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The extensive research on waste management has primarily remained confined to metro cities and focused on economic and environmental issues. The present study explores waste management in smaller urban areas from an institutional standpoint, mapping formal and informal players onto a two‐dimensional framework: institutional type and institutional strength. The analysis is based on data accumulated through in‐depth interviews and focus group discussions in three towns of India. Despite the absence of formal acknowledgment, it establishes a continuum between formal and informal actors whose efforts to collect waste and provide public goods and services are mutually supportive. Although the informal sector is ranked lower, there is little variation in institutional strength between the formal and informal sectors. A formal‐informal hierarchy hinders informal waste collectors from moving up the value chain. The paper argues against separating the formal and informal actors in urban policy and planning. A waste management system that is formally integrated is required to extract greater economic value from waste and to strengthen the informal‐formal continuum. This should enhance both the wages and working conditions of waste workers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Most developing countries have large and persistent informal sector. Historically, the literature was dominated by strict duality viewpoint, where the formal and informal sectors are treated as two separate entities. However, in recent times, a new approach has developed where the formal and informal sectors are not binary but they often co-exist and feed into each other. Most academic work on agglomeration economies is based on developed countries where almost all production takes place in the formal sector. Apriori, there is no reason to believe that agglomeration economies do not extend to the informal sector. Hence, in this paper, we hypothesize that agglomeration economies can arise from the interaction between formal and informal firms as well. To check the validity of the hypothesis, we study the geographic distribution and Coagglomeration pattern between formal and informal manufacturing firms in India. Using the firm level National Sample Survey for unincorporated enterprises and Annual Survey of Industries data, we calculate the Ellison and Glaeser Coagglomeration index at 2-digit NIC level. Further, using the Marshall's theory of agglomeration, we create four kinds of linkages to capture the nature of interdependence between formal and informal firms, i.e. Buyer, Supplier, Labor and Technology. We find that there is heavy clustering of both formal and informal manufacturing firms in India, however, mostly in different areas, with few exceptions like Western Uttar Pradesh and Southern Tamil Nadu. Out of 22 major industries, we find high coagglomeration only in 7. The average value of coagglomeration index at aggregate level decreases from 0.00536 in 2000-01 to -0.0027 in 2015-16. This indicate towards reduced interdependence over time, however in few industries it remains high. The average value of labor linkage increased from 0.1889 in 2000-01 to 0.3651 in 2015-16, during the same period buyer linkage remained constant around 0.2481 and supplier linkage fell from 0.5755 to 0.2749. The technology linkage remained low throughout in the range of 0.02-0.03. Strong buyer and labor linkage mean subcontracting of inputs is the main motive driving the interaction between formal and informal firms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates the relationship between the state and India's rural informal sector by focusing on the collective mobilizations of middle-sized agricultural producers in Western Uttar Pradesh. These cultivators are involved in an economic sector which is at the same time capitalist, largely informal but also, to some extent, state-regulated. Through their mobilizations organized by the Bharatiya Kisan Union (BKU), they have attempted to influence state regulation of agricultural markets, obtaining increased input subsidies and better procurement prices for their produce, and thus an increase in the rates of return and profitability of their farming activity. The paper conceptualizes the modality of production of these farmers as 'subsidized capitalism', alluding to the self-employed and self-funded producers with holdings large enough to support a pair of bullocks defined as 'bullock capitalists' by Lloyd and Susanne Rudolph (1987), while denoting the crucial role of public subsidies in preserving this faction of informal agrarian capitalism. The paper also points to the ambivalent relationship between the 'subsidized capitalists' of Western Uttar Pradesh and the state: although they seek protection from the central government in the context of globalization, they confront and contest local state institutions by deploying collective strategies to distort local regulations of agricultural markets. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]