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Anti-corruption knowledge and discourse emerged in the mid-1990s promoted by powerful international actors and organizations, mostly targeting countries in the 'Third World'. In this paper, we seek to decolonize this knowledge and show how it influences the construction of national identity of former colonies. Our case is a country with a reputation as one of the most corrupt in the world: Indonesia. Long celebrated in the West for its economic growth and political stability, in 1997 the Asian Financial Crisis forced Indonesia to accept financial aid from the International Monetary Fund accompanied by harsh conditions that resulted in domestic turmoil. Using discourse-historical method, we trace how national identity was constructed in The Jakarta Post from 1997 through two decades of Western-influenced corruption-related reform. Our findings show how acceptance of Western anti-corruption discourse and knowledge early on contributed to highly negative internal constructions of Indonesian national identity, but over time, this gave way both to more positive self-presentations as well as greater critique and contestation of this knowledge. Moreover, alternative rationales for anti-corruption were asserted that drew from shared understandings of Islam and Indonesia's independence. Overall, we show how this type of internationally dominant management and organizational knowledge (MOK) colonized how Indonesia was imagined but that contestation was possible, enabled by improvements in economic circumstances. We conclude by arguing that to understand the colonizing effects of MOK, it is necessary to look at the impact of management knowledge beyond the boundaries of organizations, including at the level of national identities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Indonesia has seen recent expansions of fundamentalist movements mobilising members in support a change to the current constitution. Against this background, two studies were conducted. In Study 1, we explored the intersection of religious and national identity among Indonesian Muslims quantitatively, and in Study 2, we qualitatively examined religious and national identification among members of moderate and fundamentalist religious organisations. Specifically, Study 1 (N = 178) assessed whether the association of religious and national identity was moderated by religious fundamentalism. Results showed that strength of religious identification was positively associated with strength of national identification for both those high and low in fundamentalism. Using structured interviews and focus group discussions, Study 2 (N = 35) examined the way that self-alignment with religious and national groups develops among activists of religious movements in Indonesia. We found that while more fundamentalist activists attached greater importance to their religious identity than to any other identity (e.g., national and ethnic), more moderate activists represented their religious and national identities as more integrated and compatible. We conclude that for Indonesian Muslims higher in religious fundamentalism, religious and national identities appear to be less integrated and this is consequential for the way in which collective agendas are pursued. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Due to its diverse nature, being an Indonesian is sometimes confusing as it entails overlapping national, ethnic and religious identity. By using a social representation approach, online survey research involving 114 Indonesians was carried out to explore these questions: How do Indonesians negotiate their ethnic, religious and national identity? What identity markers should one possess to claim being an Indonesian? And lastly, who is the nationalist? Research findings suggest that national and ethnic identity as well as ethnic and religious identity were consensual, while the relation between religious and national identity was emancipated. It is also found that being a Muslim and possessing a stronger sense of ethnic identity would increase the likelihood of being a prouder Indonesian, while being a female, living abroad for 5-10 years, being a nationalist Muslim and embracing transnational Islamic movements reduced the probability of having a stronger sense of national identity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]