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Ankara’s failure to permit the US to launch a ground attack into northern Iraq from Turkish soil could have a substantial impact on the future evolution of Turkish-US relations. For Washington, Turkey’s strategic significance derives from its strategic location, and the denial of access to it threatens Turkey’s utility to the US. For Turkey, Washington ? and the Pentagon in particular ? has been a major supporter, not only militarily but in Europe and at the IMF too. The crisis in Turkish-US relations over Iraq raises the question of whether Turkey’s domestic politics and regional concerns can be squared with Washington’s, and whether Turkey can be regarded as a close ally in pursuit of broader strategic objectives. The future of the Kurds too remains unsettled, and could still emerge as a crisis in Turkish security policy in ways that compromise Washington’s commitments and obligations. This paper will trace the unfolding of Turkish-US relations proceeding, during, and since the war with Iraq, and consider the prospects for Turkish-US relations in their wake. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyzes the relationship between public opinion and policies of the Turkish government about the Iraq war in 2003. Specifically, linkages between the public opinion and Turkish parliament’s vote against sending troops and allowing American troops to launch an offensive to Iraq from Turkish territory on March 1, 2003 will be discussed. The major questions we elaborate are 1) To what extent the public opinion has influenced Turkish policy-makers’ decisions about the war; 2) How did the political climate of early 2003 shaped the March 1 decision?; 3) What were the differences of opinion between the MPs (both from the ruling JDP and opposition RPP) and the leaders of the government?; 4) Why did the leaders of the governing JDP have divided opinion about the issue and how did this affect parliament’s decision?; 5) What was the influence of other parties from the political spectrum on parliament’s decision?; 6) What was the effect of pressure by the influential Turkish bureaucracy (especially the military) on the decision making processes?; 7) How did the institutional factors affect the rejection of March 1 resolution in the Turkish Grand National Assembly?; and 8) To what extent the media and cultural factors shaped the opinions of politicians and public?The first part of the paper will introduce a discussion of official Turkish policies in regard to Iraq since the Gulf War in 1991. This will be followed by a discussion of public attitude about the Iraq issue, both before and after the 2003 war. A brief discussion of institutional context of Turkish foreign policy decision making and broader political context of the time will pursue. Finally, an extensive discussion of how the public opinion constrained the decisions of policy makers and bureaucracy about participation to the invasion of Iraq will be made. This discussion will be informed by the theoretical insights from the foreign policy analysis literature. Methodologically, we utilize archival research, interviews with the country’s decision-makers and public opinion polls. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper identifies the external and internal factors that guided state military coalition decisions and test these factors against the model of burden sharing developed by Bennett, Lepgold, and Unger in Friends in Need: Burden Sharing in the Persian Gulf War. This paper explains the Turkish decision to not support the U.S. invasion. Turkish coalition behavior was markedly different than the first Gulf War, even under intense pressure from the U.S. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper will analyze Turkey?s relations with the European Union in the post-Iraq war era. In doing so the main research question is how the latest-US led war in Iraq has affected (will affect) the prospects of Turkey?s accession to the EU. I will mainly assess the impacts of the following developments on the nature of Turkey-EU relations: The growing estrangement between Turkey and the United States over Iraq and the PKK issue, the rising influence of Kurdish nationalism in the region, the politicization of the Kurdish problem inside Turkey, the growing confrontation between the West and Iran due to the latter?s plans to develop nuclear weapons/energy, the rising Iranian influence in the Middle East, the prospect of civil war in Iraq, the American efforts to promote democratization and liberalization in the Middle East, the US-EU disagreement on the rationale and methods of democratization in the region, the growing ascendancy of energy issues in international issues. This paper will not focus on such EU related factors as the growing enlargement fatigue and the ambiguity regarding the EU?s future in analyzing Turkey-EU relations. Similarly the goal is not to approach the issue from a ?Turkey/inside? framework. The number of studies that focus on such independent variables abounds. Here, I will try to shed a light on the impact of ?post-Saddam Iraq related developments in the Middle East? on the ?nature of Turkey-EU relations?. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The demise of the USSR and the end of the Cold War marks the beginning of a new era for Turkish and American foreign policies on regional and global politics. As is widely argued, it was the Cold War era’s common threat perceptions which forced the US and Turkey to strengthen their strategic relationship which was named “strategic partnership” by the both Turkish and American statesmen. However, the globalization process which immensely affected the international systemic structure also affected Turkish-American relations and their common threat perceptions towards regional and global problems and opportunities. In this respect, the course of foreign policy objectives of both the US and Turkey on the recent Iraq conflict (2003) display some structural disparities emanating from differentiating perceptions of regional and global developments. The 2003 Iraq crisis and their impact on Turkish-American relations best explains the contradiction of both countries’ national security setting on the Iraq issue and the US Global War on terror. In this context, the current state of affairs of the Turkish-American relations can be best understood from both counties’ analysis of foreign objectives in the post-cold war era. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Turkish and French efforts to restrain their U.S. ally in 2003 demonstrate the regularity of alliance restraint in international affairs and the importance of the more powerful state in the dispute mobilizing its power resources. The French effort failed to stop or substantially delay the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq. Turkey prevented U.S. forces from invading Iraq in the north but did not stop the overall U.S. war plan. The United States mobilized its resources to overcome French non-participation, entice Turkey with aid and political guarantees, and, when that failed, fight the Iraq war without a major ground invasion from the north. U.S. officials were unified and seeking to attain high nationals security objectives, both factors that make a restrainee hard to stop. These results are generally consistent with my previous work on alliance restraint, Warring Friends. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The decision by the Turkish parliament on 1 March 2003 to reject a proposal to let thousands of U.S. ground troops already in the Mediterranean enter Iraq through Turkey was monumental. It gave the Turkish public, who had taken to the streets in protest of the government?s proposal, a sense of victory: democracy had prevailed over persistent US pressure and an aid package worth over $30 billion. Although Turkey eventually allowed the U.S. the use of its airspace, the event significantly strained the relations between the two long time allies. The decision was a major setback for U.S. military plans as access through Turkey would have enabled the military to place scores of troops in Northern Iraq as quickly as possible. The U.S. in this case faced an interesting paradox, not unlike the difficult position it has found itself in when dealing with many countries in the Middle East since the onset of its war against Iraq?pressuring governments to support the war it has waged in the name of democracy, when that support would come only in the face of strong counter public sentiments and would require the ruthless repression of public dissent in some cases.This is a decision-forcing case that focuses on this critical decision by the Turkish parliament. Students are exposed to a common dilemma faced by elected representatives all around the world, particularly in countries that rely heavily on foreign patronage?respond to the wishes of the citizens who will hold you accountable when the next elections come around or to the demands of the patron(s), whose continued financial support might hold the key to a sustainable economy. This teaching case study can be used in upper-level undergraduate courses on the comparative politics of democratizing or developing countries, Middle East politics, and foreign policy. It should also be of substantive interest to scholars of both US and comparative foreign policy due to its use of primary source materials not readily available in the US. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]