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The work is devoted to the study of the impact of external control on the strategies of pollutant discharge enterprises and government regulators in the field of environmental protection. The authors construct a model of the relationship between these entities. It is an evolutionary game in which the players are entities that generate pollutants and the government departments that implement pollution supervision. The choice of strategies of both of these entities and the evolutionary stability of the system controlled by different regulatory efforts, i.e., a third party, are analyzed. The authors then verify the evolutionary paths and evolutionary results of the model under different conditions using simulation analysis based on this model. The conducted research shows that the weak power of third-party supervision is not enough to promote the evolution of the behavioral decisions of the government and enterprises. An appropriate increase in the power of third-party supervision will change the choice of the government and enterprises strategies in the short term; however, due to the mutual influence of the strategies between both sides of the game, in this situation, the evolutionary system does not pursue a stable state. The strong power of third-party supervision will push enterprises to choose a pollution control strategy, change the intensity of government supervision, and replace government supervision to a certain extent. It is an interesting example of modeling the relationship of this system on the basis of evolutionary game theory. The findings can be regarded as a theoretical reference for environmental pollution control of enterprises. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the study of the sustainable development of public health in China, academic circles have little to do with the unique hierarchical medical system and online appointment diagnosis system in China's medical system. Therefore, based on the medical situation in Shanghai, China, in addition to the traditional dimension of medical expenses, this paper fully considers the impact of the current hierarchical medical policy, constructs a selection model for medical treatment behavior under the hierarchical medical system and online appointment diagnosis system, and carries out simulation analysis through the cellular automata grid dynamic model. This paper finds that the time-cost-oriented medical treatment behavior of Chinese patients will have different distribution under the current hierarchical medical system and online appointment diagnosis system. (1) When the medical treatment system neither allows online appointment nor referral, a large number of patients congregated in high-grade hospitals, with the most unreasonable distribution. (2) With the implementation of the system of allowing referral and online appointment, patients are gradually diverted to lower-grade hospitals or off-peak hours, and the distribution is relatively improved. (3) If the medical treatment system allows both referral and online appointment, the distribution of patients is the most reasonable. Therefore, China's current hierarchical medical system and online appointment diagnosis system will, to a considerable extent, become a policy tool that affects patients' choice of hospitals and an effective means to achieve the rational allocation of existing medical resources, which will play an important role in the sustainable development of public health in China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]