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Inquiry in Global Studies: Music and Politics is a regular course offering in which first-year honors students examine the social and cultural import of music in a global context. This qualitative study examines the practical and pedagogical implications of teaching music and politics during the coronavirus crisis. In a thematic, five-part series analyzing non-Western music both in service to the government and as protest against it, the author describes how students perceived the commonalities and diversities in global culture, history, politics, and society through music while at the same time demonstrating growth in music-making processes and confronting a remote learning paradigm. In a curriculum spanning North Korea, China, Russia, Cuba, and Iran, the author considers the impact of music instruction in cultivating an understanding of transnational community. The paper concludes with selections from the final student showcase and a review of learning outcomes, prompting honors practitioners to consider how high-impact practices in the arts can empower students, cultivate community, and give rise to new multicultural competencies. Changes driven by COVID-19 (course content, delivery, and assessment measures) are presented.

Widespread use of the Internet in 21st century society is not risk-free. This paper studies the comorbidity of some problematic uses of Internet with depression in order to assess their correlation. With that aim, a meta-analysis of 19 samples obtained from 13 different studies (n=33,458) was carried out. The subjects of these studies are adolescents between the ages of 12 and 18 years ([mu]=15.68) from different cultures and continents (Europe, Euro-Asia, America and Asia). The effect size obtained from the use of a random-effects model (r=0.3, p<0.000) is significant, moderate and positive, thus confirming the relation between pathologic uses of the Internet and depression. Moreover, meta-regression test results showed that 9% of the variance (R2=0.09) is associated with the male gender, while age and culture are not significant variables. The variability rate of the studies is high (I2=87.085%), as a consequence of heterogeneity rather than publication bias, as Egger's regression test shows (1-tailed p-value=0.25; 2-tailed p-value=0.50, and [sigma]=1.57). Therefore, the need for specific interventions in secondary education dealing with this issue is evident to ensure that it does not extend into adult life.

In the event of a conflict or contingency on the Korean Peninsula, one of the five People’s Liberation Army (PLA) theater commands is responsible for implementing China’s military strategy and operations in Korea—the Northern Theater Command (NTC). What capabilities does China deploy to the NTC? How does it compare to the other theater commands? And do NTC’s military capabilities change the existing balance of power on the Korean Peninsula? Using the most up-to-date data, this paper offers, first, a theater-level comparative analysis of the PLA and, second, a quantitative assessment of how China’s NTC capabilities affect the military balance of power between North Korea on the one hand, and South Korea and the U.S. Forces Korea on the other. Of PLA’s five theater commands, the paper finds that the NTC has maintained the largest and heaviest ground force, the largest air force, and the second most powerful naval fleet. When NTC military capabilities are added to the existing military balance between North Korean forces and the U.S.– South Korean alliance forces, the United States and South Korea’s air supremacy is challenged and naval dominance is overturned. This is especially the case in the West Sea of Korea, the Yellow Sea. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Cross-border higher education institutions are considered a main way to fulfill the educational internalization in Mainland China; to some extent they represent the attitude of entering the international market. In this paper, the history, status quo, and future of Chinese-foreign cooperatively-run schools are analyzed and discussed. Cross-border higher education institutions in Mainland China have experienced the process from accidental and disorder to a systematic and quality orientation.

Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to review the current status of collaboration in cultural heritage preservation in East Asia, including digital projects, and to suggest practical improvements based on a cultural structuralism perspective. Design/methodology/approach: Through exploratory research, the paper addresses aspects for successful collaboration in cultural heritage digitisation in East Asia. Findings: The paper indicates the difference in collaboration of cultural heritage digitisation between regions such as Europe and the unique situation in East Asia. Social implications: If collaboration between the countries of East Asia was implemented then such a community could deal with the issues of cultural heritage by having a standard scheme or policy. Originality/value: There has been little literature published on East Asian cultural heritage initiatives, particularly in the area of digitisation and digital preservation. (Contains 4 figures.)

In the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)'s case of nuclear proliferation, less attention has been paid to the role of security assurances. This paper seeks to assess the role of security assurances for the DPRK provided by the UN, the Soviet Union, China, and the United States and to figure out why these assurances are less effective to bridle its nuclear ambition. It argues that an effective security assurance for nuclear non-proliferation should meet at least two conditions. Firstly the security assurance should be credible, which can be realized by being publicized, legally binding, and infusing with further commitments. Secondly, the security assurance tailored to the unique features of the target state's concerns is more likely to be effective. Using this set of criteria, the only moderately effective assurance is that provided by the Soviet Union. The general security assurance of the UN is neither legally binding nor specifically targeted. The alliance with China exists only on paper as Pyongyang believes Beijing is reluctant to fulfill its obligation as an ally. The United States is taking a capricious attitude on the DPRK and none of its security assurances are legalized or address its major concern of regime survival. These may help explain why security assurances failed to prevent the DPRK from acquiring nuclear weapons. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this paper is to analyze the most important aspects of the ideological relations between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) in the face of the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC). The Policy Brief is divided into four parts: Reactions of the Workers' Party of Korea to the 20th Congress of the Communist Party CPC; Mention of Korea during the 20th CPC Congress; The role of CPC in People's Republic of China according to WKP and the Significance of Sino-North Korean ideological relations after 20th Congress of the CPC. The methodology included media and literature review, which were collected through Korean Central News Agency, Rodong Sinmun and documents of the 20th Congress of the CPC. This study makes evident the importance of ideological relations between China and North Korea. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

From a rationalist perspective, this paper analyzes the current nuclear stalemate between the United States and North Korea. Using a simple game theoretical model, this paper shows that the current deadlock emanates from a commitment problem, Pyongyang's concern that the United States will be unable to commit itself to following through on an agreement once Pyongyang has dismantled its nuclear programs, because Pyongyang's accommodation of the demand for denuclearization would imply not only the increased vulnerability of the North to U.S. military presence but also the undermining of its future bargaining power relative to that of the United States. Currently, the lack of a reliable enforcing mechanism to guarantee the implementation of a nuclear deal generates this commitment problem, making it more difficult for both sides to strike a deal. Thus, this paper offers three policy alternatives to minimize the commitment problem as a prerequisite to resolving the North Korean nuclear problem and making progress towards denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula. First, minimizing the commitment problem requires bringing in a third party who is capable of securing the implementation of an agreement. Besides bringing in a third party, this paper also proposes two other ways to make reneging costly. The final agreement for a nuclear deal must be a legally binding agreement such as a treaty that requires U.S. domestic legislative approval and finally, North Korea must relinquish any economic aid from the United States to reduce the possibility that a nuclear deal made between them does not cause any U.S. domestic backlash against the deal. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose-This paper seeks to address China's cooperation and limitations in sanctioning North Korea. This study goes beyond the majority of existing research which discusses North Korea's nuclear sanctions in the context of China's foreign policy or policies concerning the Korean Peninsula in the Northeast Asian order. Design/Methodology/Approach-In this paper, China's perception, interest, and the institutional environment surrounding North Korea's nuclear pursuit have been chosen as main factors of analysis. Findings-While perception and interests pose fundamental influence on state behavior, an institutional foundation is needed for China to project its actions or preferences. In short, cooperation with international sanctions was made possible with China's changing perception of the nuclear regime, increase in relevant interests, and evolution of the domestic institutional environment. Practical Implications-however, the same factors may also work to hinder future Chinese cooperation. Concerned parties must consider these precariously inter-related factors in order to garner further Chinese support for sanctions on North Korea. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study investigates shared benefits through the cooperation between North Korea and China over transboundary water management in the Yalu River Basin. Primary attention has been placed on joint hydropower development since the 1950s, which has brought in developmental benefits for North Korea and security benefits for China. Data on the study have been collected from relevant papers, government publications, and media reports of China and South Korea. The information on North Korea, particularly about hydropower dams, is only accessible through secondary sources collected from South Korean government thinktanks due to the lack of publicly available data. The case study method is deployed for exploring specific issues and context and addressing problems. The significance of the study lies in the fact that this study is one of the first studies to examine transboundary river cooperation for development and security benefits between the countries. An array of bilateral agreements over the river basin has culminated in co‐building and jointly operating the four dams along the river. The construction of two additional dams, which is nearing completion, symbolizes shared benefits for both countries, hydroelectricity for North Korea, and regional security for China. Research Impact Statement: The study provides an in‐depth and unique analysis of joint hydropower development between North Korea and China in the Yalu River Basin. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper starts from the assumption that geostrategic and security interests alone are not sufficient to explain China’s foreign policy choices. It argues that ideas about what China’s role as an actor in the increasingly globalised international system should be, and about world order in general, have a deep influence on China’s foreign policy decision-making process. Taking the North Korean issue as a case study, the paper postulates that China is currently engaged in a search for a ‘new’ identity as a global player. China’s actor identity is composed of various partly contradictory role conceptions. National roles derived from China’s internal system structures and its historical past lead to continuity in foreign policy, while the ‘new’ roles resultant from China’s rise to global power require an adaptation of its foreign policy principles. In the case of its relationship with North Korea, China’s foreign policy is oscillating between the two roles of ‘socialist power’ – as thus comrade-in-arms with its socialist neighbour – and ‘responsible great power’, which leads to it being expected to comply with international norms, and thus to condemn North Korea’s nuclear provocations and related actions. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Article Type: Commentary Essay Purpose--While it is no secret that China has always been using its official aid as well as non-official trade to help in stabilizing the Kim regime and subtly influence North Korea's political economy in China's interest, there has been little literature on the challenges and risks faced by Chinese investors in North Korea. The purpose of this paper is to examine what are the most common challenges faced by Chinese private investors as well as the general state of Chinese private investors' business operations. Design, Methodology, Approach--To study the general state of Chinese private investors' business operations in North Korea, the author conducted research in the Sino-North Korean border areas (Hunchun, Dandong, Yanji, Changbai, Baishan, Helong. Shenayng and Changchun, etc.) in July 2014, December 2015 as well as May and June 2016. As part of this research, the author conducted interviews with more than 60 Chinese private investors, businessmen, officials and smugglers. Findings--The study suggests that Chinese private investors, especially Hanethnic Chinese businessmen, are facing significant challenges in North Korea. Without China and North Korea's joint efforts to improve the business environment for Chinese private investors, these investors are likely to massively withdraw from North Korea or turn to engaging in illicit trade. Practical Implications--This paper presents a general picture of North Korea's business environment for Chinese private investments as well as their survival strategies, hence it may help potential investors evaluate their risk and return of engaging in North Korean investments so that they may decide if it would be profitable to invest in North Korea. Originality, value--Based on interviews with Chinese private investors, illicit traders and government officials, the study has important implications for both Chinese private investors and government officials attempting to tackle this issue. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why has North Korea been unable to implement serious economic reforms like those of China? By tracing the process of economic reform in China, this paper argues that the improvement of national security, especially as a result of diplomatic normalization with the United States, was an essential precondition for successful economic reform and growth. It reduced the fear of an open‐door policy and eased domestic control as well as reallocation of resources from the military to economic development. Furthermore, diplomatic normalization with the United States lifted economic sanctions, and allowed access to global markets, foreign direct investments, and membership in major international economic organizations. However, North Korea has technically been at war with the United States for the last 66 years. Therefore, it maintains very tight control of its population and spends a substantial portion of its GDP on the military. It has also been under severe economic sanctions and does not have access to the global economy. The possibility of any meaningful economic reforms in North Korea will depend on its success in improving national security by resolving the nuclear issue and normalizing diplomatic relations with the United States. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Given the contextual conditions in each country, the United States, Korea, and China all have their own unique history of special education, which leads to different special education and service systems for students with special needs. The purpose of this paper is to compare the development and current status of special education in all three countries. The researchers did a comprehensive literature review primarily using the database of Academic Search Complete, in addition to national journals, published governmental reports, and official documents from Korea and China. The results of this review provide a better understanding of special education and trends in special education across all three countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There are diverging assessments of China's role in resolving the nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula. China's role has been characterised variously as a bystander, arbiter, catalyst and mediator over the years. This paper aims to clarify where China stands on North Korea and assesses the different phases of the Chinese approach to conflict resolution during the North Korean nuclear crisis. The main argument is that China wishes to maintain the regional status quo while appearing to adjust its position in line with the international community. China's current duplicity stems from its different priorities and concerns to the remainder of the world, and can best be explained using a role theory analysis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The fast-moving diplomacy around North Korea's nuclear weapons demands nimbleness and quick responses to dynamic changes in the relationships among the six interested parties. Yet Russia continues to adhere to long-standing objectives and positions. Consequently, it runs the risk of being further marginalized despite its anxieties to avoid that situation. This paper outlines Russia's vital interests in regard to the Korean Peninsula and its positions on major issues in the current process. It also underscores the fact that Russia's position on Korea is critical to its overall Asian policy. Therefore, because its policy remains immured in past concepts and goals, Russia's Korea and Asian policy are in danger of not being realized. Moreover, its evercloser alignment if not alliance with China is rendering it less and less important as a factor in Korean affairs. The essay concludes with some remarks as to what the consequences of these processes might entail for Russia and the other parties in their efforts to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article aims to assess the progress of the ROK--Japan security cooperation in recent years, both in the bilateral and trilateral framework involving the United States. It argues that the unprecedented progress in North Korea's nuclear program, along with a constant U.S. persuasion, led to a certain political convergence to allow and accompany the security cooperation. This said, political mistrust, asymmetric expectations and diverging perspectives still persist, explaining why the cooperation is mainly taking place within the trilateral framework. Nevertheless, the latest set of dialogue, exchanges and joint exercises did build up confidence and highlighted the benefit of an expanded cooperation while pushing the two countries to seriously consider the concrete issues, conditions and implications of such cooperation. The paper concludes that the recent progress in the security cooperation is still fragile and dependent on external factors, even if it is pointing to a greater understanding. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Facing the North Korean city of Sinuiju across the Yalu River, the Chinese border city of Dandong in Liaoning Province has recently taken on large urban developmental projects as part of a plan to build the wider city as the new economic hub of East Asia. This paper examines how Dandong’s recent urban developmental projects rely on its close relationship to North Korea and on North Korea’s role as a capitalist frontier. It argues that these projects simultaneously deploy a politics of waiting and a politics of memory to inscribe its central role in East Asia’s economic future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The potential competitiveness for new routes and resources has been theoretically discussed with regards to the Arctic route but is gradually becoming a reality as global warming increases. In June of 2017, China officially included the Northern Sea Route (NSR) as part of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and major countries' interests in the NSR are greatly expanding. This paper presents the general characteristics of the NSR, NSR development in China, the expected relationship between the NSR and the BRI, and this relationship's implications for Korea. The NSR has poor facilities and information infrastructure and is not economically viable for commercial navigation due to its high-cost conditions compared to competitive routes. In order to explore the Arctic and develop the NSR, large-scale projects must be funded over a long period of time; this has caused major difficulties in development. However, as the NSR is included in the BRI, there could be an opportunity to utilize BRI funds, such as Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). Further, China's NSR development and the NSR development of partner countries, such as Korea, should be further stimulated. As Korea has strengths in terms of its shipbuilding technology and geographical location, which is located at the core of the NSR, Korea would have chances to expand the economic cooperation and business opportunities with China and Russia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When it comes to human rights abuses, North Korea is in a category of its own. Since 2003, the General Assembly of the United Nations has annually adopted a resolution to condemn the country's record. However, it was not until 2013 that the UN's Human Rights Council created a Commission of Inquiry to investigate the State's human rights violations. In their 400-page report, the Commission reached two conclusions: first, that North Korea has infringed on its people's rights on a scale and gravity without parallel in the contemporary world; and second, that it has not acted alone, but with the assistance of China. For the first time, China's forced repatriation of North Korean defectors was placed under an international spotlight. This paper explores the possibility that China will be held accountable for North Korea's human rights abuses, especially in light of International Human Rights Law and International Refugee Law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Regional security analyses of Northeast Asia focus largely on North Korea, China, and the ongoing maritime disputes within the region. There is less discussion, however, on the wider security outlook of the region and its impact on the individual countries of Northeast Asia. This paper analyzes the security environment of Northeast Asia and how it affects the defense decision-making of the Republic of Korea. This paper also assesses the current state of the South Korean alliance with the United States and considers how the state of this alliance affects Korean security decision-making, and finds that South Korea is attempting to balance the regional security threats it perceives with changing domestic political demands. The security developments South Korea is pursuing may lead to deterioration in regional security, but the United States may be able to support regional stability through its alliances and forward presence. In analyzing both external and internal factors that influence South Korean defense decision-making, this research helps to contextualize these decisions and inform readers of the complex environment in which those decisions occur. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

North Korea's nuclear weapons and ballistic missile tests during the Kim Jong-un era have strengthened the country's military power, deterring South Korea, Japan and, in particular, the United States. While North Korea's nuclear and missile capabilities are rapidly improving, parallel developments aren't occurring in the traditionally technical air and air defense forces. Plagued with aging airframes, technical problems, parts shortages and budget shortfalls, the North Korean Air Force no longer challenges the South Korean and American air forces. This paper examines the North Korean Air Force, analyzing its organization and deployment, air defense and early warning capabilities, aircraft acquisition, and aircraft production. Shortfalls in each of these areas caused Pyongyang to develop, test, and operate an increasingly sophisticated drone fleet. While North Korea won't be able to build a state-of-the-art aircraft industry, it will nonetheless find creative ways to strengthen its air force capabilities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study investigates the consequences of sudden regime changes in North Korea. The study considers how large volumes of refugees would affect South Korea and other neighboring countries. It also proposes likely countermeasures for South Korea and its allies. If sudden regime change in North Korea were to lead to large-scale refugees entering China, Russia, Japan, and South Korea; it could bring massive changes in the balance of power in Northeast Asia. A refugee crisis of this magnitude demands meticulous planning to minimize unexpected consequences to the region. This paper examines the following questions: What is the decision-making process that refugees undergo when deciding to leave North Korea? What would be the volume of North Korean refugees heading into China, Russia, and Japan? What would be the volume of refugees entering South Korea? What would be the most likely routes taken by refugees? This study analyzes these questions and suggests policy implications for the South Korean government. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

During 2016 China's policies towards North Korea appeared to undergo considerable short-term change, increasingly distancing itself from its neighbour and instead supporting the international community's response. Existing research has focused on long-term policy change and given little importance to short-term changes in policy, or has drawn on realist and constructivist theories which expect consistency and struggle to account for these changes. This article took an identity discourse approach to understanding the 2016 short-term changes in China's North Korea policy. It used quantitative computer assisted text analysis methods to measure changes in the dominance of different identity discourses related to North Korea that are produced on the Chinese Internet. It found that around 2015–2016, a previously more dominant "revolutionary" identity discourse lost dominance to a "stakeholder" identity discourse. The article argues that this change made possible the shift in approach to North Korea at the start of 2016 and indicates ways the short-term policy changes at this time may contribute to longer-term change in China's behaviour. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper posits four ranked, generic goals of state foreign policy, maps them against the American ‘pivot,’ and concludes with possible handicaps of that shift. Drawn broadly from realism and liberalism, those abstract goals are as follows: national security, economic growth, prestige among the community of states, and the promotion of cherished national values. Applying this framework specifically to Northeast Asia, the USA, regarding security, is likely to increasingly ‘hedge’ China, and its North Korean client, with regional allies, off-shore balancing, and a shift toward AirSea Battle. On trade, the USA will continue its decades-long effort to reduce Asian mercantilism by tying Asian traders into multilateral, neoliberal rule sets. Regarding prestige, the ‘Beijing Consensus’ is a growing challenge to US soft power which the pivot seeks to refute. In addition, on values, the USA will continue to nag especially China to conform to US standards of law and human rights. The USA will continue to push the broad liberalization of Asian polities and economies. The democratic peace and liberal trade are the ideological frame and motivation of the pivot. Nevertheless, significant US handicaps may slow the pivot: American cultural distance from Asia means little public support and understanding of its necessity; strong regional allies will tempt the USA toward offshore balancing on the cheap; and the dire US budget shortfall will reduce the resources necessary to fund it. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article explores the burgeoning of Chinese investment in North Korea. By drawing on various materials including press reports and official data from both China and South Korea, the paper suggests that this rapid growth serves China's general policy goals toward North Korea, propping up the Pyongyang regime by leading it to embrace sustainable economic reforms. At the same time, Chinese investment has increasingly taken on commercial attributes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper centers on elaborating a sequence path of the forty years of the Sino-North Korean alliance by employing several standards that explain why alliances endure or collapse. The sequence path began when China's threat perceptions began changing in the early 1970s. The next stage witnessed significant decline in China's credibility as an alliance partner. As a result, the third stage showed North Korea's increasing secondary alliance dilemma that was further stimulated by the collapse of the communist world and the end of the Cold War. As a solution, North Korea bandwagoned with the United States. The final picture of this ongoing sequence path has appeared with North Korea's maneuvering between Washington and Beijing, as well as China's attempts to preserve its traditional sphere of influence against encroachment by the United States. This paper concludes that the alliance is being transformed from an ideological military alliance to a new triangular security relationship between North Korea, China, and the United States. In accordance, North Korea is becoming increasingly autonomous in its alliance with China. In so doing, Pyongyang is attempting to play one superpower off against the other, much as it succeeded in doing with the former Soviet Union and China. China, in turn, is compelled to defend its traditional sphere of geopolitical influence. North Korea will be involved in the coming conflict between China and the United States during the twenty-first century. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose—While conventional wisdom holds that the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) sustains a “blood-alliance” with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), traditional literature has failed to address scenarios where the DPRK could pose a direct military, let alone a nuclear threat, against the PRC. The purpose of this research is to outline “unthinkable” but possible scenarios where the DPRK could become a direct threat against the PRC. Design, Methodology, Approach—The design for this research is organized into analyzing a hypothetical DPRK contingency scenario which would warrant Beijing’s involvement as a third-party intervener (TPI). The scenario explores a contingency where the DPRK launches a limited-objective attack against the Republic of Korea (ROK) with People’s Republic of China (PRC) intervention. The scenario explores whether Kim’s strategic nuclear threats could counter PRC intervention and its related policy implications based on stakeholder’s objectives. Findings—Under an imminent regime collapse scenario, the Kim regime could be compelled to threaten, or worse, detonate nuclear weapons against the PRC as a show of force to prevent Chinese intervention in future DPRK contingencies if Beijing were to intervene as a third-party actor. Given the DPRK’s xenophobic tendencies, and the fact that the regime may fear that Beijing could try to replace it, Beijing needs to recognize that it could also be subject to a DPRK nuclear strike to counter that intervention. Practical Implications—If we believe the DPRK’s nuclear weapons pose a realistic threat against the PRC, all relevant stakeholders should be preparing for such implications in future strategies and scenarios. If Beijing fails to support Pyongyang, or threatens the regime’s survival, the DPRK and PRC could end up in a military conflict. The DPRK’s nuclear weapons could deter the PRC from becoming involved in such a conflict. Originality, Value—The conditions for the DPRK posing a direct nuclear threat against the PRC is under examined. Neglecting to account for scenarios could lead to a significant oversight in future strategic planning for the United States (US) and Republic of Korea warfighters on the Korean Peninsula. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What motivates states' choice of social classification? Existing explanations highlight scientific beliefs of modern states or social engineering by ideological regimes. Focusing on the initial state-building period of two Communist regimes, China and North Korea, this article complements the existing literature and suggests that social classification reflects three missions of political leaders: regime distinction, governance, and power consolidation. Population categories are created to distinguish the new government from the old, to selectively provide welfare, and to attack political opponents. The varying weight of the missions and their manifestation in social classification depend on new ruling elites' cohesion and past experiences. This comparative historical analysis sheds light on the rise of political chaos in China and the personalistic dictatorship in North Korea in the 1970s. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article presents the "Competitive Rent-Seeking Model" that accounts for how reform policies paved the way for sustainable economic growth in "authoritarian transition economies" despite widespread corruption. Competitive rent-seeking refers to the process whereby the entry barrier to rent-generating economic activities, once monopolized by a small number of vested interests, has been lowered inviting more potential rent-seekers into the system. This was accomplished by enacting decentralizing and market-friendly reform policies that in turn exacerbated corruption but boosted production efficiency leading to improved social welfare. The model is exemplified by the Chinese and Vietnamese experiences during the 1980s. Furthermore, this article demonstrates that the model is applicable to the North Korean economy under Kim Jong Un's economic reform policy of the "Socialist System of Responsible Business Operation in Economic Management" initiated in 2014. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

North Korea has been regarded as the least likely place to attract foreign investors due to its poor infrastructure, policy reversals, and totalitarian regime. However, the recent growth of Chinese direct investment in North Korea has drawn much attention due to its implications for the North Korean economy and regional stability. This research provides an analytical framework by considering two fundamental issues that any foreign investor takes into account when making an investment decision: property rights protection and profitability. It examines how recent changes have influenced these two issues, which, in turn, shaped the incentive structure of Chinese private investors. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Whenever the existence of North Korea is threatened, China always has in the past come to its aid by opposing both economic sanctions and military pressure against Pyongyang, and most likely will continue to do so in future. At the same time, China prefers to orchestrate stability on the Korean Peninsula by restraining military adventurism by Pyongyang that might lead to the collapse of the regime. For China, the survival of North Korea is key to maintaining stability on the Korean Peninsula. In this regard, China has continually expanded its economic relationship with North Korea, as well as hosting the series of six-party talks. However, some questions still remain: How much influence does China really have over North Korea, and what kind of leverage does China have? This paper will argue that China's influence over North Korea is greater than that of the United States, Japan, South Korea, and Russia. China's influence extends from the economic, political/diplomatic, through to the military fields. However, due to the complex security and political environment in Northeast Asia, it is uncertain whether China will actually exercise its influence over North Korea. Rather, China's influence over North Korea is limited at best, because if China were to use all the instruments it has at its disposal to bring pressure to bear on North Korea, it would endanger its larger strategic objectives for the region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

North Korea has been China's socialist ally since the Korean War. Although North Korea's provocations like nuclear tests have damaged Chinese national interests, China has supported North Korea. This research project examines why China has supported North Korea by analyzing event data from the Integrated Crisis Early Warning System (ICEWS). After China became integrated in the global economy, it has regarded stability and peace much more than the strategic factors of North Korea and has not viewed North Korea as a balanced ally to help China maintain the balance of power since the 1990s. This work also attempts to examine whether or not a strategic reason still plays a role in China's approach toward North Korea. The empirical results demonstrate that when North Korea faced physical and nonphysical threats from the United States and its allies (South Korea and Japan) in Northeast Asia, China showed amicable behavior toward North Korea in order to save its buffer zone. However, China did not approach North Korea when it faced strategic disadvantages. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China's policy toward North Korea's nuclear weapons programme represents an empirical and theoretical puzzle. Contrary to political relationship theory, Beijing has opposed its ally North Korea acquiring nuclear weapons. And contrary to power projection theory, a favourable asymmetry in material power has not resulted in Beijing being able to persuade, or otherwise coerce Pyongyang into terminating its nuclear weapons programme. To understand China's policy on the North Korean nuclear proliferation issue, the concepts of power and power projection need to be understood differently, in relational power terms. The relational view of power calls for the specification of scope, domain, the means, and the opportunity cost of alternative policy options. Once this is done, the limits and complexities of Chinese policy come into clearer focus. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Through a carefully crafted comparison of East Asia's surviving communist regimes (North Korea, China, Vietnam, Laos), this article offers a rare systematic study of how dictatorships manipulate collective memory to their own advantage. I employ methods of narrative analysis to identify different storytelling strategies that may serve to anthropomorphize the regime party as the "hero" in relation to the historical past. Moreover, I rely on quantitative content analysis (N > 2000) to demonstrate that the four communist regimes use propaganda photographs of their respective leaders to communicate collective memory narratives to mass audiences. The article thus makes two original contributions to the literature on autocratic politics. First, I show that narratives provide autocratic regimes with a powerful tool to tap into different sources of legitimacy, including output and identity legitimacy. Second, the findings of the visual content analysis suggest that, contrary to existing views, personalization – at least in terms of media personalization – does not have to come at the expense of the regime party. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The North Korean government has tried to promote export and attract foreign direct investment (FDI) since the 1990s. Sino‐North Korea trade values jumped during the 2000s, and China became North Korea's largest trade partner. China's FDI in North Korea began to increase abruptly since the late 2000s. The mining sector led China's investment in and import from North Korea. Although China has dominated any other country in FDI inflows and international trade with North Korea, the former's contribution to the economic development of the latter has not been so substantial in the light of the composition of international trade and FDI inflows. To materialise the potential of Sino‐North Korea trade and Chinese firms' investment in North Korea further, it is essential to improve North Korea's diplomatic relationship with China. In addition, the North Korean government needs to pay attention to upgrading the structure and composition of bilateral trade and FDI inflows from China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

North Korea references gender equality in its socialist constitution, but the de facto social and legal circumstances that women face in the country are far below the de jure status they are purported to enjoy. North Korean women endure extremely low public health standards and pervasive harassment. Yet their growing market power and social influence are underestimated. Women account for the majority of North Korean border crossers, and their informal economic activities are supporting families while modernizing the economy. This essay examines the dangers of exploitation that North Korean women face and highlights the ethical and legal imperatives of supporting their roles in marketizing the economy and liberalizing the society in one of the worst human rights–violating states. Women are North Korea's most deserving recipients of international assistance and the country's most promising partners to the world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explains China's abortive attempt to stop North Korean nuclear development between 1993 and 2016. It attributes this failure to two international conditions. The first is geographical contiguity. As an adjacent great power, China had limited leverage over North Korea. Beijing's threats of sanctions lacked credibility, as sanctions could trigger dangerous local instabilities. Its security inducements implied a risk of subordination, which Pyongyang was unwilling to accept. The second is the unipolar international system. Unipolarity curbed Beijing's ability to protect Pyongyang from the United States, while simultaneously inducing China to pass the buck of restraining North Korea to the American unipole. This article corroborates these main arguments by drawing upon primary and secondary sources in Korean, Chinese, and English. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Processing trade is an important exporting mode for many countries developed by the export‐oriented industrialisation such as 1960s Japan, 1990s Korea and 2000s China. Exporters who rely on processing trade for foreign profits do not enjoy much market power, and hence care more about exchange rate changes. We develop a model to illustrate how processing trade affects exporters' responses to exchange rate fluctuations. The model suggests that the elasticity of export price with respect to exchange rate for processing‐trade exporters is greater than that of the ordinary‐trade exporters, while the elasticity of export quantity of processing‐trade exporters is smaller compared to their ordinary‐trade counterparts. Most developing countries' governments offer processing‐trade exporters better tax/tariff reduction policy to encourage exporting, which grants processing‐trade exporters additional advantage to adjust more on export price and less on quantity when facing changes in exchange rate and therefore causes their different responses to exchange rate fluctuations. We find strong empirical supports by studying the data from China, which is the largest developing country and biggest processing‐trade exporter. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article will analyze the connection between history, countervailing ideologies, that is, the legacy of the Cold War, and the perceived identification of human rights violations as they pertain to countries with major security interests in Northeast Asia. This article will further show that the enduring nuclear-weapons problem in North Korea has been inextricably linked to human rights issues there, specifically because Washington wants to change the behavior of officials in Pyongyang so that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) becomes a state that at least remotely resembles a liberal democracy. Although supported by much of the international community, including the United States' South Korean and Japanese allies in Northeast Asia, Washington's North Korean policy has remained ineffective, as Pyongyang has continued to perform missile testing and still possesses nuclear weapons. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines what contribution, if any, Russia can make to peace on the Korean Peninsula. It begins by assessing Russia's relatively marginal standing in the current Korean negotiations and proceeds from there to analyze Russia's interests and stake in a Korean peace process. While in fact Moscow's standing here is marginal, its interests in peace in Korea and overall in Northeast Asia and in being included in any such process are considerable. The main contribution it can make is in the provision of energy and trade infrastructures such as its longstanding advocacy of a trans-Siberian, trans-Korean railroad and an analogous gas pipeline. We argue that matters have reached a stage where Russia depends on at least one if not both Korean states to allow it into this process and make these kinds of contributions. But beyond the two Korean states, one of the other major participants, i.e. the United States and/or China must also permit such Russian involvement. Yet our reading of their interests strongly suggests that they are opposed to giving Russia precedence over their own interests in Korea. While there are real possibilities for one or both Korean states to invite Moscow into this process, Russia now depends upon "the kindness of strangers" to play the role it wants to have in Korea. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose--This article aims to introduce the evolution of North Korean SEZ and their related policies as well as examine their potential role in the current economic reform in North Korea. Design/Methodology/Approach--Based on a survey of official literature as well as field research interviews conducted in China and the DPRK, this article analyzes North Korea SEZs and their related policies against the backdrop of Pyongyang's longstanding objective of building an "independent national economy." Findings--This article finds SEZs are not used in support of a wider economic reform but rather seem to be used as interfaces with profit- seeking actors, with limited impact on the current economic system. Practical Implications--This study shows that Pyongyang, while increasingly bolder and determined in establishing economic cooperation programs with foreign actors, its economic policies remained determined by the quest for political and economic independence. Originality/Value--This article offers an original viewpoint on North Korean SEZs, partially based on field research interviews, and provides keys to understand both the logic behind North Korean SEZs and their lack of success. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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The Trump administration's policy on Asia in 2019 displayed a mix of overreach and fecklessness. In terms of economic, strategic, and cooperative relations, the US floundered, stumbled, and fell short, particularly in its efforts to deal with China and North Korea. Overall, observers saw more grandstanding than anything else. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]