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The willingness of defence departments to select the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) for their fifth-generation multirole fighter has frequently been analyzed as stemming from the close historical connections allies such as Japan or Canada have with the United States. However, such an approach glosses over or ignores the operation of military procurement processes which are more idiosyncratic and subject to many pushes and pulls from different actors and directions. This article compares the experiences of Australia and Canada in procuring the JSF. Both countries are British Commonwealth members, with a long history of supporting western, and in particular, US alliances. But while Australia has secured its F-35 procurement and the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) has already received its F-35s, Canada has only recently overcome a lengthy F-35 procurement battle that remains mired in controversy and will not deliver to the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) an aircraft for several years yet. This comparative case study between Australian and Canadian defence priorities offers a new explanation for this disparity of procurement success based on the need to both create and maintain alignment between government strategic defence policy and military service doctrine if major platform purchasing decisions are to survive. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Contemporary arguments about private paramilitary organizations often focus on the threat of physical violence that they pose to the state: if such organizations garner enough physical power, then they can overtake the state via violent coup. Inspired by the legalist scholar Han Feizi's position, we contend that such organizations also represent a sociopolitical, existential threat to the state. Specifically, their tendency for ideological expansion and subsequent gathering of political influence undermines state institutions, even without the use of overt physical force. Consequently, the sociopolitical enterprise of having a unified, stable state is incompatible with the existence of, and public political support for, private paramilitary organizations, regardless of their actual or potential physical power. This argument succeeds regardless of the moral status of such paramilitary groups. Such groups, when they match the essential components of the description Han Feizi provides, are practically and politically antithetical to the integrity of the state. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How do people acquire modesty? A simple answer is: if people see that modesty is a worthy trait, they will incorporate it into their character. However, sometimes the knowledge that one is modest would undermine one's modesty. So, Driver claims that the modest person must not know his merits. If we are to accept Driver's claim, it would be difficult for us to conceive how learners can consciously acquire this virtue. In response, Bommarito puts forward a more moderate claim. The modest person does not need to be ignorant of his good qualities; even if he knows about them, he must not pay attention to them. Bommarito's explanation opens a space for Asian philosophers to engage in the debate. Asian philosophers generally emphasize the importance of practice and how practitioners must attend to the state of their consciousness so that they are not carried away by their desires. With regard to this, I put forward two ideas in this paper. First, I propose a third account of modesty, the knowledge account. I argue that modesty, in its worthy form, requires an agent's understanding of his temptations and weaknesses. Second, I will explain the Confucian view of moral education in regard to this discussion. I introduce strategies regarding learners' acquisition of virtues, including self-cultivation and cultivation through following rituals in interpersonal affairs. I believe that the Confucian view of moral education would enable agents to acquire virtues without the self-denial that troubles Driver and Bommarito. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What are the fundamental divisions in ethics? Which divisions capture the most important and basic options in moral theorizing? In this article, I reject the ‘Textbook View’ which takes the tripartite division between consequentialism, deontology, and virtue ethics to be fundamental. Instead, I suggest that moral theories are fundamentally divided into three independent divisions, which I call the neutral/relative division, the normative priority division, and the maximizing division. I argue that this account of the fundamental divisions of ethics better captures the main concerns that normative ethicists have when assessing moral theories. It also helps us make progress in comparative ethics and makes visible theoretical possibilities obscured by the Textbook View. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One of the ways in which a philosophy may exhibit its national character is to take up an acknowledged national theme or project and address it philosophically. This is the approach that I will take. This article establishes, through reference to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada (2008–2015) and the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2007), that the relationship between Indigenous knowledge and Western science-based knowledge has become a recognized public issue in Canada. It shows that a relationship, or translation, exists between Indigenous knowledge and Western science-based knowledge through a linchpin that can be called "ecology." Finally, it explicates the relation of spirit to embodiment within this translation through a comparison of Indigenous knowledge with a contemporary current in cognitive science. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What place does freedom have in Confucianism? We find a wide spectrum of views on the matter: some deny that Confucians value or even conceive of freedom, while others celebrate uniquely exalted forms of Confucian freedom. This paper examines the range of proposals, finding consensus among these diverse views in that all identify distinctive Confucian emphases on (i) subjective affirmation of the good and (ii) the cultivation of desires and intentions to align with that good. The variation among views of Confucian freedom does not result from disparate interpretations of Confucian teachings. Rather, their divergence lies in affirming or denying that these core aspects of Confucian thought should be seen as 'freedom.' This reveals an undiscussed, fundamental question regarding Confucian freedom: Can and should we see the traditional Confucian moral ideal—that is, Confucian goodness and sagely virtue—as versions of freedom? What do we gain by doing so? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Field philosophy is a method of philosophical practice. As such, it is open or neutral with regard to topic and content, to the social location of collaborators, and to the type of outcome or product that is its aim. With regard to its criteria, field philosophers may pursue philosophical collaborations in government, business, entertainment, religion, science, or other areas. In this paper, I respond to critiques of philosophers doing politically engaged work and then show that there are several reasons that field philosophy is strongly suitable for the pursuit of social justice. First, researchers with an existing interest in civic engagement and social justice will find field philosophy effective for achieving concrete goals. Second, social justice depends on ethical arguments, so there is an existing interest in incorporating philosophical perspectives. Third, field philosophers can draw on resources developed by feminist and racial justice scholars who have long theorized the association between academic practice and political engagement. And fourth, feminist and progressive inquiry develops insights into the functioning of social institutions. Cross-culturally, field philosophy is a research method that develops reflective participation in knowledge production and that supports academic engagement in decision-making for positive social outcomes, however, those are locally construed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of this paper is to offer a new interpretation of the controversial concept of 'immanent transcendence' (neizai chaoyue 内在超越) in the work of the Confucian philosopher Mou Zongsan 牟宗三 (1909–1995). After a series of introductory remarks on the semantic and conceptual range of the terms 'immanence' and 'transcendence' in comparative philosophy, I go on to provide a historically sensitive analysis of the origins of thenotion of 'immanent transcendence' in Mou's work. In doing so, I argue that rather than merely reflecting a blanket ontological or epistemological claim serving todifferentiate Chinese from Western culture and thought, the paradoxical concept of 'immanent transcendence' has a profoundly socio-political dimension and testifies Mou's efforts to maintain a form of continuity between the normative and the factual in the face of the unprecedented challenges faced by the Confucian tradition in the modern era. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Typical modes of reasoning in the Chinese tradition have often been described by Western thinkers as 'correlative' or 'analogical' in contrast with the supposedly rational, Western mode of reasoning. However, analogical reasoning has a prominent place in much of pre-modern writing in the West, including philosophical, medical, and theological treatises. At a glance, some readers may note a similarity between Western analogical thinking and Chinese correlative (tongbian) thinking. However, closer inspection reveals that analogies in the Western tradition and Chinese correlations had very little in common. Analogical thinking in the West often relied on deeper causal relations (as in the Hippocratic tradition) or on underlying principles of similarity (as with Plato's analogies). In contrast, Chinese tongbian thought often constructed correlative arguments based on patterns of similarity inherent in the world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Statistics show that in academic, as well as the conservative part of philosophical society of contemporary Iran, the considerable part of papers, theses and research projects are devoted to comparative philosophy. In the first part of this essay we will struggle to show this domination relying on some official statistics. But this event is associated with numerous side effects and shortcomings which will be discussed in the second part of the paper. In the third part, the causes and roots of this event will be assayed. But among various mentioned causes one cause seems to be more prominent. Serious engagement with comparative studies is a stage of fundamental approach of conservative institutes, and to some extent, of experts of humanities in Iran, to western humanities in order to indigenize those sciences and this in turn has its origin in certain ideological and political motives persuaded by the quarrel with the west. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article opens with a discussion of recent theoretical and methodological innovations in the field of comparative philosophy. In this regard, I propose and explain a new possible method of contrasting particular aspects of divergent philosophical texts or discourses and denote it as a 'philosophy of sublation'. Then, the paper provides a concrete example for such a post-comparative method of reasoning, I will try to apply a 'sublation philosophy' approach for a reinterpretation of certain aspects of the complex philosophical intersections between modern Japanese and Chinese philosophies through the lens of a contrastive analysis of Nishida Kitarō's and Mou Zongsan's dialectical thought. In this way, I hope to shed some new light upon some general questions regarding different models of dialectics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores the mountain as a site of pilgrimage. It considers the efficacy of pain and peril in bringing value to the 'sacred' point of arrival in the contexts of pilgrimage, expedition and objective exploration, focussing on the contextual history and contemporary experience of walks around Mount Kailash in Tibet, referring back to the other examples to form a comparative argument around the broader issues of relativity connecting the embodied to the spiritually realised. There are facts here, imaginings, reconstructions and subjectivity but these find consolidation in three foci: 1. The peaceful and unanimous appropriation of a single sacred space by multiple religions; 2. The ritual liminoid efficacy of a pilgrimage in a genuinely perilous environment; 3. The intertextuality of the symbolic space and the real space as they are performed within the unique natural mandala of Mount Kailas in Tibet. Kailash is the spiritual centre of the universe in Tibetan Buddhism, the home of Siva in Hinduism and is also a holy site in Bonism; it is therefore a multi-faith site with multiple symbolic existences operative at once. However, it was also once perceived to be the possible source of great rivers such as the Ganges and as such is bound up with colonial tales of secret and disguised Victorian expeditions to survey and map, usually ending in great peril. Pilgrims and expeditionaries walk around the mountain - indeed it is claimed to be a pilgrimage route to a 5th of the world's population - in a circumnavigation that takes them to some 18600 feet in the outer kora, higher on the inner, and as such the 'walk' claims lives annually. The article will draw upon experiences of the walk, both secular and non-secular, both physical and meta-physical, exploring written accounts from the multiple perspectives of authors such as Krishna Yadav, Colin Thubron, Shri Swami Satchinanada, Gibbons & Pritchard-Jones, John Snelling, Charles Allen. The article will conclude with a consideration of the higher space and a state of liminal realisation gained only when something is risked through the traversing of that space; it will look at the crucial and causal link that connects exposure to self-endangerment, the charging of a sacred venue and the attainments realised. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Zhi is an important Chinese notion that conveys among other things human capacity to set aims, to determine a course of action, or to persist in a resolve. The term naturally turns up in Chinese contributions to Western Free Will debate. In this paper, I explain zhi by working out a comparison that goes from East to West. I do a three-fold textual analysis of zhi focusing on the Mencius. I outline different usages found in the text, examine a nuanced, dominant meaning suggested in 2A.2, and discuss notional features based on language patterns. My analysis yields a more homegrown understanding of zhi which I shall compare with Western expressions of moral agency. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After some introductory remarks on the work of the modern Chinese philosopher Feng Qi, I begin this article by providing some observations concerning the ambiguous notion of ‘wisdom’ in Orientalist representations of non-Western thought and in comparative philosophy, as well as on the peculiar form of subjectivity ascribed to the ‘wise’ subject. I then proceed by offering an account of Feng’s philosophical universalism and historical materialist outlook, outlining the identification of wisdom with metaphysics in his early work and exploring the status and function of wisdom in his mature writings. In doing so, I analyze the tension in Feng’s work between the theoretical rationality and systematicity of ‘metaphysics’ on the one hand and the existential and transformative orientation of ‘wisdom’ on the other. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I suggest that Kierkegaard proves a helpful interlocutor in the debate aboutAnalects13.18 and the meaning ofyin隱. After surveying the contemporary debate, I argue that Kierkegaard and the Confucians agree on three important points. First, they both present relational selves. Second, both believe certain relationships (God for Kierkegaard andtian天 and the sages for the Confucians) are integral for moral knowledge. Third, both present a differentiated account of love where our obligations are highest to those with whom we are closest. Moreover, Kierkegaard’s ‘covering’ in the deliberation ‘Love covers a multitude of sins’ inWorks of Loveof ‘covering’ suggests innovative meanings foryin隱 that are compatible with Confucian philosophy. Finally, I argue that sagely discretion in covering on the Confucian account is like the teleological suspension of the ethical. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Confucianism tends to play only a marginal role in current theorizing about justice, which is a global pursuit dominated by Western theory and its strong tendency to assume that justice refers to some substantive conception of distributive, socioeconomic justice. This article examines and compares reconstructions of Confucian justice by Joseph Chan, May Sim, and Fan Ruiping. Each reconstruction makes reference to both classical and modern Western justice theory and thus each involves a comparative approach; indeed, each reconstruction seeks ultimately, in its own distinctive fashion, to present a version of Confucian justice that is comparable with modern Western justice theory. In this article we assess, critically and comparatively, the tertium comparationis and the arguments in each reconstruction. While our analysis does not wholly endorse any of the reconstructions, it shows that there is a richness and vitality to Confucian justice theory that merits proper consideration in justice theory conceived as a truly global and cosmopolitan discipline. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores the pedagogical implications of John Dewey’s claim that his definition of experience is shared by Daoists. It compares characteristics of experience with those in Daoism, and then considers the similarities and differences between key cultivation practices each proposes, focusing on the roles of the teacher and sage. My main reference to Daoism is the translation of the Daodejing by Roger Ames and David Hall, who use Dewey’s conception of experience to explain the character of Daoism. There are two facts that Dewey chooses to define experience and link with Daoism—what it is not, and what it is. Comparisons of these facts with Daoism support Dewey’s claim: both define the ‘what is’ as the principle of unity of opposites. While sharing this view, their proposals for its cultivation reveal similarities, but also some significant differences. The Daodejing gives the Daoist sage a major role to play in the cultivation process of other persons, as does Dewey for the teacher. However, unlike Dewey’s teacher who guides the process, the sage is to create a cultivating environment, thus allowing the sage to ‘let go.’ The Daoist practices offer new ideas to consider in the quest for experience in lessons. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The contribution focuses on Neo-Confucian texts as collected by Zhu Xi (朱熹 1130–1200) and Lü Zuqian (1137–1181) and is a look from the ‘outside’, from the perspective of German theories of Bildung (‘self-cultivation’). It aims at demonstrating that among other insights that today’s readers may gather from Neo-Confucian literature, one aspect protrudes from others: that learning can be considered as a virtue—even a meta-virtue—a form of life and mode of self-formation of the person. It does not seem exaggerated, from this perspective, to state that Neo-Confucian philosophy is—to a large extent—a philosophy of learning and self-transformation which offers fruitful irritants for questioning the widespread habits of thinking about skills and their development in today’s strong and problematic discourses and corresponding educational policies. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

An introduction is presented to a special issue on Confucian views of learning in relation to humanistic pedagogy in East Asia, noting issue articles on topics such as a comparison of Socratic and Confucian views on learning, Neo-Confucian philosophy in relation to Western approaches, and the role of self-transformation in Confucian thought.

This paper attempts to do a comparative study on two traditions of humanistic pedagogies, West and East, represented by the Socratic and the Confucian teachings. It is intended to put into question our common misunderstanding reflected in the stereotyped contrasts between the Socratic self and the Confucian self: an intellectualist vs. a moralist, an active vs. a passive learner, and a political progressive vs. a political conservative. In this attempt, I will focus on the clarification of the idea of ‘self-knowledge’ in each thinker, especially in its connection to our being virtuous or good. This bold attempt will give us a chance to view Socratic and Confucian teachings from an unfamiliar perspective, which will in turn lead us to see where and how the two thinkers’ teachings can converge and diverge in a new light for our humanistic teaching. It will also show how a comparative study in philosophy of education can contribute to constructive intercultural conversations. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The term ‘humanism’ is Western in origin. It denotes the tradition that places special emphasis on cultivation of letters for education. In the West, this tradition was originated with sophists and Isocrates, established by Cicero, and was developed by Renaissance humanists. East Asia, however, also has its own humanistic traditions with equal educational relevance. One of these is a Japanese version of Confucian humanism established by Ogyu Sorai (1666–1728). This tradition is based on the interpretation of Confucius as a lover of poetry and a teacher of rites. In this article, we discuss the main features of East Asian humanism represented by Sorai and Confucius. Then, after an overview of Western humanism, we aim to elucidate both the convergence and divergence of the two traditions. The investigation will help us (hopefully) to envision humanistic education of the twenty-first century. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

An editorial is presented in which the author discusses Eastern and Western cultural foundations underlying philosophical and ethical views on learning, highlighting the views of philosophers Socrates and Confucius. The author considers differences in the ethical thought of Socrates and Confucius, and he considers problems with the approach of comparative philosophy.

In recent years, it has become a popular trend for the scholars in comparative philosophy to interpret Confucian moral theory by means of Aristotelian virtue ethics. However, this interpretation overlooks the relation-centred characteristics of Confucian ethics that is lacking in Aristotelian ethics. In this article, I will argue that there is relation-based ethics in the Western tradition—the ethics of Thomas Aquinas. By examining Aquinas's theory of love, I will show the relational characteristics of his ethics. I will use Aquinas's theory of love to interpret three important points of Confucian ethics: filial reverence and material support are both integral parts of xiao孝 (filial piety); the importance of remonstration for xiao; and the symmetrical features of Confucius's virtues. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article is an introduction to an ancient Egyptian text called The Tale of the Eloquent Peasant and an argument that it ought to be seen as a classic of political philosophy. After contextualizing the tale as part of a tradition of moral and political philosophy in ancient Egypt, I explore the methods by which the text defines the proper roles of political authority and contrast its approach to justifying political authority with the argument from the state of nature so common in modern Western political philosophy. I claim that the tale's argument from dysfunction anticipates the move in contemporary Western political philosophy towards privileging non-ideal over ideal theory. I discuss challenges in translating the key term in the tale –ma'at– in light of the fact that it can be taken to mean ‘justice’ and/or ‘truth’. Finally, I discuss how the irony at the heart of its narrative can lead us to interpret the tale as having either conservative or revolutionary implications for the political system it depicts. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Nicholas Malebranche's Dialogue between a Christian Philosopher and a Chinese Philosopher on the Existence and Nature of God (1707) has long been characterized as being at best a thinly veiled attack on Spinozism and at worst a deeply flawed, Eurocentric misunderstanding of a foreign philosophy. However, a consideration of the context of the work's production and an analysis of Malebranche's argumentative strategy open up a way to understand the dialogue as an historically important, genuine engagement with Chinese philosophy. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This essay explores some of the affinities between current theories of North American Indigenous trickster narratives and continental philosophy where they are both concerned with the question of responsibility in subject formations. Taking up the work of Judith Butler, Franz Kafka and Gerald Vizenor, the author works to show how both continental and Indigenous intellectual traditions work against any assumed stability for the 'I' in the narration of the self, yet toward responsible relationality. Such affinities, however, emerge from differing socio-cultural and linguistic horizons that are not reducible one to the other. This is particularly so with regard to the natural world and the ways in which Indigenous narratives are developed to foster responsible subjects to a larger biotic environment. Through discussion of such affinities and differences, the author seeks to broaden and multiculturalize contemporary debates in philosophy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the independent invention and development of a system of comparative anthropology by the philosophers and scientists Immanuel Kant, Johann Gottfried Herder, and Wilhelm von Humboldt in late-19th century Prussia. They each attempted to analyze and distinguish the traits unique to individuals as well as traits that can be studied collectively as the characteristics of peoples, nations, and historical eras. Particular focus is given to their thoughts about human nature and human difference during a period of increasing state power and its global implications. Humboldt's conception of pluralism is discussed. Herder's idea of degenerative romanticism is examined.

Physical cosmology places constraints on philosophical cosmologies, understood in Alfred North Whitehead's sense as comprehensive theories of nature and ultimate reality. These constraints are not strict because it is usually possible for a philosophical cosmology to work around an awkward implication from physical cosmology, though the price may be a decrease in plausibility. This paper identifies distinctive patterns in the ways three different classes of philosophical cosmology - supernatural cosmology, process cosmology, and ground-of-being cosmology - negotiate constraints from physical cosmology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article explores the philosophical aspects between the Eastern and Western cultural relationships. It states that the cultural development of Western and Eastern countries has common components that are present in the actual experience of different nations. Moreover, it indicates that there is a considerable gap between the needs of macro theory and achievements in specific areas that relate to spiritual life in Eastern countries.

Haiyaso , a short text found in the collected works of the early Tokugawa Confucian Hayashi Razan (1583–1657), purports to be a record of a debate held in 1606 between Razan and the famous Japanese Jesuit scholastic Habian (1585–1621). The debate is presented in the text as a confrontation between Confucianism and Christianity. In the modern period, right up to the present, the text has been used prolifically to present ‘a conflict between Western thought and East Asian intellectual systems’ as one of the central stories of the intellectual history of early seventeenth-century Japan. In this sense, the text has been used to justify the imposition of fashionable modern dichotomies – between ‘East and West’ and ‘rational and religious’ – onto the intellectual history of Tokugawa Japan. This outlook has been supported by an inaccurate representation of Habian's Jesuit period treatise Myōtei mondō as some kind of ‘introduction to Western thought’. In fact, Myōtei mondō is a much more complex work which, among other things, shows the clear influence of Confucian and Neo-Confucian humanism. This article goes back to the extant source documents of indigenous Japanese Jesuit thought, and the attacks on it in the early seventeenth century. Through examining the ideas of Habian in contrast with other Japanese and Chinese Jesuit texts, and by analysing the context within which Haiyaso sits in Hayashi Razan's collected documents, the paper demonstrates that Haiyaso was a fabrication, in the sense that it is a work of propaganda probably written well after Habian's death, and imputing to Habian views that he clearly did not hold. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Contrary to Orientalist interpretations, authoritarian political practices are inconsistent with the axial Asian philosophies, which implicitly call for a socially responsible critical press (communication outlets). This is certainly the case with Buddhist philosophy. Confucianism and Hinduism also do not endorse authoritarianism. First, this essay analyzes each of these philosophies to show their disapproval of actions that enhance state authority and central control against people's wellbeing. Second, it identifies the probable reasons for the discrepancy between the ethico-political orientations of the main Asian philosophies and the authoritarian press practice prevalent in much of Asia and elsewhere, namely, (a) the failure of the Westcentric modernisation paradigm to uplift the "sovereign nation-states" in the periphery of the modern world-system, which grew out of the erstwhile colonial empires; (b) the appeal of continuing with the colonial tradition of governing through coercive and autocratic institutions to suppress public criticism; and (c) the impact of Orientalism, which caused the rulers of the new "nation-states" to misconstrue or ignore the principles embodied in Asian philosophies. Thus, political-economic reality appears to have superseded the ethico-political orientations of Asian philosophies in engendering the putative Asian model of development. However, because concepts such as freedom, democracy, authoritarianism, and social responsibility evoke different connotations in the West and the East, Freedom House's ranking of countries based on Westcentric criteria is debatable. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article seeks to locate the geo-social philosophies of Montesquieu and Watsuji Tetsurō within the distinct traditions of travel writing in Enlightenment Europe and early twentieth-century Japan. Both men exhibit common concerns for the nature of nation and nationalism, politicizing travel as a means of exploring Otherness. However, L'Esprit des Lois (1750) and Fūdo (1935) offer qualitatively distinct philosophical responses to the question of the relationship between climate and socio-political identity. While Montesquieu places humankind within an objective environment which acts upon the physical bodies of individuals, Watsuji suggests that the relationship between people and their climate is more essential: mankind exists in a climate, or not at all. It is suggested that these distinct philosophical systems reflect the environmentwithin which they were conceived: philosophy does not merely describe climate, but is itself modelled by it. In the case of Watsuji, the interdependence of travel, climate, philosophy and politics is seen to have disastrous consequences in the context of Imperial Japan. Finally, the article asks some questions about the significance of politicizing travel and climatizing philosophy in today’s world of globalization and environmental change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Introduces a series of articles about truth from the perspective of comparative philosophy. Developments in comparative philosophy; Contentions on the significance of comparative philosophy; Conceptualization of truth; Basic philosophical terms for dealing with truth.

Analyzes the relevance of comparative philosophical study to the problem of truth. Views of truth in various culture; Usefulness of truth beyond contemporary Western philosophy; Theories of truth.

The article presents the author's opinions and response to the essay "Socrates and Confucius: the cultural foundations and ethics of learning," by Michael A. Peters, published in the 2013 volume of the journal. Topics addressed include examination of the commonalities shared between the Eastern and Western educational philosophies of Socrates and Confucius, discussion on the merits of cross cultural studies, and suggestions for further inquiry surrounding different prominent figures.