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This paper attempts to explore the connections between expanding female education and the participation of women in paid employment in Japan, China and India, three of Asia's largest economies. Analysis based on existing data and literature shows that despite the large expansion in educational access in these countries in the last half century, women have lacked egalitarian labour market opportunities. A combination of social discouragement and individual choice largely explains the withdrawal, non-participation or intermittent female presence in the labour force, notwithstanding increased educational access. In taking stock of these issues and debates across these countries, it is argued that the parallel experiences of women in these countries can be traced back to persistent gender norms which, amongst other things, imply the centrality of marriage and non-market unpaid labour for women. The paper argues that there is a need for gender-sensitive public policy in order for increased education to translate to labour market gains for women, leading to sustainable development outcomes. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This paper examines defense industrialization in three leading arms-producing states in Asia - India, Japan, and South Korea - and how their experiences compare to China's recent defense industrial developments. It argues that despite decades of considerable effort and investments in pursuit of a techno-nationalist self-arming strategy, these countries have experienced only modest success when it comes to achieving such self-reliance. Most regional defense industrial bases lack the necessary design skills and technological expertise in order to truly innovate, and at best these countries act as 'late innovators' when it comes to armaments production. The experiences of these countries have lessons for China as it attempts to move into the first tier of arms-producing states. China has over the past 15 years made significant progress in modernizing its defense technological and industrial base. At the same time, China faces the same long-term challenges that currently confront other regional arms industries - that is, making techno-nationalism work at the later stages of innovation. This is particularly critical as China's defense industry strives to move from a basically platform-centric to an increasingly network-centric technological-industrial process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper examines if the ‘economic centre’ of Asia is likely to shift over the next 20 years. In this context, it addresses the widely held notion that a deterioration of Southeast Asia's geographic centrality within the Asia Pacific region is likely to occur due to the rise of China. GNP-weighted centrality indices are calculated for major Asian cities, and it is shown that the changing economic map of Asia is unlikely to lead to geographic marginalization of Southeast Asia: even if the economic importance of China increases significantly, this will be more than offset by the corresponding decline of Japan. As a consequence, the total economic weight of Northeast Asia is likely to decrease slightly compared to Southeast Asia and Greater India over the next 20 years, with the economic centre of Asia moving further to the southwest. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With the rapid rise of competitive space activities within Asia, this study examines the prospects for increasing international cooperation. After discussing relevant conceptual issues, it surveys the space policies particularly of China, India, Japan, and South Korea and examines the skewed patterns of cooperation seen at the international, regional, and bilateral levels. It then analyzes the historical, technology, and political factors that have impeded, especially regional, space cooperation in Asia to date. The study concludes that expanded regional space cooperation is an unlikely near-term outcome, but the paper also argues that the risks entailed in the current situation are growing and that US policy initiatives could make a difference in helping to lead countries out of this dead-end. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The growing India-Japan engagements are not only focused on economic issues, but also cover a wide range of interests, including regional security, political, and maritime security concerns. Both countries are consolidating strategic partnerships to address the risks and vulnerabilities posed by the evolving regional balance of power. Through their embeddedness with China, both India and Japan form an intrinsic part of the Indo-Pacific geopolitical security architecture. The key transformation of relations between these two states in the region is in response to the geopolitical change brought about by China's rapid ascension. In this regard, the article further explains how both countries are systematically strengthening a strategic partnership and gradually reinforcing economic, political, security, and strategic cooperation against China. This article seeks to address how both states would restrain rising China's strategic maneuvering in the Indo-Pacific region through an analysis of the India-Japan alignment, with the main focus of this study being on analyzing how both India and Japan are now investing in a long-term strategy to balance China's hegemonic policies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We aim to investigate the impact of environmental entrepreneurship and green innovations on CO2 emissions in highly polluting Asian economies. For empirical estimation, we have applied ARDL and NARDL models. In the short run, the linear estimates of environmental entrepreneurship are significant in China and India. The short-run non-linear estimates of environmental entrepreneurship are significant in the case of China, India, and Japan. Similarly, the short-run linear estimates of green innovations are significant in China, India, and Japan, whereas the non-linear estimated coefficients of green innovation appeared to be significant in India, Japan, and Russia. In the long run, the linear estimates of environmental entrepreneurship are negative and significant in three countries, namely China, Japan, and Russia. Similarly, the estimates of green innovations are negative and significant in China, India, Japan, and Russia. In the non-linear model, the estimated coefficients of positive shock in environmental entrepreneurship are significant and negative in the case of China, India, and Japan; while, the estimates of negative shock in environmental entrepreneurship are negative and significant in India only. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Lisbon Treaty enacted in 2009 allows the European Union (EU) to adopt a foreign, security, and defense policy with a higher profile. In particular, the High Representative and the European External Action Service are now in a position to conduct a continuous conversation with China, India, Japan, and ASEAN beyond trade-oriented dialogues. But a genuine strategic approach toward Asia requires military expertise so as to adequately assess how to best contribute to stability in this part of the world. Military diplomacy involving individual member states already takes place, yet virtually no information is shared at the EU level. The adoption of a full-fledged strategic approach toward Asia would not only be politically astute and make excellent economic sense; it can also consolidate EU institutions in the realm of foreign, security and defense policy. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This essay considers the special status of ruins (and especially Rome), not simply as objects that defy time and bear tangible witness to the past, but because of their function as symptoms and guardians of historical consciousness. Fragmentary and no longer capable of performing the function for which they were originally built, buildings in ruins mark the lost and the invisible, but in doing so, mark permanence and duration. The author questions the universality of ruins and asks whether (as Chateaubriand, for example, suggests) it is true that ‘all men have a secret attraction to ruins’. The author considers Rome's place in the European tradition of ‘the end of the world’ in comparison to traditions in India, China, and Japan, and identifies important ancient differences. In China, for example, the past and the passage of time are represented by other means. Ruins do not occupy a place in cultural memory comparable to that within the European tradition. The meaning of ruins, the author suggests, ‘is peculiar to Western culture’. It is part of one distinct set of strategies for marking historical breaks, but also ensuring a sense of continuity, both of which underlie the necessity of ruins. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The author argues that India must restructure its foreign and security policies within the framework of a multipolar world, in which China has become the second largest economy, while the economies of U.S., Europe and Japan have stagnated. The key factors to a new Indian foreign policy are hinged on the presence of an unstable neighborhood, an assertive China and a divided domestic politics. The author also believes that India must use its economic, cultural, military and diplomatic profiles to highlights its place in the international arena.

Background Statistics are critical in holding governments accountable for the well-being of citizens with disability. International initiatives are underway to improve the quality of disability statistics, but meaningful ID data is exceptionally rare. Method The status of ID data was evaluated in a review of 12 national statistical systems. Recurring data collection by national ministries was identified and the availability of measures of poverty, exclusion, and disadvantage was assessed. Results A total of 131 recurring systems coordinated by 50 different ministries were identified. The majority included general disability but less than 25% of the systems screened ID. Of these, few provided policy-relevant data. Conclusions The scope of ID data was dismal at best, though a significant statistical infrastructure exists for the integration of ID data. Advocacy will be necessary. There is no optimal form of data monitoring, and decisions regarding priorities in purpose, targeted audiences, and the goals for surveillance must be resolved. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When the subprime-induced financial crisis broke out in the U.S. housing sector in the summer of 2007 and mushroomed into a global financial crisis by September 2008, it was widely believed that the Asian economies, especially the 'big four'-Japan, China, South Korea, and India-would remain largely immune from the worst of the crisis. However, this assumption has proven to be false. All four countries have felt the negative impact of the financial contagion-albeit differently. Whereas China and India have been moderately impacted, Japan and South Korea have experienced heightened financial instability, sharp economic contraction, and a deep recession. What explains the big four's vulnerability to the crisis, and why have Japan and South Korea been affected more negatively than China and India? How have the four countries responded to the crisis, and what can they do to further insulate their economies from the vagaries of the global financial markets? In this article, the author addresses these interrelated issues. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study compares the patterns of women's employment in four major Asian economies: China, India, Japan and South Korea. It illuminates how the heterogeneous characteristics of political regimes, institutional arrangements and societal values are manifested in the employment system and human resources of each country. It also reveals the varying cultural, social and institutional forces that prevail, despite similar outcomes of women's employment. The contribution adds to existing knowledge of women's employment through the comparison of four major Asian countries which remains under-explored. It also contributes to the theoretical debates of gender and employment by adopting an interdisciplinary analytical framework that incorporates socio-cultural, politico-economic and institutional perspectives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Confronted during the first decade of the twenty-first century with the rapidly burgeoning US-Indian security partnership and then by the emergence of the India-Japan security relationship, Beijing struggled to respond. After initially attempting to court India away from a too-close partnership with the United States in the first half of the decade, Beijing shifted to a more coercive approach around the end of 2005. One key mechanism used to pressure India was psychological war waged via the Internet raising the possibility of another Sino-Indian war. As China shifted from a soft to a hard-line approach toward India, policy toward Japan was moving in the opposite direction. After keeping relations with Japan in the freezer during the early part of the decade, around 2006, Beijing shifted gear and adopted a much more conciliatory approach. The authors hypothesize that these simultaneous shifts in Sino-Indian and Sino-Japanese relations were not coincidence but predicated instead on an understanding that simultaneous efforts to pressure Japan and India could drive those countries further together. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Having maintained a low-key relationship since early postwar, Japan today shows increasing interest in India as a rising economic and regional power. The two nations are now developing ties in many areas consequent with India's ascent, most importantly in politico-strategic matters. This strategic development is intriguing as Tokyo was one of the most critical voices condemning New Delhi's decision to conduct nuclear testing in 1998, when the relationship reached its nadir. So why this strategic repositioning and why now? This article explores Japan's move towards India as an attempt to balance and bandwagon strategically. Japan's strategic thinking now recognises India as potential balance for Japan against China while Japan bandwagons with the United States in response to both India and China as rising Asian powers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]