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This paper investigates the relationship between cross-shareholding networks and internal controls quality using a sample of all listed A-share firms in China during 2007–2020. We find that the higher the centrality of cross-shareholding networks, the lower the quality of internal control. This finding passes a series of robustness regressions. Moreover, we further test the influence channel of cross-shareholding on the internal control quality and find that the agency cost is the corresponding intermediary. That is, the cross-shareholding network increases the agency cost of the firm and thus reduces the quality of internal control. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigated how hiring one of the Big 4 auditing firms helps initial public offering (IPO) owners attract venture capitalists' (VCs) backing when going public to address the gap in auditing and venture capital literature. For this, the paper examined a large dataset from 1995 to 2019 consisting of 33,536 IPO firms from 22 countries with diverse socioeconomic, political, and cultural contexts. The study found that hiring Big 4 auditors increases IPO owners' chances of recruiting VCs by up to 50%. The analysis also supports prior findings, which state that IPO owners strategically choose Big 4 audit firms to lower agency costs and send quality signals to improve openness and disclosure as well as boost VCs' confidence in the IPO market. This research offers multiple benefits to academics, policymakers, investors, and issuers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The advent of the digital economy has ushered in unprecedented opportunities for corporate development. Utilizing a comprehensive data set comprising Chinese listed companies spanning the period 2011–2020, this study empirically examines the impact of digital transformation on corporate illegality. The findings reveal a significant reduction in corporate illegality attributable to digital transformation. This empirical result retains its significance even when subjected to a battery of robustness tests. In terms of the underlying mechanisms, this paper conjecture that digital transformation reduces the internal and external information asymmetry, thereby curbing corporate illegality. Further heterogeneous analysis shows that digital transformation is more effective among corporates with higher agency cost (state‐owned or large corporates) or corporates located in regions with lower degree of marketization level. These heterogeneous effects provide supportive evidence to the above conjecture. The implications of this study extend the boundaries of digital transformation research and furnish novel and actionable insights into the prevention of corporate illegality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study investigates the relationship between institutional investor association and stock price crash risk, using data from all listed non-financial sector companies in the Chinese capital market. The findings indicate a significant positive correlation between institutional investor association and stock price crash risk. Moreover, property rights and agency costs play significant moderating roles in this relationship. Specifically, the impact of institutional investors on stock price crash risk is more pronounced in non-state-owned enterprises (non-SOEs) than in state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Furthermore, this impact is more pronounced in firms with high agency costs and prominent agency problems compared to firms with low agency costs. This research contributes to financial regulators being able to identify better and prevent stock price crashes, ensuring the stability of investors' returns from their invested enterprises. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This research aims to test and analyze the influence of agency costs, intellectual capital, managerial ownership, and institutional ownership on firm value with financial performance as a moderating variable. The population in this study are LQ45 index companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (BEI) for the 2020-2022 period. This research used a purposive sampling technique with a sample size of 18 companies for three consecutive years for a total of 54 observations. Partial research results show that agency costs and intellectual capital have no effect on firm value. Meanwhile, managerial ownership and institutional ownership have a positive effect on firm value. Financial performance is unable to moderate the influence of agency costs on firm value, nor is it able to moderate the influence of intellectual capital on firm value. However, financial performance can moderate the influence of managerial ownership and the influence of institutional ownership on firm value. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study investigates whether CEOs' early adverse experience could explain cross‐sectional heterogeneity in the financialization of non‐financial firms. We utilize whether the CEO lived through the Great Chinese Famine as a proxy for the adverse experience. We find that non‐financial firms led by CEOs with such experience are significantly less likely to be involved in financialized activities than those led by CEOs without such experience. Experienced CEOs are prone to develop conservative preference for the short‐term financial assets over long‐term ones. The famine effect is more pronounced in enterprises with less competitive industries, less ownership of controlling shareholders, and non‐Big 4 audit firms. Furthermore, channel tests demonstrate that the famine experience reduces CEO overconfidence and lowers the agency cost of their firms, resulting in a lower financialization level. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Taking China's A-share listed manufacturing enterprises from 2014 to 2020 as objects, this paper discusses the impact and mechanism of corporate digital transformation on supply chain relationship transactions from the perspectives of information asymmetry and agency costs. The findings show that digital transformation significantly inhibits the supply chain relational transactions; the mechanism testing results reveal that digital transformation is conducive to the alleviation of information asymmetry and agency costs, which thereby reduces the degree of supply chain relational transactions; the regulatory effect analysis demonstrates that the impact of digital transformation on supply chain relationship transactions becomes more significant in non-high-tech enterprises and enterprises with less fierce industry competition. Finally, this paper confirms that a decline in the proportion of supply chain relationship transactions can significantly reduce the operational risk of enterprises. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this study, we explore the impact of ownership structure on a firm's earnings quality in emerging markets. Using the Chinese manufacturing industry sample set, we demonstrate that higher profitability performance could increase earnings quality. Higher concentrated shareholding and institutional shareholding reduce information asymmetry and improve external monitoring, improving earnings quality. Well-studied independent board members do not improve but contribute negatively to earnings quality. Such a result may be due to the lack of variation in the number of independent board members in each list of firms. Almost all firms choose to have three independent board members. Finally, bond debt increases asset size and agency costs; the impact of bond debt on earnings quality is negative. When considering the interaction between bond covenants and external monitoring, including independent board members and institutional shareholdings, the interactive effects reduce the negative effect of the bond debt on earnings quality. This study contributes to discovering that both direct and indirect monitoring of ownership structure contributes to the firm's management and provides some useful insight to reduce agency costs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This research examines how the interactive effects of financial flexibility value and accounting conservatism influence corporate investment decisions and further explores the moderating effect of a firm's mispricing on the above relationship. The findings show that firms with high financial flexibility and conservatism in the prior period are less likely to over-invest in the current period, because managers tend to make conservative decisions. Moreover, equity financing results in over-investment among overpriced firms, which is robust after considering a firm's hedging factor and high agency costs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the relationship between market concentration, agency cost and firm performance using an unbalanced panel of 1911 publicly listed manufacturing firms in India for the period 2001 to 2020. It classifies firms according to ownership types and evaluates the effects of agency cost and market concentration on performance of firms. The study considers agency costs that result from principal-agent (PA agency costs) as well as from principal-principal conflicts (PP agency cost). Additionally, it shows how the interaction between various concentration indices and agency costs (PP and PA agency prices) affects performance. Using a generalized methods of moments technique to estimate three dynamic models, the study finds that both types of agency costs have a strong negative impact on performance, market concentration has a negative impact but is limited to certain types of firms and the combined effects between concentration and agency cost are strong which shows that an increase in market concentration causes a decline in performance due to an increase in agency cost. Thus, our findings support the prediction that competition acts as a disciplining device to reduce agency costs which in turn helps to reduce managerial slack and improve firm performance. Our study has several policy implications. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The study is conducted to assess the impact of corporate governance on the firm performance and to study the mediating role of agency cost in the association between corporate governance and firm performance. 74 non-financial companies are selected as a sample for the study. The data from 2017 to 2022 is assessed in the study. Regression analysis is used to assess the direct impact of corporate governance on agency cost and firm performance. Mediation is assessed using Sobel Test. The finding of the study revealed that better corporate governance leads to better firm performance. Results also showed that stronger governance decreases agency cost which in turn leads to better firm performance. This study is unique in a way that it studied the mediating role of agency cost in the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance. The study will help the companies to recognize the importance of strong governance structure in order to increase financial performance. The study will also help to identify the role of agency cost on financial performance and to recognize that agency cost can be reduced via better corporate governance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

If corporate executives are responsible for investment decision-making, their executive stock options (ESOs) payoffs shall be contingent on decision-making results. This study proposes a new valuation model for ESOs correlated with investment and financial decisions. Our findings suggest that their investment choices and financial policies determine corporate executives' payoffs generated from their holdings of ESO contracts. In particular, if a firm's executives are more responsible for their investment behavior, they receive more ESO payouts. Our mode reinforces corporate executives on behalf of shareholders' interests through ESO's payoffs directly connected with their attitude of responsibility for investment policies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One of the biggest issues in organization in centuries is problem raised by the relationship between actor inside. This problem called principal-agent problem which explained by principal agent theory (PAT). The emerged new technology disruption called blockchain technology (BCT) receive the challenge to offers the solution for principalagent problem, it claims empirically could reduce or even eliminate the problem, thus lead to lower cost to solved the problem, called agency cost. This technology application wide spread in several sectors, the example is the implementation of Decentralized Autonomous Organization (DAO). DAO is the blockchain based new form of organization, who run based on a smart contract or algorithm run in the computer network. This paper is conceptual paper, we explained about the basic of blockchain, and we analyzed the correlation between blockchain and principal agent theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using the enactment of Document No. 18 as a quasi-natural event, we take a sample of Chinese A-share listed companies from 2010 to 2017 to test the impact of depoliticization on stock price crash risk based on the difference-in-differences (DID) model. Our results show that depoliticization reduces future stock price crash risk more significantly among non-state-owned enterprises. Furthermore, depoliticization can mitigate stock price crash risk through the effects of financing needs, censorship risk and agency cost. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Historically, it was common for companies to issue assessable stock. With assessable stock, a company's board of directors could request additional payments beyond the initial stock price. Typically, shareholders forfeited their stock ownership if assessments remained unpaid; defaulted shares were sold at auction. This form of securitization became popular in extractive industries, such as gold and silver mining. In this article, I provide a description of its legal history and a detailed case study of large companies with mining claims on the Comstock lode between 1860 and 1877, considered an exemplar of successful mine development with assessable stock. I also examine several hypotheses used to explain the practice of issuing assessable stock, such as limiting agency and information costs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The mixed ownership reform aims to improve the property rights structure of the state−owned enterprises (SOEs) and reduce agency costs, and the current mixed reform strategies mainly include equity blending by introducing external non−state capital, executive assignments, and employee stock ownership. In this paper, 953 valid data of A−shares listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2008 to 2020 are used as samples to construct the indicators of mixed reform strategy by the literature statistics method. After obtaining multiple impact indicators, the regression impact model of corporate agency cost suppression strategy is constructed by MATLAB software using a machine learning algorithm. On this basis, the performance of multiple machine learning algorithms is compared, and it is found that the integrated optimization−based bag−boosting model is used to study the effect of hybrid reform strategy to reduce the agency costs of SOEs, and the proportional setting of indicators when the effect is optimal is also explored. Finally, the laws of different influencing factors on the agency costs of enterprises are explored separately by the eigenvalue method. The results of the study show that the proportion of shareholding of the first largest non−state shareholder is sin−functional with the agency costs of SOEs when non−state majority shareholders are introduced into SOEs' equity mix, and the agency costs tend to decrease after SOEs become privately held enterprises. The greater the number and proportion of supervisors appointed by non−state shareholders, the greater the supervisory restraint effect on SOE managers and the better the effect of suppressing agency costs. The participation of non−state−owned shareholders in the company's business decisions by appointed executives and the special resource advantages of SOEs intensify the occurrence of the self−interest of appointed executives and the increase of agency costs of SOEs. The implementation of an employee stock ownership plan plays the role of employee supervision and restraint on SOE managers, which reduces the agency costs of SOEs. Based on this, it can provide support for the government to improve the hybrid reform policy and promote the process layer by layer, and also provide theoretical reference for SOEs to deepen the equity mix, incentivize employee shareholding, and empower non−state shareholders to govern and thus reduce agency costs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

High-quality economic development can be achieved if a major strategic direction for China are delivered from the macro level to the micro level. Taking A-listed enterprises in China from 2005 to 2018 as samples, this paper studies the impact of directors and officers liability insurance (D&O insurance) on the highquality enterprise development. The research results show that D&O insurance can promote high-quality development. In addition, the mechanism test shows that D&O insurance can reduce agency costs and improve innovations and high-quality enterprise development. Further analysis shows that when stateowned enterprises including their internal controls has no major defects, D&O insurance has more significant positive impact. Thus, this paper suggests that the insurance should be promoted for realizing high-quality enterprise development. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

By employing the Chinese listed firm's data from 2010 to 2017, this study explores the impact of share pledging on firms' corporate social responsibility (CSR) performance. Empirical results indicate a negative relationship between share pledging and CSR performance. This effect is robust after using alternative measures and different regression methods, and also consistent after tackling the endogenous issues. Furthermore, we find that risk-taking and agency cost are two possible underlying mechanisms through which share pledging reduces CSR. In addition, CSR reduction caused by share pledging leads to poorer economic performance and lower market value of firms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the impact of pay gap on the quality of the internal control. Using state-owned enterprises listed in China from 2012 to 2019 as samples, we find new evidence of an inverted U-shaped relationship between the pay gap and internal control quality, which includes the executives' internal pay gap, external pay gap, and executives-employees pay gap. Furthermore, we also find that there is an inverted U-shaped relationship between the pay gap and the internal control quality in state-owned enterprises with commercial competition, but we don't find similar results for the samples of state-owned enterprises with specific functions. In addition, we provide evidence that the pay gap not only has a direct impact on internal control quality but also has an indirect impact on internal control quality through agency costs. This study supplements research on internal control quality from the perspective of incentives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the impact of product market competition on the dividend policy of Indian firms. We have taken product market competition as the proxy of external corporate governance. This study has used 1142 non-financial, non-utility, and non-government Indian firms listed in NSE from 2001 to 2018. For the purpose, five different product market competition and three various dividend measures were employed. Also, the interaction between product market competition (external) and board corporate governance (internal) on dividend policy was examined using a newly developed board corporate governance index (BCGI). The findings suggest that non-competitive firms are more likely to pay higher dividends than competitive firms. Non-competitive firms face more significant agency problems and therefore, pay higher dividends than competitive firms. Finally, the study found that the influence of internal corporate governance on dividends to be much higher and significant in the case of non-competitive firms compared to competitive firms. Overall, the findings of this study offer consistent evidence that external corporate governance and dividend policy are substitutes, and higher agency costs and higher internal governance strengthens this relationship. The outcomes of this study can help the managers to more precisely take dividend decisions by looking at the competition level in the market. The results suggest that managers should pay less dividends when firms operate in a high-competitive industry and vice-versa. The policymakers should design corporate governance norms after considering the competitiveness of the industry. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This research aims to investigate the relationship between the presence of females in the board of directors (BOD) and agency cost as well as firm performance with the mediating role of agency costs. We employ STATA to test feasible general least squares and generalized method of moments (GMM) on Vietnamese listed firms' data over 2015–2019. The results demonstrate that the presence of female directors is positively related to firm performance. The percentage of females has a positive relationship with agency cost, which has a negative impact on firm performance. The mediating role of the agency cost variable only reduces the positive impact of gender diversity in the BOD on firm performance, but this relationship is not reversed. The main contribution is the examination of the moderating role of state ownership and the mediating role of agency costs. Our study provides evidence about women's roles in different legal contexts, which might foster the formation of future legal frameworks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates the impact of herding behaviour of Chinese Securities Investment Funds (SIFs) on firm value by taking stock price informativeness and agency cost as intermediary variables. It constructs LSV model to measure herding behaviour of SIFs, and develops logarithmic conversion method of the goodness-of-fit to characterize stock price informativeness. The stepwise regression method is employed for empirical analysis and it is found that: (i) The herding behaviour of SIFs significantly negatively affects the stock price informativeness, and the former is 'intentional herding' that ignores personal private information. (ii) The stock price informativeness is positively related to firm value, while agency cost has a significant negative influence on firm value. (iii) The stock price informativeness and agency cost play significant partial mediating effects between the herding behaviour of SIFs and firm value, respectively. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose: Prior studies find that US firms with managerial incentives may manipulate the earnings gap to obscure higher performing segments to competitors or to hide underperforming segments from external monitors. The purpose of this study is to complement extant research by examining the association between managerial incentives and segment earnings reporting of cross-listed firms in the USA and the impact of country-level characteristics on this association. Design/methodology/approach: The dependent variable is the earnings gap between firm-level earnings and sum of segment-level earnings. Managerial incentives are proxied by proprietary cost and agency cost. Proprietary cost is measured by the Herfindahl index. Agency cost is measured by inefficient resource transfer activities across segments. Foreign firms in this study are companies listed on major US Stock Exchanges with headquarters outside the USA. Comparable US firms are selected using the Propensity Score Matching procedure as a control group. Findings: The authors find that 1) proprietary cost motive is not the determinant of earnings gap reporting for cross-listed firms; 2) cross-listed firms motivated by agency costs are more likely to manipulate segment earnings reporting than US firms; and 3) among cross-listed firms motivated by agency costs, firms in weak rule of law countries demonstrate more manipulation in segment earnings than firms in strong rule of law countries. Originality/value: Extant research with regard to segment reporting exclusively focuses on US firms, and little is known about the practice of segment reporting by cross-listed firms originating from different legal regimes. This study fills the gap in the literature by comparing cross-listed firms to US firms in the reporting of segment earnings. The results of this study have implications for regulators and investors who are interested in evaluating the extent of cross-listed firms' financial reporting quality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The research focuses on the annual report readability and agency cost of Nigeria's listed deposit money banks. The research aimed to study the connection between annual report readability and agency cost of Nigerian deposit money banks. It used secondary data derived from the annual reports of the selected banks. Two-panel OLS were carried out, along with a correlation matrix and some descriptive analysis. The results were positive, which indicated annual report readability had a significant relationship with agency cost and the study recommends the firms should employ proper procedures when preparing their reports and further research should be done on the topic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The real estate industry is characterized by a high degree of financial intensity and is more significant in certain areas. The relative enterprises require certain financial ability and large shareholders' controlling power to support their survivals and competitiveness. However, due to the multiple adverse impacts of current state policies on banks and private capital, the problem of capital restraints of real estate has become increasingly serious. From a corporate governance perspective, this paper studies the interactions among financial constraints, ownership concentration and corporate performance under different shareholding states: by analyzing the quantitative characteristics of equity structure and searching for the appropriate range of the largest shareholder holding ratio, which has considered both the financial sustainability and characteristics. It is found that raising the ownership concentration could enhance supervision effect rather than encroachment, effectively ease the financial constraints and improve the performance of enterprises, both of which are significant under high ownership concentration. Financial constraints play a significant intermediary effect in absolute holdings and have obvious regulatory effects in decentralized equity. Also, the mechanisms of ownership concentration are reflected in the strengthening of corporate supervision, reduced agency costs, improved operating efficiency, and increased investment attractiveness. The adjusted behavior adds to the responsibility awareness rather than free-ride psychology, forming a dynamic game on financial decisions. Their financial sustainability in areas would provide a nationwide reference for governance reform and managerial behavior. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Firm value has an important role because it can explain how the market appreciates the company. This paper aims to explore the influence of capital structure, agency cost, and firm size on the company value of small and medium-listed firms in the Indonesian stock exchange. In the way to achieve the study objective, data was gathered from 227 small and medium listed firms from 2019 to 2020 selected by using certain criteria. This study applied a panel data regression model with a random effect approach to detect the impact of capital structure, agency cost, and firm size on the firm value. Statistical test results denote that capital structure and agency costs have a positive effect on firm value, while firm size has no effect. These study findings provide an outlook that capital structure decisions and agency cost control can maximize firm value in small and medium companies listed on the development index of the Indonesian capital market. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Road network requires timely maintenance to keep pavement surface in good condition for reduction of fuel consumption with the limited budget. This study focused on development of pavement preservation strategies in the road network considering multi-objective optimization of agency cost and environmental impact (in terms of CO2 emission). Field data from long-term pavment performance (LTPP) database were used to quantify the impact of pavement preservation treatments (crack seal, chip seal, and thin overlay) on the changes of surface roughness. The emission rate functions of vehicles with respect to speed and pavement surface condition were developed using Motor Vehicle Emission Simulator (MOVES) with the updated tire rolling resistance coefficients. The multi-objective optimization problem was solved using the Simulated Constraint Boundary Model (SCBM) method. The final solution was recommended based on the minimized distance from the utopia point to the Pareto front. The results show that the optimization solutions are affected by the available budget, existing pavement condition, truck traffic, and unacceptable level of pavement roughness. For multi-objective optimization of minimizing both agency cost and CO2 emission, the recommended preservation treatments among different segments is a combination of crack seal and thin overlay in most cases. These findings can be used by highway agencies to make road maintenance decisions considering the tradeoff between agency cost and environmental impact. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using large reductions in import tariffs as an exogenous shock to the competitive environment, this paper examines how an increase in foreign competition affects the importance of corporate governance. Consistent with prior studies, weak governance is associated with lower firm value, lower operating performance, lower labor productivity, higher capital expenditures, higher non-production expenses, and higher wages in the absence of increased competition. However, the differences between weak and strong governance firms along each of these dimensions are reduced or eliminated after a tariff cut. The effects are concentrated among firms in previously noncompetitive industries, defined as having sales concentration above the median or import penetration below the median in the year before the tariff cut. These conclusions are supported through the use of multiple alternative measures of operating performance and corporate governance. Altogether, the evidence indicates that an increase in competition can mitigate agency costs and serve as a substitute for traditional corporate governance mechanisms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study investigates the association between CEO perquisites and bank loan spreads. We collect detailed data on CEO perquisites from the proxy statements of S&P 500 firms between 1993 and 2015 to study this issue. The empirical evidence supports the agency cost view that the lending banks demand significantly higher returns (spread), more collateral, and stricter covenants from firms with higher CEO perquisites. We further confirm that the effect of these perquisites remains after we control for various corporate governance and agency cost factors. We conclude that banks consider CEO perquisites as a type of agency cost when they make lending decisions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Agency cost is a behavioral corporate finance problem that has an important place in finance literature. While it is often discussed in the current literature, Turkey oriented relative literature is quite limited. In this study, the agency costs before, during, and in the post-2001 financial crisis era are examined between companies with foreign owners and others by using cross-section regression analyzes and marginal effects based on these analyzes. The obtained findings show that there is a significant difference between the two firm groups in terms of agency costs during the 2001 financial crisis, before and after the crisis. The findings obtained do not show any change in different robustness checks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study explores the relationship between ethnic diversity and corporate investment in Chinese listed firms. Based on data from China's A-share market companies and the national census dataset, we find that local ethnic diversity is negatively related to corporate investment efficiency. Furthermore, we explore the channel through which ethnic diversity affects corporate investment efficiency, and our study indicates that both social trust and agency cost play mediating roles between ethnic diversity and investment efficiency. Robustness tests verify our conclusions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose: The aim of this study is to investigate the effect of foreign institutional investors (FII) on the contribution of cash and dividend to firm's value in the context of Japan. Design/methodology/approach: This study used a sample of 1,929 nonfinancial firms listed in Tokyo Stock Exchange in the period from 2002 to 2016. For data analysis, pooled OLS regression with firm and year fixed effect is applied. Further, the p-value of difference is used to test the null hypothesis of equal coefficients. Findings: The findings depict that cash holdings contribute more to firm's value when ownership by FII is high. Contrarily, dividends contribute more to firm's value when ownership by FII is low. The results remain consistent after using excess cash holdings instead of cash holdings and after re-estimating the main regression model in the presence of top 30% and bottom 30% ownership level. Research limitations/implications: This study is limited to Japanese nonfinancial sector. The results implied that firms where the probability of managerial agency cost and expropriation of cash is high, the presence of FII mitigates the agency cost and positively influences the contribution of cash to firm's value. Overall, this research highlighted the disciplinary and monitoring role of FII in Japan. Originality/value: This study provides new insights on the monitoring and governance role of foreign institutions, showing that FII promote better cash management and utilization, which significantly affects the contribution of cash holdings to firm's value. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We study the effect of change in the organizational structure from a corporation to a real estate investment trust (REIT) on the firm value. Changing the organizational structure from a corporation to a REIT could result in an increase in the firm value, and some companies may be motivated to change their organizational structure because of this. We examine three possible sources of gains in the firm value from such a change in the organizational structure. They are the potential tax savings, reduction in agency costs of managerial discretion, and increase in the price multiples after the conversion. We examine the changes in the firm value of firms that announce conversion to a REIT during 1990–2016. We find that the announcement period returns are positive and strongly significant. Consistent with the tax hypothesis, the announcement period returns are positively related to the effective tax rate of the sample firms. Consistent with the managerial discretion hypothesis, the announcement period returns are positively related to the level of free cash flow of low growth firms. Consistent with the mis-valuation hypothesis, the announcement period returns are higher when REIT valuations are higher relative to the sample firms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The life of Family Businesses is largely limited to the generational transition (on average 30% of these survive the second generation, 15% of these to a third, and 1% to the fourth). Objective: to analyze success and failure factors in successions from the literature. Method: to developed said analysis from a descriptive approach. The document review process completed the following stages: definition of the objective, bibliographic search, consultation of databases, establishment of search strategy and selection criteria, organization of information, and writing. Results and conclusions: the succession problem starts from the conflict of interests between the family business systems (company, family, and property), arising situations such as: informality, loose discipline, assumptions of permanence, nepotism, grasp, among others. Finally, a succession plan was developed considering the factors that influence the process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose: This paper aims to examine the effect of Shariah Advisory Panel (SAP) on both the level of agency cost and fund performance against conventional corporate governance, within corporate and Shariah governance settings, between Shariah and conventional mutual fund (CMF), in an emerging economy of Malaysia during the period 2008-2015. Design/methodology/approach: Panel data regression is appropriately used within corporate governance research because of empirical issues of unobserved heterogeneity effects to avoid spurious evidence. The secondary data of 172 CMFs and 80 Shariah mutual funds are gathered hand-collected from annual reports and master prospectuses for the purpose of analysis between the period 2008 and 2015, generating 2,016 fund-year observations. Findings: SAP is found to have a positive effect on agency costs. Consequently, it leads to empirical evidence that substantiates a negative and marginally significant association with fund performance when designated by accounting measure. Thus, the Shariah monitoring proxy is not a good mechanism for controlling agency costs inconsistent with performance maximizing (agency cost minimizing) outcomes. Research limitations/implications: The unique data set of mutual funds used in this research may restrict the generalization of the findings unless mentioned and explained specifically the data characteristics. The single proxy for Shariah monitoring could be better off by having a list of different measures. Practical implications: The paper highlights and suggests a consistent improvement in regulation that could be performed by policymakers pertaining to the non-trivial additional cost of implying Shariah governance. Originality/value: This paper provides empirical evidence of the SAP effects from the view of a more complex monitoring structure in consequence of having an additional layer of governance, devoting on the trade-off between benefit and cost to shareholders. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether firm ownership characteristics can explain demand for Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) implementation. Specifically, we examine the relationship between the presence of large shareholders, multiple blockholders and a dual-class share structure, and ERM implementation. To our knowledge we provide the first evidence on the effect of multiple blockholders and dual-class share structures on the implementation of ERM. ERM best practices can be considered as governance tools, used to monitor managerial discretion in risk management, ultimately reducing the agency cost of risk management. Accordingly, we analyze the demand for ERM in certain governance (e.g., ownership) settings. We use quantitative methods in our study: survey and regressions (tobit and logit models). Ownership data is hand-collected while ERM data comes from a survey conducted in the Nordic region. We find that ERM is implemented less frequently in firms where there are multiple blockholders, and where large controlling owners hold dual-class shares. These findings indicate that there is less demand for ERM's monitoring role in firms that are associated with high agency costs. Given the increasing use of dual-class share structures, we believe further examination of ownership characteristics and corporate risk management is warranted. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The excellence of corporate governance in companies lies in their ability to adopt the corporate social responsibility (CSR), which enhances their growth. This study examines the effect of agency cost, firm size, and CSR disclosure on the firms' growth. Specifically, the study analyzed the agency cost and firms' size as the moderators that influence the firms' performance asymmetrically. In its approach, the study compiled data of 300 Pakistani listed companies, which have a significant concern with CSR for the period 2010–2018. Using the 2SLS and GMM instrumental panel regressions, our empirical results show that the agency cost is detrimental to the firms' growth. In contrast, the firms' size boosts the firms' growth. Moreover, the growth of firms with leverage declines and the presence of independent directors improves the firms' growth. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Corporate governance plays a significant role in eliminating agency costs. Corporate boards have the main role of monitoring the management; they help in aligning the interests of principals and agents. Boards are responsible for care and diligence that brings financial control, so that profitability can be ensured in the corporate firms. This paper focuses on reviewing the literature on board structure extensively. This paper reviews many aspects of board structure, i.e. board size, board meeting frequency, board independence, board ownership and composition, board education, audit committee, and so on. Further, this paper furnishes the type of board structure that will contribute towards increasing firm performance, thereby helping in mitigating agency costs. This research study uses a descriptive research design. Random sampling is used while selecting different kinds of literature review of board structure. This study takes the 1991-2019 time period for reviewing of literature. The period is selected based on convenience sampling. The results depict that reasonable frequency of board meetings, the board size, independence of directors, well-educated board members, audit committee, board composition, and ownership make a positive impact on firm performance, thereby reducing agency costs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of corporate governance quality and ownership structure on the relationship between the agency cost and firm performance. Both the fixed-effects model and a more robust dynamic panel generalized method of moment estimation are applied to Chinese A-listed firms for the years 2008 to 2016. The results show that the agency-performance relationship is positively moderated by (1) corporate governance quality, (2) ownership concentration, and (3) non-state ownership. State ownership has a negative effect on the agency-performance relationship. Various robust tests of an alternative measure of agency cost confirm our main conclusions. The analysis adds to the empirical literature on agency theory by providing useful insights into how corporate governance and ownership concentration can help mitigate agency-performance relationship. It also highlights the impact of ownership type on the relationship between agency cost and firm performance. Our study supports the literature that agency cost and firm performance are negatively related to the Chinese listed firms. The investors should keep in mind the proxies of agency cost while choosing a specific stock. Secondly; the abuse of managerial appropriation is higher in state-held firms as compared to non-state firms. Policymakers can use these results to devise the investor protection rules so that managerial appropriation can be minimized. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article aims to investigate the determinants of firm's capital structure (debt ratio) such as asset structure, profitability, agency cost, innovation and technology, and firm size as a moderating variable. This study used quarterly data from the financial statements of food and beverage firms at the Indonesia Stock Exchange with a purposive sampling method that met the research criteria with panel data analysis. The findings show that firm size and asset structure affect leverage positively; however, profitability and innovation and technology negatively affect the debt ratio, while agency cost does not affect leverage. All findings are in line with the hypotheses except agency cost. The firm size as a moderating variable shows strengthening of the interaction between agency cost and innovation with leverage. However, interacting with firm size weakens the effect of the relationship between assets structure and profitability with the debt ratio. Managerial implications of the target of debt ratio that creates the value of the firm need to be flexible and controlled by the interaction of the firm size with firm characteristics and innovation to achieve an optimal firm value of F & B sector. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The social cognitive theory emphasizes the risk-taking behavior of an entrepreneur, which leads him to make the right decisions. In this regard, this study formulates the concept of the cognitive CEO through the DAE statistical technique. Specifically, CEO attributes such as CEO age, CEO compensation, CEO tenure, goodwill, and the number of CEO-attended meetings are used as inputs that influence the intangible assets, the output. Chinese SMEs have been selected for empirical analysis for the years 2014–2018. The empirical results reveal that having a cognitive CEO augmented corporate sustainability, while agency cost and the number of supervisors strongly diminished corporate sustainability. Meanwhile, high earnings per share and high total assets are vehicles for maintaining the sustainable growth of firms. Additionally, it is indicated that firms with a loan burden cannot maintain sustainable corporate growth. Lastly, the execution of 2SLS and GMM instrumental regressions authenticate the veracity of results. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study examines the impact of corporate governance, reflecting a wide spectrum of board characteristics and ownership structure on agency costs in 281 listed companies on Ho Chi Minh Stock Exchange (HOSE) in Vietnam in the period 2013--2018. For this purpose, three board characteristics were chosen: (1) the size of board of directors, (2) equilibrium between non-executive and executive members of the board of directors, (3) theCEOchair duality and three types of ownership structures were chosen: (1) management ownership, (2) government ownership, (3) foreign ownership. An inverse proxy of agency costs is used: asset utilization ratio (asset turnover), which reflects the managerial efficiency. The research methodology includes three statistical approaches: Ordinary least squares (OLS), fixed effects model (FEM) and random effects model (REM) are considered to employ to address econometric issues and to improve the accuracy of the regression coefficients. The results can create effective corporate governance mechanisms in controlling the managerial opportunistic behavior to lower agency conflicts, and hence lower agency costs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose: Many farm producer organizations pursue growth and complexity in response to price volatility, industry consolidation and other external developments. Consequently, as ownership is dispersed and control is delegated, members may face increasing agency cost. In spite of the potential to impact performance and even survival, empirical attention to agency problems in farm producer organizations is limited. The purpose of this paper is to address the gap in the literature with an empirical study. Design/methodology/approach: With survey responses from 365 farm producer organizations in the USA, the author uses a two-limit tobit model to estimate the relationships of six ownership and governance characteristics (i.e. board size, management size, director independence, manager independence, CEO independence and non-member ownership) to agency cost, which is proxied by the operating expense ratio. Findings: While controlling for heterogeneity in scale and technology, the author finds positive relationships of board size, management size and CEO independence to agency cost. The novel result illustrates there is a significant cost to the adoption of non-traditional ownership and governance characteristics by farm producer organizations. Practical implications: The presence of agency cost serves as motivation to farm producer organizations to implement new or adapt old agency mechanisms. One recommendation is to reconsider the payment structure of non-member CEOs. There may not be enough incentive to inspire an upstream bias, which is perhaps possible by linking CEO performance to price, patronage and member-oriented performance measurements. Originality/value: Agency cost is rarely studied in relation to farm producer organizations. Recent contributions in the empirical literature lacked an explicit connection of ownership and governance characteristics to agency cost. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

From an agency theory perspective, we find the increase of stock liquidity will lead to more dividend payouts. There are two potential channels, the 'outcome hypothesis' (La Porta et al. 2000) and the 'creditors substitute hypothesis' (Brockman and Unlu 2009), through which stock liquidity could increase dividend payouts. We confirm that stock liquidity influences dividend payouts mainly through the latter. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this article is to determine what causes the phenomenon of disappearing dividends, which mostly occurs in stock exchanges in developed and emerging countries. This is the phenomenon of the decreasing probability of issuers to choose to pay dividends (cash, stock, and mixed) rather than not to pay. The results of multinomial logit model show, that size and profitability have a significant positive effect on cash, stock, and mixed dividend decisions. The decision not to pay dividends is influenced by low agency costs, high debt, over-liquidity, and excessive investment opportunities. To overcome this phenomenon, all stakeholders must be able to manage the above cause variables in an integrated manner. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Shareholder valuations are economically significantly and statistically negatively correlated with the length of 10 K filings or their digital file sizes, whereas annual reports posted on corporate websites are uninformative. Firms with longer 10 K filings are likely to experience slower growth, lower profitability, experience free cash flow problems, and write off goodwill and intangible assets from past acquisitions. Lengthy filings are more damaging than suggested by three‐year performance following report filing dates, suggesting that outside investors penalize firms for information asymmetries and associated agency costs. Full disclosure is best from the standpoint of long‐term shareholder wealth, but managers could be maximizing short‐term term returns that better match their investment horizons. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyzes the effect of CEO succession via overall hierarchical jumps on Chinese firm performance and agency cost. It categorizes hierarchical jumps into low, medium and high level. The study reveals through panel regression analysis that the CEOs appointed via medium hierarchical jumps substantially enhance firm performance. Conversely, the successors appointed through low and high hierarchical jumps have relatively no effect on firm profitability. Conclusively, this research evaluates that the aged CEOs should be preferred among the CEOs successors via high hierarchical jumps, which have mitigated the agency problem decisively. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Using the data of A-share listed companies from 2011 to 2016 in Shanghai and Shenzhen, we establish a panel threshold model which the threshold variable is internal control, and analyse the nonlinearity relationship between dividend and agency cost. The result shows:There exist threshold effects between dividend and agency cost based on internal control. Cash dividend can reduce agency cost when internal control quality is higher than the threshold, otherwise, cash dividend will no longer have any effect. That means, a valid internal control is the foundation of dividend governance function. Furthermore, the descriptive statistics result implies that, companies with higher internal control quality than threshold are popular. This paper proofs that agency theory is effective in Chinese market, and higher internal control quality higher propensity to pay. So we disagree with the previous hypothesis of "result" and "substitution" between internal control and dividend. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]