China's proper place in the world as an important and leading country. At the same time, however, I want to outline the two major limitations of some nationalist arguments: one being that they take an essentialist approach to understanding the Chinese nation, and the other being that they remain evasive concerning the undemocratic political condition of much of the current nationalist fervor. Given the murky public space occupied by openly voiced speech and expression, nationalism in China today is neither just a spontaneous outpouring of patriotic enthusiasm nor merely a diversionary plot devised by the Communist Party to maintain its authoritarian regime. It is both of these, and this is substantiated and confirmed by the delicate interaction of the official and nonofficial versions of nationalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the Chinese diasporic culture and national identity in Singapore. The section reflects on the importance of the Tiger Balm Gardens or Haw Par Villa, built in the 1930s by overseas Chinese pharmaceuticals tycoon Aw Boon Haw, in Singapore's Chinese community area. According to the report, during the colonial era, the garden marked the success not only of Aw Boon Haw but also of the Chinese migrant community in Singapore, which was renovated into an orientalized theme park and then resuscitated as the repository of diasporic Chinese entrepreneurship.

Chinese nationalism has ignited much debate among academics and the general public in both China and the West. Rather than search for the true core of Chinese nationalism, this essay will examine the curious custom of National Humiliation Day as an oblique entry into the politics of identity. The nation is not simply a question of people or territory, the author contends, but of time: the national time scripted by events such as National Humiliation Day. By comparing the differing practices of the holiday as it was celebrated in the early twentieth century and is observed in the early twenty-first century, the author argues that in the early twentieth century the political performances aimed to produce a proper Chinese nation out of the clashes between the Qing dynasty, northern warlords, and foreign empires. The goal was to construct a “China” worthy of being saved. When National Humiliation Day was revived in China at the turn of the twenty-first century, the political performances were more focused on containing the nation through a commemoration of the various crises of the early twentieth century. Thus the essay will argue that the nation does not arise from the ideology of its leaders, as much as through popular performances such as National Humiliation Day. Hence it shows how politics is best analyzed as a series of performances, not just by state actors in official sites like the Foreign Ministry, but also through the cultural governance of less official sites in art, film, literature — and public holidays. In this way, National Humiliation Day activities go beyond producing and containing nationalism; Chinese people are also consuming nationalism as part of a symbolic economy that generates identity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The fall of the Qing dynasty (1644-1911) and the founding of the modem Chinese nation-state brought both opportunities and challenges to Chinese Muslims. No longer having to deal with emperorship and its foundational ideology, Confucianism, they were soon confronted with new state ideological impositions, namely, Han nationalism and socialism, imposed by the Republican and Communist regimes. These new challenges were both threatening and promising, for although the new ideologies were fundamentally antithetic to Islam, the new regimes promised an equal status to Chinese Muslims and saw how they could aid national diplomacy and international relations with Muslim countries. Within this context, China's Muslim intellectuals tried to reorient and reposition Muslims and Islam by minimizing differences and maximizing commonalities during both the Republican and the Communist regimes. By studying Ma Jian (1906-78), one of modern China's most influential and representative Muslim intellectuals, as well as his juxtaposition of Islam and China, I look at the way of being a modem Chinese Muslim intellectual in China's post-1949 internal and international contexts. The Turkic Muslim communities in Xinjiang and elsewhere in China are excluded from this study. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]