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The gradual deterioration of the US–China relationship during the Trump era has inspired the development of diverse theoretical approaches to grasping the essence of the two countries’ recent great power rivalry. Although the Cold War analogy is a useful heuristic for making sense of the dynamics of the US–China strategic competition, it is based on the bygone US–Soviet relationship, and thus may lead to misunderstandings about the particular logic of the current US–China relationship. The pitfalls of relying on the Cold War analogy include motivated bias, cognitive bias resulting from framing effects, and potentially missing the real causal variable driving the rivalry. Historical analogies are necessary but not sufficient for grasping the nature of the US–China case. Instead, scholars should ascend the ladder of abstraction to escape the conceptual stretching problem that contributes to misunderstandings in studies of the dynamics of the US–China strategic competition.

Recent research has focused increasingly on the strategies that Southeast Asian countries have adopted vis-à-vis a rising China. This article aims to contribute to the literature by discussing Myanmar's alignment posture towards China under the post-September 1988 military regime. In particular, the purpose is to specify and explain the nature and management of this alignment. The argument is as follows: first, during the two decades of SLORC/SPDC (State Law and Order Restoration Council/ State Peace and Development Council) rule, Myanmar sought only limited alignment with China, focused primarily on diplomatic support and protection, with only a moderate record of bilateral defence and security cooperation. Second, Myanmar's alignment with China after 1988 was shaped by at least three important factors: the core principles of the country's previous foreign policy after colonial rule, a deeply embedded sense of nationalism among the military elite, and Burma's Cold War interaction with China. Third, in managing its alignment with China over the last decade, the SPDC avoided compromises perceived as unpalatable in return for the promise of diplomatic protection and instead 'rewarded' Beijing by consenting to economic and infrastructure projects that were considered to advance the regime’s interest in either generating state revenue or contributing to the consolidation and expansion of control over state territory. The SPDC also pushed Beijing into reconsidering its position on the sensitive issue of armed ethnic groups in the Sino-Myanmar border region. The Myanmar case thus shows that lesser powers can obtain security benefits from a major power without this necessarily requiring more than limited alignment or entailing a serious erosion of political autonomy, particularly when the former possesses valuable natural resources and enjoys considerable geo-strategic significance for the latter.

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to describe how China’s rapid growth and increasing resource dependence have changed its relationship with India and their respective defense strategies. In particular, we consider China's Belt and Road Initiative, India's “Act East” policy and the strategic and economic value of the Indian Ocean and South China Sea regions. Design/methodology/approach The authors find no econometric evidence of interactions between China and India’s military spending using a Richardson-Baumol arms race model. Likewise, in a cross-county panel data study of military spending, they find that China’s military spending has no independent effect on military spending in other countries. The authors also show that once wage costs and other sources of military inflation are accounted for, the pattern of real defense spending growth is much less intense than is suggested by nominal data. Nevertheless, they show that China has been undertaking intense military modernization with rapidly rising capital-labor ratios in its defense spending. Findings The authors find little evidence of a traditional arms race, but also show that China, and to a lesser extent India, have been realigning their military capabilities to these new security risks while maintaining overall military burden on the economy. Research limitations/implications Econometric analysis is limited by data availability and is necessarily historical, whereas the security situation is very fluid and may change in the short term. Practical implications The paper identifies factors that are likely to influence China and India's attitudes to defense spending in the coming years. Social implications The paper finds that there is not an arms race in the traditional sense but may be an arms race in terms of new technologies and military modernization. Originality/value This is a very much underexplored topic in economics. The authors take an interdisciplinary approach showing how economics tools can be used to help understand this important issue in international relations.

Power plays a fundamental role in the system in the international relations. Basie on Game Theory, and by the assumption that the total amount of power is relatively constant in a short period of time, this paper makes a modelling analysis of the "take-and-give" movement of power among rational countries. Based on building the curve of power taken and the curve of power given, the power balance mechanism model and the power movement track model are constructed. We also make an analysis and by the examples. In the current situation, this paper agrees with the view of most scholars. China and the United States have opened a "cold war" different from the United States and the Soviet Union. With the coordination between the PRC-US relations, it is concluded that a stable international power mechanism requires the active cooperation of all countries, which could promote the power operation to reach the equilibrium point. The analysis method of power movement can explain the cause, progress, and trend of Sino US cold war to a certain extent.

"The economic and political rise of China has led to considerable controversy regarding potential repercussions for the current global governance architecture. At least two opposing scenarios are conceivable: China's adaptation to the rules and norms system shaped by developed countries or the pursuit of a distinctive policy approach, a possibility that involves the danger of clashing regulatory policies. A recent and increasingly dynamic trend giving substance to the phenomenon of China's rising importance is the growth of outward foreign direct investments (OFDI) by Chinese enterprises. Against this background, the present paper investigates the evolution and change of Chinese international investment policy-making, with a particular focus on bilateral investment treaties (BITs) as the most important legal instrument for the governance of global foreign direct investment (FDI) flows. China has been a committed signatory of BITs since the early 1980s (120 treaties up to 2007). It is thus the second most active contracting party to BITs worldwide, surpassed only by Germany. The traditional Chinese BIT approach, however, has only cautiously supported the legal protection of FDI. As a mere capital-importer, China concluded BITs that contained serious reservations and safeguards intended to preserve policy spaces for the regulation of incoming investments. Starting at the end of the 1990s the Chinese government initiated a decisive policy shift towards a liberal BIT approach characterized by high levels of substantive and procedural investment protection. Upon examining a representative sample of Sino-foreign BITs, this study concludes that the policy shift was a pro-active decision of the Chinese government intended to introduce liberal treaty provisions first and foremost with developing countries which are the main destination of Chinese OFDI. A further explanation for this development may be found in the great importance attached to the promotion of OFDI through the 'Going Global' strategy announced by the Chinese government at the end of the 1990s. In sum, this paper concludes that China has adopted a complementary rather than a competitive approach in the field of global FDI governance. China has fully agreed to standards of the current international liberal regime for FDI protection and has become an important global player in this context. This policy shift will yield consequences for China itself by levelling the playing field for international investors. Furthermore, developing countries that have concluded BITs with China will face a further reduction of their legal and regulatory autonomy, which is already limited by treaties with developed countries. China's BIT policy, therefore, contradicts the widespread rhetoric of a mutual beneficial South-South cooperation. Lastly, the emerging complementarity of investment policies between China and developed countries at the bilateral level gives rise to the possibility of enhanced cooperation between both at higher levels, for instance as part of the Heiligendamm Process between G8 countries and emerging countries." (author's abstract)

This paper sets out to challenge the dominant narrative of the creative economy as a new option for developing countries. The much-vaunted growth rates proclaimed by UNCTAD's Creative Economy Programme have slowed, and are seen to apply to a particular kind of manufactured good, as well as being overwhelmingly dominated by Asia, and especially China. This paper tries to unpick the dominant creative economy model of entrepreneurship, creative human capital and open market opportunity and suggests that - other than in East Asia - it is business as usual for the Global North. The creative economy not only fails to deliver its promise of development but has profound consequences for local cultures, caught up in an ever more global web of exploitation driven by the new digital platforms. We need to return to the earlier concerns of 'culture and development' now fully aware of the downsides, as well as the potential, of cultural economies in an uncertain global landscape.

"This working paper brings together assessments of the trilateral relations between China, the EU und the US from the disciplines of political science and economics. The first paper primarily addresses the following three issues: a) China's current development and prospects b) EU-China relations, and c) recommendations in terms of EU policies towards China. The second paper applies a three tier analysis looking first at changes in the Chinese and global economic setting caused by China's WTO accession. It then takes a look at the bilateral economic relations between China and the EU and US respectively. Finally the scored goals and competing interests of the USA and the EU vis-a-vis China are analysed." (author's abstract) Die Verfasser behandeln die trilateralen Beziehungen zwischen China, der EU und den USA aus politik- und wirtschaftswissenschaftlicher Sicht. Der erste Beitrag greift folgende Themen auf: (1) Chinas aktuelle Entwicklung und Perspektiven; (2) Beziehungen zwischen der EU und China; (3) Empfehlungen für die Chinapolitik der EU. Der zweite Beitrag setzt sich zunächst mit Veränderungen auseinander, die sich im Zuge von Chinas Beitritt zur WTO ergeben haben. Sodann werden die bilateralen Wirtschaftsbeziehungen zwischen China und der EU sowie zwischen China und den USA behandelt. Der Beitrag schließt mit einer Analyse der konkurrierenden Interessen der EU und der USA in Bezug auf China. (ICEÜbers)

This paper examines India’s strategic environment in the round. ‘Strategic’ refers here to politico-military aspects of international relations, particularly those with implications for the use or potential use of force in the future. Thus economic factors are considered secondarily, and only insofar as they have diplomatic and military ramifications – as in the case of Chinese infrastructure projects in South Asia, or Indian port-development in Iran. This approach also sets aside what we might call ‘structural’ factors, such as large-scale multilateral trade deals, such as the US-led Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), and sociological-demographic trends, such as relative population growth rates, also such issues necessarily influence the real and perceived balance of power over the long-run. The paper begins by considering India’s most salient adversary, Pakistan, before looking at the connected issue of Afghanistan and Central Asia. It then turns east to examine another rival, China, followed by the Unite...

Public diplomatic decisions are one of the main themes of the American think tanks, they are committed to the sustainable development research of the national policy and they utilize the media in a variety of ways. This paper offers an overview on the classification of American think tanks and mainly chooses CNAS (Center for a New American Security); CSIS (institute of international relations strategy); Brookings (Brookings institution) as examples to discuss the cooperation between think tanks and the media on public diplomatic policies in three periods: prior to the release by the media; while promoting of the policy; encountering problems after implementing. This paper concludes by emphasizing on the use of media for think tanks on public diplomatic policies, especially for counter-terrorism cooperation, and proposes several suggestions for China.

Asia's share of global demand for natural gas has increased from 13 to 18 per cent over the past decade, and the overall consumption has nearly doubled. At the same time, there is a growing gap between regional natural gas demand and supply, with increasing reliance on imports. Regional liquefied natural gas (LNG) imports are forecast to increase by 60 per cent by 2030, and natural gas has been described as Asia's “fuel of the future”. Asian LNG importers seek to diversify their supplier mix as much as possible to lower the prices and to reduce economic vulnerability to future disruptions or the failure of any one producer to provide adequate supplies. This paper explores major regional importers' approaches to LNG import diversification between 2002 and 2012 and explains why patterns of LNG imports differ between states and over time. The focus of the paper is on five largest LNG importers in the region: China, India, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. Keywords: LNG, Asia, Imports, Diversification, Energy security

Recent developments in the world economy have led to a new concept of international relations where emerging markets, notably BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) economies, create a strong counterweight to the already existing world powers of the Triad (US, EU and Japan) in both economic and political areas. This results from the reallocation of global economic activities, global consumption to emerging and developing countries and hence import/export destination shifts. BRICS economies can be described today as being highly integrated into international trade, thus enhancing their engagement in the world economy. Even though the Triad remains among the most important trade partners for BRICS, their total share in BRICS’s trade is decreasing. This paper examines changing geographical trade patterns of BRICS’s exports in regard to significant changes in global trade shifts within the past decade. The aim of the paper is to identify product groups that are involved in BRICS’s trade relations development and show possible diversions. The assessment focuses on regional trade orientation among BRICS themselves and between BRICS and the Triad. The results are further tested on the consistency of the countries’ revealed comparative advantage together with the assessment of export trade intro-version, complementarity and trade barriers. The results indicate that BRICS’s exports to markets other than the Triad are increasing but consist of less significant product groups. The export intensity assessment provided rather independent evidence of BRICS’s current behaviour than BRICS as a group. The most significant trade diversion from the Triad to BRICS was identified for the Mineral fuels, oils, distillation products, etc. product group ex-ported by Brazil and South Africa to China and India.

China’s economic rise has transformed the global economy in a number of manufacturing industries. This paper investigates whetherChina’s transformative influence extends to the new green economy.Drawing on the debate about how China is driving major economicchanges in the world – the “Asian drivers” debate – it identifies fivecorridors of influence and investigates their relevance for the wind ener-gy industries. Starting with the demand side, it suggests that the size andrapid growth of the Chinese market have a major influence on competi-tive parameters in the global wind power industry. While Western firmshave found ways of participating in the growth of the Chinese market,the government’s procurement regimes benefit Chinese firms. The latterhave invested heavily and learned fast, accumulating production capabili-ties that have led to changes in the global pecking order of lead firms.While the combined impact of Chinese market and production power isalready visible, other influences are beginning to be felt – arising fromChina’s coordination, innovation and financing power. China’s economic rise has transformed the global economy in a number of manufacturing industries. This paper investigates whether China’s transformative influence extends to the new green economy. Drawing on the debate about how China is driving major economic changes in the world – the “Asian drivers” debate – it identifies five corridors of influence and investigates their relevance for the wind energy industries. Starting with the demand side, it suggests that the size and rapid growth of the Chinese market have a major influence on competitive parameters in the global wind power industry. While Western firms have found ways of participating in the growth of the Chinese market, the government’s procurement regimes benefit Chinese firms. The latter have invested heavily and learned fast, accumulating production capabilities that have led to changes in the global pecking order of lead firms. While the combined impact of Chinese market and production power is already visible, other influences are beginning to be felt – arising from China’s coordination, innovation and financing power.

This paper provides a new and different perspective on the competition-collaboration dynamic in business and international relations, using a hypothetical model involving three nations—the United States, China and India. While the United States has been preoccupied with internal squabbles and external wars, India and China have been quietly emerging as powerful Asian states, building relationships both economic and military. The two countries have had a competitive relationship for several decades, not the least of which has been competing for a more muscular economic, political, and military alliance with the United States. This paper seeks to identify the relationships between the two nations and the United States in an effort to quantify the conditions under which a stable three-way balance of power may exist, using classic competition modeling. Simulations demonstrate stable coexistence when each market consumes most of the resource for which the other two are better competitors, oscillations...

This paper aims to study the problems and issues of China's relations with ASEAN, which has achieved the establishment of ASEAN Economic Community by 2015. Taking into consideration the institutional framework constituted by the multiple agreements signed between China and ASEAN, how will the development of China-ASEAN relations be influenced by increasing economic interdependence between the two? What will be the difficulties ahead in enhancing trade and investments? Does promoting economic cooperation lead to more mutual trust in the political-strategic arena? China's recent policy in developing "one belt, one road", and Chinese relations to the US-led Trans-Pacific Partnership and their implications to ASEAN will also be examined in this paper.

This paper analyzes China's new approaches of education aid to Africa through a case study of Cameroon. China's cooperation has been characterized by different discourses and different historic relationships with recipient countries than those of traditional donors. Sino-African policies have gone through different stages, each connected to wider political and economic realities. Currently, a broadening of China's engagement with Africa can be noticed through increasing aid packages and the inclusion of African countries other than those that had traditionally been close to China. Cameroon has been one of the countries that have had a relatively extended cooperation with China. Four types of Chinese education aid to Africa are illustrated by this paper: (i) Confucius Institutes, which are providing language and culture-related training in host countries; (ii) longer term scholarships and short-term training for Africans in China; (iii) school construction; and (iv) stand-alone education projects. By analyzing how these three different types of aid are taking place in Cameroon, various and apparently contradictory strategies and discourses materialize.

PurposeThe primary purpose of this paper is to investigate and ascertain the effects of integrative motivation on the willingness to participate in boycott activities.Design/methodology/approachThis paper uses a mail survey to examine the relationships among six constructs in a boycotting issue context, in order to explore Chinese consumers' willingness to boycott against Japanese products or services with the fallout from a Japanese former PM's continuous visits to a controversial war shrine since 2001.FindingsThe findings suggest that there are significant and positive pairwise relationships between boycott participation and three factors (i.e. animosity, efficacy, and prior purchase). High animosity towards Japanese goods and the other two constructs, at the high end of the attitude spectrum, increase the level of willingness to engage in consumer boycott practices.Practical implicationsConsumer boycotts are a worldwide and historic phenomenon in modern society. As the number of protests grows and as local authorities recognize the economic and political impact of such activities, then multinational companies (MNCs) and host countries begin to see the historic and cultural perspective of these events in addition to the conventional consumer behaviour perspective. To enable boycotting to become less harmful, MNC management need to understand what makes local consumers so affronted. The results of the evaluation can potentially be generalized towards a strategic analysis of the boycott model in other hostile market situations.Originality/valueThe findings of this paper offer pivotal implications for decision makers and the management of those Western multinational enterprises who are concerned with increasing their share of the world's largest consumer market. In particular, Japanese MNCs need to pay much more attention to the oppressed and potentially explosive emotion of animosity as the legacy of past conflicts (i.e. war, economic, political, etc.) between Japan and China.

This paper focuses on the changing interaction between Taiwanese entrepreneurs and local Chinese governments. Through the analysis of this changing process, it can be seen that Taiwanese businesses are a special “asset” of Chinese governments. The main argument of this paper is that both central and local governments in China have strategic considerations in respect of Taiwanese businesses. The Chinese central government values Taiwanese businesses because more Taiwanese investment in China strengthens the Beijing government in negotiations with the Taibei government. Nevertheless, since the Kuomintang (KMT) (Guomindang) regained power in 2008, the strategic value of Taiwanese businesses in the cross-Strait relationship seems to have decreased. The central government has created a profitable macro-environment enabling local officials to give a warm welcome to Taiwanese businesses. Chinese local governments value Taiwanese businessmen not only because of the central government's deliberate policy but also because they are pursuing their own self-interest. This paper firstly focuses on the changing interaction between Taiwanese businesses and Chinese local governments. It then further analyses the different but complementary interests of both central and local governments in China in relation to Taiwanese investors.

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of increasing trade and investment relations between China and Latin American economies. The paper focuses on the threats and opportunities that permeate this relationship.Design/methodology/approachThe paper surveys existing literature and secondary data in Spanish, Portuguese, and in English to investigate the different ramifications of this dynamic relationship between China and Latin American economies.FindingsAfter analyzing trade and investment trends and data, it is clear that Latin American economies must make changes to increase their participation in the Chinese market. Direct involvement with China is inherently risky, however, the opportunities obviously make the alliance necessary. Latin American economies are under increasing pressure to revamp their business environments and to implement long‐term strategies in order to compete more efficiently with China, domestically and in third‐markets. China has showed Latin American economies that investments in education, R&D, innovation, infrastructure, and friendly business policies, both facilitate and foster the creation of new competitive advantages.Originality/valueThis paper highlights and contributes to a better understanding of the ongoing challenges and opportunities permeating the Chinese Latin America's trade and investment relationship, as well as a indicating a number of areas for further study.

The rise of China poses many challenges and opportunities to itself as well as to other countries. Will its rapid rise in power change the way in which world affairs are run? If so, in what way will global governance be affected? What are China’s aspirations, demands and limitations in its engagement with global governance? This paper addresses these questions. First, it takes a look at China’s view of the nature of global governance. Then it identifies the principles and tactics used by the Chinese government in dealing with global governance before making an assessment of the special features of Chinese international relations in this area. Next the paper turns to the perceptions of other major countries towards China’s behaviour in the area. It concludes by suggesting that China’s increasing involvement in global governance renders its policy preferences increasingly felt around the world.

PurposeThis paper focuses on the relationship between spontaneous business groups, such as the Taiwanese Businessmen Association (TBA), and the Chinese government.Design/methodology/approachIn analysing the relationship between the TBAs and the Chinese government, this paper focuses on three cities, Tianjin, Kunshan and Dongguan. Furthermore it observes Taiwanese investment in mainland China from 1987 to 2004, in three sub‐periods: 1987‐1993, 1994‐1999, 2000‐2004. Statism (e.g. rational choice) appears to be a valid theoretical framework.FindingsIt was found that the Chinese government's changing interaction with Taiwanese businesses always suited their best interests at the time, which proves that the Chinese government applied rational module in interacting with Taiwanese businesses.Research limitations/implicationsRational choice is not a comprehensive approach in political science, but it is the most suitable approach to analyse the interaction between the Chinese government and Taiwanese businesses.Practical implicationsThe first TBA was established in Beijing in 1990; nowadays there are over 100 TBAs in mainland China. It has been argued that TBAs can be seen as the emergence of a sort of civil society in mainland China; to others, they merely reflect the strong will of the Chinese government to attract foreign investment.Originality/valueThis paper demonstrates that Taiwanese businesses is a security asset for the Chinese government in the cross‐Strait relationship.

Summary This paper analyzes policies affecting global groundnut-products markets. The new US groundnut policy is now a minor source of distortion in world markets where India and China stand out as the major distorters. We analyze and quantify the effects of groundnut-products trade liberalization on consumer welfare and producer income. Our analysis shows that African exporters would gain significantly from reductions in protection and subsidies in India, and to a lesser extent, China, although China’s exports of food-quality groundnuts would expand dramatically. Net-importing OECD countries would suffer from higher world prices. The paper draws direct implications for the Doha trade negotiations.

This paper compares the globalisation experience of the late 19th century with that of the post world war period. It notes the enormous changes in the world economy arising from the increasing participation of the developing countries in the world goods, labour and capital markets and the reduction in the cost of communications that has underlined these changes. More importantly globalisation was made by a consensus on trade, debt and macroeconomics which has led to policy reforms in developing countries including China whose entry into the WTO provides a high watermark in globalisation of the latter period. The paper notes that globalisation is not in danger of reversal given that the forces that led to this outcome in the earlier period have become weak. Ideas, interests, international relations and stability achieved in the post World War period gives ground for qualified optimism about the continuation of globalisation.

The end of the Cold War has marked the rise of globalization as one of the contending issues in international relations. As a dominant wave of world transition, globalization requires the states to coordinate their behavior and align their policies and standards to a generalized principle of conduct or to certain suggested directions. While some states have actively and positively responded to these changes, a few others have struggled to retard the influence of globalization, viewing it as a threat to social stability, state sovereignty, and national and cultural identity. However, China shows a dual response to this challenge. It welcomes globalization as a way to enrich national competitiveness, and it confines the impact of globalization exclusively within the economic field only, lest its regime stability be shaken. Hence, this paper argues that the impact of globalization on Chinese international behavior falls short of a fundamental change in Chinese worldview. To prove this argument, this paper ex...

The goal of the paper is to analyze the Sino-Russian relations in Central Asia since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The analysis will briefly touch upon the relations between Beijing and Moscow in general but the focus will remain on their relations in the post-Soviet era in Central Asia. Today, China and Russia are BRICS member states. They are united in opposing US unipolarity and they are among the largest and most populous countries in the world. Their border is over 4.000 km long and they are both veto powers on the United Nations Security Council. However, relations between China and Russia have always been complex. At times they waged wars and had border disputes, only to become close allies shortly after. Period of severe conflicts between 1917 and 1950 was followed by a progressive era of oil exploration, student exchanges and various other partnerships. Their rapprochement ended in 1960 and started again in 2008. But the question is: How long wills the rapprochement last? They currently have many things in common but Central Asia remains a potential area of dispute for both countries. Analyzing some accounts on Chinese investments in Central Asia (e.g. Tiezzi, 2014), it becomes obvious that Beijing is highly unlikely to withdraw from the region in case of Russian pressure. On the other hand, Russia is highly unlikely to continue tolerating the rising Chinese influence in Central Asia, as its role has already been significantly reduced in this region. The pipeline that was supposed to connect Siberia with the Chinese province of Xinjiang has been postponed because Putin believes that it could give China leverage over Russia’s internal, as well as external political processes. Putin’s decision will certainly not stop China’s expansion in Central Asia and the Russian Federation will try to avoid a subordinate position in its former republics. This situation complicates their relationship in Central Asia, especially if growing US investments in the region are taken into account. This is why selecting a single IR theory to analyze the Sino-Russian relations in Central Asia is not a simple task. Considering the current circumstances and initiatives by both countries in their internal affairs, as well as in Central Asia, neoclassical realist approach to Sino-Russian relations might give the best results and it will therefore be applied in this paper.

This paper is a preliminary study of Chinese considerations of China’s “economic security”, a notion that gained currency in China-based Chinese scholars’ research on China’s international relations in the 1990s. Among other things, such considerations reflect Chinese scholars’ acceptance of Western Realist/Nationalist convictions about the international political economy. The paper also finds that Chinese concerns about what the international political-economic environment holds for China’s approach to national greatness through economic growth by continuing to interact with the rest of the world, while not unfounded, are more ideology-driven than fact-based. This tendency contrasts sharply with Japanese notions of “economic security,” which have greatly influenced industrial restructuring in Japan and Japan’s international economic/security policies Japan since the term came into being in the 1970s.

Thirsty for oil and other raw materials needed to fuel its breakneck development, China is funnelling money and manpower into an expanding number of countries in order to secure access to natural resources. This effort has successfully increased Chinese oil assets overseas but it has also exposed Beijing and Chinese national oil companies (NOCs) to significant risks. The present paper focuses on one type of risk – political risk – and how it has affected China’s global quest for oil since 1993. It starts with a brief overview of political risk. It then looks at political risk management as applied to the oil industry in general. The paper continues with a discussion of the political risk management of Chinese national oil companies over time. This includes a concise exam-ination of several instances in which the interests of Chinese NOCs have been undermined due to political risk and the shortcomings in the approaches of Chinese NOCs to political risk. Recent developments suggest that Chinese NOCs are learning from these mistakes and adjusting their strategies accordingly. Although progress toward these readjust-ments has been made, China’s own socio-political context is still hampering the ability of Chinese NOCs to deal with on-the-ground realities that are clearly much more unstable than China’s own.