1. The Political Origins of Centralized Wage Bargaining.
- Author
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Teitelbaum, Emmanuel and Hadden, Jennifer
- Subjects
- *
WAGE bargaining , *QUANTITATIVE research ,OECD countries politics & government - Abstract
An expansive literature demonstrates the importance of centralized wage bargaining for economic outcomes in OECD countries. Scholars have devoted far less attention to the origins of centralized bargaining and the question of why variations in the degree of bargaining centralization exist. Standard accounts suggest that centralized wage bargaining is the product of one of three factors: the exposure of small markets to trade, the strategic interest of employers in coordinated wage bargaining, or the Olsonian logic of union encompassment. In this paper, we show the importance of politics in generating centralized wage bargaining. We argue that political parties (not unions) are the relevant encompassing organizations that internalize the externalities of union behavior. Historically, left parties endeavored to use union-party ties to forge robust structures of centralized wage bargaining when they were electorally competitive and were successful in doing so when they had a high degree of control over affiliated unions. We test this hypothesis through historical process tracing in three paradigmatic cases (Sweden, West Germany and the United Kingdom) and a quantitative analysis of centralized bargaining in 15 OECD countries. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
- Published
- 2009