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The anomalous negative relationship between left‐tail risk measures and future returns has recently attracted the attention of finance researchers. We examine the role of the derivatives market in attenuating left‐tail risk anomaly in India, where derivatives trade only for a subset of stocks. We find that the negative association between left‐tail risk measure and future return is absent only in stocks having derivatives, indicating that derivatives trading hastens the diffusion of negative information into the stock prices. We find evidence that the information generation role of derivatives markets plays a primary role compared to investor inattention and limits to arbitrage. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We document strong evidence that CEO incentive compensation can predict the significance of stock price momentum through discretionary accrual and real activities manipulation. The profit of momentum strategy increases with CEO pay‐for‐performance incentive, but decreases with CEO risk‐taking incentive. It also evaluates the effects of information uncertainty on such relationship. The evidence is more significant for firms with older and longer tenured CEOs and firms with more informed traders. The relationship between the profit of momentum strategy and CEO pay‐for‐performance incentive is stronger among CEOs without the risk‐taking incentive. Our results are robust for different sub‐samples based on before and after Reg FD and Sarbanes–Oxley Act, even after controlling for the potential endogeneity. Further, our findings are consistent with the information diffusion explanation of momentum and the agency theory that incentivised CEOs tend to manipulate information by smoothing good news, concealing mildly bad news and accelerating the disclosure of extremely bad news. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We propose a timing momentum strategy by incorporating moving‐average signals in the price momentum and show that the proposed strategy substantially outperforms the buy‐and‐hold strategy. The performance of the timing momentum is better than that of Barroso and Santa‐Clara's (2015) constant‐volatility momentum and is identical to that of Daniel and Moskowitz's (2016) dynamic momentum. One advantage of the timing momentum is that its weights on winner and loser portfolios are lower than the other two strategies, thus leading to lower transaction costs. Further, we show that the profitability of the timing momentum is enhanced when information uncertainty is high. More importantly, the timing momentum has time‐invariant profitability across various time‐series predictors and during periods of momentum crashes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Innovative firms confront potential lenders with various risks, including possible innovation failure, uncertain R&D investment payoffs, cash flow volatility, and low collateral value of hard‐to‐value intangible assets. As a result, these firms might struggle to obtain financing. More readable financial disclosures could mitigate the informational risk around innovative firms' fundamentals, ease their monitoring by lenders, and thus ultimately reduce these firms' cost of debt. In this regard, we find that while all firms can overcome information uncertainty about their firm fundamentals and reduce their spreads by having more readable financial disclosures, there is an additional benefit in terms of readability further lowering the cost of debt for innovative firms. The additional benefit that innovative firms can achieve from having more readable financial disclosures, however, is limited to situations of more pronounced information asymmetry where there is no previous lending relationship. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Contrary to theoretical expectations and empirical evidence in developed markets, the Chinese stock market reacts positively (negatively) to interest rate increases (cuts) by the central bank. During the period from January 1996 to December 2016, the Shanghai Composite Index had an average abnormal return of 1.07% (−1.85%) in reaction to interest rate increases (cuts) over the two‐day announcement window. We further demonstrate that short‐term market reactions are transitory and have no permanent effect. Finally, we reveal that short‐term market reactions cannot be explained by market frictions or information uncertainty. Rather, such reactions are likely driven by investor sentiment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 2009, the Securities Exchange Board of India allowed qualified institutional investors to anchor initial public offerings (IPOs) by participating in the issue at a price and allocation publicly disclosed preceding the issue. We study anchor investors (AIs) in Indian IPOs during 2009–2017. We find the share allotment and the number of AIs separately have significant impacts on valuation and underpricing; however, the net effect is nonsignificant. Further, AIs significantly influence other institutional investors' participation in the IPO and induce lower aftermarket volatility. Overall, our evidence suggests that AIs boost demand for and mitigate ex ante information uncertainty of IPOs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study examines the determinants of goodwill overstatement at the time of mergers in a Korean setting. In the Korean M&A market, there are two types of mergers: mergers between independent companies (non‐affiliated mergers) and mergers between companies under common control (affiliated mergers). This study extends the literature by examining the factors likely to cause goodwill overstatement in both types of mergers. The results reveal that in affiliated mergers, goodwill at the time of a merger tends to be overstated when controlling owners have higher equity ownership in the target than in the acquirer. By contrast, information uncertainty in the target value causes initial goodwill overstatement in non‐affiliated mergers. We also find that monitoring of independent institutional investors with concentrated holdings against overpaying for the target is more pronounced when controlling owners in affiliated mergers have incentives to overpay for the target. In affiliated mergers, acquirers tend to write off goodwill more frequently when controlling owners have higher equity ownership in the target than in the acquirer. In non‐affiliated mergers, information uncertainty in the target value is significantly associated with subsequent goodwill write‐offs. These results suggest that the type of merger has important consequences for initial goodwill recognition and subsequent impairment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Prior research finds that there is a delayed reaction to both analyst‐based earnings surprises and random‐walk‐based earnings surprises. Focusing on the market reaction from the post‐announcement window, prior studies show that analyst‐based drift is larger than random walk‐based drift. This finding is counter‐intuitive if we believe large, sophisticated investors tend to trade on analysts' forecast earnings news and thus react faster and more completely than smaller and less sophisticated investors react to random walk earnings news. In this study, we construct a relative measure of post‐earnings‐announcement drift (PEAD) (i.e., drift as a proportion of total market reaction to earnings news) which we refer to as the 'drift ratio', and we provide evidence, consistent with our intuition, that analyst‐based drift ratio is smaller (not greater) than random‐walk‐based drift ratio. We find that this difference is more pronounced in more recent periods and for firms with more sophisticated investors. Our approach to measure the PEAD is more intuitive than that in traditional PEAD literature. Our results thus complement existing research findings by utilizing the drift ratio measure to generate new insights about the drift phenomenon. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We jointly test the effects of two types of investor uncertainty, one related to future firm performance and unrelated to accruals (cash flow uncertainty) and one directly related to accrual estimation errors (accounting quality uncertainty). Distinct from prior studies, our uncertainty estimates are based on a matched-firm design that minimizes the mechanical relationship between the two uncertainty variables. We find a strong negative relationship between cash flow uncertainty and multiple estimates of the cost of equity capital. With respect to accounting quality uncertainty, we find a strong positive association with both expected stock returns and implied costs of equity, but only in settings that control for cash flow uncertainty. Collectively, our results suggest the need to consider different types of investor uncertainty when examining how investor uncertainty affects the cost of equity capital. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We posit and find an effect of disclosure and analyst reporting regulations implemented from 2000 through 2003 (including Regulation Fair Disclosure, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Global Settlement Act) on the importance of analyst and forecast characteristics for analyst forecast accuracy. Following the enactment of these regulations, more experienced analysts and All-Star analysts do not maintain their superior forecast accuracy, and analysts employed by large brokerage houses perform worse than other analysts. In addition, we find a decrease in the importance of analyst effort, the number of industries and firms followed, days elapsed since the last forecast, and forecast horizon. While the importance of bold upward forecast revisions does not change, bold downward revisions lose their relevance for forecast accuracy after 2003. Finally, we find an increase in the importance of prior forecast accuracy. We find that the importance of these characteristics varies with the precision of publicly available information. Specifically, the decrease in the importance of most analyst and forecast characteristics and the increase in the importance of prior forecast accuracy are greater when the precision of publicly available information is low. Overall, our results suggest that the positive effects of experience, effort, brokerage house size and All-Star status on forecast accuracy in the pre-regulation period were because of the information advantages that these analysts enjoyed (rather than their ability to generate private information). In contrast, our results suggest that prior forecast accuracy is related to analysts' ability to generate private information. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Prior evidence shows voluntary recalls do not lead to better abnormal stock returns when compared with involuntary ones, although they intend to convey positive signals. This puzzling evidence can be attributed to the ignorance of information uncertainty associated with different product recall strategies. Because of the mixed managerial motives inherent in business strategy, voluntary recalls may involve greater information uncertainty than involuntary ones that prevent investors from receiving the intended positive messages. This paper argues that corporate social responsibility (CSR) establishes a firm's presence in stakeholder engagement and plays a crucial role in certifying information conveyed by voluntary product recalls. The findings suggest that firms with better CSR performance receive significantly greater firm value change than those with poor CSR performance upon the announcements of voluntary recalls. Besides, the CSR effect is mainly driven by the firm's engagement in technical CSR activities because of the direct dialogues with stakeholders caring about products. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We examine how information uncertainty surrounding IPO (initial public offering) firms influences earnings management and long-run stock performance. For low-information-uncertainty issuers, at-issue earnings' management is positively related to subsequent unmanaged earnings and has no relationship to market reaction to earnings announcement and long-run stock performance following the offering. For high-information-uncertainty issuers, however, at-issue earnings' management is unrelated to subsequent unmanaged earnings and negatively related to market reaction to earnings announcement and long-run stock performance following the offer. The evidence suggests that, on average, managers in low-information-uncertainty firms tend to engage in earnings' management for informative purposes, while managers in high-information-uncertainty firms engage in earnings' management for opportunistic purposes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We examine whether rational investor responses to information uncertainty (IU) explain properties of and returns to the post-earnings-announcement-drift (PEAD) trading anomaly. Consistent with a rational learning explanation, we find that: (1) unexpected earnings (UE) signals that are characterized as having greater IU have more muted initial market reactions; (2) extreme UE portfolios are characterized by securities with higher IU than non-extreme UE portfolios; and (3) within the extreme UE portfolios, high IU securities are more prevalent and earn larger abnormal returns than low IU securities. Further tests show that prior evidence of greater PEAD profitability for higher idiosyncratic volatility securities is explained by the greater information uncertainty associated with these securities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]