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This paper addresses the question "what are the similarities and differences between U.S. trade frictions with China, Japan, and South Korea that account for different U.S. retaliation patterns?" This paper develops six independent variables and their relative measurements from U.S.-Japan and U.S.-South Korea cases and the literature, and examines their impact on U.S. retaliation to China. Our results indicate that four out of six independent variables have decreased the probability of U.S. retaliation since 2001. Furthermore, the U.S. has lost the necessary political, economic, and military leverage to retaliate to China, although it has had two of the three "motivations" to do so. This paper suggests that U.S. leverage over China has deteriorated for two major reasons: (1) U.S.' "illusion" of the latter party's ability/willingness for cooperation and of its own capabilities to retaliate; and (2) China's accumulation of relative gains at an unprecedented rate after 2001. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper tests three democratic peace theory hypotheses for East Asian political cooperation and a fourth commercial exchange hypothesis. H1 suggests that like regimes will have excellent bilateral relations, H2 suggests that unlike regimes will have poor bilateral relations, and H3 draws on Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder to say that democracies will have poor bilateral relations with nondemocracies. Finally, H4 suggests that there is a positive correlation between two regimes' economic ties and their bilateral relations. A robust test of the respective hypotheses (using a pool of nineteen bi-national East Asian dyads that includes China, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan) provides the most durable support for H4. Economic linkages are defined via a mathematical formula that incorporates the volume of cross-national trade and the base 10 logarithm of each regime’s GDP. Political contestation is defined via a score that incorporates Polity IV data and a measure of Internet openness from the OpenNet Initiative. This test finds H4 is the most convincing explanation for the variation in bilateral relations among the dyads; in addition, the relationship is considerably more robust when the China-Taiwan dyad is excluded. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Korea reached a settlement on the Korea-U.S FTA which expected heavy loss, yet did not conclude Korea-Japan FTA talks which expected to be relatively less severe. This paper shows that ‘consensus’ plays a significant role in explaining this paradox. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The comfort women case in South Korea has been a polemic issue in the context of inherited responsibility. The Japanese government who emphasizes on state as an agent for taking the responsibility tends either to deny collective responsibility of historic wrongdoings or to limit the scope of its roles to superficial ways such as reparation. Meanwhile South Korea demands not only reparation but official apology, emotional compassion, and material compensation on the ground that nation, not state, should be accountable for historic injustice, but this claim still encounters a difficulty of application to cases originated in multinational countries. Based on these observations, we will develop two arguments: (1) that reciprocal nondomination conceptualized with civic responsibility will better the comfort women case in the context of inherited responsibility because this contains full ground of deliberation in which those who come from regardless of state or nation can participate; (2) that reciprocal nondomination embodied with civic responsibility can be operated as a regulative principle which prompts both victims and wrongdoers to have their deliberative stances and to reach an agreement conducive to transitional justice. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Economic voting plays a central role when one theories about the direct links between economic conditions and the political decisions of voters. In the research of developed democratic countries, such as in Western Europe and the United States, economic voting is used to predict the voting behavior of citizens. Unfortunately, scholars tend to pay less attention to newly emerging democratic countries, e.g. Latin America, Eastern Europe and East Asia. The research generally avoids using democratization as an explanation for the emergence of economic voting. Among these countries, the relatively consolidated and stable democratization in Eastern Asia provides an essential case for examining the emergence of economic voting. There is insufficient research about economic voting in this field, so some scholars conclude that there is no economic voting in East Asia. Therefore, I assume democratization will lead to economic voting, especially in Japan, Korea and Taiwan; because all these countries went through a similar democratization process—shift of power followed by economic transformation. Overall, this research will contribute to going generalization about democratic theory and economic voting and how they compare with other Third-Wave democracies. According to the above hypotheses, I will use a cross-national method in my research. Moreover, the observed cases will focus on the important national election outcomes in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan before and after the transfer of power in these countries. In addition, I will especially observe the short-term voting behavior changes, and demonstrate whether significant economic events reinforce economic voting. The dependent variable is the difference in percentage of votes for the incumbent party and for the challenging party. I want to observe if bad economic conditions will punish incumbents and reward challengers. The independent variables in the research include economic evaluation, social cleavage and partisanship. Multivariable regression will be used in the research to estimate the effect of independent variables on the percentage of the vote. In addition, we use some demographic data as control, such as education, gender and age and so on. I have chosen the data of voting percentage results from the statistical electoral data in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan as my dependent variables. As for the independent variables, I employed the database of the East Asia Barometer for this research. It includes updated data for my cases and contains both complete economic evaluations and partisanship questions in the questionnaire. I will use the results of the survey for analysis in this research. The ultimate goal is to acquire an understanding of the relationship between democratization and economic voting, and then determine whether East Asian democratization leads to economic voting. It will become the foundation to research the emergence of economic voting in all newly emerging democratic countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper takes seriously political leadership in reform processes and its relationship with other political variables in explaining the very divergent economic reform outcomes in South Korea and Japan a decade after crisis. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines how political institutions and incentives can help us understand the timing and nature of decentralization reforms in two highly centralized unitary states in East Asia, Japan and South Korea. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Following the diplomatic normalization by the 1965 Basic Treaty with Japan, the Republic of Korea (hereafter, South Korea or ROK) still used Japan's past wrongs and/or South Korea's security contribution to Japan as a means of gaining bargaining leverage over Japan. For example, the Chun Doo-hwan regime (1980-87) in South Korea often invoked history and security to put pressure on Japan in unrelated issues, such as trade and government loan, equating Japanese concessions with evidence of its genuine repentance. After the late 1990s, however, South Korea appears to have discarded this strategy of associating history or security with economic issues in its foreign policy-making toward Japan. Why did South Korea abandon the previously oft-used strategy of utilizing history or security as a method of obtaining bargaining leverage over Japan?In addressing this question, I argue that although not a deterministic factor, a change in the self-perception of South Koreans from "dependent" upon to "competitors" with Japan provided the ROK policymakers with an environment in which with enhanced confidence they seek to separate economy from political issues. More specifically, the disintegration of South Korea's vertical economic structure with Japan since the early 1990s resulted in the alteration in the self-perception of South Koreans from "dependent" upon to "competitors" with Japan. This perceptual change contributed to the promotion of South Korean policymakers' confidence toward Japan, thereby placing psychological constraints on their keeping the strategy of using history or security as a tool to put pressure on Japan in economic issues. The ROK democratization, furthermore, led to the establishment of the institutionalized foreign policy making process, thus placing serious institutional constraints on South Korean policymakers' keeping their former strategy to connect history or security with economic issues in its foreign policies toward Japan. Under democracy, South Korean Presidents still contained the authority to make a final decision, yet they got placed under heavy institutional constraints emanating from other actors, such as diverse government organizations, the National Assembly, civic/academic organizations, and the mass media. Unlike past practices, the ROK Presidents under a democratic system became unable to push through their own policy ideas without taking other voices into account. Under this condition, therefore, it was quite difficult for South Korean policymakers - holding the changed self-perception from "dependent" upon to "competitors" with Japan - to keep using the former history- or security- related negotiation strategy toward Japan. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The deeper institutionalization of democratic values in South Korea has accelerated South Korea?s communication with Japan at governmental and nongovernmental levels, thereby contributing to their efforts at bilateral reconciliation with Japan. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]