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This paper discusses recent migration to North America with reference to the 1962 and 1967 Canadian immigration regulations and the 1965 United States Immigration and Nationality Act. Despite the similar emphasis on manpower and kinship criteria as the basis for the admission of immigrants, differences between Canada and the United States exist with respect to the importance of immigration for the respective economies, the organization of immigration, the formal regulations, and the size and composition of migrant streams. After an examination of the volume, origin, and occupational composition of immigration to Canada and the United States, flows between the two countries are studied. The paper concludes with a scrutiny of changes in immigration regulations which are pending in both countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Following the report of the Stiglitz Commission, measuring and comparing well-being across countries has gained renewed interest. Yet, analyses that go beyond income and incorporate non-market dimensions of welfare most often rely on the assumption of identical preferences to avoid the difficulties related to interpersonal comparisons. In this paper, we suggest an international comparison based on individual welfare rankings that fully retain preference heterogeneity. Focusing on the consumption-leisure trade-off, we estimate discrete choice labor supply models using harmonized microdata for 11 European countries and the US. We retrieve preference heterogeneity within and across countries and analyze several welfare criteria which take into account that differences in income are partly due to differences in tastes. The resulting welfare rankings clearly depend on the normative treatment of preference heterogeneity with alternative metrics. We show that these differences can indeed be explained by estimated preference heterogeneity across countries-rather than demographic composition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Over the past few decades, a variety of groups have begun to argue that the US and European patent systems do not adequately represent the public interest in their decision making and that they need to undergo fundamental changes to their structure and orientation. These challengers have adopted similar strategies-in terms of the venues chosen and the arguments, evidence, and rhetoric used-in each context. However, they have experienced more success in Europe than in the United States. This paper begins to explain this difference by arguing that the US and European patent policy domains have different 'expertise barriers'-formal and informal rules that make it difficult for those without the knowledge that is recognized as relevant and legitimate in that domain to engage as equals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Cross-country comparisons of differential survival by socioeconomic status (SES) are useful in many domains. Yet, to date, such studies have been rare. Reliably estimating differential survival in a single country has been challenging because it requires rich panel data with a large sample size. Cross-country estimates have proven even more difficult because the measures of SES need to be comparable internationally. We present an alternative method for acquiring information on differential survival by SES. Rather than using observations of actual survival, we relate individuals' subjective probabilities of survival to SES variables in cross section. To show that subjective survival probabilities are informative proxies for actual survival when estimating differential survival, we compare estimates of differential survival based on actual survival with estimates based on subjective probabilities of survival for the same sample. The results are remarkably similar. We then use this approach to compare differential survival by SES for 10 European countries and the United States. Wealthier people have higher survival probabilities than those who are less wealthy, but the strength of the association differs across countries. Nations with a smaller gradient appear to be Belgium, France, and Italy, while the United States, England, and Sweden appear to have a larger gradient. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Levels of rising political distrust in the USA and parts of Europe attracted political scientists’ attention in the 1990s, and urged them to look at possible consequences of this phenomenon for the functioning of democracies and social life. Approximately during the same period, from a sociological viewpoint, social capital theorists started studying the effects of declining social capital on political and economic life. In this article, we looked at the relationship between political distrust and social capital from an interdisciplinary perspective. We studied the relationship in six European countries from three regions (North-West, South and East), and the USA, and we were interested in the question of whether this relationship varies over the regions, or whether it is approximately the same everywhere. We used ISPP data from the 2004 wave, which included a range of social capital indicators and political distrust items. Social capital was subdivided into four dimensions, namely, networks (membership of organizations), interpersonal or social trust, social norms (citizenship norms), and linking social capital (political activities). First we studied the effect of political distrust on these four dimensions of social capital, while controlling for other variables such as political efficacy, political interest and a set of socio-structural background variables. One of our main findings was that the only significant effect of political distrust we found throughout all countries was a negative effect on one dimension of social capital, namely, interpersonal trust: the more people distrust politicians and people in government, the less they trust other people in general, even when controlled for all other variables. The reverse relationship led us to the same conclusion: the more people tend to trust people in general, the less they distrust politics, a result we found in all countries. This finding refutes the claim that there is no or either only a very weak relationship between political and social trust, as some have strongly argued before. Other important political attitudes connected to social capital were political interest and political efficacy, and for political distrust it was external efficacy. Significant socio-economic factors were religiousness and educational level for membership of voluntary organizations, educational level for interpersonal trust, religiousness for citizenship norms, and educational level and age for political activities. The reciprocal relationship was strongest in the USA and North-Western Europe, as were the explained variances of our (more extensive) regression models. In Southern and Eastern Europe other factors appear to be at work which influence both social capital and political distrust. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Results from the Women's Health Initiative (WHI) trial support findings from observational studies that oestrogen-progestin therapy (EPT) use is associated with an increase in breast cancer risk. We conducted a meta-analysis using EPT-specific results from the Collaborative Group on Hormonal Factors in Breast Cancer (CGHFBC) pooled analysis and studies published since that report to obtain an overview of EPT use and breast cancer risk. We also assessed risk by histologic subtype of breast cancer, by schedule of the progestin component of EPT, and by recency of use. We estimate that overall, EPT results in a 7.6% increase in breast cancer risk per year of use. The risk was statistically significantly lower in US studies than in European studies - 5.2 vs 7.9%. There was a significantly higher risk for continuous-combined than for sequential EPT use in Scandinavian studies where much higher total doses of progestin were used in continuous-combined than in sequential EPT. We observed no overall difference in risk for lobular vs ductal carcinoma but did observe a slightly higher risk for current vs past EPT use. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]