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Based on 20 models from phase 6 of the Coupled Model Intercomparison Project (CMIP6), this article explored possible reasons for differences in simulation biases and projected changes in precipitation in northern China among the all-model ensemble (AMME), "highest-ranked" model ensemble (BMME), and "lowest-ranked" model ensemble (WMME), from the perspective of atmospheric circulations and moisture budgets. The results show that the BMME and AMME reproduce the East Asian winter circulations better than the WMME. Compared with the AMME and WMME, the BMME reduces the overestimation of evaporation, thereby improving the simulation of winter precipitation. The three ensemble simulated biases for the East Asian summer circulations are generally similar, characterized by a stronger zonal pressure gradient between the mid-latitudes of the North Pacific and East Asia and a northward displacement of the East Asian westerly jet. However, the simulated vertical moisture advection is improved in the BMME, contributing to the slightly higher performance of the BMME than the AMME and WMME on summer precipitation in North and Northeast China. Compared to the AMME and WMME, the BMME projects larger increases in precipitation in northern China during both seasons by the end of the 21st century under the Shared Socioeconomic Pathway 5–8.5 (SSP5–8.5). One of the reasons is that the increase in evaporation projected by the BMME is larger. The projection of a greater dynamic contribution by the BMME also plays a role. In addition, larger changes in the nonlinear components in the BMME projection contribute to a larger increase in winter precipitation in northern China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Future changes in tropical cyclone (TC) activity over the western North Pacific (WNP) under the representative concentration pathway RCP4.5 are investigated based on a set of 21st century climate change simulations over East Asia with the regional climate model RegCM4 driven by five global models. The RegCM4 reproduces the major features of the observed TC activity over the region in the present-day period of 1986–2005, although with the underestimation of the number of TC genesis and intensity. A low number of TCs making landfall over China is also simulated. By the end of the 21st century (2079–98), the annual mean frequency of TC genesis and occurrence is projected to increase over the WNP by 16% and 10%, respectively. The increase in frequency of TC occurrence is in good agreement among the simulations, with the largest increase over the ocean surrounding Taiwan Island and to the south of Japan. The TCs tend to be stronger in the future compared to the present-day period of 1986–2005, with a large increase in the frequency of strong TCs. In addition, more TCs landings are projected over most of the China coast, with an increase of ∼18% over the whole Chinese territory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Asian values thesis describes the cultural exceptionalism and alternative political development of East Asia. This study used four rounds of Asian Barometer Survey (ABS) datasets (spanning 2001–2016) to empirically examine the effects of Asian values on citizens' support for democracy in four East Asian societies—mainland China, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan—based on the theoretical distinction between the private and political spheres in which Asian values operate. The analysis produced three major findings. First, no remarkable gap exists between the citizens of China and those of other East Asian societies in terms of Asian values in the private sphere. However, Asian values in the political sphere are prevalent in China, while citizens in the other three societies have abandoned them. Second, supporting democracy is not incompatible with accepting the family and social ethics implied by Asian values, whereas Asian values in the political sphere have significantly negative associations with preference for democracy. Third, although most citizens in East Asia support democracy, the strongly positive evaluation of its suitability for local societies observed at the beginning of the twenty-first century has weakened in the region over the last 20 years. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Over the last two decades, China has experienced one of the most dramatic and sustained periods of economic growth in world history. China's use of economic statecraft provides an important venue in which to examine the role of unacknowledged ‘coercive diplomacy’ within the context of China's ‘peaceful rise discourse.’ In contrast to Western countries, which have overtly used sanctions and other forms of economic coercion, China has publicly denied any such policies while at the same time quietly pursuing them. China's denial of using coercive economic statecraft has muted the reactions of neighboring publics and government, but it cannot entirely forestall them. Without seriously undermining China's ‘peaceful-rising’ image, a more explicit statement from Beijing regarding its coercive economic measure could provide deterrence and assurance to China's neighbors in resolving the disputes. This article first surveys existing literature on economic statecraft focusing on the coercive aspects of such strategies. Second, it presents an in-depth case study on how China uses economic leverages over its neighbors in East Asia: North Korea, Japan, and the Philippines. Finally, it highlights the limits of China's economic statecraft within the constraints of China's ‘peaceful rise’ discourse. It concludes with implications for Asian politics and beyond. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is obvious that the security environment in East Asia is more unstable and unpredictable. In the South China Sea, tensions over disputed islands initiate a more severe Sino–American rivalry. In the East China Sea, China disputes the control over the Senkaku Islands, and is escalating military activities around those islands. North Korea continues provocative activities including launching of ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons tests. This naturally leads to the idea that Japan needs to play a larger role to restore stability in the international order. This paper explores the challenges facing East Asian security in the face of the passage of Japan's new security bills in 2015 and how they impact the future of Japanese security policy. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The teaching of foreign languages to young learners is growing in popularity around the world. Research in this field, particularly of English as a second/foreign language education in East Asia, is a relatively new area of empirical inquiry, and it has the potential to make significant contributions to child second-language acquisition (Child-SLA) theory building, research methodologies, and policies in East Asia and beyond. This article reviews relevant peer-reviewed literature on English education among young learners in East Asia (China, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan). I begin by reviewing policy literature to illustrate the social and policy contexts of early English education, identifying major policy-related concerns. Next, I review empirical studies of English learning and teaching, organizing them by their relevance to the previously identified policy concerns. The article concludes with suggestions for future research. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Since the 1990s, alongside China's economic growth, the international community has fostered a general anxiety towards a "China threat." In order to relieve itself from suspicion, China adopted the dual strategies of "harmonious worldview" and "good neighbor policy." The strategies led to the use of soft power in China's foreign policy. China aimed to reduce security concerns implied by the threat theory by supporting an image that caters to international peace and development. This article seeks to explain how China achieves its interests in Southeast Asia through the use of soft power. The authors address the concepts of "harmonious worldview" and "good neighbor policy" and how the twin strategies and soft power have shaped China's foreign policy in recent years. This article aims to provide insights into China's policy options in Southeast Asia in the near future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

East Asia (EA) is conventionally defined to comprise China and Japan, the four newly industrialized economies (NIEs) of South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEANs) economies. The EA region is well known for its dynamic economic growth through the past 50 years. The first wave of EA's high growth was led by Japan, and it soon spread to the four NIEs and some ASEAN economies. This marks the first rise of EA or EA-I. Japanese economists used to explain such a phenomenon as the ‘flying geese pattern’. The second wave of EA's high growth was led by China, and it is currently spreading into the whole of the EA region. The second rise of EA or EA-II is economically much more formidable than EA-I because of China's vast economic scale compounded by its high rates economic growth. The China-led EA-II today accounts for 24.4% of global GDP (higher than the US share of 21.5%), as compared to 15.2% of the Japan-led EA-I. Increasingly, China's economy operates not just as an engine of growth for the EA region but also a catalyst for regional economic integration. After the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, global economic gravity has clearly shifted to EA. However, individual EA economies are still beset by problems of structural imbalance. Above all, the future of EA-II critically depends on the continuing economic rise of China, i.e. the ability of China's economy to sustain its dynamic economic growth without falling into the ‘middle-income trap’. EA economic growth has been taking place in the kind of regional order that is, from time to time, undermined by bilateral discord and regional conflict. China as the region's largest economy will no doubt continue to lead the region's economic growth and shape the pattern of economic relations among the EA economies. Increasingly trade and investment in the region are gravitating towards China. However, for a long time, China will not be able to shape the region's geo-political landscape. China's message of ‘peaceful rise’ has not been unequivocally accepted in the region. China's overall relations with other EA economies will continue to be ‘hot in economics and cold in politics’. The growing political and strategic role of the USA has further complicated China's relations with other EA economies in the region. For years to come, China's geo-political leverage in the region will remain limited as opposed to its expanding geo-economic influence. The existing regional order in EA will, therefore, continue to be marred by uncertainty and instability. It is still a long way from the East Asian Community, which is to be based on not just sustainable economic growth and increasing integration, but also harmonious political and security relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article traces the evolution of heightened Chinese expectations and the resultant spike in national identity in 2010, using a six-dimensional framework: 1) ideological, 2) temporal, 3) sectoral, 4) vertical, 5) horizontal, and 6) intensity. A hybrid ideology rose to the forefront. Forceful historical arguments covered three distinct periods. The triad of economic, cultural, and political identity raised sectoral identity to an unprecedented level. The leadership kept pressing the case for vertical identity in contrast to the West. Above all, it put the spotlight on horizontal identity to draw a sharper contrast with the United States and neighboring states as well. If at the time of the Hu-Obama summit the tone softened somewhat, China continued its risky wager on widening the identity gap. Regardless of whether China's foreign policy is currently assertive, its national identity narrative remains a driving force for divisiveness in the regional and international order. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The study of Chinese foreign policy has long shown that domestic politics and domestic constraints are sources of foreign policy, albeit generally considered less potent than ideology and interests. Domestic political constraints should also be explored as factors in Chinese regional policies toward East Asia, including regional economic institutions. This paper examines three domestic institutional constraints on regional foreign policy in the area of trade and economics: a fragmented decision-making structure that has difficulty with coordination, a relatively heavy reliance on top level decision-makers at a time when issues of Asian economic policy have relatively low priority for these same decision-makers, and the relatively extreme lack of autonomy for negotiators vis-a-vis top decision-makers in Beijing. These constraints are by any means unique to China. However, at a time when many observers and participants are expecting—indeed, often hoping for—Chinese leadership in the region, the paper posits that these constraints hinder the PRC's ability to fill this role. The key empirical focus is regional trade agreements and regional economic organizations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The literature on China's regional rise reveals divergent understandings of why China changed its regional strategy and when such a transformation occurred. There are also different understandings of the extent of China's power in the region—or more often, the extent to which US power in East Asia is already challenged by China's regional rise. Nevertheless, there is a consensus of sorts over how Chinese policy has changed with an emphasis on a combination of proactive diplomatic initiatives and ever increasing economic interactions. After providing a brief overview of the existing literature, the main part of this article considers the role of China's ‘soft power’ in reconfiguring power relationships in East Asia. It suggests that while the US might have lost some of its ideational appeal, it is through working within existing frameworks and ‘norms’ (rather than establishing new revisionist alternatives) that China has had most success in assuaging fears of the consequences of its rise. However, the way in which others conceive of China's rise and Chinese power (and subsequently act) does provide a form of ‘non-hard’ power that might help China's leaders attain their regional objectives particularly in light of the continuing global economic crisis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China's rise entails a potentially threatening increase in its political and military power. Adherents of 'democratic peace theory', however, see cause for optimism: the economic development accompanying China's ascendance might have a pacifying effect on Chinese foreign relations. Unfortunately, in China's case this hope is probably unfounded. Some of China's most prickly foreign policies, including its unwillingness to accept postwar Japan as a 'normal' nation and its insistence that Taiwan must eventually unify with China regardless of the wishes of Taiwan's inhabitants, are already 'democratic' in the sense that most of China's people endorse them. Chinese public opinion has become a powerful influence on foreign-policymaking, and one that sometimes pushes Beijing toward conflict even when China's leaders would prefer conciliation. Democratisation in China would not immediately remove the sources of tension between the Chinese and the other Asia-Pacific democracies, and China's neighbours must understand that on some issues the Chinese government must meet compelling domestic expectations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The rise of China is seen by some observers as a precursor of inevitable hegemonic competition in East Asia. At the very least, it seems likely that China's influence in East Asia will grow at the expense of the United States. Whether this will eventually amount to a form of hegemonic transition is far less clear. It is, therefore, an opportune moment to consider the relative strengths and weaknesses of China and the US in East Asia. This paper suggests that the nature of hegemonic competition and transition is more uncertain and complex than some of the most influential theoretical understandings of hegemony would have us believe. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines U.S. foreign relations in Asia, especially relations with China. Under President George W. Bush, U.S. policy is seen as having been a series of reactions to events, particularly in its efforts to halt North Korea's nuclear weapons program. The development of a strong regionalism in East Asia and China's efforts to become a co-operative regional partner with its neighbors are seen as the most important changes in the region in the 2000s. It is argued that these developments offer the U.S. an opportunity to work with China bilaterally on issues of mutual interest, and through China to work with other Asian countries.

This article examines the massive social, economic, and political upheaval of the 17th Century from the perspective of East Asia. Historians have long debated the origins and meaning of events in Europe during that time period but China, Japan and others also experienced serious internal conflict. The author explains events surrounding the end of the Ming dynasty in 1644 but wonders if it is helpful to compare events in China to events in Europe. He also speculates on the impact of climate on historical events.