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Following the industrial crisis of the 1920s and the Great Depression in the 1930s, consecutive provincial governments in Nova Scotia turned their efforts toward state-led economic development. After the election of Robert Stanfield and the Tories in 1956, a wholesale industrial planning model was unveiled. Indeed, Stanfieldian economic policy in Nova Scotia was predicated upon the belief that direct state-led interventionism was necessary to offset regional inequity. State corporate entities, such as Industrial Estates Limited, and renewed interest in a state-driven industrial relations paradigm were central in the province's efforts to revitalize its flagging economy and offset predicted decline in the Cape Breton coal and steel industries. This article examines the fate of the Clairtone Sound Corporation, one of Nova Scotia's "new industries" that emerged out of these state-led development efforts. A case study of this Stellarton-based firm reveals how structural processes of deindustrialization produced crisis even within sectors that were completely distinct from the province's cornerstone industries of coal and steel. This case includes a reflection on the class composition of the modernist state in Nova Scotia and represents a convergence of the historiographical focus on state-led industrial development in the Maritimes and recent literature found within deindustrialization studies. À la suite de la crise industrielle des années 1920 et de la Grande Dépression des années 1930, les gouvernements provinciaux successifs de la Nouvelle-Écosse ont orienté leurs efforts vers un développement économique dirigé par l›État. Après l›élection de Robert Stanfield et des conservateurs en 1956, un modèle de planification industrielle en gros a été dévoilé. En effet, la politique économique « stanfieldienne » en Nouvelle-Écosse reposait sur la conviction que l›interventionnisme direct dirigé par l›État était nécessaire pour compenser les inégalités régionales. Les sociétés d›État, comme Industrial Estates Limited, et le regain d›intérêt pour un paradigme de relations industrielles dirigé par l›État ont joué un rôle central dans les efforts de la province pour revitaliser son économie chancelante et compenser le déclin prévu des industries du charbon et de l›acier du Cap-Breton. Cet article examine le sort de la Clairtone Sound Corporation, l›une des « nouvelles industries » de la Nouvelle-Écosse qui a émergé de ces efforts de développement menés par l›État. Une étude de cas de cette entreprise basée à Stellarton révèle comment les processus structurels de désindustrialisation ont produit une crise même dans des secteurs complètement distincts des industries phares du charbon et de l›acier de la province. Ce cas comprend une réflexion sur la composition de classe de l›État moderniste en Nouvelle-Écosse et représente une convergence de l›accent historiographique sur le développement industriel dirigé par l›État dans les Maritimes et de la documentation récente trouvée dans les études sur la désindustrialisation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Ekonomski Vjesnik is the property of Ekonomski Vjesnik and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Economic recovery is longer in service-providing economies than in goods-producing economies. Services cannot be produced and inventoried ahead of demand; goods can. We are the first to document this macroeconomic repercussion of the sectoral shift away from the secondary sector toward the tertiary sector, that is, of deindustrialization and the rise of services. We distinguish between nontradable services and all other sectors, using U.S. state-level employment data for post-1960 recessions. Concerns over the endogeneity of services are addressed in two ways: by using 3-year pre-recession averages of sector shares, and separately by invoking instrumental variables. Our results are robust to alternative specifications. The increase in service production and deindustrialization in the United States over the last half-century lengthens the trough-to-peak employment recovery from recessions by about 40%. (JEL E24, E32, L80, N12), Recovery from recessions in the United States takes longer today than in the past. This change has not happened because recessions are longer. Nor has it occurred because recessions are [...]

The financialization of the Brazilian economy is often criticized as being responsible of the slowdown of capital accumulation in this country. Indeed, very high interest rates are maintained in order to finance the public debt, and this fosters capitalists to get more Treasury bonds rather than to invest in the productive area. Nevertheless, the evolution of the profit rate in this area also explains the particular relation existing between capitalists, finance and productive investment, as Marx showed it more than a century ago. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper seeks to examine whether Malaysia is facing negative deindustrialization by examining value-added, trade and productivity trends over the period 1990-2005. The evidence produced in the paper is concrete enough to confirm that Malaysia is facing negative deindustrialization. While it is typical, as part of the process of structural change, to see a rise and fall in the share occupied by manufacturing in the GDP, the evidence shows that Malaysia is indeed facing premature deindustrialization with a trend slowdown in manufacturing value-added, trade performance and productivity since 2000. Not only has the trade performance of manufacturing been falling, manufacturing labour productivity has also slowed down, with the key sectors such as electric-electronics, textiles and transport equipment showing either negative or low productivity growth since 2000. Malaysian industrial policies have been fairly successful in connecting with the global value chains of multinationals and in developing resource-based industries, but have not achieved the same success in stimulating their transformation to high value-added activities. The lack of effective institutional change, partly explained by ethnic policies, is advanced as the prime reason for the setting in of negative deindustrialization in Malaysia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To link to full-text access for this article, visit this link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.eeh.2007.11.002 Byline: David Clingingsmith (a), Jeffrey G. Williamson (b) Keywords: India; Deindustrialization; Globalization; Trade; Ricardian model; Textiles; 18th Century; 19th Century Abstract: India was a major player in the world export market for textiles in the early 18th century, but by the middle of the 19th century it had lost all of its export market and much of its domestic market, primarily to Britain. The ensuing deindustrialization was greatest c1750-c1860. We ask how much of India's deindustrialization was due to local supply-side forces -- such as political fragmentation and a rising incidence of drought, and how much to world price shocks. An open, three-sector neo-Ricardian model organizes our thinking and a new relative price database implements the empirical analysis. We find local supply side forces were important from as early as 1700. We then assess the size of Indian deindustrialization in comparison with other parts of the periphery. Author Affiliation: (a) Weatherhead School of Management, Case Western Reserve University, 11119 Bellflower Road, Cleveland, OH 44106-7235, USA (b) Department of Economics, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA Article History: Received 1 December 2006 Article Note: (footnote) [star] We are grateful for advice and criticism from William Bernstein, Leah Platt Boustan, Huw Bowen, William Clarence-Smith, Greg Clark, Ron Findlay, Bishnupriya Gupta, Peter Harnetty, Debin Ma, Bob Margo, Patrick O'Brien, Kevin O'Rourke, Sevket Pamuk, Leandro Prados, Om Prakash, Ananth Seshadri, T. N. Srinivasan, Tirthanker Roy, Tony Venables, two anonymous referees for this journal, and participants in the Harvard Economic History Tea and Workshop, the 5th World Cliometrics Conference (Venice: June 2004), the Stockholm School of Economics (Stockholm: October 2004), and the GEHN Conference on Imperialism (Istanbul: September 2005). We also thank Javier Cuenca Esteban and Bishnupriya Gupta for sharing their data. Clingingsmith acknowledges support from the Project on Justice, Welfare, and Economics at Harvard University. Williamson acknowledges support from the National Science Foundation and from the Harvard Faculty of Arts and Sciences.

The paper develops an open economy dynamic model with bequests and credit constraints. The agricultural sector uses only labor, the industrial sector needs an indivisible investment. Under autarky, productive agriculture provides the funds needed for investment in industry and in equilibrium credit constraints are not binding. If agriculture is not sufficiently productive, the price of the industrial good must be high enough to make the industrial sector sustainable. In an open economy, if the country has the comparative advantage in agriculture, deindustrialization may occur over time. Deindustrialization is welfare-reducing when the negative wealth distributional effects swamp the gains from trade. Keywords: Credit constraints; Deindustrialization; Immiserizing trade; Endogenous wealth distribution; Comparative advantage

To authenticate to the full-text of this article, please visit this link: http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1743-4580.2009.00259.x Byline: Peter Cole (1) Abstract: This article examines the experiences of two rural communities that, since the advent of the North American Free Trade Agreement, lost major employers. Rural deindustrialization has struck the Midwest particularly hard. While the disappearance of hundreds or thousands of jobs is devastating, some small towns have adapted faster than others. Farmington, Missouri has, for now, weathered the storm far better than another small town, Galesburg, Illinois. This article seeks to do something other than retell a familiar, if generally accurate, story about the suffering caused by the current wave of globalization, facilitated by trade deals. Rather, it will explore the possibility that corporate-driven globalization is not an unmitigated disaster for rural America and rural Americans. Rather, some towns struggle but persevere, some suffer tremendously, while still others create jobs, although all jobs seem ever more insecure in the increasingly global economy. Author Affiliation: (1)Western Illinois University Article note: Dr. Peter Cole, Associate Professor of History, Western Illinois University, Department of History, Macomb, IL, 61455. Telephone: +011-309-298-3691. Fax: +011-309-298-2540. E-mail: P-Cole@wiu.edu

Manufacturing trade expansion is estimated to have contributed very substantially to deindustrialization. The estimates of effects of changes in manufacturing trade on manufacturing employment based on factor content analysis are discussed with reference to OECD countries.

A case study of the decline of the textile industry in New England between 1920 and 1960 sheds light on the political and economic effects of deindustrialization. Policy responses to deindustrialization include retrenchment, central government intervention, and economic development.

Byline: David Kucera (1,2), William Milberg (1,2) Keywords: International trade; deindustrialization; factor content analysis Abstract: Input-output analysis is used to estimate the labor content embodied in changes in manufacturing output resulting from changing patterns of manufacturing trade. For ten OECD countries from the late 1970s to the mid-1990s, changes in world trade of manufactures are estimated to have had a negative net effect on manufacturing employment of 3.5 million jobs, 2.0 million in the US alone, compared to a 6.2 million decline in actual manufacturing employment. The employment losses resulted mainly from North-South trade. At the industry level, there were large losses in labor-intensive industries and in industries that were strategically targeted by developing country industrial policies. There were employment losses in nearly all manufacturing industries, not a mixture of winners and losers. Such a pattern may result not from surging imports from the South but rather declining exports to the South in the aftermath of the 1980s debt crisis. JEL no. F14, F16, O24 Author Affiliation: (1) International Institute for Labour Studies of the International Labour Organization, Geneva (2) Department of Economics, New School University, 65 Fifth Avenue, 10003, New York, NY, USA Article History: Registration Date: 07/06/2012

The proposition that pre-Famine Ireland experienced deindustrialization is widely accepted. Some scholars associate it with trade, and others with technical change in linen manufacture. The trade returns suggest that, at least until 1826, there is no evidence of the import penetration which should be associated with deindustrialization. The census returns to 1841 do not confirm that the Irish economy experienced deindustrialization. In textiles, the increase in capacity in the modern sector to 1841 was insufficient to account for a large-scale disappearance of manufacturing jobs.

A number of authors have argued that as a result of trade with Britain the Irish economy deindustrialized in the pre-Famine period. An examination of the census returns of 1831, 1841, and 1851 suggests that this was not the case. The trade returns for the period before the mid-1820s do not provide evidence of import penetration. An alternative hypothesis is advanced that trade did not lead to deindustrialization in pre-Famine Ireland but rather created employment in an economy with a weak domestic market and ample supplies of semi-idle labour.

The effects of deindustrialization on South Bend, IN, and the US as a whole are studied. The nonmanufacturing sector has begun to employ a labor percentage of the labor force while salary differences between manufacturing and nonmanufacturing workers have increased according to economic analysts. However, payroll earnings per employee generally rose between 1956 to 1989 which offset the increase in nonmanufacturing employment.

The intra-OECD trade and the North-South trade can have varying influences on the trends of employment and production in developed countries. A contraction in manufacturing employment is correlated with North-South trade. The manufacturing trade balances in the OECD has a minimum influence over the pattern of employment and production at the aggregate level. Furthermore, the participation of the South in international economic arena influenced structural changes in the North.

To date most of the analysis of structural adjustment has focused on the agricultural sector. Comparatively little has been written on the relationship between structural adjustment and industry. Yet arguably given the limitations of an agriculturally based economy, Africa requires some form of industrialization to augment living standards in the long run. The paper attempts to sketch out and analyze the World Bank/IMF model of industrial adjustment. A number of serious deficiencies are found in the model, including weaknesses in its methodological foundation, inconsistencies in the components, and impediments linked to structure and class that will constrain the adjustment process. Overall it is suggested that the World Bank/IMF model is likely to deindustrialize the existing manufacturing base without encouraging any significant replacement.

Sections of the post‐industrial working‐class have made a notable return to media and political discourses in the context of the rise of populism across Europe and the United States. These narratives, which exclude women and BAME working‐class people, suggests the (white, male) working‐class are angry and resentful of being left behind by increasingly globalized political economies, nostalgic for the industrial ordering of work, home, and community. It seems that the political and media establishment are, selectively, understanding what has long been realized by researchers of deindustrialization. In the first, this paper surveys and critiques recent discourses on the post‐industrial working‐classes. The paper then traces the development of industrial ruination as an interdisciplinary area of academic focus, highlighting the themes of memory and temporal factors that have come to dominate the literature. The next section reviews contestations surrounding the affordances of landscapes and industrial ruins for the analysis of memory and history. Finally, the paper proposes interrelated ways to advance future study which historical–cultural geographers are well placed to carry forward. Here, I call for greater attention toward the affective and embodied dimensions of classed experience and the intersectionalities of race and gender in working‐class subjectivities. Further, I suggest there is an imperative to a deeper understanding of constitutive "affective" histories to mediate enduring social inequalities and their political and socially divisive mobilizations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Brazil’s political-economic structure has rapidly evolved over the past decade, shedding its shallow policy alignment with neoliberalism of the 1990s. Brazil’s large, diversified industrial base was painfully constructed over the course of the twentieth century. A major and sustained political realignment, which began in 2003, has resulted in two essential thrusts in development policy: (i) a “growth with equity” strategy that has dramatically reduced poverty and inequality; and (ii) a state-led “industrial policy” designed to upgrade manufacturing and direct the accumulation process toward specific sectors, highlighting and consolidating the National Innovation System (NIS). Nonetheless, as a result of the commodity boom that swept through Latin America, Brazil’s natural resource sector achieved outsized growth from 2002 to 2012. One result has been a shift toward resource intensive activities and a broad opening to low-cost Chinese manufactures. Utilizing an institutionalist framework and method, this article analyzes the cohesion of the NIS and the emergence of the “deindustrialization” debate. Also, it assesses the instrumental nature of the “growth with equity” strategy. The article hypothesizes the viability of an endogenous “neo-developmentalist” strategy, while acknowledging the emergence of fundamental exogenous forces and structural ceremonial/institutional factors that have impeded the consolidation of a Brazilian social structure of accumulation. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Flint, Michigan, was recognized throughout most of the twentieth century as 'Motor City, U.S.A.' For a generation, from the 1950s to the early 1980s, it was second only to Detroit [...]

Remaking Chicago Deindustrialization, in many ways the most potent political-economic neologism of the 1980s, might well have been coined in Chicago. Here, the dramatic downturn of the manufacturing economy three [...]

Copyright of Tendencias: Revista de la Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Administrativas is the property of Universidad de Narino, Facultad de Ciencias Economics y Administrativas and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

This paper has three objectives: i) to empirically examine labor market transitions in deindustrializing Asian economies; ii) to study the character of labor market risks and how these risks are shifting by gender, by education level, and by age in the transitional period; and iii) to rethink the commonly accepted assumptions that deindustrialization and globalization are the main causes of new labor market risks and, thus propose the possibility of institutional legacy as an important factor for such risk shifts. This study focuses on the labor market risks in the Republic of Korea, Japan, and Taiwan. Three steps are taken in this inquiry. First, this study commences by empirically examining the three labor market changes mentioned above. Second, it challenges the idea of the emergence of 'new risks,' arguing instead for the concept of 'risk shift': the feature of risk shifting to different demographic groups. Lastly, with the empirical evidence already used, this paper discusses whether deindustrialization or globalization is a sufficient cause for risk shifts in deindustrializing Asian economies, proposing that institutional legacy may be an important factor in risk shift. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study looks at some specific questions involved in the discussion surrounding deindustrialization in Brazil and delves into aspects of the theoretical-historical debate on deindustrialization found in literature on economic development. The first part emphasizes some elements of this debate in specialized literature, discussing theoretical aspects of the Kaldorian formulation and stressing the role of industrial growth and structural changes in the growth of capitalist economies. The second organizes and analyzes some recent performance indicators for the Brazilian industrial sector. Finally, this study offers some brief conclusions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The tertiarisation, or perhaps more accurately, the deindustrialisation of the economy has left deep scars on cities. It is evident not only in the industrial wastelands and empty factory buildings, but also in the income and social structures of cities. Industrialisation, collective wage setting, and the welfare state led to a stark reduction in income differences over the course of the 20th century. Conversely, deindustrialisation and the shift to tertiary sectors could result in increasing wage differentiation. Moreover, numerous studies on global cities, the dual city, and divided cities have also identified income polarisation as a central phenomenon in the development of major cities. Using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), we find an increasing polarisation of household income structures since the mid-1990s. In urban agglomerations, this income polarisation is even more pronounced than in the more rural regions. The income polarisation in Germany is likely to have multiple causes, some of which are directly linked to policies such as the deregulation of the labour market. But extensive deindustrialisation is probably also one of the drivers of this process, and it has directly weakened Germany’s middle-income groups. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The industrialization of developing countries has fundamentally transformed work, employment, and labor for millions. Despite the industrialization of most of the developing world, we present evidence that Latin America has experienced stagnating industrial employment in the past few decades. Benefiting from recently available data on industrial employment as a percentage of total employment from 1980 through 2006, we analyze fixed-effects models for 20 Latin American countries. Specifically, we examine three theoretical explanations: productivity/comparative advantage, institutionalism, and dependency/world-systems. Our analyses demonstrate that the prevailing productivity/comparative advantage explanation has limited value. By contrast, we find supportive evidence for a combination of institutional and dependency/world-systems variables. In particular, the stagnating industrial employment share in Latin American countries has been driven by the negative effects of (in order of magnitude) the Mercosur trade agreement, mineral and ore exports (as a percentage of total exports), the duration of the current political regime, military spending (as a percentage of GDP), and inward foreign direct investment flows (as a percentage of GDP). [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

En este trabajo se analiza la desindustrialización en El Salvador, un fenómeno que afecta a los países de América Latina desde los años ochenta y tiene repercusiones en términos de estancamiento económico y pérdida de empleos de calidad. En la primera sección se presenta una reseña de la literatura seleccionada sobre este tema. A continuación se examinan las causas de la desindustrialización en El Salvador, en primer lugar la posibilidad de que las remesas ocasionen un fenómeno de enfermedad holandesa. Descartada esta hipótesis, se examinan las repercusiones de las reformas económicas llevadas a cabo en los años noventa y, mediante la estimación de ecuaciones de cointegración, se encuentra evidencia de que la extrema apertura comercial constituye el motivo principal de la contracción de los sectores de bienes transables. El trabajo termina con una serie de recomendaciones y conclusiones. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The regions in depression due to deindustrialisation - the old industrial regions - can be defined by common internal characteristics, characterised by brownfields springing into existence, dwindling human potential, labour market depression and secondary migrational push. The primary focus of the article is the rust belts appearing following deindustrialisation, brownfields and their complex revitalization, especially in terms of the labour market. The aim is to prove the correlation between brownfields and the labour market at subregional level in Hungary by analysing two regions characterised by negative deindustrialization, namely Észak-Magyarorszàg and Dél-Dunàntúl. Local Moran's I was used to analyze regional autocorrelation between brownfields and the labour market indicators. Furthermore, subregions smitten by industrial depression are discussed in detail. The study considers the following hypothesis: in Hungary, brownfields came into being following deindustrialisation, especially negative deindustrialisation, which influences the labour market at subregional level. It is also supposed that the failure of development is due to misconceived revitalization. Using my previous results, I set up a new model of revitalization, which, in my opinion, can be facilitated by utilizing a new development. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There has been considerable concern in Latin America over the implications of increased competition from China for local industry. These concerns include the possibility of “deindustrialization,” the increased “primarization” of the region's exports and the difficulties of upgrading manufactured exports into higher technology products. This article examines the impact of Chinese competition both in the domestic market and in export markets on Brazilian industry. It documents the increased penetration of Chinese manufactures in the Brazilian market and the way in which Brazilian exports have lost market share to China in the US, European Union and four Latin American countries. Brazil, because of its more developed and locally integrated industrial sector, is not typical of other Latin American countries and the article also discusses the relevance of the Brazilian experience for the region as a whole. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Examines the deindustrialization of Singapore, or the structural shift from the manufacturing sector toward the service sector. Statistics highlighting the movement of Singapore's economy towards the service industry; Role of the state in the economic restructuring; Regional security issues in Asia which affect the success of Singapore's deindustrialization.