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Israel's relationship with the West during the first half of the 1950s was not a walk in the park. Economic relations fitted into this general picture. Both Britain and France were sceptical as far as Israel's potential was concerned. Their early prognoses tended to be quite gloomy. Simultaneously, economic relations provided a convenient communication channel at a time when overt association with the Jewish state was not desirable. The progress in Franco-Israeli economic ties during the years 1953-1955 illustrates this ambivalence in full. While prudence remained, the increase in bilateral trade managed to warrant the military supplies. Britain, constituting a traditional market, surpassed France as a trading partner. Given British political aloofness, the instrument of trade served primarily its immediate economic purpose. Based on archival sources gathered in all of the three countries, the paper traces the interplay of trade and diplomacy in the early years of Israel's foreign relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

On the basis of a study of American, British and Canadian records, this article examines the relationship of France to the negotiation of the North Atlantic Treaty from the perspective of the ‘ABC’ countries, particularly Canada. How did the perceived vulnerability of France influence the approach of the members of the ‘North Atlantic Triangle’ to the justification, timing and contents of the proposed pact? How did France's inclusion in Western Union and its exclusion from the preliminary talks in the Pentagon affect American, British and Canadian attitudes to the development of the draft alternatively known as the ‘Pentagon Paper’ or the ‘State Department Draft’? These questions are addressed, as well as the impact on the later ambassadorial talks of France's priority to immediate rearmament and its determination to include the departments of Algeria within the defensive perimeter of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. Finally, the article assesses the extent to which France and its requirements influenced the policies and actions of the Canadian government throughout the negotiation of the North Atlantic Treaty. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Brexit has been a game-changer for Britain, and its key partners. Strategic shifts as well as historic relations have impacted the UK's relationship with France in a number of unexpected ways. This article explores some of the key historical events that have caused both agreement and strife between the two states, looking at the bilateral treaties established to deepen cooperation on security and defence, specifically the Lancaster House agreements, and considers the series of intriguing accords and conventions that have arisen from the mid-1980s, as well as the logistical challenges of the shared border and juxtaposed border controls of Britain and France. Post-Brexit diplomatic forums in which Britain and France are joined by Germany are then explored, before assessing Britain's attempts to forge its new role in relation to long-standing commitments to France and an evolving relationship with the EU. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article analyses the responses of three established European powers, France, Britain and Germany, to a world of rising regional hegemons. It argues that Europe as a region remains unique as it consists of three regional powers of similar material and ideational power resources and is the most institutionalised region worldwide. The current transformation of world power configurations, debated in competing visions of global order, challenges Europe's central place. Facing gradual marginalisation, the foreign policy adaptations of Germany, Britain and France have been insufficient and remarkably static. Old foreign policy identities still play a significant part in European self-perceptions. However, views are gradually changing as the world becomes more heterogeneous. Among the emerging regional powers, China, India and Russia are perceived as decisive global players. Other rising powers are viewed as mainly regional and, hence, more manageable actors. Finally, the article calls for a general shift in European attitudes towards the non-European world and argues that European powers should overcome traditional Euro-centric world views. Rather, they should start to engage with rising powers in a serious discourse over common global responsibilities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]