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During the Beijing 2022 Winter Olympics, Eileen Gu attracted considerable attention and sparked numerous discussions on Chinese social media. Using the method of textual analysis, this paper examines the various responses of Chinese women, particularly Chinese feminists, to Eileen's achievements on Chinese social media, framing these responses within recent studies of neoliberalism's undoing of feminism as well as long-standing debates about the relationship between feminism and nationalism. This paper argues that discussions about Eileen on Chinese social media not only illustrate how neoliberalism is absorbed, reworked, and resisted in its transnational circulation but also demonstrate how nationalist narratives can be strategically used by Chinese feminists to validate their feminist positions. It further enriches existing scholarship on neoliberalism with a transnational perspective, reaffirms the importance of contextualizing the relationship between Third World feminism and nationalism, and highlights the significance of uncovering indigenous feminist resources in Third World countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As the Covid-19 pandemic has swept across the world, the wearing of medical facemasks has become a hot topic on social media. In China, the relevant discourses are entangled with codes of medical science, national self-esteem and appropriated modernity. These discourses can be dated back to the narrative established by Dr Wu Lien-teh, the great fighter in the Manchurian plagues of 1910–1911 and 1920–1921. This paper reveals that Wu and his colleagues used different strategies when displaying to the Western world their achievements in the anti-plague battle and when proving the effectiveness of the Western medical and hygienic system to Chinese people. Wu and his colleagues used metonymies, analogues and metaphors on or related to medical facemasks to illustrate the possibility of building a modernised nation with sovereignty. Because the construction of a sanitary system in China has always been labelled as a patriotic movement (Rogaski, Ruth. 2004. Hygienic Modernity: Meanings of Health and Disease in Treaty-Port China. Berkeley: University of California Press, 285–298), the wearing of medical facemasks has constituted an important part of the narrative of nationalism and hygienic modernity. This discourse continues to play a significant role in today's campaign against the coronavirus. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article investigates how fashion and nationalism were expressed through two iconic dress styles worn by women, the qipao in Taiwan and the terno in the Philippines in the post-WWII era. We consider the positioning of women's bodies in the nation-building project and how sartorial practices reflected expectations around gendered performance in the public and private spheres. Both countries emerged from domination by major powers—Japan and the US—in the post-war era and ruling elites were keen to project an image of nation that was distinctively Asian and modern, while the first ladies of both nations championed their respective styles of national dress. In the Philippines, the terno was a fusion garment adapted over time that reflected the nation's earlier cultural links with Spain, whereas in Taiwan the qipao marked women's bodies as Chinese in the public sphere as Chinese nationalists consolidated their political control over the country. We argue that the relative success and longevity of the terno in the Philippines is due to a lengthy, organic process of internal cultural authentication prior to its take-up by former First Lady Imelda Marcos, as opposed to the top-down imposition of the qipao on Taiwanese women's bodies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Chinese pre-nationalist, culturalist concepts of world order and of self and other have remained a powerful part of Chinese nationalist conceptualisations of the world, self and other. Here, I analyse Chinese concepts regarding the challenge of including non-Chinese peoples into the Chinese nation-state. Carrying critiques of Levenson's 'culturalism-to-nationalism thesis' forward, I demonstrate how culturalist concepts of the world became merged with nationalist concepts. Nationalist objectives made it necessary to adjust culturalism to new functions. I analyse how culturalism became a handy tool used by nationalist thinkers Liang Qichao, Zhang Taiyan and Sun Yat-sen to match the general nationalist ideal of a nation's homogeneity with the Chinese nationalist ideal of the Chinese nation-state's multi-ethnic territory. Culturalist arguments helped to undermine the right to build own nation-states for non-Chinese peoples, by putting this right into relation with certain qualities of peoples – culture, history, and population size. The Chinese inner-state 'other', the non-Chinese peoples, have been conceptualised as inferior in every of these qualities to deny them the right to build nation-states and instead legitimate their inclusion into the Chinese nation-state. Nevertheless, non-Chinese peoples will never be full members of the nation-state, but remain in 'exclusive inclusion' like Agamben's homo sacer. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Schools worldwide have long engaged in various forms of 'war education'. In China, an extensive 'Patriotic Education' campaign and an expanded 'National Defense Education' curriculum have led to an increase in youth-oriented military programs in the 2000s. Previous work on the implementation of these programs in Chinese schools has mostly focused on urban elite youth, while overlooking the reception of these programs by non-urban, non-elite populations. The present study addresses this issue by examining youth perceptions and experiences of military training courses in urban and rural high schools. Drawing on the analysis of Chinese publications in the 2000s and on data from field interviews with students of different backgrounds, the study finds that youth military training constitutes a contentious program. Although the Chinese government promotes the program as crucial for military strengthening and the fostering of a patriotic spirit, PRC academic and media writers provide alternative rationales for the program, which at times undermine the logic of government articulations. Meanwhile, interviews with youth document divergent attitudes and even resentment towards the program, especially among city youth. This finding casts doubt on the assumption that military-training courses necessarily contribute to the increased 'militarization' of Chinese youth and education. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The essay examines the changes and continuities in the construction of Chinese national sport hero(in)es after the Beijing 2008 Olympics, and investigates this development in the context of the reform of Chinese elite sport. Through employing Critical Discourse Analysis to interrogate the Chinese sport hero discourse from government-run media concerning two of the most renowned Chinese national sport hero(in)es, the paper identifies the maintenance, albeit with subtle changes, of the traditional nationalist account concerning the athletic and political qualities of Chinese national sport hero(in)es. Concurrently, there are also new features, which are argued to be the consequence of a shift in the political climate in Chinese sport, in the post-2008 construction of national sport hero. The paper concludes with a discussion, from a Foucauldian perspective, of the relationship between the discourse, knowledge and the power of/over discourse in the construction of Chinese elite athletes as national hero(in)es throughout the period. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study traces the way the evolving nature of the Korean national identity has shaped the construction of the Chineseness of immigrants as others. Two immigrant groups, Chinese immigrants called Hwagyo and Korean-Chinese referred to as Joseonjok, have constituted the majority of foreigners in Korea during different historical eras. Although Koreans assumed both represented 'Chinese' people, I argue that the core of their Chineseness was defined differently according to the evolving sense of the Korean subjectivity. The growth of the national economy and the culturally advanced and orderly society constituted the sources of the national character and provided legitimate grounds to discriminate against Chinese immigrants who were assumed to pose economic and cultural threats. This study suggests that the different logic of 'othering' is derived from the evolution of the Korean national identity in response to the nation's changing economic and political circumstances. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The history of the warship Zhenyuan/Chin'en 鎮遠 built in Germany for the Chinese navy and captured by the Japanese in 1895 during the First Sino-Japanese War is depicted in several different types of art works: not only multiple Japanese woodblock prints but also Chinese and Western illustrations show scenes involving this battleship. Combining these art works with historical accounts allows one to capture the significance of the ship as a symbol of national pride and identity of the different nations involved in its transnational history. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The study explored the strength of national identification and intergroup attitudes of Chinese youth (n = 591, aged 12-15) toward the Chinese, the Americans, the Japanese, and the South Koreans. The participants were asked to fill in a questionnaire and write down reasons why they 'like' or 'dislike' the four groups. The results showed a consistency in in-group favoritism. Gender and age were both related to Chinese youths' national identifications and their national intergroup attitudes. Confucian ethics, media influence and historical complex were identified as main factors that may contribute to their attitudes toward the four groups. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A widely-held perception is that the image of North Korea among most Chinese people has changed from that of a socialist comrade and ‘little brother’ to an idiosyncratic, trouble-making neighbor. This research questions the homogeneity of Chinese people’s viewpoints towards North Korea. Concepts of state and popular nationalism are used to examine differences and similarities between the Chinese state and its people in their perceptions and sentiments towards North Korea, mainly focusing on the period of succession from Kim Jong-il to Kim Jong-un. Examining online discussions representing Chinese popular nationalism demonstrated that Chinese netizens’ political viewpoints are diversified along the ideological spectrum of left and right and that only the ‘moderate left’ netizens hold an image of North Korea which is close to that of their political authorities. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Scholars tend to overlook the overseas Chinese press as a communicative tool for Chinese nationalism. This paper takes media history as its focal point to demonstrate the contextual influences that shaped the operations of Chinese print media and gave rise to the manifestation of the overseas Chinese (huaqiao) identity in Japan. In particular, it emphasises that the mobilisation of the modern Chinese nationalism movement of the time was not the sole determinant of Chinese identity. It was also influenced by the way in which Chinese ethnic boundaries came to be shaped and reshaped in different historical periods through the dynamics between overseas Chinese communities and Japanese society. I use two overseas Chinese publications from different periods to illustrate the impacts of modern Chinese nationalism and the changing social and political context of Japan on the Chinese press. Finally, I present a synthetic narrative to account for the history of the overseas Chinese press in Japan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper critically assesses the issues surrounding nineteenth-century Chinese migration to British colonies, especially Australia. The issues discussed in the paper include the origin of the term “sojourner” and its relationship to Western colonialism, and the origin of the termhuaqiao(overseas Chinese) and its relationship to Chinese nationalism. By being critical of the narrative of the “sojourner” for its cultural essentialist approach to Chinese migration, the paper highlights two important aspects of Chinese migration patterns and behaviour that are often neglected by the sojourner narrative: socioeconomic circumstances at the origin of migration and Western colonialism at the destination of migration. The paper argues that the Chinese publications by the migrants and what happened in Hong Kong at that time demonstrate the consequences of the combination of these two aspects of history. The paper finally observes that the little understood behaviour of the Chinese peasantry migrants appears to be post-modern and transnational. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This paper takes a reflective look at the notions of identity, ‘race’ and ethnicity using a few ancient and modern Chinese ‘texts’. It begins with an examination of the reforms known as ‘adopting the costume of barbarian/foreign people and practicing mounted archery [hufuqishe]’ carried out by King Wuling 武靈王 (in reign 325–299 BCE) in 307 BCE as described in theZhan Guo Ce戰國策 and theShiji史記 by Sima Qian 司馬遷 (c.145-c.87 BCE). Its cultural and educational significance is then discussed in order to show how the issues faced by King Wuling are still relevant to the educational scene in the contemporary world. Some recent materials from Hong Kong school textbooks relating to the issues on identity and ‘race’ are then used to contrast and compare with the approach taken by King Wuling. This study argues that the inability to take a critical stance toward categories such as ‘race’ (zhongzu) risks perpetuating dated and ethically questionable mentalities. In addition, the importance of taking into consideration issues pertaining to purpose and evaluation in the context of education is highlighted. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Employing national identity theories and survey data in Taiwan, this article explains national identity shift in Taiwan. Descriptively we find that most Taiwanese people reject being called ‘Chinese’ (zhongguoren) when asked about their national identity. However, they do not deny their ethnic and cultural Chinese identity. What they object to is being called Chinese nationals, especially this China which is internationally recognized as the People’s Republic of China. In other words, most Taiwanese people do not identify themselves with the mainland Chinese state even though they still associate themselves with the Chinese nation. It is also noted that there is no consensus with regard to national identity in Taiwan, since close to one third of the population still do not object to be called zhongguoren. The author’s analytical findings further confirm that external sovereignty-related factors are related to the Taiwanese national identity shift. Specifically, a changed state boundary, separation desire from mainland China, and recognition of Taiwan as a sovereign state, not the distinctive cultural reconstruction inside Taiwan, contribute to the national identity shift in Taiwan. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Since Hong Kong's reunification with the People's Republic of China in 1997, debates about patriotism have erupted from time to time in Hong Kong. Considering Hong Kong's socio-political background, the feelings and attachment of Hongkongers towards their motherland are unsurprisingly complex. We therefore need a multidimensional concept to capture the complexities of Hong Kong patriotism. Based on survey data, we propose that the term ‘liberal patriotism’ best describes the type of patriotism in Hong Kong society, which is that love of the homeland and the state are qualified by liberal democratic values. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Following the revolution of 1932 that ended absolute monarchy in Siam, a new government came into power that sought to legitimize its rule by encouraging mass identification with the state. Practically, the expansion of a wage economy and the development of a state-led education system were seen by government officials as central to promoting a sense of citizenship to as yet disinterested rural communities. Throughout its first decade in power, the government thus set up projects to provide such groups with skills that might contribute to their overall material advancement. Following the lead of similar endeavours, particularly in India, one of the principal ways in which it would do this was through the production and bringing to market of cotton textiles. However, with foreign imports both superior in quality and cheaper than anything produced internally, the state struggled to establish a public relations message that might convince consumers to purchase Thai-produced textiles. As a result of specific limitations rooted in Thailand's ambiguous status globally, this meant that Thai leaders struggled to replicate the success of such movements elsewhere. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The 2005 anti-Japan protests in China inaugurated a new era of Chinese popular nationalism with their pervasive visuality and virtuality. The outpouring of emotions in cityscapes and cyberspaces – anger, outrage, zealousness and even pleasure – requires us to take emotion, passion, hope or sheer delight seriously and to recognize the power of some of the more alarming forms of popular nationalist sentimentality. This chapter analyses one instance of Sino-Japanese relations: the epithet of ‘riben guizi’ or Japanese devils in Chinese popular culture in four historical moments: late-Sinocentric imperium, high imperialism, socialist nationalism and post-socialist globalization. I want to suggest that while this ‘hate word’ performs an affective politics of recognition stemming from an ineluctable trauma of imperialist violence, it ultimately fails in establishing a politics of reconciliation. I argue that anti-Japanism in China is less about Japan than China's own self-image mediated through its asymmetrical power relations with Japan throughout its modern history. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The current study examined national culture differences between US American and Chinese participants (N = 317) regarding face need concerns and apology intention, based on positive and negative face needs (Brown & Levinson, 1987) and concerns for self-face and other-face (Ting-Toomey, 2005). Participants read vignettes that varied in relationship types (in-group vs. out-group members) and situation types (negative face vs. positive face threatening) and responded to scales measuring realism of the vignettes, intention to apologize, and five types of face need concerns. The findings showed that Chinese participants, compared to US Americans, had stronger intentions to apologize when their acts threatened the other person's positive face, while US American participants, compared to Chinese, had stronger intentions to apologize when their acts threatened the other's negative face. Other findings and implications thereof are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Chinese nationalism has ignited much debate among academics and the general public in both China and the West. Rather than search for the true core of Chinese nationalism, this essay will examine the curious custom of National Humiliation Day as an oblique entry into the politics of identity. The nation is not simply a question of people or territory, the author contends, but of time: the national time scripted by events such as National Humiliation Day. By comparing the differing practices of the holiday as it was celebrated in the early twentieth century and is observed in the early twenty-first century, the author argues that in the early twentieth century the political performances aimed to produce a proper Chinese nation out of the clashes between the Qing dynasty, northern warlords, and foreign empires. The goal was to construct a “China” worthy of being saved. When National Humiliation Day was revived in China at the turn of the twenty-first century, the political performances were more focused on containing the nation through a commemoration of the various crises of the early twentieth century. Thus the essay will argue that the nation does not arise from the ideology of its leaders, as much as through popular performances such as National Humiliation Day. Hence it shows how politics is best analyzed as a series of performances, not just by state actors in official sites like the Foreign Ministry, but also through the cultural governance of less official sites in art, film, literature — and public holidays. In this way, National Humiliation Day activities go beyond producing and containing nationalism; Chinese people are also consuming nationalism as part of a symbolic economy that generates identity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article compares and contrasts the Internet-based national identity projects of overseas Chinese and near abroad Russians. Our study, which is based on two diasporic communities of similar size and both characterized by a historical weakness of national identity, finds that while Internet use seems to be increasing nationalism and reifying national identity among the ethnic Chinese living in the Pacific Rim, it is paradoxically dampening nationalism and weakening national identity among the Russians living in post-Soviet space. Our thesis is that this divergence results from a combination of factors rooted in the real world, not the virtual. These factors include: the perceived benefits of stressing national identity in ingroup/outgroup interactions, conflicts or competition with other identity anchors, and the political and economic stature of their respective ethnic homelands. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article provides information of the essential principles of patriotic education for the Chinese nationality. The goals of developing patriotic education include the inspiration of national spirit, promotion of national cohesion, and foster national pride and dignity. Another principle involve the adherence to the policy of focusing on nation-building. It also strengthens the leadership and patriotic consciousness, sets up patriotic education bases, and creates a societal atmosphere for patriotic education.

The article focuses on Chinese immigrants and the problem of national identity in the work of artist Emily Carr. Carr's approach to the Chinese at times bears similarities to her assumptions about First Nations persons, although, at other times, it is contrary to these assumptions: the manner, for example, in which she foregrounded and enfolded First Nations cultural forms into her own work is similar to her ostensibly benign assessment of Chinese art, artists, and religious figures, but her indignation at the manner in which First Nations persons are treated by the government never extends to the Chinese.

This article looks at the early history of the British Chinese community in the light of transnational studies. It questions the belief that homeland and intradiasporic economic ties are predominantly new, save on the rare occasions that elites maintained them, and that early political transnationalism was less common still and even more sure to be elite based. In so doing, it draws attention to the role played by political elites in galvanising migrant communities. It also analyses the role played by class-based organisations in constructing transnational ties, a form of Chinese transnationalism that other studies fail to note. It finds that transnational practices and institutions pervaded the early community in its immigrant phases, both from below and from above. This immigration was overwhelmingly proletarian, but nonetheless transnational. Though basically economic, the transnational community was also political. Capturing a mass base among Chinese overseas was a central strategy of late-Qing dissidents. Crucially, China's early radicals shared a Cantonese origin with their compatriots in Britain, North America, Australia, and elsewhere. The article's findings challenge transnational theories, which stress contemporaneity, economics, and elites. The political cultivation of Chinese in Southeast Asia by Republicans and Communists has been the subject of numerous studies. Far less is known about analogous activities in Europe. By exploring early Republican and Communist influences on the Chinese in Britain, this article traces further paths along which diasporic nationalism spread. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Focuses on Chinese Protestant nationalism in the United States from 1880 to 1927. Influence among the Chinese in American and Chinese politics; Reform efforts; Character and development of the ideology of Chinese Protestant nationalism.