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In Britain in the 1970s inflation rose to historically unprecedented peace-time levels, and became the central issue of economic policy-making. We know a great deal about the elite policy debates on the significance of this inflation, and the arguments about how to reduce it, but we know far less about how inflation was understood by the population at large, and how those understandings were shaped. This article explores the evidence on popular understanding, especially analysing the material gathered by the Counter- Inflation Publicity Unit, created in the summer of 1975. Along with other evidence, this material is used to explore how far the Labour government's economic propaganda can be said to have influenced popular opinion on both the significance and causes of inflation. The evidence supports the argument that the belief that trade unions were the main culprit for inflation was reinforced and entrenched by this propaganda, with important unintended consequences for the arguments about policy that followed the ' Winter of Discontent' of 1978/9. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This communication follows the evolution, reception, and implications of the parliamentary commissioner's critical 1968 report on Foreign Office 'maladministration' regarding compensation for British concentration camp inmates. It explores officials' and ministers' attitude to the investigative techniques associated with this new office, as well as their hostile reaction to the publicity and parliamentary controversy to which his work gave rise. It concludes by exploring the wider implications of the case, especially the inherent problems faced by governments seeking closer and more harmonious relationships with the governed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article documents a landmark dispute between British Petroleum (BP) and the Nigerian tax authorities that occurred over a N130 million (£100 million) capital gains tax assessment arising from an intra BP Group transfer of its 50 per cent shareholding in Shell/BP Nigeria. This was necessitated by a BP transaction in Abu Dhabi. This tax assessment, which was more than twice the yearly cash flow of BP's Nigerian operations at the time, ignited a chain of events and schemes that saw the British government covertly and overtly providing support to BP, with the primary goal of influencing the outcome of the dispute in order to protect the interests of both the British government and BP. Evidence in this article highlights the complexities of postcolonial relationships between centre countries and African ex-colonies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Industrial relations were reconstructed in the UK in the 1970s, but only in a limited way. This article examines how business preserved ultimate managerial prerogative in the organisation of the firm and the workplace by constraining the process of reconstruction. The analysis contributes to understanding of business in the 1970s and varieties of capitalism literature on comparative political economy by suggesting that changes in industrial relations were accepted by business only where congruent with corporate strategy. Evidence comes from industrial relations surveys and the Bullock Inquiry on board-level worker participation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Conventional wisdom is critical of the newly elected Labour government's reaction to external financial difficulties in the autumn of 1964. Anxious about its political position, it avoided the necessary measures, involving stringent deflation and possibly devaluation. This article seeks to revise the traditional view by re-examining the response to what were actually two sterling crises. The first was handled efficiently. The second was provoked by speculation stemming from market expectations of devaluation. The decision not to devalue but seek external support was justifiable, given changes within the international economy which were to create problems for many postwar nation states. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Presents a response to an article written by Charles Batteson, which focused on the 1976 Ruskin College Speech, delivered by James Callaghan, which was regarded as the moment of British politics of 1976. Contention that the New Right Speech was instrumental in pivoting the direction of Labour policies for school reform; Origin of the Ruskin Speech; Significance of the Ruskin Speech to New Right education policies.

Focuses on the expressions and skepticism associated with education and politics while referencing to then British Prime Minister James Callaghan's 1976 Ruskin Speech. Reference to the political importance of education; When the Government inertia started to erode; Presentation of the 1976 speech along with its aftermath.

Reports on an intraparty division in the British House of Commons during the 1974 to 1979 Parliament. Effect of cross-issue constraint on political party divisions; Evidence for the expression of dissent when a party is in the opposition; Difference between the Labor Party and the Conservative Party on party structure of voting.

The article offers information on the reduction of the effectiveness of government authority in Great Britain. It is stated that the changing constellation of economic and political forces mixed with the coalition of refractory socioeconomic problems has decreased the government's effectiveness. In addition, the government is controlling with deteriorating capacity over a fissiparous society which threatens of becoming too divided to agree and too complex to be ruled. Moreover, there is a mounting uncertainty that the government can solve recurring problems or can cope with expectations of the electorate.

This paper seeks to present a positive model of politico-economic interaction in the United Kingdom and to estimate it empirically with recent data. The basic hypothesis advanced is that the governing party aims to stay in power and therefore seeks to increase its popularity with the electorate when its (perceived) re-election chances are low. For this purpose it undertakes an expansionary policy expected to lead to a popularity increase and an improvement in its election prospects. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper represents a preliminary exploration of the question as to whether agencies in the public sector have been used as a tool of anti-inflation policy. Government intentions to impose extra restraints on public corporations, relative to private industry, have become obvious since 1972 in so far as they are an explicit element of policy. Looking at the post-war period as a whole there is some basis for thinking that similar intentions were largely absent up to 1964 but in the 1965-72 period they were present first of all in the way in which the machinery of prices and incomes policy was applied in the 1965-9 period, second in an even more disguised form of pressure in 1970 and 1971 and third in the more effective control of public corporations in the execution of the CBI initiative during parts of 1971 and 1972. The evidence of such intentions is much less clear for wages than prices and indeed since the early 1960s public corporation wage inflation has if anything been slightly higher than in manufacturing industry and the difference increased in the 1970s. The data suggest that discriminatory price restraint was partly effective in the 1965-7 period and more strongly so in the 1970s. The analysis of the effects of such restraints is a separate topic in itself. Price restraint on the public sector has probably been attempted for a number of reasons. One is to show, in the context of invocations for general price and wage restraint that the Government could keep its own house in order. In addition there has been concern for some of the anticipatory and distributional effects of inflation. The rather debilitating effect on the Corporations, as recorded in their recent Annual Reports,[1] has to be set against any such benefits. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While it is frequently asserted that British industry has earned an inadequate return on investment, there has been little agreement among economists as to what exactly this rate has been in recent years. This note provides striking new evidence that the profitability of British industry is currently much lower than anyone had previously supposed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]