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This paper assesses the role of the BASIC countries — Brazil, South Africa, India, and China — in UN climate change negotiations. The paper explores the formation and evolution of the group, and focuses on how the four major developing countries of China, India, Brazil, and South Africa have coordinated their positions and acted jointly to achieve an agreed outcome with other players in the recent UN Climate Change Conferences in Copenhagen and Cancun, based on an analysis of their country profiles and negotiation positions on a wide range of climate issues. The paper argues that the emergence of the BASIC Group is a reflection of the ongoing power shift from EU–US agreement to BASIC–US compromise in UN climate negotiations since the early 1990s. The rise of BASIC also has its roots in recent global market dynamics and further reflects the power transformation in the economic dimension of the international system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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This paper explores the intersection between three processes associated with globalisation. First, the rise of emerging economies like China, Brazil and India, the so-called 'Rising Powers', and their potential to define the contours of globalisation, global production arrangements and global governance in the twenty-first century. Second, the importance of corporate social responsibility (CSR) goals in the shaping of global trade rules and industrial practices. Third, the significance of small firm clusters as critical sites of industrial competitiveness. Some of the most significant examples of successful, innovative and internationally competitive small firm clusters from the developing world are located in the 'Rising Powers' and cluster promotion is a core element of national industrial policy in some of these countries. There is also evidence of engagement by clustered actors with corporate social responsibility goals around labour and environmental impacts. While these three processes have been separately studied there has been no attempt to explore their intersections. This paper addresses this gap through a comparative analysis of secondary data, and a detailed reading of the literature, on CSR and clusters in Brazil, China and India. It assesses the evidence on small firm clusters in the Rising Power economies and considers how these Rising Power clusters engage with CSR goals pertaining to labour, social and environmental standards. It argues for a greater focus on the formal and informal institutional context, termed the 'social contract', in explaining divergent experiences and practices observed across these countries. This raises important questions for future academic and policy research on clusters, CSR and the Rising Powers. The paper concludes by outlining a research agenda to explore the local and global consequences of the relationship between Rising Power clusters and international labour and environmental standards. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper investigates the European Union (EU)-Brazil and EU-China regional policy dialogues, viewed as vectors of crossnational policy transfer. Regional policy is considered as having limited transfer potential due to its inward orientation, context specificity and complexity. Yet, knowledge exchange and voluntary policy transfer have taken place between the EU and Brazil and between the EU and China since the mid-2000s. The study investigates and compares actors, motivations, mechanisms of transfer, conditioning factors and types of outcomes, shedding a light on the underresearched phenomenon of international policy transfer in regional policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Latin America is a critical region for analyzing China's economic statecraft. Following the Monroe doctrine, Latin America has long been seen as part of the sphere of U.S. influence. For the purpose of studying the effectiveness of China's economic statecraft I will focus on two countries that stand on opposite extremes: Brazil and Mexico. Both countries happened to be important target states (strategic partners) of China's economic statecraft in the region, albeit for different political and strategic goals. In this paper I will compare the different domestic political and economic conditions, interests and institutions in these two countries to explain why China has made greater progress in projecting its economic power through trade and investment to pursue its political goals with Brazil, but has not succeeded in Mexico. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Different modes of economic coordination constitute a key aspect of the Comparative Capitalisms research framework. With regard to emerging economies, the close relationship between the state and business has been perceived negatively as an instance of corruption and patrimonialism that are considered to be economically harmful. This paper addresses the puzzle why some large emerging economies – China, India, and Brazil in particular – have seen considerable economic growth since the 2000s despite such 'failures' or 'institutional deficits'. We find strong evidence for a public–private mode of coordination based on reciprocity. This inter-personal mode of coordination helps to explain an unexpected degree of institutional coherence of capitalism, albeit to different degrees, in the large emerging economies under scrutiny. We argue that while there is evidence of economically productive public–private coordination in China and India, economic coordination in Brazil by comparison is much more contested, and thus less beneficial economically. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Estudios Internacionales is the property of Instituto de Estudios Internacionales de la Universidad de Chile and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Conjuntura Austral is the property of Conjuntura Austral and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The cooperation between Brazil and China dates from 1980 and is inserted in the South-South cooperation scope. However, the literature observes a transformation of this cooperative modality in the crisis of international relations – as evidenced by the impact of covid-19 pandemic – and the domestic challenges faced by developing countries. This raises the question of whether there is increasingly a gray area between South-South and North-South cooperation, and whether there is any likelihood of a reversal of this low cooperative profile between states. In this context, the paper seeks to analyze Brazil-China cooperation in science, technology and innovation (STI), observing the nuances of the previous and subsequent period of the covid-19 pandemic. Has there been a reduction in this cooperation in the contemporary scenario? How has the pandemic impacted this process? To answer these questions, this research is based on a bibliographic and documental review, as well as official websites of the cooperative initiatives and the Brazilian organizations involved in the bilateral interaction. We conclude that the biggest leaps in bilateral STI relations occurred at the end of the first decade of the 21st century and at the beginning of the second, with a subsequent reduction in cooperative intensity, although relations remained active. Furthermore, we note a transition in strategic terms and that, during the pandemic, new bonds were established, as well as dialogues for the renewal of the existing cooperation. Under the current administration of President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, recent international acts have been signed and there has been a strengthening of the partnership, especially in the space area, demonstrating a boost in South-South cooperation in STI between Brazil and China.

This article brings to fore long-standing intricacies and dilemmas in Brazil's and China's international positioning. It reveals the complex discursive repertoires shaping the Brazilian and Chinese sense of Self in the world, in the Global South, and, more particularly, in relation to Africa. It engages with the concept of "liminality" to highlight how constructing South–South relationships and invoking Southern identities have been ambiguous, indeterminate—thus liminal—endeavors in these countries' international affairs. By dissecting their diplomatic and corporate narratives towards Africa, our analysis demonstrates, notwithstanding tensions and contradictions, how Brazilian and Chinese actors have creatively acted upon this liminality to pursue foreign policy goals and economic projects. In doing so, the article stresses the floating, ambiguous nature of powerful constructs such as "South" (and "West"), and binary oppositions between them. It concludes by discussing how a liminality perspective allows us to understand the unfixed and multifaceted nature of roles and identities in international relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The rise of large developing countries has led to considerable discussions of re-balancing global relations and giving greater priority to understanding South-South relations. This paper, in exploring the central ideas of Chinese and Brazilian foreign policy and the behavior of these two rising Southern countries toward Sub-Saharan Africa, argues that the English School of International Relations is well suited to understanding the intentions and actions that characterize South-South relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Bilateral swap agreements gained great importance due to the 2008 crisis and China has been a protagonist in this movement. Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Suriname individually and at different times established such a deal with the Chinese. However, until August 2020, only Argentina, of those countries, had activated the agreement. In this paper, we question which aspects explain the use or not of these agreements with China. Through primary data gathering and bibliographic review, this study states that the swap agreements established with China are important as sources of liquidity in times of external vulnerability for Latin American countries. However, its use is limited due to low convertibility of the Renminbi (RMB).

Copyright of Carta Internacional is the property of Associacao Brasileira de Relacoes Internacionais and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Carta Internacional is the property of Associacao Brasileira de Relacoes Internacionais and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This paper analyses the defense strategies of Brazil, China and India and how they have responded to strategic needs that although they are different in the magnitude of their specific contexts, resemble to each other when they impose reforms to meet the regional and systemic character requirements. Deepens in Brazil, evaluating how the new technologies can break down this low strategic profile and initiate a new phase for the Brazilian strategy defense.

China’s economic growth and the expansion of its companies have led to many questions about the country’s global objectives. Leaders in Beijing cultivate economic power to maximize the country’s global influence. Brazil, as one of China’s largest trading partners and top destinations for outward Chinese investment, has attracted much attention. This paper presents field research and scholarly analysis to demonstrate that China’s governmental institutions are supporting economic expansion into Brazil as part of a broader strategy to shore up global economic power. However, the Brazilian government has successfully limited Chinese investment in certain sectors, like agriculture, to protect its own economic interests.

This article introduces the special issue on ‘South African Foreign Policy: identity, directions, and intentions’. Here we seek to summarize key insights from the contributions to this special issue to deepen understanding of South Africa’s evolving post-apartheid foreign policy through an exploration of the nature and trajectory of key bilateral relationships from both the global ‘South’ (Brazil, China, Iran, the AU) and ‘North’ (Japan and the UK). This window on the country’s international relations enriches understanding of the normative and structural factors that influence not only South African foreign policy, but those of what Edouard Jordaan calls emerging middle powers as they seek to position themselves as influential actors in international affairs. We sketch the contours of these key South African relationships in four areas where the tendencies and tensions of emerging middle power foreign policies are apparent: regionalism, multilateralism, reform of global governance, and approach to moral leadership. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Institutions are frequently thought of as ‘socialising’ member states into pre-established norms. However, this influence is not necessarily a one-way street; members can also affect institutions, whether individually or collectively. This article analyses the behaviour of two emerging powers – Brazil and China – within the field of international development. What roles have these two states played in shaping global development norms? The article examines the key motivations, positions, and initiatives taken by Brazil and China, with special reference to the UN development system (unds). Whereas Brazil and China’s early behaviour within theundsdiverged significantly, in the post-cold war period both have become increasingly interested in – and capable of – influencing UN norms. However, despite greater involvement in UN development negotiations, these countries’ leverage in normative debates originates outside of theunds, through their South–South cooperation programmes. The current diversification of platforms through which the norms of international development are negotiated may enhance the influence of emerging powers, although their ability to channel this influence effectively will depend on their capacity for norm entrepreneurship, rather than mere norm blocking. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The first decade of the twenty-first century witnessed a sharp intensification of the relations between China and Brazil. The two countries deepened their commercial links and, as a result, Brazil became China's largest trading partner in Latin America. They have also further improved the quality of their political cooperation by setting up, for the first time, high-level bilateral institutions. Both countries have also been working together within multilateral institutions and mechanisms. The economic causes and impacts of this phenomenon have been widely discussed, but little however has been said about its specific political and strategic dimensions. In order to fill this gap, this article suggests an analysis that looks at the historical context of the relationship between China and Brazil, and sets up an enquiry into the most relevant domestic actors and at the strategic meanings behind their partnership. The goal here is twofold. Firstly, to analyse the role of domestic actors in the intensification of this partnership. Secondly, to discuss to what extent this intensification may be seen as evidence of any strategic interest of China and Brazil to put in place a more proactive, wilful and global foreign policy intended to shape globalisation and the world order. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay deals with the many connections between Brazil and China, as it examines the fundamental drivers of this accretive friendship. Brazil, like China, is a rapidly growing economic giant with a large resource base. Brazil has experienced an average growth of 7 per cent and China of 10 per cent. These growth rates require large amounts of energy sources, natural resources and raw materials. Both countries are positioned to benefit from increased rapprochement: China needs Brazil to supplement its rising commodities needs, and Brazil needs China to finance its industrial and manufacturing investments. Today, China is Brazil's leading trade partner, replacing the United States and emerging as a viable ally at a time of waning hegemonic control. As large oil deposits lie 150 miles off the Brazilian coast, China is attentive to Brazil's wishes, as well as to its desires to rightly develop the trillion dollar oil boom that is currently taking place. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Regional powers such as China, India, Russia, and to a lesser degree Brazil and South Africa, now occupy a significant role on the world stage. The United States, while still enjoying superpower status, has taken note. At the same time, the transnational nature of the challenges facing the world will require multilateral and bilateral co-operation perhaps unprecedented in modern history. How will the United States respond to these new requisites within the context of this changed world? While it is too early to assess the Obama administration's foreign policy substantively, it looks to be adopting an approach emphasising the building of consensus and multilateralism in its international engagement. Moreover, there is reason to expect that it will actively seek a more constructive set of relationships with regional powers. United States domestic political constraints may yet hamper Obama in this new approach, as might the type of response the new administration receives from old and new powers to its overtures. Whether the changes are more in tone than substance remains to be seen. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]