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This paper provides the inter-temporal capital asset pricing model with incomplete information and short sales constraints. We derive the general equilibrium market equation and the security market line of the "classical" capital asset pricing model in continuous time in the presence of incomplete information and short sales. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper empirically investigates how firm-level information uncertainty impacts momentum profits in the Chinese Class A share market. We employ seven different factors to gauge the degree of firm-level information uncertainty—firm size, firm age, analysts’ coverage, return volatility, dispersion in analysts’ earnings forecast, trading volume, and the quality/strength of corporate governance (free float ratio). We find evidence showing that information uncertainty has an amplifying effect over the momentum profits, and the amplifying effect is more pronounced over the time periods following DOWN market state over the sample period from January 1996 to December 2013. The robustness of the empirical evidence is warranted by a risk-adjustment test based on the FF3F model and Wang and Xu’s (Financ Anal J 60(6):65-77, 2004) FF3F model, a sub-period analysis, and a different definition of market states. The empirical findings can provide an important reference point for international and domestic investors when adjusting investment strategies and portfolio positions in relatively volatile financial markets such as the Chinese stock market. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents the results from a minimum-effort game in which individuals can observe the choices of others in real time. We find that under perfect monitoring almost all groups coordinate at the payoff-dominant equilibrium. However, when individuals can only observe the actions of their immediate neighbors in a circle network, monitoring improves neither coordination nor efficiency relative to a baseline treatment without real-time monitoring. We argue that the inefficacy of imperfect monitoring is due to information uncertainty, that is, uncertainty about the correct interpretation of a neighbor's actions. Information uncertainty prevents individuals from inferring safely that their group has managed to coordinate from the available information. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]