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Purpose -- The purpose of this paper is to examine students' perceptions of managerial mistakes and why (and why not) managers admit mistakes. Design/methodology/approach -- This paper provides a reflective account of how students' perceive management mistakes and deal with admitting "mea culpa" -- "I am to blame". Findings -- The findings show a range of attitudes: they highlight the intermingling pressures associated with the cultural environment and mistakes; they identify media characteristics and its influences on mistakes and mea culpa; they highlight ceremonial processes and tasks that shape and influence the declaration of mea culpa; and they identify how the psychology and sociology of mistakes confronts and affects students. Taken together, the study highlights the varying degrees of wariness that is carried forward by the students from vicariously learning about management mistakes. Originality/value -- This paper links up with recent discussions on retail failure and retail pedagogy. It is hoped that this paper will encourage more academics to address, and engage with, management mistakes creatively in their teaching. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to examine how one firm – the British Shoe Corporation - eventually failed because, as a result of the strength of its predominant managerial mental model it fell into a number of exploitative learning capability traps. Design/methodology/approach – The paper uses a contemporary historical case study approach. This allows for a longitudinal study of the phenomenon. It examines the core concepts involved before moving on to consider the task environment in which the company operated, the origins and nature of its predominant managerial mental model, its performance over its lifetime and how and why it fell into the various capability learning traps. Findings – The study found that the firm's predominant managerial mental model had a significant impact on its capability learning. It argues that to prevent other finns falling into these sorts of traps they should adopt scenario planning and seek out internal asymmetries. Research limitations/implications – The study is limited in that it only considers one specific case. More studies of the same sort need to be carried out before the findings can be considered generalisable. Again much more research is needed into the process of seeking out internal asymmetries, a recently developed concept with very little written on it. Practical implications – The paper provides advice on ways to prevent firms falling into the same sorts of learning traps as the British Shoe Corporation. Originality/value – The paper is original in that it relates the problem of falling into capability learning traps to the predominant managerial mental model of the organisation. It provides a practical example of the phenomenon and discusses practical strategies that other firms can adopt to avoid suffering the same outcome. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose – The aim of this paper is to evaluate the extent to which hubristic behaviour on the part of Thomas Farrow contributed to the downfall of Farrow's Bank in 1920. Design/methodology/approach – The article traces the way in which Thomas Farrow's behaviour changed over the course of his managerial career using primary sources obtained from various British archives, including: court records, witness statements, auditors' reports, newspapers, journals, and personal letters. The article then evaluates Farrow's actions in relation to the criteria outlined in Petit and Bollaert's “Framework for diagnosing CEO hubris” so as to assess how far he can be said to have become afflicted by managerial hubris. Findings – All the collected evidence points to the conclusion that Thomas Farrow had, by the time of the Bank's collapse in 1920, become afflicted by managerial hubris. This was reflected most clearly in the fact that he increasingly came to view himself as being somehow above and beyond the laws of the wider community. As a result, he felt little compunction about fraudulently writing-up the Bank's assets so as to cover the huge losses that his reckless investments had produced. Practical implications – The Farrow's Bank episode confirms that the probability of management hubris materialising is enhanced when external control mechanisms are either lacking or inefficiently applied. On top of this, the amateurish organizational set-up of the Bank also suggests that the likelihood of hubris syndrome developing is enhanced when organizations themselves grant too much discretion to their leaders. Originality/value – The paper breaks new ground by applying the latest management and psychology theories on the subject of leadership hubris to the field of financial management. Its value lies in the fact that it provides scholars and practitioners with an in-depth insight into how hubris syndrome can develop in organizational settings. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper traces the development of the law relating to liquidated damages in Australia, New Zealand, England, and Singapore. The examination reveals that there is little difference because the courts in each jurisdiction have drawn on common precedents. The paper canvasses the distinction between a genuine pre-estimate of the likely damage and a penalty. Where a party has sought to guarantee compliance with a contract by use of a liquidated damages provision that coerces his or her contractual partner, there is a potential for the clause to be held to be void as a penalty. However, there is a developing reluctance on the part of the courts to interfere with the bargain made by the parties. The use of liquidated damages clauses adds to the predictability of the outcomes of construction contracts. The consequences of a liquidated damages provision being held to be void are discussed. The work concludes with an examination of situations where a party can elect to claim the damages assessed by common law principles in lieu of liquidated damages. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper investigates the relationships between registrations, de-registrations and population density at county level in the UK using VAT data for 20 years over the period 1980–1999. The rationale for this is based on the need to understand how the extent to which, in different parts of the UK, differences in the relationship between birth rates and death rates combine to produce an interpretable pattern in net birth rates. The analysis of the net birth rate shows that a strategy aimed at the net birth rate might, in principle, just as well aim at reducing business failure, rather than raising the birth rate. Indeed this might be more efficient, since it implies that less start-ups are “wasted” as it would avoid the necessity, if targets are to be reached, of encouraging those individuals who are patently unsuited to running their own business into business ownership. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]