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This paper analyzes China's impact on Australia-U.S. relations from 1949 to 1996, including how far Australia's China policy followed the American lead. The conclusion: American influence was dominant, but Australia's own initiative was enough to belie the suggestion that it was no more than a blind follower. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China's remarkable economic development has had profound domestic and international effects. Among the most important of these is China's growing impact on the region of which it is an increasingly important and influential part. For countries such as Australia, which has rapidly become deeply economically integrated with - even dependent on - China, this presents a major and much-discussed challenge as it tries to balance economic and strategic priorities. Australia provides an important and revealing illustration of how China's elites view key states in its region, which have assumed a growing economic and even strategic importance. This paper aims to develop a more comprehensive overview of the way the strategic, economic and political dimensions of the Sino-Australia relationship are understood in both countries. It also highlights the importance of realist thinking in both Australia and China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The PRC and Taiwan are competing to gain diplomatic recognition from Pacific Islands states, a number of which recognise Taiwan and serve as a barrier to its international isolation. Since much of Oceania is in Australia's sphere of influence, this struggle has often involved Canberra. This paper focuses on the intensifying conflict--with conclusions about the local political economic situations of the countries in Oceania that are most likely to switch recognition, the dilemmas that the issue poses for Australia and its alliance with the US, and the game theory of these auctions of diplomatic recognition. The rental of recognition is analysed as a "sovereignty business" in which some Pacific Islands states engage—similar to the offshore financial centres which are prevalent in the region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One of Australia's main policy interventions in the South Pacific since the end of the Cold War was sanctions on Fiji in response to the latter's December 2006 coup. Dubbed 'Smart' sanctions, this policy was not only designed to pressure Fiji to return to democracy, but also to sustain Australia's longstanding regional leadership aspirations, aspirations which went hand in hand with its 'strategic denial' of unwelcome geopolitical challengers (Hawksley Global Change, Peace & Security, 21(1) 115-130, 2009). There has been little analysis of the unintended consequences of sanctions, namely, whether 'Smart' sanctions ironically contributed to greater strategic competition in the South Pacific, weakened regional security and prompted expressions of Pacific regionalism that excluded Australia. In the years after the coup, Canberra achieved its primary aim of being, and being seen to be, the dominant power in the South Pacific. However, during this time, Fiji "Looked North" and Pacific Island Countries (PICs) developed greater confidence in the 'New Pacific Diplomacy', thus providing the opportunity for China and other powers to expand their influence in the region (Fry and Tarte, 2015). To the backdrop of growing concern about Chinese influence, the failure of 'Smart' sanctions against Fiji shows the constraints of sanctions as a foreign policy tool. The fact that sanctions are no longer a palatable policy option has not been adequately canvassed in the literature. In this context, in order to counter Chinese influence, Australia requires greater soft power resources and a sustained effort to listen to the concerns of PICs in order to achieve Australia's interests (Newton, 2020b). In the 'New Pacific Diplomacy', threatening sanctions is likely to be counterproductive. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Debate within Australia regarding the bilateral relationship with China is complex, contentious and often lacks clarity. Informed by basic international relations theory, we identify two dividing lines within this debate. First, whether understanding China's behaviour is most effectively done through a unitary actor framework, or whether it is essential to look inside the 'black box' of the Chinese party-state. Second, whether one is more concerned about the 'Thucydides trap' or 'Munich'—that is, are the consequences of an overreaction or an underreaction more concerning when interpreting China's intentions and responding to perceived threats. These dividing lines generate four ideal-type policy viewpoints that we label Balancers, Hedgers, Engagers and Reformers, and apply in the Australian context. We then overlay our framework onto the public debate in Australia, selecting a specific bounded case study: commentary and analysis concerning China's behaviour throughout the COVID-19 pandemic of 2020, in particular responding to Australia's call for an international inquiry. Our objective is to progress an often circular debate by offering an accessible frame that clarifies and synthesises fundamental disagreements. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Australia faces a complex set of dilemmas in foreign, defence, and economic policy. Australian governments have traditionally relied on the United States to underwrite the country's defence policies, and have regularly demonstrated loyalty to the bilateral strategic alliance. Yet, Australia's economic security has become more dependent on China, a country with which the US has a competitive relationship. This article first reviews theories of competition among great powers. It then analyses key factors that are shaping the region and the Australian policy environment. It is argued that Australia may have much to gain from acting collaboratively with other middle powers within multilateral institutions. In this context, Australia may also benefit from a more robust recognition of its own distinctive national interest. 澳大利亚面临外交、防务、经济政策上一系列的复杂难题。澳政府以往一直是依赖美国为澳国的防务政策签字画押，而且一直对双边战略联盟忠诚不二。但澳大利亚的经济安全却更依赖同美国有着竞争关系的中国。本文梳理了有关大国竞争关系的各种理论，分析了构成地区以及澳大利亚政策环境的诸多因素。作者认为，与中等强国进行多边体制内的合作，会让澳大利益受益非强。坚定不移的强调自己的国家利益，对澳大利亚也是有益的。 [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Following its time-honoured ‘great and powerful friends’ foreign policy tradition, Australia has been cultivating close ties simultaneously with the United States and China. Yet, as a rivalry between the two powers apparently looms large, Australia faces an acute dilemma. While the rise of China and the question of Taiwan are often cited as main causes of US–China discord, this article argues that the American neoconservative policy on China, underpinned by a belief in both military strength and moral clarity, is integral to this growing competition and is, by extension, partly responsible for the emergence of Australia's predicament. To avoid such a difficult choice, the article suggests that Australia should strive to curb the policy influence of neoconservatism both in the United States and at home by pursuing a more independent foreign policy, making clear its strategic postures on US–China relations, and helping establish a trilateral strategic forum between Australia, the United States, and China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]